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THE NEW DEVELOPMENT OF WATER LAW IN
CHINA
BY PATRICIA WOUTERSt , DESHENG HU, JIEBIN ZHANG*,
A. DAN TARLOCK*, PHILIP ANDREWS-SPEED***
ABSTRACT
China, the most populous country in the world, faces critical water
shortages. The country's rapidly increasing population now totals an
estimated 1.3 billion people, thus aggravating the existing water crisis.
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Currently, China receives only one-forth of the world's average per
capita renewable water supplies, but still experiences extreme waterdeficiencies. Thus, the country must address serious challenges. On
August 29, 2002, at the Twenty-ninth Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress ("NPC"), the NPC
revised the 1988 China Water Law and adopted the 2002 China Water
Law.'
The new water legislation represents a milestone in the
evolution of country's water law.
The 2002 China Water Law
significantly revises its predecessor, the 1988 China Water Law. As a
forward looking piece of legislation, the new law seeks to address
existing serious problems and to anticipate future water concerns.
This article examines the policy behind the adoption of the 2002
China Water Law, discusses key issues related to its implementation,
and identifies important problems that continue to exist.
The
following discussion centers on whether the new legislation provides
an adequate framework to ensure the reasonable, equitable, and
sustainable utilization of water resources, within a framework that
ensures effective implementation. The article begins by summarizing
China's most important water issues and provides an overview of the
1988 China Water Law. Next, the article explains the legal and
institutional context of the 2002 China Water Law. In order to test the
effectiveness of the new law, the authors use the Tarim River Basin as a
case study for analysis. From this evaluation, the authors conclude that
the 2002 water law suffers from some serious shortcomings and
recommend changes to the legal and institutional arrangements.

1. 2002 Water Law of the PRC. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui Huibian
[Fagui Huibian] [Laws & Regulations of the PRC] (translated by Chinalaw-assisted
Legal Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws,
PRCLEG 2461); 1988 Water Law of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fagui
Huibian [Fagui Huibian] [Laws & Regulations of the PRC], translated in 5 STATUTES &
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (1989) (LEXIS, Chinalawinfo
Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 1186).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ancient Chinese civilization received recognition for its significant
development of dykes and diversions throughout the country's major
river systems. China's long history of water management-which has
included development, utilization, and conservation of water
resources, and which focused especially on flood control-resulted in
intense inter-regional conflicts that steadily increased over time. 3 The
first diversion of the Min River, located in the modern Sichuan
Province, occurred in 316 BC; this diversion "is used today much as it
was designed., 4 However, early Chinese tradition did not rely on a
legal framework per se for water resources management.) In the
periods of slavery and feudalism, control of water and its distribution
occurred largely without creation of individual entitlements.
According to the ideology that "no land does not belong to the
king, no man is not the servant of the king," private land ownership
slowly emerged in the 4th century BC.6 However, even after the
concept of private land ownership appeared, water users still relied
largely on custom and privilege. 7 "Water regulations in China are a
part of its peculiar legal, administrative and political framework, the
principles of which have evolved their own developmental path
through history, independent of the other major legal systems in the
world." 8 The State retained absolute control of water involved in large
2. RANDALL A. DODGEN, CONTROLLING THE DRAGON, CONFUCIAN ENGINEERS AND THE
YELLOW RIVER IN LATE IMPERIAL CI IINA 1 (2001).
3.
4.
5.

See generally id. at 1-9 (explaining China's water history and resulting conflicts).

ALASDAIR CLAYRE, THE HEART OF THE DRAGON 136 (1985).
See DANTE CAPONERA, Water Laws in Ancient Hydraulic Civilisations, in NATIONAL
& INTERNATIONAL WATER lAW & ADMINISTRATION: SELECTED WRITINGS 23, 31 (The

Hague, London, Kluwer Law International 2003) [hereinafter CAPONERA I].
6. See CAYONERA, Water Law in the Chinese Legal Systen, in NATIONAL &
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAw & ADMINISTRATION: SELECTED WRITINGS 37, 43, 46
[hereinafter CAPONERA II].

7. See id. at 37-71.
8. ld. at 37.
The basis on which Chinese legal thought stood was the belief that there
existed a close interconnection between the human social order and the
natural cosmic order....
As a consequence, the foundations on which social order was based were
not laws but the li, variously translated as rites, rules of conduct, or custom,

which prescribed to individuals in any circumstance of life a behaviour in
harmony with the natural order or things. They thought that laws, being too
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diversionary projects and developed it as a state enterprise. This
developed water became a resource continuously and intensely
managed by Imperial bureaucracies. 9 For example, Karl Wittfogel's
famous study, OrientalDespotism, identified centralized imperial control
of water as the source of China's persistent absolutism. 0
The Republic of China (1911-1949) and the People's Republic of
China (1949-present) continued Imperial China's tradition of
bureaucratic management of water during their respective regimes,
During the
especially during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s."
twentieth century, extensive State water and irrigation expansion
projects supplemented China's existing canals and irrigation systems.
Within a three-month period between late 1957 and the end of
January 1958, the State mobilized 100 million peasants to create a
functioning irrigation system for 7.8 million hectares of land. 2
Today, massive State development remains the dominant method
of water resource management. The People's Republic of China
continually expands its irrigated acreage in arid regions of northern
China, plans new trans-basin diversions, and constructs large new
projects, some of which equal the scale of the now almost completed
Three Gorges Dam project." However, 2002 China Water Law marks a
shift in the future of water resources management, largely through
new regulations and rules governing China's water law.
China's decision to develop a semi-market economy and to
integrate itself into the World Trade Organization resulted in a break
with China's long history of Confucian and Socialist traditions of
subordinating law to the exercise of State power. 4 Since the 1980s,
abstract, could not take into consideration the infinite variety of all possible
situations, and that their strict application would lead to the infringement of
the feeling ofjustice which is inborn in men.
Id.

9. See generally LESTER Ross & MITCHELL A. SILK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1987) (explaining imperial law relating to natural
resources served to protect the
entitlements).
10.

KARL A. WITrFOGEL,

state's paramount interest rather than create

ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL

POWER 1-2 (1957) (outlining the framework for the comparative study).
11. See CAPONERA II, supra note 6, at 63-68 (reviewing the history of water law in the
Chinese legal system, especially the "Republican & Modern Period" from 1911-1958).
Caponera concludes: "private ownership was never mentioned in Chinese water law
until very recently.... The concept of ownership, even in modern China, has never
been absolute, but relative, in the sense that the exercise of property rights is limited
in so far as is required by the collective interest." Id. at 69.
12. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 547 (2d ed. 1999). For an
early description and assessment of the water conservancy programs put in place
between 1949 and 1959, see KEITH BUCHANAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHINESE
EARTH: ASPECTS OF THE EVALUATION OF THE CHINESE EARTH FROM EARLIEST TIMES TO

MAO TSE-TUNG

193-98 (1970).

13. ChinaBlueprints Its Major Water Projects, XINHUA DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 27, 2002,
www.china.org.cn (translatedby Alex Xu).
14. Western legal scholars long assumed that law was incompatible with Confucian
ethics. For a recent survey of the literature, see Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101
MICH. L. REV. 179, 180-81 (2002). In recent years, scholars such as William Alford
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China has formally embraced the "rule of law" directly in line with
western notions of the principle.' Notably, the change has resulted in
creation of legal frameworks in a number of resource management
areas where no frameworks previously existed.
Water resource management changes resulted in the 1988 China
Water Law and its revision in 2002. This article analyzes the evolution
of recent China water law developments primarily from an internal
Additionally, in order to facilitate an
Chinese perspective.
understanding of Chinese law, the article presents some comparisons
between Chinese law and features of water use regulations in many
common and civil law regimes. 6

have painted a much more nuanced view of the role of law and legal reasoning in
Imperial China. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, Law? What is Law? Why Western Scholars of
China Have Not Had More to Say about Its Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RuLE OF LAW IN
CHINA 45 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPURLICAN C14INA
1-3 (Kathryn Bernhardt & Phillip C.C. Huang eds., 1994).
15. See Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools
Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 512
(2002) (implementation of the rule of law ideal is always a matter of degree).
16. China defines the rule of law more in the tradition of the German Rechtstaat
than in the Anglo-American tradition of a law that restricts activities by the state. Id. at
481-82 n.23.
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China is one of the most water deficient countries in the world.1
Annually, China receives an estimated 2.27 billion acre-feet of water
(2.8 trillion cubic meters)."' In 2003, China received about 1.68 acrefeet (2,076
cubic meters) per person-only one-fourth of the world's
19
average.
The disproportionate availability of water, in both location and
time, has only further aggravated China's water crisis. ° The flood
total.2 '
season account for about 60 to 80 percent of the annual water
However, wide fluctuations in precipitation from year to year,
including frequently occurring drought and wet years, has resulted in
serious water disasters.
China's water is also unevenly distributed geographically; much
more water exists in the south than in the north. Southern China,
including the area south of the Changjiang, accounts for 53.5 percent
of China's population and 36.5 percent of its total territory, but the
South's water resources amount to 80.9 percent of the country's total."
Conversely, Northern China, including the Liaohe, Hailuanhe,
Huanghe, Huaihe and inland river basins, contains 46.5 percent of the
country's population and 63.5 percent of its territory, while its water
resources merely amounts to 19.1 percent of China's total.2 4 This
geographic disparity is clearly illustrated in the arid Hailuanhe River
Basin, which annually receives only .29 acre-feet (357 cubic meters) of
water per person (approximately 17 percent of the country's
average) . Uneven water distribution is one of the
26 primary causes of
China's lack of social and economic development.

17. See Parched Planet Needs Wake-up Call on Water, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 24, 2004,
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/Detail.wct?SelectlD=4275&ReclD=2;
see Wang Shucheng,
Explanation to the Water Law of the People's Republic of China (Amendment Draft)
[hereinafter Explanation](Chinese version), attached in Guohun [2001] 156, dated
November 26, 2001, availableat
(last
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper12/1/classOO1200078/hwz211659.htm
visited Apr. 29, 2003).
See also China's Water Resources Bulletin 2000 (Chinese
version), available at
visited
(last
http://www.shuiziyuan.mwr.gov.cn/gongshi/show-gazettea.asp?id=79
Sept. 6, 2003), and China's Water Resources Bulletin 2001 (Chinese version), available
at http://www.shuiziyuan.mwr.gov.cn/gongshi/show-gazettea.asp?id=114 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2003).
18. Id.
19. ParchedPlanetNeeds Wake-up Call on Water, supra note 17.
Mar. 22, 2004,
20. See Minister Calls for Water Conservation, XINHUA,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/22/content_ 378830.htm.
21. See WATER RESOURcES DEPARTMENT OF MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES, 5
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECT OF DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES IN

CHINA 11-12 (1999).

22. For example, there were serious damaging floods in 2003, which had been
preceded by serious droughts in the North.
23. Water
Deficit
Haunts
Nation,
CHINA
DAILY,
June
7,
2002,
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/Detail.wct?SclectlD=6034&ReclD=.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 21.
26. See Zhang Guangdou, Wafer Resource Issues of China in 21 Century, in 14
ADVANCE IN EARTH SCIENCES 16-17 (Jan. 1999).
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In 1997, 60 percent of the surface water in the Hailuanhe River
Basin was diverted, 91.4 percent of the water in the Huanghe River
Basin was diverted, and 80.2 percent of surface water was diverted from
2
the Huaihe RiverY.
As an example, "the amount of surface water used
in the Huailunhe River Basin counted 60.0 percent of the total
amount of surface resources in the basin."28 Groundwater removed to
augment surface diversions accounted for 95.7 percent, 31.0 percent,
and 33.9 percent of the total shallow groundwater, respectively, in
each of these river basins.
The three main uses for surface water are agricultural irrigation,
industry, and domestic use.' ° In 2000, total water used (excluding
ecological uses) totaled 445.7 million acre-feet (549.8 billion cubic
meters). Agricultural irrigation consumed 280.8 million acre-feet
(346.4 billion cubic meters), industry consumed 92.3 million acre-feet
(113.8 billion cubic meters), and domestic use consumed 46.8 million
acre-feet (57.7 billion cubic meters) .3'
Agricultural irrigation
consumes the most water in China; in 2000, it accounted for 63
percent of all water used.32 In 2001, total water consumption
(excluding ecological uses) equaled 451.3 million acre-feet (556.7
billion cubic meters): 62.6 percent for agricultural irrigation, 20.5
percent for industry, 10.8 percent for domestic use, and 6.1 percent
for forestry, fisheries, and animal husbandry.
III. MAIN ISSUES IN WATER UTILIZATION
China faces three key problems related to its water resources
management: flooding, water scarcity, and water pollution."3 Each has
negatively impacted the Chinese economy, social development, and
environmental improvement."
Floods of China's major rivers-in
particular, flooding in Changjiang in 1998 and the extraordinary
floods of Huanghe River in 1933 and 1958-have attracted world
attention. 5
However, water scarcity problems associated with drought
situations, which historically occurred mainly in the north and
27. TIlE MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE PRC, WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN OF
THEPRC (1997), availableat
http://www.shuiziyuan.mwr.gov.cn/gongshi/showgazettea.asp?id=3 (last visited June
9, 2003) (Chinese version only).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. THE MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE PRC, WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN OF
THE PRC (2000), available at
http://www.shuiziyuan.mwr.gov.cn/gongshi/showgazettea.asp?id=79
(last visited
June 9, 2003) (Chinese version only).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See The Comprehensive Report on Strategy of Water Resources of SustainableDevelopment
in China, 8 CHINA WATER RESOURCES 7 (2000).
34. ParchedPlanetNeeds Wake-up Call on Water, supra note 17.
35. See Hu MINSI & LUO CHENZHEN, THE HISTORICAL EXTREME FLOODS IN CHINA 17187 (The Ministry of Water Resource & Powered., 1989).
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northwest parts of China, have now extended into southern China.b
North and northwestern China make-up the semi-arid and arid regions
that lack water and precipitation needed just to preserve the
environment of the river basin. 7 Currently, however, the southern
part of China, which typically has a wetter climate than the north,
often experiences periodic drought conditions. 8
Such water deficits strain population centers and lead to further
problems. Currently, more than 400 of the 668 major cities in China
suffer water shortages; the country's estimated annual water supply
deficit is greater than 6 billion cubic meters.39 One hundred of these

cities-including major population centers such as Beijing (population
11.36 million in 2002), Tianjin (9.19 million), Xi'an (7.03 million),

Taiyuan (3.22 million), Datong (3.05 million), Qingdao (7.16
million), Yantai (6.45 million) and Dalian (5.58 million)-are
Such severe water
currently experiencing severe water shortages.40
shortages lead to groundwater over-abstraction and results in greatly
reduced local water tables, ground surface subsidence, and seawater

infiltration in costal areas.4!
Environmental degradation is a secondary effect of the serious
water supply shortages. The flow of the Huanghe River experienced
its first adverse affects in the 1970s-each year since then the flow has
steadily declined. In 1997, 700 kilometers of the river-90 percent of
its length-suffered reduced flow; the longest recorded period of
interrupted flow was 226 days.42 Many organizations and specialists
continue to research environmental problems resulting from these
long-term interruptions.43
The Tarim River, the most important river in northwest China, also
has a history of interruption spanning approximately 30 years." The
Tarim River's total, uninterrupted length is more than 198 miles (320
kilometers). Its interruption results in Lop Nur Lake drying, serious
36,

See MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES OF THE

PRC,

WATER RESOURCES STATISTICS

BULLETIN OF THE PRC (2002), available at
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/gonggao/030613.doc (Chinese version only) (last visited Dec.
12, 2003).
37, Id.
38. Id.
39. Minister Calls for Water Conservation,supra note 20.
40. Id. See also Jiang Wenlai, Research on Water Resources Safety of China in the 21st
Centuy, 8 CHINA WATEP RESOURCES 41 (2000) (explaining how the improvement of
water utilization efficiency establishes highly effective water resource administration).
41. Elosie Kendy et al., Summary of Policies Drain the North China Plain: Agricultural
Policy & GroundwaterDepletion in Luancheng County, 1949-2000, 71 INT'L WATER MGMT.
INST., at v. (2003).
42. Ye Qingchao, Flow Interruptions & Their EnvironmentalImpacts on the Yellow River
Delta, in 5 ACTA GEOGRAPHICA SINICA 385-391 (1998), quoted in Cong Xian Li et al.,
Abstract, Some Problems of Vulnerability Assessment in the Coastal Zone of China, MARINE
GEOLOGY LABORATORY OF TONGJI UNIVERSITY, SHANGHAI CHINA (2002).
43. See, e.g., id.
44. See Zhu Xiangmin, Adapting New Measures to Strengthen Comprehensive
Rehabilitation in Tarim River Basin in the New Situation, 9 CHINA WATER RESOURCES 50-52

(2001).
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ecosystem degradation, and desertification, which threatens the
existence of the indigenous environment.45 Indeed, the issues of the
Tarim River appear even more serious than those of the Huanghe.
In 2000, although the country's total water use accounted for only
19.8 percent of the available water resources, most of northern China
and some parts of southern China experienced the most severe
drought since 1949. More than 20 provinces, autonomous regions,
and municipalities directly under the Central Government (CGMs) 46
suffered severe drought effects. The drought affected approximately
101 million acres (41 million hectares) of agricultural land (one acre
equals 0.405 hectares); almost 20 million acres (8 million hectares)
could not be harvested. 27.7 million people in rural areas and 17
million livestock, such as horses, oxen, cows, donkeys, and mules,
suffered from shortages of drinking water. Six hundred twenty cities
in eighteen provinces, autonomous regions, and CGMs experienced
water shortages that limited more than three hundred cities to set
water supply quotas that affected more than twenty-six million people
in the urban population.
Water pollution causes very serious problems in China. Most
rivers, fresh water lakes, and groundwater supplies in cities experience
the effects of pollution.4 7 Approximately 50 percent of river lengths
and 90 percent of city water supplies are polluted to some extent.4
The Huaihe, the Haihe, and the Liaohe are the three most seriously
polluted rivers; the three most seriously polluted lakes are the Taihu,
the Dianchi, and the Chaohu. 9
Water management, and related policies and legislation, have
created much of the problem. The importance of water management
in achieving rational water utilization and sustainable development
policy in developing countries, especially quickly developing countries
such as China, necessitates in-depth analyses of both the present legal
and institutional system and plans to satisfy future water demand.

45. See FAN ZILI, ET AL., STUDY ON THE ECOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT EVOLUTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN TARIM RIVER BASIN, PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR ON THE
RIVER WATERSHED 171WATER RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF TARiM

177 (1998) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS].
46. China is administratively divided into 23 provinces, 5 ethnic autonomous
regions, 4 CGMs and 2 special administrative regions. An ethnic autonomous region
or a CGM has the same political, economical and jurisdictional rights as a province.
47. See ParchedPlanet Needs Wake-up Call on Water, supra note 17.
48. See Ruskola, supra note 14.
49. Hajime Shirayama, Joint Water Quality Study to Determine the Cause of Pollution on
the Upstream Portion of China's Liaohe River, July 1998-June 2002, NORTHWEST PACIFIC
REGION ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION CENTER, at 102.
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IV. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN GENERAL
A.

LEGISLATIVE BODIES AND HIERARCHY OF LAWS

The term "law" has two distinct meanings in China: a) in a general
or broad sense, the term "law" refers to a legal norm enacted or
administered by the State, b) in a special or more narrow sense, "law"
refers to the written normative document adopted by the National
People's Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee."° However,
sometimes its definite meaning should be understood in accordance
with the circumstance where it is employed. The Chinese legislative
bodies and hierarchy of laws are stipulated by the Constitution of the
PRC, which was promulgated in 1982 and amended four times, with
thirty-one amendments. Other laws that provide more detail in some
aspects, such as the Legislation Law of the PRC 52 , Law of PRC on the
Organization of Local People's Congresses and Local Governments at
Various Levels.53 However, the PRC legislative structure differs from
the United States and other parliamentary systems; and the Standing
Committee (discussed below) has lawmaking power when the larger
legislative body is not in session.
Constitution.

The Constitution is the highest law in the Chinese

hierarchy of law. It is recognized as the mother law of all other laws,
50. SHANGIl LAW DICTIONARY 600 (2d 1984).
51. ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [XIANFA] [hereinafter CONSTITUTION]
(1982) (P.R.C.) art. 58, translated in 1 LAwS & REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATTERs 279 (1991), available at
Its
official
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/cnstitution.html.
Chinese version is also available at The National People's Congress of PRC web page
http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/xfxza/index (last visited Mar. 16, 2004), and the
unofficial English version available at
visited
(last
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
16/03/2004). The Standing Committee consists of a Chairman, vice-chairmen, a
secretary-general, and representatives of minority nationalities. Id. art. 65.
52. 2000 Legislation Law of the P.R.C., ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FAGUI
HUIBIAN [FAGuI HuIBIAN] [Legislation Law] art. 2, translatedin LAWS & REGULATIONS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATrERS 5. Legislation
Law of the PRC (2000) was adopted by the 3rd Session of the Ninth National People's
Congress on March 15, 2000, and came into force on July 1, 2000. Its official Chinese
version is in Gazette of the Standing Committee of NPC (No. 2) (2000). In accordance
with art. 2, "It]he enactment, amendment and repeal of any national law,
administrative regulation, local regulations, autonomous regulations and special
regulations shall be governed by this Law. The enactment, amendment and repeal of
administrative rules promulgated by agencies under the State Council and local rules
promulgated by local governments shall be carried out in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Law." Id.
53. 1979 People's Republic of China Organization Law for Local People's
Congresses and Local Governments at All Levels, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fagui Huibian [Fagui Huibian] [Laws & Regulations of the P.R.C.], www.unpan.org.
Law of the PRC on the Organization of Local People's Congresses and Local
Governments at Various Levels was adopted by the 2nd Session of the Fifth NPC on
July 1, 1979, and has been revised three times, respectively on December 10, 1982,
December 2, 1986 and February 28, 1995. Its official Chinese Version is in the Gazette
of the Standing Committee of NPC (No. 1)(1995).
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and forms the foundation of all other laws and has a higher force than
all other laws. 54 The NPC holds exclusive authority to amend
51
Constitution.
Basic laws. The NPC enacts and amends basic laws governing
criminal offences, civil affairs, the state organs and other matters.
However, when the NPC is not in session, its permanent body-the
Standing Committee-exercises the function and power to partially
supplement and amend laws enacted by the NPC provided the basic
principles of these laws are not contravened 7
Laws other than basic laws. The Standing Committee of the NPC
exercises the function and power to enact and amend laws, with the
exception of those that should be enacted by the NPC. 6
Regulations.
Three kinds of regulations exist: administrative
regulations, local regulations, and autonomous regulations and
separate regulations. Administrative regulations are enacted by the
State Council in accordance with Constitution and the law.'q The State
Council, i.e., the Central People's Government of the PRC, is the
executive body of the NPC as well as the highest organ of state
administration.
Local regulations are adopted by the people's congresses at the
provincial level or their standing committee in light of the specific
situations and actual needs of the jurisdiction." Besides this, in light of
the specific situations and actual needs of the jurisdiction, the People's
Congress and its Standing Committee in a major city 62 may enact local
regulations.
Autonomous regulations and separate regulations are enacted by
the people's congresses of ethnic autonomous areas on the exercise of
autonomy and in light of the political, economic and cultural
characteristics of the ethnicity of or ethnicities in the areas
concerned.64 Autonomous regulations or separate regulations enacted
by an autonomous area become effective after review and approval by
the Standing Committee of National People's Congress, those enacted
by an autonomous prefecture or autonomous county shall come into
force after it is reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee of
the People's Congress of the province, autonomous area, or

54. See CONSTITUTION pmbl., para. 13 and art. 5.
55. See id. art. 62, para. 1.
56. See id.
57. See id. art. 67; see also Legislation Law art. 7.
58. See CONSTITUTION art. 67; see also Legislation Law art. 7.
59. See CONSTITUTION art. 89; see also Legislation Law art. 56.
60. See CONSTITUTION art. 85.
61. See id. arts. 100, 115; see also Legislation Law art. 63.
62. A major city refers to a city where the People's Government of the province or
autonomous area is seated, the city where a special economic zone is located, and any
other major city approved by the State Council. Legislation Law art. 63.
63. See Legislation Law art. 63.
64. See CONSTITUTION art. 116; see also Legislation Law art. 66.
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municipality directly under the central government.'
Rules. There are two kinds of rules: departmental rules and local
rules. The People's Bank of China, the Auditing Agency, or any
working department under the State Council (e.g., the Ministry of
Water Resources ("MWR")) issue departmental rules. These organs
exercise regulatory functions within the scope of its authority in
accordance with national law, administrative regulations, as well as
decisions and orders of the State Council.
A matter on which an
administrative rule is enacted shall be a matter within the scope of its
implementing national law, administrative regulations, and decisions
or orders issued by the State Council. 7 Departmental rules should be
applied nationally, except when otherwise provided by the
Constitution, laws, administrative regulations or the particular rules
itself.
Local rules are formulated by the people's governments at
provincial level, or those of major cities, in accordance with the
Constitution, national law, administrative regulations and local
regulations at the provincial level.8
Chart I: Hierarchy of Laws in China
[The Consuriio

ILaws other than Base Laws
Regulations
Administrative Regulations

Local Regulations

Autonomous Regulations

and Separate Regulations

Rules
Departmental Rules

Local Rules

B. SYSTEM OF WATER LEGAL NORMS
Since 1979, two general types of laws exist governing water: laws
specifically relating to water, and laws that include provisions indirectly

65.
66.
67.
68.

See Legislation Law art. 66.
See CONSTITUTION art. 90(2); see also Legislation Law art. 71.
See Legislation Law art. 71.
See id. 73.
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relevant to water issues. A noteworthy example of this latter type is
Article 9 of the Constitution, which provides the basic system of
natural resources management-including ownership, utilization, and
protection of water resources.69
The following list reflects the organization of laws that specifically
relate to water:
* 2002 Water Law of the PRC;70
* Law for Water Pollution Prevention and Control of the
PRC;7'
72
* Law for Flood Prevention and Control of the PRC;
73
PRC.
the
of
Conservation
Soil
and
Water
on
Law
*
Laws indirectly
* Law for
* Law for
"
Law for
* Law for
* Law for

relevant to water include:
Environment Protection
of the PRC;74
7
Fishery of the PRC; 5
Forestry of the PRC;"
77
Pasture of the PRC;
7
Electricity Power of the PRC; 1

69. Article 9 of the Constitution of PRC reads as follows:
All mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, un-reclaimed
land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by
the whole people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, grasslands,
un-reclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collective in accordance
with the law. The state ensures the rational use of natural use of natural
resources and protects rare animals and plants. Appropriation or damaging
of natural resources by any organization of individual by whatever means is
prohibited.
CONSTITUTION art. 9, translatedin I LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA GOVERNING FORFIGN-RELATED MATTERS 279, 282 (1991).
70. 2002 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC (translated by
Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo
Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 2461).
71. 1984 Law of the PRC on the Prevention of Water Pollution and Treatment of
Polluted Water, Laws & Regulations of the PRC, translated in 2 STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No. 840511 (1987) (amended
by Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress May 15,
1996, translated in LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATFD MATrERS 357).
72. 1997 Flood Control Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC, translated
in 2 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 647 (1997).
73. 1991 Law of the PRC on Water and Soil Conservation, Laws & Regulations of
the PRC, (translated by Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Peking University,
LEXIS, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 622).
74. 1989 Law of the PRC on Environmental Protection, translated in 6 STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc, No. 891261 (1990).
75. 1986 Fishery Law of the PRC, translated in 3 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No. 860120 (1988).
76. 1984 Forestry Law of the PRC, translated in 2 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No. 840920.1 (1987).
77. 1985 Grassland Law of the PRC, translated in 3 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No. 850618 (1988).
78. 1995 Electric Power Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC, (translated
by Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo
Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 117).
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Law on Administrative Licenses of the PRC.7f
As of November 2001, the State Council had adopted or
formulated twenty administrative regulations that also relate to water
administrative
important
most
the
management."' Presently,
regulations include:
8
• Industry Policy on Water Conservancy, 1
* Implementation Procedures for Water-drawing Permit
System (based on the Article 32 of the 1988 China Water
Law, but still valid) ;82
• Regulations for River Channel Management;""
84
* Regulations for Flood Prevention;
* Regulations for Soil Conservation;"'
* Regulations for Compensation for Land Occupation and
Resident Resettlement in Construction of Large-andmedium-sized Water resources and Hydropower Projects."8
By December 2001, the Ministry of Water Resources-the major
agency responsible for management of the nation's water resources,
and for unified management of and supervision water resources
throughout the country-had issued ninety administrative rules to
implement laws and regulations such as the Procedures for
The
Supervision and Management of Water Drawing Permit."7
provincial congresses have formulated or issued local regulations to
implement the 1988 China Water Law and other laws and
administrative regulations, such as the Detailed Implementation Rules
for the Water Drawing Permit System of Xinjiang and the Water
Resources Management Regulations of Shanxi Province. 8 Some local
governments have also issued local rules to implement laws,
regulations, and departmental rules pertinent to water.8 9 In total, by
the end of November 2001, provincial congresses had implemented
0

79. See Circular of the State Council on Implementing the Administrative License
Law of the PRC, (translated by Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Peking
University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 117).
80. Jing Zhengshu, Speech at the Press Conference on the Promulgation and
available at
2002),
(Sept. 5,
Law
New
Water
of
Implementation
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/20020906/slxw/slxg9161.htn (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
81. Industry Policy on Water Conservancy, issued by the State Planning
Commission on September 4, 1997, and approved by the State Council Industry Policy
on Water Conservancy.
82. See 1988 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC art. 32,
translated by 5 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc.
No. 880121.2 (1989).
83. Regulations for River Channel Management, Laws & Regulations of the PRC.
84. Regulations for Flood Prevention, Laws & Regulations of the PRC.
85. Regulations for Soil Conservation, Laws & Regulations. of the PRC.
86. Regulations for Compensation for Land Occupation and Resident
Resettlement in Construction of Large-and-medium-sized Water resources and
Hydropower Projects, Laws & Regulations of the PRC.
87. Speech ofJing Zhengshu, supra note 80.
88. Id.
89. -d.
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more than 800 specialized and detailed local regulations and rules."
Early indications suggest governmental entities are equally active in
implementing 2002 China Water Law. Since its enactment, some
provincial congresses have formulated or issued local regulations
implementing the revised law. For example, on October 31, 2002,
Zhejiang Province adopted Regulations on Water Resources
Management that became effective January 1, 2003. Additionally, on
December 6, 2002, Guangdong Province adopted Regulations on
Water Resources Management that became effective on March 1, 2003.
V. THE 1988 CHINA WATER LAW: IMPORTANT ASPECTS
The 1988 China Water Law established the foundation and
framework for the administrative management of water resources.91
The law specifies the authority, functions, and powers for the Ministry
of Water Resources, other related ministries, and water bureaus at
different levels (province, prefecture, and county). The Standing
Committees of provincial People's Congresses subsequently issued
implementing procedures for the 1988 China Water Law.9
The water law aimed to address conflicts and shortfalls of the
inadequate and fragmented system that had arisen in China during
the 1970s and early 1980s, 9 introducing seven important provisions:
ownership and protection of rights, creating an institutional
framework, planning and implementation, water use management,
water quality protection and pollution prevention, a permit system for
withdrawals, and a water pricing system.
A. OWNERSHIP AND PROTECTION OF RIGHTS

Under the 1988 China Water Law, two categories of water
resources ownership exist: state ownership and collective ownership.
The law provides for general state ownership of all water resources,
with the exception of the collective ownership of water in ponds and
reservoirs owned by "agricultural collective economic organizations""
("ACEOs"). Under this system, the State protects legitimate rights and
to develop and utilize water
interests of individuals and organizations
9
resources consistent with the law. '

90.
91.

id.
See 1988 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC art. 9, translated
by 5 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No.
880121.2 (1989).
92. See, e.g., The Procedures for Implementing the Water Law of Xinjiang (adopted
by the 26th Session of Seventh Xinjiang People's Congress on May 8, 1992 and
entered into force on June 11, 1992).
93. See Ke Lidan, Water Law and Management of China, China Water Conservancy
and Hydropower Publishing House 3-36 (1998).
94. 1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 3. Agricultural economic collectives are
socialist economic systems under collective ownership by the working people.
95. Id.
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B. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The 1988 China Water Law combined water-related provincial,
prefecture, and county administrative agencies into one centralized
management system of water resources administration called the
Competent Department of Water Administration ("CDWA"), which is
responsible for establishing and implementing the institutional
The CDWA,
framework of the water resources administration. 6
created under the State Council, is responsible for creating a national
system for administration of water resources. 9 CDWAs created at or
above the county level administer local water resources. (See Chart II:
Institutional Framework under the 1988 China Water Law)
C. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

The 1988 China Water Law established a system of unified
planning within individual river basins to develop and utilize water
resources and prevent water-related calamities.98 The system includes
elements of both integration, in the form of comerehensive plans, and
specialization, in the form of professional plans. The CDWA under
the State Council, after collaborating with related departments and
local governments, develops integrated planning within statedesignated major river basins and presents these plans to the State
Council for approval. 00 Integrated planning for other river basins
comes from CDWAs of the local government of those regions, in
collaboration with the relevant departments and districts. A local
CDWA presents its plan to the government at the same administrative
level (i.e., autonomous region, province) for approval and then
submits it to the superior CDWA for the latter to make a record."
D. WATER USE MANAGEMENT

The central-government level CDWA also formulates long-term
water supply and demand plans for the entire country, and districts
that cover multiple provinces, autonomous regions, and CGMs.' 2 The
CDWA then presents these long-term water supply and demand plans
to the State Council planning department, which holds approval
authority for such plans. 1 3 Likewise, local CDWAs at or above the
county level (province, prefecture and county) formulate their own
long-term water supply and demand plans in collaboration with other
departments at that administrative level. 10 4 The State Council planning

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. art. 9.
Id.
1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 11.
Id.
Id.

101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 30.
Id.
Id.
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department at the next higher administrative level approves these local
long-term water supply and demand plans; the plans must reflect the
plans formulated by the higher CDWA and actual local conditions.""
Finally, superior CDWAs (e.g., a prefecture's CDWA is superior to a
county's CDWA) formulate the water allocation scheme for interadministrative districts. '°6 This process involves seeking the advice of
local people's governments and receiving their approval before
executing the scheme.'
E. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND POLLUTION PREVENTION

The 1988 law assigns to the State responsibility for adopting
measures to effectively protect water resources, maintain water sources,
prevent and control soil erosion, and improve the natural
Each unit of government is responsible for: (1)
environment."'
enforcing water pollution prevention and control measures consistent
with the provisions of the Law for Prevention and Control of Water
Pollution; and (2) protecting and improving water quality.'0 " The Law
for Water Pollution and Control, issued before both the 1988 China
Water Law and the Environment Protection Law in China, was the
pioneering basic law relating to water and water protection; it still
dominates the subject of water pollution and control in China.
F. PERMIT AND WATER PRICING SYSTEMS

Under the 1988 China Water Law, the State was required to adopt
a permit system to regulate direct withdrawals from aquifers, rivers,
and lakes." ° Household use, raising livestock and poultry, and other
uses for small quantities were exempted from this permit system."' In
September 1993, the State Council promulgated Implementation
Procedures for the Water Drawing Permit System, which outlined the
scope and implementation measures for the permit system.
Under the 1988 law, anyone using water supplied by a water2
project must pay water fees to the owner or manager of the project."
Entities that directly withdraw groundwater from aquifers located in
urban areas must pay water resource fees to the local government."3
Governments of provinces, autonomous regions, or CGMs determine
fees for withdrawals in non-urban areas." 4 Governments of provinces,
autonomous regions, or CGMs could determine water resources fees
The State Council determines
for all other direct withdrawals.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 31.
Id.
Id. art, 5.
Id. art. 6.
1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 32.
Id.
id. art. 34.
Id.
Id.
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collecting procedures for water fees and water resources fees." 5 In
1985, the State Council issued the Procedures for Calculation,
Collection and Management of Water Charge of Water Projects. The
procedures provide the main legal basis for meeting the required
criteria and managing the supply of water projects.
G. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

The 1988 China Water Law provides for the resolution of two kinds
of water disputes: those between regions and those between individuals
or local entities.
For water disputes between regions, the Law
prescribes resolution by consultation in the spirit of mutual
understanding, conciliation, friendship, and cooperation."'
If this
method of consultation fails to settle the inter-regional dispute, the
parties may appeal to the government at the next higher level to assist
in finding a solution to the dispute."7 For water disputes between
entities or individuals, the 1988 China Water Law allows settlement by
way of consultation and mediation ("reconciliation")."" If one of the
parties concerned is unwilling to settle the dispute through this
process, or consultation and mediation fails to provide an acceptable
resolution, either party can appeal to the government above the
county level or its authorized department for guidance, or they can
appeal directly to a court.19

115.
116.

Id.
1988 Water Law of the PRC art. 35.

117.

Id.

118.
119.

Id. art. 36.
Id.
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Chart I: Institutional Framework under the 1988 China Water Law
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VI. VITAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE 1988 CHINA WATER LAW:
TARIM RIVER BASIN AS A CASE STUDY.
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A. BASIC CONDITIONS

The Tarim River Basin ("Basin") is in the south of the Xinjiang
Uigur Autonomous Region (hereafter "Xinjiang") in northwest China.
The Basin is a relatively independent, closed, inland hydrological
2
basin."
It spans all five Prefectures in South Xinjiang (Banyingol,
Aksu, Kizilsu, Kashgar and Hotan), a total area of nearly four hundred
121
thousand (393,824) square miles (1.02 million square kilometers),
22
and contains a population of around 8 million people.
The Basin
occupies 61 percent of Xinjiang's total area and holds 47 percent of its
population./
The Tarim River flows some 1514 miles (2437
kilometers) from its source within China-the Laskim, a small upper

120. See Lei Zhidong et. al, Fo-mation and Utilization of Water Resources of Tarim River,
44 SCIENCE IN CHINA 615 (Dec. 2001) available at
http://ww.scichina.com/contents/2001/yk/ye/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
121. Dr. George E. Radosevich & Mr. Douglas C. Olson, Existing and Emerging
Basin Arrangements in Asia: Tarim Basin Water Resources Commission Case Study 2
(June 24, 1999), availableat
http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/18ByDocName/TarimBasinWaterR
esourcesCommissiontheMRC/$FILE/TarimBasinWatResCom&MRC.pdf
(last visited
Apr. 21, 2004); CouNTRY REPORT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 31 (Chinese
Ministry of Water Resources ed., 2003), available at
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/resources.shtml (last updated Mar. 25, 2004).
122. Uyghur American Association, Xinjiang Develops Water-efficient Agriculture (Oct.
25, 2000) at
http://,Aww.uyghuramerican.org/economy/xinhuaoct252000.html (last visited Apr.
24, 2004).
123. See Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 1999.
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tributary of the Yarkant River-to its termination at Taitema Lake. 2 , It
is the longest inland
25 river in China, and lies in the largest inland river
basin in the world.1
The Basin annually drains an average of 31.8 million acre-feet
("MAF") (39.2 billion M) of surface water'
from five major
tributaries: the Kaidu-Konqi, the Aksu, the Yarkant, the Kaxgar and the
Hotan Rivers.12 The plains of the Basin receive little precipitation
(annual mean of just under 2 inches (1.96) or 50mm); no surface
runoff is generated in this area of the main stem,12 and thus, the Tarim's
flow depends entirely on those of its tributaries. 1
The Kaidu-Konqi River, although within the Tarim Basin, is
hydrologically separate from the Tarim and has no natural connection
with the Tarim River. 12" The Kuta Trunk Canal, built in 1976, transfers
water from the Kaidu-Konqi River to the lower reaches of the Tarim
River main stem."0 Since 2000, the channel has been famous for
transferring water from Bostan Lake to the lower reaches of the Tarim
River main stem to restore the degraded ecosystem.
The greatest change affecting the Tarim River Basin in the last 50
years has been the growth in human activity, particularly
agriculture."' Although the Basin's smaller tributaries have always
flowed intermittently, the much larger Yarkant River, with a catchment
area of approximately 42,471 square miles (110,000 square kilometers)
and an annual runoff volume averaging about 5.9 MAF (7.25 billion
m3), 32 began drying up in its lower reaches in the early 1970s as a
result of increased agricultural diversions.' 9 Since then, the flows of
the Tarim main stem have depended heavily on flows from the Aksu
and Hotan Rivers, where irrigation water diversions have also
increased and downstream flows have continually decreased.1 4 As a
result of large irrigation diversions and reduced tributary flows, since
1972, the Tarim main stem has shortened by approximately 200 miles
124. He Wenqin, Water Resources in Tarim River Basin 21, in Water Resources,
Environment and Management of the Tarim River Watershed: Proceeding of Seminar on the
Water Resources, Environment and Management of the Tarim River Watershed.
125. CoUNTRY REPORT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 121, at 32;
Shen Yuling, Land and Water Resources Management in Xinjiang Uyuar Autonomous
Region, China 2 (2003) (unpublished dissertation, NOLD PhD-course), available at
http://www.uit.no/MostCCPP/nold/frontpage.yuling.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
126. Zhou Hongfei et al., Irrigated Agriculture and Sustainable Water Management
Strategies in the Tarim Basin, in NEW APPROACHES TO WATER MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL
ASIA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP HELD IN Ai.EPPO, SYRIA (Nov. 6-11, 2000) 127, 129
availableat http://wAw.unu-.edu/env/workshops/Aleppo/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2004).
127. COUNTRY REPORT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 121, at 32.
128. See id.
129. Radosevich & Olson, supranote 121, at 1.
130. SeeZhidong, supra note 120.
131, SeeRadosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 1-2.
132. See Hongfei et al., supranote 126, at 132.
133. See CUI WANGCHENG, OASES PROCESSES AND DESERTIFICATION OF THE YARKANT
RIVER
AND
THE
KAGAR
RIVER
VALLEY
(1994),
summary
available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7539E/w7539e0b.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
134. See Radosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 1-2.
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(320 kilometers). The flow reduction has destroyed downstream
vegetation-including poplar foresfland (Populus diversifolia) the
downstream flows once supported. " ' The reduced flow of the Tarim
River has had serious impacts; Lop Nur and Taitema Lake-both
historically fed by the Tarim-completely dried up during the late
1960s and early 1970s."6 The resulting government and public
concern over the degradation of the Basin's downstream ecosystem
prompted numerous research projects, workshops, and seminars to
address these issues. Moreover, the restoration of the degraded
ecosystem of the Tarim's lower reaches has become one of the greatest
concerns of the central government since mid-1990s.'37
B. MAIN WATER ISSUES
1. Water Use Disputes
The government must still address serious issues regarding the
region's water resources, including exploitation, social and economic
development, and environmental protection. The lack of a wellestablished water allocation mechanism creates disputes among water
users, counties, prefectures, and agricultural sectors throughout the
Tarim Basin.
The most serious current dispute is between uncontrolled
productive use of the Tarim's tributaries and the environmental
protection of riparian forest along the Tarim mainstream. 3 ' Until
recently, limited industrial development prevented conflict between
agriculture, industry, and domestic uses in the Tarim River
Basin. However, increased oil and gas exploitation will escalate these
disputes. 39 The government has traditionally favored agricultural
production over environmental protection, and thus, only water
available after agricultural withdrawals is available for environmental
purposes. Due to this preference, reclaiming and preserving the
downstream ecosystems of the Tarim River while achieving sustainable
development within the Basin will prove difficult.

135. Id. at 1.
136. China Hails Rebirth of Lake on Desert Rim, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 18, 2001, available
at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200111/18/eng20011118-84788.shtml; Xinjiang
to Revive Lop Nur by Water Diversion, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 20, 2001, available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200101/20/eng200lOl 20 60997.html.
See also
THE UNU GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM V, FRESHWAIER RESOURCES IN ARID LANDS

(Juha
I.
Uitto
&
Jutta
Schneider
eds.,
1997)
available
at
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu02fe/uuO2fe.htm.
137. In 1998, The Central Government of the PRC inaugurated the Tarim Basin II
Project along with the World Bank. The project was the biggest one to improve the
irrigation and promote the environmental protection in a river basin in China. See
generally The World Bank Group, Project Introduction, Tarim Basin II, at
http://www.worldbank.org.cn/English/content/693g1207183.shtml.
138. See id.
139. See, Lang Yihua & Gu Dingfa, Development of Oil Field and Rational
Utilization of Water Resources in Tarim Basin, the Proceedings, at 79-83.
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2. Lack of Unified Planning
No master plan exists for the Tarim River Basin, although the
individual tributary basins-with the exception of the Kaidu-Konqi
River Basin-have drafted river basin plans.'" These plans lay the
foundation for establishing minimum flows that must leave each
tributary basin and feed the Tarim main stem. The plans also address
hydraulic works construction and instituting general water
management in the respective river basins.
Due to their piecemeal nature, these plans do not produce a
harmonized, integrated water resources management plan for the
Tarim River Basin as a whole.141 Moreover, at present, the local
governments of the several prefectures in the Basin are only
considering the development of water resources in light of their own
plans, not a coordinated master
social and economic development
42
plan for the Tarim River Basin.
3. Lack of effective unified water management
Given the substantial demands placed on the Tarim River Basin,
and the numerous political subdivisions in which the Basin lies,
effective Basin management requires a unified approach among these
subdivisions. Although governmental experts have identified this
need, the government has not yet succeeded in creating such a unified
approach.
Since the 1950s, local government within each of the five
prefectures located within the Tarim Basin Prefectures have
established separate water resources bureaus ("Bureaus") . 43 The
prefecture governments authorize the Bureaus to independently
water
resources
within
each
individual
manage
the
prefecture. Although the Bureaus have district management
authority, they can do little to affect management and uses on other
tributaries and the Tarim River main stem itself.'"
The 1988 China Water Law began to change this independent
approach. The basic water administration system prescribed in the
1988 China Water Law applies to the Tarim River Basin. 45 Under this
administrative system, the Xinjiang Water Resources Bureau exists as
the CDWA under the Xinjiang People's Government.4 6 Each
7
1
Local water
prefecture's government administers its own bureau.
management mainly focuses on the promotion of agriculture and

140. See Radosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 8.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 3.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See 1988 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC art. 9, translated
in 5 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Doc. No.
880121.2 (1989).
146. See Radosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 3.

147. Id.
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economic development through building and managing irrigation
infrastructure and increasing total irrigated acreage based on local
watershed plans. Each prefecture's Planning Commission (now the
Development Planning Commission), in conjunction with the relevant
administrative bureaus, formulates five-year plans.148 However, the
prefecture's directors take no real action to protect the environmental
needs of the river. Upstream prefectures, such as the Aksu and Hotan
Prefectures, leave downstream protection of the resource to the
Bayingol Prefecture, through which the downstream stretches of the
4
) However, the majority of water flows in the main stem of
Tarim flow.W
the Tarim River depends upon flows discharged from the Aksu River,
under the jurisdiction of the Aksu Prefecture, and the Hotan River,
under the jurisdiction of the Hotan Prefecture.
Experts organized by the Xinjiang People's Government
extensively studied the Tarim River Basin in 1984. The experts
suggested managing water resources in the Tarim River Basin as a
single unit. Since then, the experts and policy-makers of the Xinjiang
Water Resources Bureau under the Xinjiang People's Government
have researched and discussed such unified planning. The research
suggested a management system under which each prefecture must be
subservient to overall management of the Tarim River, with the Tarim
River Basin Management Bureau ("TRB") to be established to oversee
the overall process.150
Despite these findings, the resulting infrastructure failed to
address the problem. In May 1990, the State Council ratified a
proposal to establish the TRB. The TRB was established within the
Xinjiang Water Resources Bureau in 1992.' In addition, the Tarim
River Basin Management Committee ("Committee") was created in
January 1992.152
Rather than providing Basin-wide oversight management, however,
the TRB was subordinated to the Xinjiang Water Resources Bureau
and was authorized to manage only the main stem of the Tarim River.
The TRB has no power in the overall management of the Tarim River
Basin.
More critically, the Committee has been only a nominal
organization. Although it established an office in the Tarim River
Basin Water Resources Commission ("TBC"), the Committee had no
Therefore, the Committee has
clear membership designated.
exercised little decision-making and coordinative functions over
unified water management of the entire Tarim Basin.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id. at 6-7.
See World Bank Group, supra note 137.
See Radosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 7.
ld. at 5.
Id.
See id.
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4. Wasteful irrigation water use
1 54
Irrigation dominates total water use in the Tarim River Basin.
However, irrigation water uses are unregulated and typically wasteful.
Due to low rainfall during the growing season, irrigation is the only
a
development."'5 Unfortunately,
way to ensure agricultural
misconception exists that increased total water diversions results in a
corresponding increase in crop yields. Because of this misconception,
local leaders in charge of agriculture have diverted much more water
Extreme seasonal and yearly fluctuations in
than is necessary.1
runoff, poor forecast techniques, and the limited capacities of small
reservoirs for regulating runoff, have exacerbated this situation. This
has resulted in irrigation flooding, especially in the upper and middle
regions of the Basin, where users have a favorable geographic position,
pay little for their water use, and hold undefined water rights."
Inefficient storage and conveyance facilities further magnify the
problem. Irrigation water is typically transferred by canals that have an
estimated average efficiency of only about 35 percent. Few canals are
lined.' 5"
Thus, a significant amount of water is lost during
Additionally,
transportation due to seepage and evaporation.
substantial water loss from seepage and evaporation occurs at the
many large, shallow reservoirs built along the tributary streams and
rivers . 5 The effects of this waste are multiple, including increased soil
salinization in the midstream region, substantial dewatering of the
stream bed (desertification in particular) in the downstream area,
ecosystem degradation, and even low agricultural yield. 6 °
C. LEGAL SYSTEM
The implementation of the 1988 China Water Law within Xinjiang
was designed to reflect the local conditions of the Tarim River
Basin. 6' In order to effectively enforce statutory management in the
Tarim River Basin, the People's Government of Xinjiang drafted
additional discretionary regulations, 62 and ultimately adopted the
Regulations for the Protection and Management of Bostan Lake."63
However, these regulations failed to adequately address the water
issues of the Tarim Basin. Therefore, on Dec. 11, 1997, the People's

154. See Radosevich & Olson, supranote 121, at 2.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Radosevich & Olson, supra note 121, at 2.
160. See id. at 3.
161. See id. at 3-4.
162. See, e.g., 1994 Occasional Regulations for Water Administration and Water
Resources Management of Tarim River Basin, Xuar Statutory Compilation [Laws &
Regulations of XUAR].
163. 1997 Regulations for Protection and Management of Bostan Lake, Xuar
Statutory Compilation [Laws & Regulations of XUAR].
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Government of Xinjiang adopted the Regulations on the Management
of the Water Resources of the Tarim Basin ("Tarim Basin
Regulations")." Consisting of 33 articles, the Tarim Basin Regulations
are the first set of regulations in China governing an entire river
basin. The most important aspects of the Tarim Basin Regulations are
as follows:
* Definition of the Tarim River Basin, which includes the
Tarim River main stem (1321 km from Xiaojiake to
Taitema Lake) and six tributaries (Hotan, Yarkant, Kaxgar,
Aksu, Weigan and Kaidu-Konqi).165
* Provisions that address the exploitation, utilization,
protection, and management of the Tarim River Basin.' 6
* Rules of ownership which place the Basin's water resources
under state ownership and require adoption of a unified
system 6 to coordinate the administration of the various
levels.1 1
* Establishment of the Tarim River Basin Water Resources
Commission ("TBC") to supervise and manage the Basin's
water resources," and outline its structure, functions, and
169
powers.
The Tarim Basin Regulations also require each Prefecture's
70 planning
to be integrated into the planning of the whole river basin.
Significantly, the Tarim Basin Regulations direct the standing
committee of the TBC to create legally binding written agreements for
water use among the related administrative bodies of the prefectures,
and address average annual water allocation, water use limits in
different conditions, each entity's rights and liabilities, and potential
violations of such agreements.' If the parties fail to reach such
People's Government will impose a decision
agreements,
• the Xinjiang
.172
and the
within three months. In that case, the related organs
7
prefectures must unconditionally implement the decision.
The Tarim Basin Regulations also require the CDWAs at different
levels, and other related departments, to conform to the national laws
and local regulations for water quality management and water
In addition to national laws, the
pollution prevention and control.'
164. 1997 Regulations on the Management of the Water
Xuar Statutory Compilation [Laws & Regulations of XUAR]
available in Radosevich & Olson, supranote 121, at 23-30).
165. Id. art. 2.
166. Id. art. 3.
167. Id. art. 4.
168. 1997 Regulations on the Management of the Water
Laws & Regulations of XUAR art. 6.
169. Id.
170. Id. art. 5(5).
171. Id. art. 16.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 1997 Regulations on the Management of the Water

Resources of Tarim Basin,
(unofficial English version

Resources of Tarim Basin,

Resources of Tarim Basin,
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Tarim Basin Regulations provide for enforcement regarding
supervision and management of water pollution prevention and
control."75
The Tarim Basin Regulations further provide the main possible
domestic and international funding sources for water resources
development, utilization, and preservation in the Tarim River
Basin."" They also provide for the creation of the Tarim Basin Water
Resources Protection Fund for the protection and management of
Tarim River Basin water resources.177
D. NEW LOCAL WATER ADMINISTRATIONS

The Tarim Basin Regulations outline the institutional framework.
Based on the provisions of the Tarim Basin Regulations, the Xinjiang
People's Government established the Tarim River Basin Water
Resources Commission ("TBC") in 1998.'17 Structured in compliance
with Tarim Basin Regulations, the TBC includes a Standing
Committee with an Executive Sub-Committee and a Management
Bureau ("TMB").' 79 As opposed to the TRB, the TBC has sufficient
power to coordinate integrated water supervision and management of
the entire Tarim River Basin. The primary functions of the TBC
include:
* implement related laws, procedures and regulations;
* supervise and manage water resources of the Tarim River
Basin as a unified whole;
* formulate and examine overall planning for the Basin;
" determine average annual total water allocated, and
establish both an annual water use limit and a total water
use plan for each prefecture;
* implement the water permit system and collect water
payments;
* manage
flood control,
drought prevention, water
conservation, soil preservation, water quality protection,
and water supply;
" build and manage hydraulic structures and other water
projects;
•
plan, build, harness, protect, and manage river channels;
" formulate and approve the water use allocation schedule
and management practice of key water diversion works
located on each tributary and the Tarim River main stem;
* introduce and disseminate advanced technology and

Laws & Regulations of XUAR art. 21.
175.

176.
177.
178.
Basin,
179.

See id.

See id. art. 24.
Id. art. 25.
See 1997 Regulations on the Management of the Water Resources of Tarim
Laws & Regulations of XUAR art. 6.
Id.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 7

management techniques for water resources development,
utilization, and conservation;
" settle disputes; and
* examine and approve all water development projects within
the basin.
The Standing Committee is the decision-making body of the TBC.
The Standing Committee has the decision-making authority to decide
significant matters of water resource development and utilization, and
to protect and manage the Tarim River Basin. 8' Its commissioners
consist of the leaders of related departments-including planning,
finance, water resources, environmental protection and land
management-the administrative directors of all prefectures, and the
director of the TMB. 8 "
The TMB, an organ of the TBC with both administrative and
technical functions, is directly responsible to the Standing
Committee,'83 but is also under the administrative leadership of the
Water Resources Bureau of Xinjiang. 18 The TMB must implement its
decisions consistent with the Tarim Basin Regulations and
Commission's resolutions. 8 - The TMB is responsible for specific
activities in the Tarim Basin, including development, utilization,
protection, and management of water resources, and is responsible for
exercising the administrative functions and powers of water resource
management for the Tarim River, water projects, water use, and water
and soil preservation. 8 6 The TMB submits work reports, plans,
programs, projects, and budgets annually to the TBC Standing
Committee.187 Finally, the TMB has the authority to establish one
office in each of the five prefectures, as well as one office for the main
stem of the Tarim River.'
The establishment of the TBC and its structured bodies is clearly
an initiative in China based mainly on the experience of international
practices, which greatly differs from the commissions (or authorities)
for river basin management set up by the CDWA under the State
Council for the key rivers and lakes defined by the State. However, the
TBC has exerted its power and role in unified water management, in
particular in formulating strategic water management, coordinating
water uses among the prefectures, rationally allocating water
resources, and implementing the downstream ecosystem restoration
projected by the recent Tarim River comprehensive management

180. See id.
181. Id. art- 7.
182. Jd. art. 8.
183. 1997 Regulations on the Management of the Water Resources of Tarim Basin,
Laws & Regulations of XUAR art. 13.
184. Id.
185. Id. art. 14.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
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project. In this sense, the TBC could provide a good example for the
other key river basin commissions (or authorities) in China to deep
their institutional reform and exert their coordinative functions.
VII. THE PROCESS OF AMENDMENT TO 1988 CHINA WATER
LAW
A.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMENDMENT

As mentioned above, the principal aim of the 1988 China Water
Law was to address the conflicts and shortfalls of the inadequate,
fragmented, and piecemeal system that had arisen during the 1970s
and early 1980s. However, the social and economic situation in the
PRC continued to change greatly after 1988; new problems arose that
needed to be addressed. According to the Comprehensive Report on
Strategy of Water Resources for China's Sustainable Development in
2001,' a water deficit between 24.3 and 32.5 MAF (30-40 billion M)
existed at the time of the study. The report also estimated the total
national economic water demand will increase to 113.5 MAF (140
billion m ) by 2030.")" Total waste or polluted water discharge was
estimated at 47.3 MAF (58.4 billion m') in 1997, which was forecasted
to increase rapidly.'9' The report predicted that urban pollution
discharge alone would surpass 69-86 MAF (85-106 billion m) by
2030.'9'
These problems, present and future, coupled with the
demonstrated need to strengthen water resources management, led to
amendment of the 1988 China Water Law. Without serious changes,
the reasonable and sustainable utilization of water resources in China
would be impossible. In short, water had become a strategic issue in
the economic and social development of China.
In June 2000, the Ministry of Water Resources submitted a draft
amendment to the 1988 China Water Law to the State Council. The
State Council's Legal System Bureau invited comments from relevant
departments under the State Council (e.g., State Planning
Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources,
Ministry of Construction, National Environmental Protection Agency).
On occasion, local people's governments at the provincial level, such
as the Shanghai Municipality and Hebei Province, also summoned
relevant experts and held symposia to assess the draft amendment.
Finally, the Legal System Bureau of the State Council drafted the
Water Law of the People's Republic of China (the "Draft
Amendment"), which the State Council passed at a subsequent
Standing Meeting. On November 26, 2001, the State Council
submitted the Proposal on the Draft Amendment to the Standing
189.
190.
191.
192.

Comprehensive Report, supra note 33.
id.
Id.
Id.
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Committee of NPC for its review and comment.
B.

THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO AND FOCAL POINTS OF THE AMENDMENT

According to the Explanation of the Draft Amendment, the
following principles were applied during its development:
* learn from implementation of 1988 China Water Law in the
last 13 years;
* learn from the legislative experiences of foreign countries
regarding water resource management;
* meet the needs of establishing the socialist market system
as well as achieving sustainable utilization of water
resources;
" emphasize water resources conservation;
* emphasize the reasonable allocation and protection of
water resources;
* promote the comprehensive development and utilization
of water resources;
* improve the mechanisms to supervise the execution of laws;
* supply legal protection for the purpose of realizing the
sustainable utilization of water resources; and
* improve the environment.
The primary goals of the amendment include:
(1) Strengthen unified administration of water resources, while
emphasizing the role the market plays in the macro
allocation of water resources;
(2) Emphasize water resources conservation and protection by
ensuring water use efficiency;
(3) Strengthen planning and management of development,
utilization, conservation and protection of water resources
by clearly stipulating the legal status of planning in the
development of water resources, and strengthening water
resources management at the basin level;
(4) Achieve sustainable development of water resources and
coordinate domestic, industrial, and ecological water
demands through the reasonable allocation of water
resources;
(5) Plainly articulate legal liability involved when exercising
administrative powers under the rule of law.
The Draft Amendment-consisting of eight chapters with some
seventy-eight articles-addressed seven principle areas: (1) ownership
rights regarding water resources, (2) water resources planning, (3) the
allocation and utilization of water resources, (4) paid use of water
resources and transferring water resources, (5) conservation, (6)
protection, and (7) a management system for water resources.
C. THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF THE AMENDMENT

Before the 2002 China Water Law was adopted, the Standing
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Committee of the Ninth NPC discussed four revised drafts. The 25th
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth NPC discussed the
Draft Amendment for the first time between December 24 and 29,
2001. During this session, Mr. Wang Shucheng explained the Draft
Amendment. He discussed eight important issues relating to the Draft
Amendment, including its principles and focal points, and the seven
focal areas. The members of the Standing Committee concluded that
revision to the 1988 China Water Law was necessary to accommodate
new circumstances and to address new problems-water shortages,
flood- and drought-related disasters, and pollution-that had hindered
national social and economic development of China.
The second discussion of the draft occurred during the 27th
Session, held from April 24 to 28, 2002. In that discussion, Qiao
Xiaoyang, the deputy director of the Law Commission, explained the
new amendments based on the opinions from some committee
members of the Standing Committee, commissions of NPC, and local
people's governments. Concerning the right to water in rural areas,
the Law Commission of the NPC held that: (1) according to the
Constitution, waters are owned by the State, i.e., by the whole people of
the State; (2) the owners of the water works, e.g. reservoirs, etc., only
have the right to use the water in its water works in accordance with
the law; and (3) the right of a rural collective economic organization
("RCEO") and its members to use waters in the ponds owned by the
organization should be protected by law. Therefore, in the revised
draft submitted to the Standing Committee in the second discussion
("Second Amendment Draft"), the Law Commission suggested
deleting the provision, "The waters in ponds or reservoirs possessed by
rural collective economic organization are collectively used," and
clarified that the93 permit system and paid use system are not applicable
to these waters.1
The members of some local people's governments interpreted
Article 19 as giving the basin management institution ("BMI") too
much power, and considered that the Article would be too difficult to
implement in practice. The members felt the BMI and local CDWAs
must be empowered to inspect the construction of water projects
based on a classification of the rivers or lakes where such projects are
located.
Based on this input, the Law Commission suggested
amending Article 19. Thus, for major rivers or lakes as designated by
the State, or rivers or lakes that cross multiple provinces, autonomous
regions or CGMs, the BMI was given the right to inspect and offer
advice on the construction of water projects, and local CDWAs
at or
9
above the county level must inspect and give opinions on this.1 4
193. The Standing Committee of NPC read the amendment draft to Water Law to
ensure the protection of the villager's right to use water, Legal Daily, Apr. 27, 2003;
also available at
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper/299/1/classO29900002/hwz207525.htm
(last
visited Aug. 29, 2003).
194. Regulating the construction of water project in accordance with the law,
National People's Congress News, Apr. 26, 2003; also available at
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The over-abstraction of groundwater was also a focus of the
discussions. Consistent with the opinion of the Agriculture and Village
Commission regarding the Second Amendment Draft, the Law
Commission recommended an amendment related to groundwater
extraction, which provision authorized local governments at or above
the county level to adopt measures to strictly control groundwater
withdrawal in areas where overdrawn.
The amendment also
authorized governments of provinces, autonomous regions, or CGMs
to determine and approve all groundwater withdrawal in areas where
severe over-extraction existed, or in zones where groundwater
withdrawal is forbidden or restricted. " '
The third discussion of the revised draft occurred during the 28th
Session on June 24-29, 2002. The Deputy Director of the Law
Commission, Qiao Xiaoyang, explained further amendments, and
suggested that the Standing Committee adopt a new amendment to
the 1988 China Water Law ("Third Amendment Draft"). The Third
Amendment Draft encouraged and protected the initiatives of the
RCEOs and peasants in the construction and investment of various
water projects. They also clarified the relevant water rights and
promoted the reasonable development and utilization of water
resources. The Third Amendment Draft also provides:
When agricultural collective economic organization or its members
invest or construct water projects or facilities in the lands owned by
the agricultural collective economic organization, or the lands
contracted by them, the management and use of them shall be done
in accordance with
the principle that the one who invests and
6
manages benefits.'
In response to the concern that the shortage of water resources
had become a serious factor limiting the national economic and social
development of the PRC, the Third Amendment Draft required the
State to create the national strategic plan on water resources.17
However, some members of the Standing Committee and the
Environment and Resources Protection Commission considered that
the relevant articles did not address adequately the interests of the
peasants and would add an unreasonable fiscal burden on them.'98

http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper/299/1/classO29900002/hwz2O7465.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2003).
195. Xinhua News Agency: The State shall strengthen the law to protect

groundwater resources, available at
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper/299/l/classO29900002/hwz207500.htm
(last
visited Apr. 29, 2003).
196. Qiao Xiaoyang, Report of the Law Commission of the National People's
Congress on the Result of Its Deliberation over Water Law of the People's Republic of

China (Draft Amendment), at page 379-80, No. 5 of Gazette of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China 2002
(Sept. 15, 2002).
197. Id.
198. The revision draft of water law stipulates the water rights of agricultural

Issue 2

CHINA WATER LAW

Some members concluded that the transfer of saved or conserved
water resources should be considered carefully.
The Third Amendment Draft, nonetheless, failed because of
conflicts of interest between the central and local governments,
between basin management and administrative management, and
because the different sectors had not reached an appropriate balance.
Additionally, problems such as RCEO water rights and the transfer of
ground water withdrawal rights that had not been resolved also led to
the amendment's failure.' 9'
From August 23-29, 2002, the 29th Session discussed a fourth draft
amendment that included, among other things, RCEO water rights.
The Law Commission recommended that the Standing Committee
adopt this revision, which it did on August 29, 2002. One hundred
thirty members voted in favor of the amendment, none voted against
it, and three abstained. 20 The amended water law entered into force
on October 1, 2002.21
VIII. 2002 CHINAWATER LAW: MAJOR DEVELOPMENT
The 2002 China Water Law consists of eight chapters containing 82
articles.2 ' Three chapters, not included in the 1988 China Water Law,
address the planning of water resources, the allocation and
conservation of water resources, settlement of water disputes, and
supervision and inspection in the enforcement of the law. In addition
to the new chapters, the 2002 China Water Law expanded several areas
of the 1988 China Water Law, including property rights of water, the
planning system of water resources, the allocation of water resources,
and the integrated management of water resources.
A. AN INTRODUCTION

Special features of PRC legislation
Although the 2002 China Water Law has many progressive
features-including the linkage between water allocation and national
and sub-national basin plans (an adoption of one of the central
principles of Integrated Water Resources Management)-to a western
observer, the legislation is silent on many substantive features that one
would expect to find in a modern water code. The legislation,
however, must be understood within the evolving context of the
function of law and legislation in China.
collective economic organizations, available at
40
.htm (last
http://www.chinawater.com.cn/newscenter/slyw/20020824/2002082400
visited Aug. 29, 2002).
199. Qiao Xiaoyang, supra note 196.
200. 2002 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC (translated by
Chinalaw-assisted L.egal Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo
Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 2461).
201. Id.
202. See id.
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International lawyers would describe most Chinese legislation as
framework instruments because the legislation both contains broad
delegations of law granting authority to central and provincial
through
law-making
further
contemglates
and
ministries,
China draws a distinction between
administrative regulations.
economic and private or civil law. Germany is an example of another
Economic law, a dynamic
country recognizing this distinction.
concept, refers to state planning directives, including environmental
to vertical relations between higher
protection, and has come to20refer
4
and lower levels of the State.
The distinction between economic and civil law became important
in China after the 1979 drive toward a socialist-market economy.2 05
Initially some legal theorists argued that almost all law was economic,
but as the concept of a permanent civil law, built on a civil code,
continues to evolve, and more property relationships are regulated
under civil law,20 6 the theory erodes.
Economic law is a form of public law because some argue
economic law creates only performance duties between higher levels
of governments instead of reciprocal civil rights and duties. Laws
drafted to achieve State objectives tend to be vague mixes of general
directives and goals addressed to subordinate officials. Economic law
does not create legal relationships between the state and private
individuals. It is thus difficult to determine if it is meant to actually be
enforced and, if so, by whom. Western rules are ultimately addressed
to the judges who enforce them against public officials. In contrast,
Chinese natural resources legislation is directed toward subordinate
administrative officials.2 0 ' The implicit assumption in the legislation is
that "the bureaucracy that 'owns' the law" will implement the law.200
No expectation exists that the law will be implemented outside of the
Once any
However, this is not always true.
state bureaucracy.
individual or unit receives a right to do something under economic
law, especially under the procedures of a relevant law (e.g., Law on
Administrative Licenses of the PRC 2003 [see infra X(D)], Law on
Environment Assessment of the PRC 2002), rights are those protected
in accordance with civil law, economic law, and administrative law.

203. Chinese laws are addressed primarily to lay administrators who are expected to
adapt it to local conditions. Thus, in contrast to the western tradition, "[c] hinese law
makers have not in general attempted to use legislative language, supported by rules
of construction, to strengthen the internal structure and order of positive law." Perry
Keller, Sources of Orderin Chinese Law, 42 AM.J. COMp. L. 711, 752 (1994).
204. ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 191 (Butterworths Asia trans., 3d ed. 1993).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 191-202.
207. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got To Do With It?, Legal Institutions and Economic
Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC.BASINL.J. 1,31 (1991).
208. Id.
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Property rights relating to water
Intense debate exists around the world regarding the nature of
water rights. Since the 1977 Mar La Plata Conference, international
conferences have periodically issued principles of water use that have
attempted to state the true nature of water rights. The question has
often reflected a dichotomy: is water an economic good or a public
good? Stated differently, is water a commodity or a community
resource? Important consequences flow from the characterization.
If water is an economic good, the market should direct its
allocation, and the State should confine itself to setting the ground
rules that support emerging markets for the acquisition of private
water rights. In recent years, this economic characterization has
dominated. The 1992 Dublin Principles declared, "[w]ater has an
economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as
an economic good. 2" The Dublin Principles have had a substantial
impact. For example, to bolster its negotiating position in the Aral Sea
Basin, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan adopted a law in 2001 modeled on
the Dublin Principles. 2 0 The law allows Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
both upstream former Soviet Asian Republics, to charge for lost
hydropower revenues and infrastructure maintenance.2
The characterization of water as a public or community good
opposes both urban service privatization and water markets, and posits
the principle that human rights include access to the amount of water
necessary to sustain human life. 12 For example, the Second World
Water Forum conference at The Hague in 2000 declared that nations
could no longer negotiate access to basic water and sanitation as a
commodity. 21 3 This characterization also reflects the concern that the
economic model will be a basis to deregulate-completely or in partaccess to water and will have detrimental effects upon both the
environment and socially and economically marginal groups.
This dichotomy is false because water has multiple characteristics
both economic and public. In reality, water is both an economic good
and a community resource. Water's unique life supporting qualities
require a strong and continued state interest in its use and distribution
by public and private entities. At the same time, a need exists to insure
widespread access to water. Exclusive state development often leads to
economically inefficient, environmentally disastrous, and socially
209. Global Water Partnership, Dublin Statements and Principles, available at
http://ww.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodelD=1 345 (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
210. Gregory E. Heltzer, Note, Stalemate in the Aral Sea Basin: Will Kyrgyzstan's New
Water Law Bring the Downstream Nations Back to the MultilateralBargainingTable?, 15 GEO.
INT'L ENVrL. L. REV. 291, 309 (2003).
211. Id. at 315.
212. E.g., Stephen C. McCaffrey, Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Implications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 1 (1992).
213. See generally Central Asia: Water and Conflict, ICG Asia Report No. 34
May 30,
2002, available at
(International
Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels)
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/docum
ents/2002/icg-uzb-30may.pdf.
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inequitable uses.24 This interest is often reflected in assertions of State
ownership. However, State ownership in the western sense is different
from the meaning in socialist legal systems such as the PRC. States
with socialist legal systems claim ownership for three primary purposes:
full proprietary ownership, the assertion of the sovereign power to
regulate the recognition and enjoyment of entitlements, and the
assertion of the public trust.
State ownership as a fiction for state regulation
In the Western liberal tradition, state ownership is usually asserted
to confirm that water rights521 have always been incomplete property
rights.1 This perspective normally asserts that: (1) water rights are
limited to the use of water as opposed to individual ownership of
streams and aquifers (water rights are usufructuary rights rather than
ownership or possessory rights); (2) access to water requires State
permission in the form of a permit, license, or court decree; 217 (3)
access can be denied if the State determines that a higher or more
efficient alternative use of the water exists; and (4) reallocations are
subject to State review. State ownership is not a true proprietary claim
but rather a regulatory or supervisory claim. 28 Governments may
actively participate in water development and distribution but they do
so-for the most part-by claiming the same entitlements open to
non-government users.
State ownership in China
State ownership in China is a cross between exclusive proprietary
ownership and the western liberal approach. Although China has
always claimed State ownership, it has not effectively controlled water
use by subordinate units of government in non-vital affairs. At the
same time, the State depends on the participation of subordinate units
and, thus, must respect their claims.
In 1958, the PRC adopted the principle of Socialist legality and
created a new constitutional and legal foundation for the Chinese
state. Under the classic socialistic framework, the State holds and
controls all land and natural resources; State ownership of all natural
The actual
resources is a cardinal principle of socialist legality.
214. See id.
215. The term water rights deployed in this article is in a broad sense and refers to
any rights relating to water. In different jurisdictions the terms have different
meanings on the one hand, and the term is a developing concept in each jurisdiction,
e.g., the concept of water rights in a civil law system is different than that of common
law system.
216. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
217. See STEPHANO BURC, PREPARING NATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE, FAO Legislative Study No. 52 (Food and
Agric. Org. of the U.N. ed., 1994). The study concludes that the non-regulated uses
"represent an ever shrinking minority of water allocation decisions overall." Id. at 5.
218. E.g., State v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 287-88 (2000).
219.
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practice of State ownership in China, however, is different from what
the Marxist theory or former Soviet practice would predict.
Article 9 of the Constitution of the PRC declares that the State (or
the whole people) owns all water resources in the country.2"0 State
ownership has not led to effective State control. In practice, State
ownership has often meant that water resources are a quasi-open
commons subject to over-use by subordinate units of government.
Access to water resources was often determined by the actions of
different ministries, not by State plans to allocate such resources. This
is a reflection of the PRC's civil law that has allowed the development
of a system of relatively firm entitlements held by subordinate units of
governments.
The General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC provide for limited
semi-public entitlements and recognize that property rights in
common resources such as water must be exercised with due regard
for the entitlements of similarly situated users. Under Article 81, both
State-owned and collective ownership units may use water in
accordance with the law, but water use is subject to the obligations of
In addition, the State
management, protection, and rational use.
protects rights to use and to benefit from the use of the water. Article
83 also recognizes that land and water use rights are correlative and,
subsequently, are limited by the principle that one must act with due
regard toward his neighbor.2 2 Thus, some have regarded the right to
use water, as with all newly emerging property rights, as usufructuary
so long as the State retains formal ownership.
B.

PROPERTY RIGHTS OF WATER AND PAID USE OF WATER RESOURCE

Increasing scarcity of water resources and trans-provincial water
pollution call for strengthening the State's macro-management of
water resources, inter-provincial flow allocation, trans-basin water
diversions, and the prevention of water pollution. The key to resolving
these problems requires two areas of focus: (1) clarification that water
resources are owned by the State, and (2) emphasis that the State
Council exercises the ownership of water resources on behalf of the
State. As mentioned above, under the 1988 China Water Law, two
kinds ownership of water or water resources existed: State ownership
and ACEO ownership. However, in accordance with the 2002 China
Water Law, only one type of ownership exists: State ownership. Thus,
290-95 (3d ed. 1985).
220. CONSTITUTION art. 9, translated in I LAws AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBI C OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATTERS 279, 282 (1991).
221. 1986 General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Fagui Huibian [Fagui Huibian] [Laws & Regulations of the PRC] art. 81
(translated by Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Pekinig University, LEXIS,
Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 1165).
222. Id. art. 83.
223. See Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China's General
Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 202-03 (Spring/Summer 1989).

WATER LAW RE VIEW

Volume 7

to effectively resolve water development and pollution problems, the
State Council should exercise ownership of water resources on behalf
of the State.224
Market mechanisms must evolve to reflect the economic or
commodity value of water and, thus, prevent waste. The State Council
should create a reasonable water pricing system and promote secure
and fair allocations of water among competing claimants. Building on
the 1988 China Water Law, the 2002 China Water Law establishes a
22
permit system for drawing water and paid use of water resources. 5
The new law also places the department of water administration, which
is under the State Council, in charge of management and
implementation of the above systems. 226 These two systems impact the
right to use water for most citizens. RCEOs and their members,
they use water in ponds and
however, are not impacted because
27
1
reservoirs owned by the RCEOs.
Under the permit system and paid use system of water resources,
the unit or individual who draws water directly from rivers, lakes, or
ground aquifers shall apply to the relevant CDWA or BMI for a permit
and pay a water resources fee. 22 The applicant will then receive the
right. When the water supplied by the water project is used, State
provisions require the user to pay a water charge to the supplying
unit.129 The following principles determine water price: compensation
for cost, reasonable profits, quality, and equitable burden of price by
all users.2 0
Most water codes exempt small, domestic uses. The 2002 China
Water Law exempts water for household, livestock, poultry-raising, and
other small quantity water uses.23 '
The 2002 China Water Law includes special provisions addressing
water rights of an RCEO, or its members, using the waters from the
RCEO's ponds or reservoirs. First, the RCEO is exempted from the
Second,
permit system and paid use system, as mentioned above.
when an RCEO or its members invest in or construct water projects or
facilities on the RCEO's lands, or the lands contracted by them, the
management and reasonable use of the water projects and the storage
of water shall be done in accordance with the following principle:
"whoever invests and manages will benefit.2 233 Third, the RCEO, when
constructing reservoirs, shall get approval from the CDWA of the
224. See 2002 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the PRC art. 3 (translated
by Chinalaw-assisted Legal Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo
Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 2461).
225. Id. art. 7.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. art. 48.
229. 2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 55.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. art. 7.
233. Id. art. 25.
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people's government at or above the county level.2

4

C. WATER RESOURCES PLANNING

The 2002 China Water Law adds a new chapter to the 1988 China
Water Law entitled "Planning for Water Resources".2 35 This chapter
requires development of a plan for a national strategy on water
resources.2 36 It also provides that-in the development, utilization,
conservation, and protection of water resources, as well as in
controlling water disasters-planning should be undertaken within
basic units consisting of a river basin.
The plan includes basin plans and regional plans. 38 The basin
plans include both a comprehensive basin plan and a specialty basin
plan."' The regional plan includes a comprehensive regional plan and
a specialty regional plan.2 40 The regional plan should be inconformity
with the basin plans, and the specialty plans should be in conformity
with the comprehensive plan.
To implement the plan, 2002 China Water Law provides that when
the plan is drawn, a comprehensive
scientific investigation, survey, and
241
CDWAs of government at or above
assessment must be undertaken.
the county level, in association with the relevant departments at the
same level, are required to organize the comprehensive scientific
investigation, survey, and assessment.2

The Law requires the CDWR, under the State Council, to
formulate and submit to the State Council comprehensive basin plans
for basins of major rivers or lakes designated by the State. 4 In
formulating plans, the Law directs CDWR to work in conjunction with
other relevant departments under the State Council and with relevant
governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and CGMs. 245 The
Law also directs BMIs, in conjunction with CDWAs and other
departments of the relevant provincial governments, to formulate
comprehensive basin plans and comprehensive regional plans for
rivers or lakes that cross provinces, autonomous regions, or CGMs.2
Following inspection and opinion by every relevant people's
government at the provincial level, these plans shall be submitted to
234. Id.
235. Compare id. ch. 2, and 1988 Water Law of the PRC, Laws & Regulations of the
PRC, translated in 5 STATUTES & REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1
(1989) (LEXIS, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws, PRCLEG 1186).
236. 2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 14.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. art. 15.
242. 2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 16.
243. Id.
244. Id. art. 17.
245. Id.
246. Id.

WATER L4W REVIEW

Volume 7

27
the CDWA under the State Council for inspection and consent. 1
After the CDWA under the State Council has invited comments from
the relevant departments, these plans shall be submitted to the State
Council or its authorized department for approval.248
CDWAs of local people's governments at or above the county level,
in conjunction with relevant departments and relevant local people's
government, are directed by the Law to formulate comprehensive
plans for the basins of additional rivers, lakes, or for regions..2 49 The
CDWAs are required to submit these plans on the record to the
people's government at the corresponding level, or its authorized
department, for approval, and to the CDWA at the next higher level. 50
The relevant department of government at or above the county
After formulation, the
level shall formulate specialty plans.
department sends these specialty plans to other relevant departments
at the corresponding level for comments, and then submits the plans
to the government at the corresponding level for approval.
However, the formulation and approval of flood control plans or water
and soil conservation plans shall be executed in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Law of Prevention of Floods and the Law of
Conservation of Water and Soil respectively.2
Once the State Council or a government at the provincial level
approves a plan, it must be executed strictly. When the approved plan
needs modification, the amendment must follow the formulation
procedure from the organization that originally approved the plan."
For example, the construction of a water project must be in conformity
with the relevant basin comprehensive plan. Before submitting a
feasibility study for approval, the relevant BMIs or CDWAs should
inspect and give its opinion whether5 the construction is in conformity
with the basin comprehensive plan.1 1

D. THE ALLOCATION OF WATER RESOURCES

In order to strengthen the macro-management of the development
and utilization of water resources, reasonably allocate water resources,
standardize allocation of water resources, reduce conflicts surrounding
water use, and harmonize social and economic development with the
situation of water resources, the 2002 China Water Law sets up a water
resources allocation system and controls water use through a quota
system.
According to the system, the competent department of
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 18.
Id. art. 19.
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development and planning administration and the CDWA under the
State Council, the National Development and Reform Commission,
and the MWR respectively, manage national macro-allocation of water
resources.2 M Additionally, the long-term and medium-term plan for
The
water supply and demand should be assessed by them.'
adjustment and storage of in-stream flows or allocation of water
quantity shall be in accordance with basin plans and the long-term and
medium-term plans of water supply and demand. 58 The allocation
plan of water quantity shall be made within each basin as a unit.2 9
When an allocation scheme of water quantity and/or the prescheme of diverting water in drought emergency involves different
provinces and autonomous regions of CGMs,' 0 the Law directs the
BMI to formulate these schemes, in consultation with provincial or
autonomous region governments, or with CGMs.26 The Law further
directs the BMI to submit the scheme for approval to the State Council
Other transor its authorized department prior to execution.2"2
administrative-regional water quantity allocation schemes, and the prescheme of water diversion in a drought emergency, shall be
formulated by the CDWA of common people's government at the next
higher level in consultation with the relevant local people's
governments.2 63 These schemes shall be submitted to the people's
government
2 64 at the corresponding level for approval, and then can be
executed.
After a scheme's approval, local governments involved must
execute it. 265 The construction and development of water resources
that cross administrative regions must be in conformity with the
approved basin allocation scheme. The relevant people's governments
at the county level shall submit the project to the CDWA of their
at the next higher level or the BMI for
common 2governments
approval.6
CDWAs at the county level or BMI, in accordance with the
approved allocation scheme of water quantity and annual predicted
income water quantity, shall formulate an annual allocation scheme of
water quantity and an annual adjusting plan, and implement a unified
adjustment of water quantity. The local people's government must
obey these schemes.6 7
According to the quota management system and procedures
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. art. 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 45.
2002 Water I -aw of the PRC art. 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 45.
Id art. 46.
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provided by law, provincial departments of industry administration
shall formulate water-using quotas for different industries.2
The
development and planning department of local people's government
at or above the county level, in conjunction with the CDWA at the
corresponding level, shall formulate the annual water-using plan and
control the total annual water use within the administrative region on
the basis of the water-use quota, economic and technological
conditions, and the water quantity allocated to the administrative
region.2"
E. CONSERVATION OF WATER

2002 China Water Law strengthens the 1988 law's system of
conservation, making water resource conservation a general principle
in all relevant areas. The 2002 Law contains seventeen articles relevant
to water conservation:
* The State shall practice strict water conservation;27°
* The people's government at all levels should27 adopt
measures to strengthen conservation management; 1

Any unit or individual is under the duty to save water;272
The State shall implement a system to determine and
define the amount of water available for use within each
administration 3 division-in effect, setting quotas for water
consumption;1
* The State shall implement systems for collecting fees for
water use, with
increased fees for above-quota water
274
consumption;
• The State shall promote increased efficiency in water use
among agricultural, industrial and municipal uses.2 7 5
The construction of a new project, or the extension or
reconstruction of existing project, must include proposals for saving
water. Water conservation facilities for a construction project must be
designed, built, and commissioned together with the principle part of
the project." 6
*
*

F. WATER RESOURCES PROTECTION

The 2002 legislation had to address water resources protection to
deal with an increase in water pollution, significant depletion of
ground water, detriments to the ecological environment, weak

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

id. art. 47.
Id. art. 47.
Id. art. 8.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 8.
Id. art. 47.
Id. art. 49.
Id. arts. 50-52.
Id. art. 53.
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coordination between water quality and quantity, and pollution
prevention.
Thus, to ensure comprehensive development and
utilization of water resources, the 2002 China Water Law created a
"water function zone system",277 and a "drinking water protection zone

system.",278

1. The Water Function Zone System
Establishing the Zones
In accordance with Article 2.1 of Management Rules on Water
Function Zones issued by the MWR on May 23, 2003, a water function
zone is a special water zone which is delimited by its major function
and corresponding standards for water quality.2 79 Under 2002 China
Water Law, the delimitation of water function zones in different basins
may be different, and the differences could be summarized as follows.
For State-designated major rivers or lakes, the CDWA under the
State Council is directed to establish water function zones.2 80 The
CDWA drafts plans for the zones in conjunction with the department
of environment protection administration, other relevant departments
under the State Council, provincial or autonomous regional
governments, or CGMs.28 The zones also account for basin
comprehensive plans, water resources protection plans, and economic
and social development. 22 The CDWA then submits proposed water
function zones to the State Council for approval. 3
For rivers or lakes other than major rivers or lakes that cross
provinces, autonomous regions or CGMs, water function zones shall be
drafted by relevant BMIs in conjunction with CDWAs and other
After each provincial
departments of provincial governments.284
government inspects and comments on the drafts, the CDWA under
the State Council, in conjunction with the department of environment
protection administration under the State Council, shall review the
draft zones. 215 Finally, the State Council or its authorized department
286
reviews and approves the draft zones.
As to rivers other than those mentioned in the above two
paragraphs, CDWAs of local people's governments at or above the
county level, in conjunction with the department of environmental
277. Id. art. 30.
278. Id. art. 31.
279. See Management Rules on Water Function Zones, art. 2.1. Management Rules
on Water Function Rules, Chinese version available at MWR webpage
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/index/20030603/7083.asp (last visited February 27, 2004).
280. 2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 32 (translated by Chinalaw-assisted Legal
Research Center, Peking University, LEXIS, Chinalawinfo Selected PRC Laws,
PRCLEG 2461).

281.

2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 31.

282.

Id.

283.

Id. art. 32.

284.
285.

Id.
Id.

286.

Id.
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at
the
other departments
and
protection
administration
corresponding level, draft water function zones."7 The CDWAs then
submit a draft to the government at the corresponding level or its
authorized department for approval, as well as to the CDWA and the
competent department of environment protection administration at
the next higher level for record. 8
Establishing Water Quality Standards
CDWAs at or above the county level or the BMIs define the
capacity of accepting waste within the zone. " CDWA considers such
factors as the water quality needs for various water uses and the natural
purification capacity of water bodies in a particular water zone.290
Based on these factors, the CDWA submits limits to the department of
environmental protection regarding total water discharge into the
29 1
zone.
CDWAs of governments at or above the county level or the BMI
shall supervise water quality in each water function zone. 2 When total
waste discharge exceeds a limit, or the water quality in the zone does
not meet functional water quality needs, the CDWA shall report to the
corresponding people's government for the latter to adopt control
measures and send information to the department of environment
•
9n20
protection
.
2. The Drinking Water Protection Zone System
According to the drinking water protection zone system,
governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and CGMs shall
delineate drinking water protection zones. Once established, these
zones adopt measures to prevent water resource pollution and
depletion in order to ensure safe drinking water for urban and rural
residents. 29 4 Sewage outlets are not permitted in drinking water
protection zones. 2895
The 2002 Law also addresses ground water use as the north of the
PRC suffers from substantial overdrafts. Under the law, limitations
exist for three ground water categories. First, where less significant
drawdown has occurred, government at or above the county level must
adopt strict measures to limit the drawdown. 9" Second, where more
severe drawdown has occurred, ground water withdrawals must be
prohibited after province, autonomous region, and municipal
governments directly under the Central Government approve the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.art. 33.
2002 Water Law of the PRC art. 34.
Id. art. 36.
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prohibition zone.
Finally, ground water withdrawals along coastal
areas must be limited, and such limitations are to be based on
scientific studies regarding ground subsidence and saltwater
in trusion. '8
IX. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK UNDER 2002 CHINA WATER
LAW
In light of water shortages, and in an attempt to achieve
sustainable water resources use, the 2002 China Water Law requires
stronger unified administration, and more centralized overall basin
management. Further, unified water resources management should
be separated from the development, utilization, conservation and
protection of water resources.299 The Law requires the State to exercise
a system of basin administration in coordination with regional
administration.30° Under this system, the following institutions are
involved in water resources administration: the State Council, the
CDWA, the department of environment protection administration, the
department of development and planning administration, BMIs, and
301
other relevant departments under these entities.
A. THE MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES

The State Council designated the Ministry of Water Resources 2
("MWR") as its CDWA in 1988. The MWR's authority has been further
expanded since the State Council institutional reform in 1998.303 The
MWR has the following mandates:
" Formulate water-related policies, development strategies,
and medium and long-term development plans, including
water conservation and demand management policies;
* Draft and implement the enabling legislation and design of
This includes
water-related regulatory frameworks.
implementation of the water-drawing permit system and
the water resource fee system, and mediation and
arbitration of inter-sector and trans-provincial water
disputes. Trans-provincial, as used in this article, means
autonomous
involvement in different province(s),
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. arts. 1, 2,8, 12.
300. Id. art. 12.
301. 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. arts. 12-13.
Resources
of
the
P.R.C.
website,
at
302. See
Ministry
of Water
http://www.mwr.gov.cn (last modified Apr. 13, 2004).
303. See, e.g., 1998 Constitutional Law of the P.R.C., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Fagui Huibian [Fagui Huibian] [Laws & Regulations of the P.R.C.], translated in LAws

&

REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED

MAiTrERS 17-21 (1998) (adopting decision to eliminate the Ministry of Geology and
Mineral Resources and create the Ministry of Water Resources to administer
groundwater according to the Decision on the Plan for Reforming the Organizational
Structure of the State Council).
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region(s), or CGM(s).
Implement the integrated management of water resources,
water, surface water, and
including atmospheric
groundwater. This includes formulation, execution, and
supervision of both national and inter-provincial
development plans for water supply and demand, and
schemes for water allocation; assessment of water resources
and flood risk and flood mitigation measures in relation to
the overall planning of the national economy, urban
planning, and major construction projects; publication to
national research and development in hydrology; guidance
to national research and development in hydrology.
Formulate water resource protection plans in accordance
with related national laws, regulations, and standards
concerning resource and environmental protection;
demarcate water function zones and control wastewater
discharge into potable and other water areas; monitor
water levels and quality in rivers, lakes, and reservoirs;
review and approve pollution loading capacities of water
bodies, including proposals to limit total wastewater
discharge.
Formulate economic regulatory measures for the water
sector; exercise macroeconomic regulation on the
utilization of funds within the water industry; provide
guidance for economic activities related to water supply,
hydropower, and diversified development within the water
sector; provide recommendations on economic regulation
of water pricing, taxation, credit and financial affairs.
Draft and review proposals and feasibility study reports on
large and medium-sized capital water construction projects
in the water sector.
Draft and supervise both the execution of technical
standards for the water sector, and specifications and codes
for water works; implement key hydrological research
projects; and popularize and disseminate water related
technologies.
Protect hydraulic facilities, water areas, dykes and coast
lines; and regulate, reclaim, and develop major rivers,
major lakes and beaches; manage foreign affairs regarding
international rivers between China and its neighboring
countries; organize construction and management of key
controlling and trans-provincial water projects; organize
and direct the monitoring and management of reservoir
and dam hydropower stations.
Provide guidance for activities related to rural water
resources; organize and coordinate capital construction of
farmland drainage and irrigation, rural electrification, and
water supply projects for townships and villages.
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*

Organize water and soil conservation nationwideincluding the creation and development of engineering
measures for water and soil conservation- and monitor,
prevent, and control soil and water losses.
* Oversee science, technology and foreign affairs activities
for water resources, including guidance in developing a
competent work force for the water sector.
" Oversee operations of the State Flood Control and Drought
Relief Headquarters. This includes the organization,
coordination, supervision, and direction of nationwide
flood control, and includes the execution of operations of
flood control and drought prevention for major river
basins and key water projects.
" Other duties and responsibilities as assigned by the State
Council. 4
Ten departments in the Ministry undertake the above functions.
According to the 2002 Law, the MWR is to be in charge of the
unified administration and supervision of water resources throughout
the entire country. M 5 Specifically, its main duties are:
" Establish BMIs in major rivers or lakes as designated by the
State.3"6
* Organize and implement a water-drawing permit system
and paid use of the water resources system throughout the

country.307
*

*

*

Organize scientific investigation, survey, and assessment of
water resources, in coordination with other departments
under the State Council. 8
Formulate comprehensive plans for major river or lake
basins as designated by the State, in coordination with
other departments under the State Council and provincial,
autonomous region, and municipal governments directly
under the Central Government, and submit such plans to
the State Council for approval."
Inspect and examine basin comprehensive plans and
regional comprehensive plans for trans-provincial rivers or
lakes other than major rivers or lakes as submitted to it;
invite comments from other relevant departments under
the State Council, and submit plans to the State Council or
its authorized department for approval. 3' °

304. See Ministry of Water Resources of the P.R.C., Main Responsibilities, at
http://www.mwr.gov.cn/english/about-mwr/aboutmwr_mr.htm (last visited Apr. 14,
2004).
305. See 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 12.
306. Id.
307. Id. art. 7.
308. Id. art. 16.
309. Id. art. 17.
310. Id.
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Initially designate water function zones for major rivers or
lakes as designated by the State, in coordination with the
department of environment protection administration and
other relevant departments under the State Council,
governments of relevant provinces, autonomous regions or
Such zones must comply with the basin
CGMs.'
comprehensive plan, protection plan of water resources,
and the economic and social development demand.1 2 The
MWR is then required to submit the proposed zones to the
State Council for approval.
" Inspect and examine water function zones for transprovincial rivers or lakes other than major rivers or basins
as submitted to it, in conjunction with the department of
environment protection administration under the State
Council, and submit the same to the State Council or its
authorized department for approval. 4
* Delimit management and protection zones for water
projects administrated by it, in consultation with the
people's government of relevant provinces, autonomous
regions, or CGMs.31'
Together with the department of development and planning
administration under the State Council, direct national macro
316
allocation of water resources.
In conjunction with other relevant departments, formulate
national and trans-provincial long-term and medium-term plans for
water demand and supply. MWR must then submit these plans to the
department of development and planning administration under the
State Council for approval, and then execute the plans after
approval. 7
Issue water-drawing permits to entities or individuals who draw
water directly from rivers, lakes or ground aquifers, consistent with
relevant provisions.1 8
Strengthen supervision and inspection over acts in violation of the
Water
Law, and investigate and settle these acts in accordance with the
19
"

law.3

When acts in violation of the law or dereliction of duty by lower
CDWAs are found in its supervision and inspection work, order such
acts be corrected within a deadline.2 °

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 43.
Id. art. 44.
2002 Water Law of the P.RC. art. 44.
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 59.
Id. art. 63.
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B. BMI
Two kinds of BMI exist under 2002 China Water Law: those set up
by the CDWA under the State Council in major State-designate rivers
or lakes, and those in trans-provincial rivers or lakes (other than major
321
rivers or lakes).
As to the BMI in the major rivers or lakes, their general duty is to
exercise management and supervision authority on water resources
within the corresponding jurisdiction as stipulated by law(s) or
regulation(s) or as authorized by the CDWA under the State
Council. 22 In the six key river basins-the Changjiang, Huanghe,
Haihe, Huaihe, Zhujiang, and the Song-Laohe-a conservation
commission has been set up. In the Tai Lake Basin, the Tai Lake
established.
Water Resources Management Bureau has been
33
Generally, each BMI is given the following mandates: 1
1. Implement, supervise, and inspect the Water Law and other
related laws and regulations, draft water-related policies
and regulations within the basin, execute water
administrative law, supervise water resources administration
and reconsideration of water administration, handle
disputes involving violations of water law; and mediate and
settle inter-provincial water disputes;
2. Organize formulation of basin comprehensive plans and
relevant specialty plans, and supervise and implement such
plans;
3. Direct unified administration and supervision of water
resources (including surface water and ground water)
throughout the entire basin, i.e. organize the survey and
assessment of water resources within the basin, and
formulate inter-provincial allocation schemes of water
quantity, issue water withdrawal permits, etc.;
4. Direct water resources protection, organize the delineation

321. 1& art. 17.
322. Id. art. 12.
323. Their mandates in detail (in Chinese) are available at
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300045.htm,
Changjiang River Water Resources Commission,
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300046.htm,
River Water Resources Commission,
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300047.htm,
River Water Resources Commission,
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300048.htm,
River Water Resources Commission,
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300051 .htm,
Water Resources Commission,
http://pe.chinawater.com.cn/jgbz/20020830/200208300049.htm,
Laohe River Water Resources Commission, and
http://ple.chinawater.com.cn/jgb/20020830/20020830050.htm,
Authority (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
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of water function zones, define the zones' capacities for
accepting waste, submit the limit on total waste discharge
into the zones, and direct supervision of water quantity and
quality;
5. Organize or participate in flood and drought control
within the basin;
6. Control or develop rivers, lakes, and estuary beaches within
the basin; and
7. Manage relevant water projects.
As for BMI in other trans-provincial rivers or lakes, their main
duties are:
1. Formulate basin comprehensive plans and regional
comprehensive plans in conjunction with CDWAs and
other provincial departments; submit those plans to the
CDWA under the State Council for inspection and consent,
Council or its authorized
and ultimately to the 32State
4
department for approval;

2.

Inspect whether the construction of a water project
conforms with the basin comprehensive plan before giving
its opinion of32 5the project and submitting its feasibility study
for approval;

Initially delineate water function zones of rivers or lakes in
conjunction with CDWAs, departments of environmental
protection administration, and other relevant provincial
government departments; and submit such plans to the
departments
for
government
relevant
provincial
inspection;
4. Determine the zones' capacity for accepting waste in
accordance with its water quality needs by determining the
function of water use to the natural purification ability of
the water body in a particular water zone, and then submit
the limitation on total waste .discharge into the zone to the
7
department of environmental protection administration;1
5. Monitor water quality in water function zones, and when
total discharge of a regulated pollutant exceeds the control
limitation, or water quality of the water function zone does
not meet water quality needs (by the function of water use),
provide timely reports to the relevant department to adopt
control measures, and send this information to the
department of environment protection administration;32
6. Delineate management and protection zones for water
projects administered by the BMI, in consultation with the
3.

324.
325.
326.

327.
328.

See 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 17.1.
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 32.1.
Id. art. 32.3.
Id. art. 32.4.
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7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

government2 9of the relevant provinces, autonomous regions,
and CGMs;
Formulate an allocation plan for water and a preliminary
plan for water diversion during drought emergencies that
involve provinces, autonomous regions, and CGMs, in
consultation with relevant provincial, autonomous region,
and municipality departments directly under the Central
State Council
Government; and submit these plans to the
30
or its authorized department for approval;
Approve the construction of water resource development
or utilization projects within the BMI's jurisdiction;'
Formulate annual water allocation plans and implement
unified water quantity regulation in accordance with
and annual
approved water quantity allocation plans
02
predictions of incoming water quantities;
Issue water withdrawal permits to the unit or individual
who withdraws water directly from rivers, lakes or ground
aquifers in accordance with relevant provisions; 3 and
Strengthen supervision and inspection over water law
violations, and investigate and settle these acts in
accordance with the law. '
C. LOCAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT

Pursuant to the 2002 China Water Law, local governments at or
above the county level play a very important role in the administration
of water development, utilization, conservation, and protection of
Their main
water resources, as well as the control of water disasters.
duties are to:
construction,
1. Intensify water conservation facilities
including those facilities in the national economic and
social development plan at the corresponding level; 336 7
2. Adopt measures to promote water-saving technology;
3. Jointly formulate a basin comprehensive plan for major
rivers or lakes with the governments at the provincial level
within those basins;33"
4. For provincial governments, to inspect basin and regional
comprehensive plans for trans-provincial rivers or lakes
within their jurisdiction (other than major rivers or lakes),
329. Id. art. 43.
330. 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 45.2.
331. Id. art. 45.4.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. art. 46.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 59.
Id. art. 1.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 5.
Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 17.
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s
and provide their
9 opinions to the department of water

administration;3

Participate in formulation of basin and regional
comprehensive plans concerning their jurisdiction;340
6. For governments at various levels, approve basin and
plans for river or lake basins within
regional comprehensive
41
jurisdiction;3
their
7. Approve specialty plans within their jurisdictions; 342
8. For government at various levels, reasonably organize
utilization of water
development and comprehensive
3 4
5.

resources within itsjurisdiction;

9.

1

For government at various levels, strengthen management
over affairs concernin, irrigation, drain water-logged areas,
and soil conservation;M4

10. For provincial governments, to participate in drafting
functional division plans for major rivers and lakes within
their jurisdictions;3

11. For provincial governments, to review functional division
plans of trans-provincial rivers and lakes that cross their
to
jurisdictions (other than major rivers and lakes referred
6
in paragraph 10) and offer the drafters suggestions;3
12. For governments at various levels, to participate in drafting
functional division plans for other rivers and lakes found in
their territory but not referred to in paragraph 10 or 11,
and approve4 7 functional division plans within their
jurisdictions;
13. For provincial governments, to adopt a system to conserve
potable water sources and take preventive measures against
pollution and depletion to ensure safe drinking water for
urban and rural residents;341
14. For provincial government, delineate management and
protection zones for water projects other than those
administrated by the CDWA under the State Council or
BMIs;3 49
15. Approve or participate in formulating plans for water
allocation and plans for water regulation in drought

539.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id.
Id.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 17.
Id. art. 23.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 32.
Id.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 33.
Id. art. 43.
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emergencies; "'
16. Adjudicate water disputes between different administrative
divisions;'"
17. For local governments, to mediate water disputes between
units or individuals;152 and
18. For local governments, to require violations to be corrected
within a certain deadline if, when supervising and
inspecting, the government discovers its CDWA or lower
CDWAs have violated the law or neglected their duties.
D. THE CDWA OF LOCAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
The CDWAs of local government at or above the county level also
play an important role in water administration under 2002 China
Water Law. r4 Each CDWA is charged with unified administration and
supervision of water within its corresponding administration region
consistent with its authorized power.3 55 Their main duties include:
1. Organize the comprehensive scientific investigation, survey
with
and assessment of water resources, in conjunction
35
; 1
other departments at the corresponding leve
2. For provincial CDWAs, participate in the formulation of
plans for non-major trans-provincial
basin comprehensive
3 7
rivers or lakes; 5
3. Formulate basin and regional comprehensive plans for
river basins or lakes (other than major or trans-provincial
rivers or lakes) in conjunction with relevant departments
and local government, then submit these plans to the
government at the corresponding level or its authorized
department for approval, and to the CDWA at the next
higher level for recording;' 8
4. Determine whether the construction of a water project on a
river or lake (other than major or trans-provincial rivers or
lakes) conforms with the basin comprehensive plan, and
provide comments and signed project approval prior to
submitting the project feasibility report for approval; 5
construction by agricultural collective
5. Approve reservoir
organizations; ' O
6. For provincial CDWAs, participate in the initial drafting of
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. art. 45.
Id. art. 56.
Id. art. 57.
Id. art. 63.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 12.
Id.
Id. art. 16.
Id. art. 17.
Id.
Id. art. 19.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 25.
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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

361.

water functions zones for trans-provincial rivers or lakes
(other than major rivers or basins which involve them);161
Initially delineate water function zones for rivers or lakes
(other than major or trans-provincial rivers or basins within
its jurisdiction), in conjunction with the department of
environmental protection administration and other
relevant departments at that level, submit them to the
corresponding level of government and its authorized
department for approval, and to the CDWA and the
department of environmental protection administration at
the next higher level for recording;
Define acceptable pollution levels of the zone based on its
water quality needs by determining the function of water
use within the zone and the natural purification ability of
the water body, and submit these zone waste discharge
limits to the department of environmental protection
administration; s3"
Supervise water quality in various water functional divisions,
and recommend, to the environmental protection
administration, limitations on discharging polluted water
from the divisions; 3 4
Collaborate with relevant departments at corresponding
levels of government to formulate mid- and long-term plans
for water supply and demand, and submit these plans to
the government department
36 5 of development planning
administration for approval;
Consult with relevant local governments in formulating a
trans-regional water allocation plan and preliminary plan
for severe droughts, and submit these plans to the
government at the appropriate level for approval and
execution;36
Approve construction of water resource development or
367
utilization projects within their jurisdictions;
Formulate annual water allocation and regulation plans,
and execute unified water regulation based on the
approved allocation plan3 and the annual forecasting of
incoming water quantities; 8
Formulate annual water use plans and define total annual
water use within the administrative region in conjunction
with the corresponding development and planning

Id. art. 32.

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365.
366.
367.
368.
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2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 45.
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departments of local people's governments on the basis of
water-use quotas, economic and technological conditions,
and water quantities allocated to the administrative
region; 6 9
15. Issue water withdrawal permits to units or individuals who
directly withdraw water from rivers, lakes, 7°or ground
aquifers in accordance with relevant provisions;1
16. Strengthen supervision and inspection of water law
violations and impartially investigate and settle these
violations in accordance with law;371 and

of law or
17. Order lower-level CDWAs to correct violations
3 72
dereliction of duty within a specified time.
E. OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Under 2002 China Water Law, other departments under the State
Council must develop, utilize, conserve, and protect water resources in37
1
conformity with the respective responsibility assigned to them.
Other departments of local governments at or above the county level
must develop, utilize, conserve, and protect water resources in
conformity with the respective responsibility assigned to them within
their administration region.'14 The law devotes special attention to the
department of environmental protection administration and to the
For
department of development and planning administration.
example, the departments of environmental protection administration
at various levels exercise unified supervision and management of
prevention and control of water pollution. 75 These departments also
participate in initial delineation of water function zones for major river
and lake basins.7T Both the department of development and planning
administration and the CDWA under the State Council are responsible
The competent
for national allocation of water resources.
departments of development and planning administration of
government at various levels must inspect and approve national and
trans-provincial long-term and medium-term plans of water demand
and supply within their respective jurisdictions. 71

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. art. 47.
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 59.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 63.
Id. art. 13.
Id.
See Law for Water Pollution Prevention and Control of the PRC art. 4.1.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 32.
Id. art. 44.
Id.
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Chart III: Institutional Framework under 2002 China Water Law

The State Council i-e, the Central PG

N]
PZZ

other miiswes and

Notes: I .
2.

expresses administrative leadership relations.
expresses professional leadership relations.

3.
4expresses co-operative relations.
4.PG: people's government.
5.MWR: Ministry of Water Resources.
6.NEPA: National Environmental Protection Agency.
7.CDEPA: competent department of environment protection admnistration
S.CDDPA: competent department of development and planning administration.
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X. CONCLUSION
China faces numerous challenges in implementing an effective
system of water resources management. Water shortage, both in
quantity and quality, has become one of the principal factors
restricting national economic and social development in China. The
unchecked and often ad hoc approach to the management of China's
water resources has resulted in unreasonable, inequitable, and
unsustainable development, with inadequate attention to protection of
its water resources. It is both necessary and urgent to strengthen the
legal and administrative regime that governs China's fresh water
resources. This must be considered in a context that is more broad
than the approach adopted under the 2002 Water Law. "Water law,
whether national or international, is relevant at all stages of water
resource development and management. " 379
From an initial evaluation of national practice, it appears that the
2002 China Water Law has introduced important and effective new
concepts not included in the 1988 China Water Law. There is a clear
objective to provide a legal framework that promotes the sustainable
utilization of China's national water resources. As such, the adoption
of the 2002 Water Law must be considered a milestone in the
development of Chinese water law and management.
However, the 2002 China Water Law contains some serious
shortcomings: it offers only a general legal framework for management
and fails to address key problems related to flooding and droughts. In
addition, the law faces difficulties in actual implementations on the
ground. For example, numerous rules and regulations enacted under
the 1988 Water Law have yet to be repealed and amended to be in line
with the new 2002 Law. The next parts highlight the critical areas that
require more attention in the ongoing review of the effectiveness of
the existing legal regime that regulates China's waters.
A.

EMPHASIZING THE SUSTAINABLE UTILIZATION OF WATER RESOURCE

As stated in Principle I of the 1992 Dublin Principles, "(f]reshwater
is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life,
development and the environment. 3 01 The importance of attempting
to ensure sustainable water resource utilization cannot be
overestimated, especially in such a populated country as China. The
authors of 2002 China Water Law recognized the importance of
sustainable utilization of water resources by mandating that one of its
purposes is "realizing the sustainable utilization of water resources. ''3"
This purpose is also reflected in other provisions or systems of the

379. Patricia Wouters et al., The Legal Response to the World's Cisis: What Legacyfrom the
Hague?, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 418, 422 (2001).
380.

THE

DUBLIN

STATEMENT

ON

WATER

AND

SUSTAINABLE

http://www.gdrc.org/wem/water/dublin-statement.htMl,
381. 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. .

DEVELOPMENT,

(last visited Dec. 12, 2003).
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2002 China Water Law relating to the development, utilization,
conservation, and protection of water resources and to the control of
water disasters as discussed below.
Importantly the 2002 Water Law recognizes water use to protect
the environment as a beneficial use. 2 It requires that in the overall
scheme of water resource development and utilization, the demands of
domestic, urban and rural inhabitants be satisfied first; and further
that the demands for agricultural, industrial, and environmental water
uses, as well as navigational requirements, are next considered and
satisfied" 3 Notably, in drought or semi-drought areas, ecological
environmental water demands are required to be given full
National economic and social
consideration and attention.38 '
development plans, urban master plans, and the location of large,
important construction projects are required to conform with local
water resource conditions and flood control demands.3 "5 In water
deficient areas, urban growth and development of high water
consumption industries, agriculture, or services are required to be
In hydropower station development, the ecological
restricted.3
environment must be protected, and flood control, water supply,
irrigation, navigation, bamboo and log rafting, fishery, etc., are
required to be taken into account.:8
Secondly, water function zones, drinking water protection zones,
ground water zones in which extraction is forbidden or restricted, and
groundwater abstraction control in coastal areas are of great value in
ensuring the sustainable utilization of water resources.
B. STRENGTHENING UNIFIED AND INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT

The 2002 China Water Law strengthens the unified and integrated
approach to water resources management. This can be seen in several
First, improvements are reflected in the
important provisions.
institutional framework, created under the 2002 law, e.g., basin
administration of water resources in coordination with administrative
The CDWA operates under the State
regional administration.
Council, the MIWR directs unified water resources administration and
supervision throughout the country, the legal status of BMIs is
established, and the CDWAs of local governments play a more
important role in the unified administration and supervision of water
resources in conformity with the authorized power within its
Second, the new law
corresponding administration region.
emphasizes unified and integrated basin water resources management,
e.g., requiring that planning be undertaken using river basins as basic
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. art. 4,
Id. art. 21.
Id.
Id. art. 23.
Id.
2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 26.
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units of management, both in the development, utilization,
conservation, and protection of water resources, and in controlling
water disasters. The regional plan within a basin is required to
conform with the local basin plan, and the basin specialty plan should
conform with the basin comprehensive plan. The plan must be
executed strictly once approved and water project construction must
Third, as
conform with relevant basin comprehensive plan.
mentioned above, according to its duty, the BMI plays a more
important role in many aspects of water resources administration
Local government at various levels have realized the importance of
water resources in local economic and social development, and many
are seeking more autonomy in water management within their
jurisdictions.8 Accordingly, during the Second Amendment Draft of
2002 China Water Law, Article 19 of the Amendment Draft was
amended to diminish some of the powers initially granted to the BMI.
Thus, it may be difficult to predict whether or not the system of basin
with
administrative
regional
administration
in
association
administration will operate effectively and efficiently, and whether or
not the BMIs will exercise its authority consistently and effectively in
line with the agreed objectives. On the other hand, BMIs in major
rivers or lakes are established by the CDWA under the State Council,
but the 2002 China Water Law does not provide how BMIs in transprovincial rivers or lakes other than the major rivers or lakes should be
set up, and by what institutions they shall be supervised. Clearly, there
is a need for the roles and relative mandates of the relevant actors,
including the BMIs, local governments, and the CDWAs to be clarified
and coordinated. A failure to do so may lead to overall confusion and
ineffective implementation of the objectives of the new law.
C. CONSTRUCTING AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT RIGHTS SYSTEM
CONCERNING WATER

"[The] stability of water rights is an important principle in water
law," and "[a] system of stable water rights is an incentive to invest in
the development and conservation of water resources."38 Experience
demonstrates that effective planning is essential in managing limited
resources such as water. The absence of such a system will undermine
the key policy objective of achieving the reasonable and sustainable
"9
utilization of water resources. Further, "rights concerning water , 0
should not be considered to be a static system; such an approach does
388. Shi Guosheng, Regulating the Construction of Water Project in Accordance with the
Law, National People's Congress News, Apr. 26, 2002.
389. The Dublin Principles for Water as Reflected in a Comparative Assessment of
Institutional and Legal Arrangements for Integrated Water Resources Management, TAC
GROUND PAPERS No 3, (Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC)),June 1999, at 29.
390. The term "rights concerning water" is employed here as a comprehensive and
wide meaning of property rights concerning water or water resources. It not only
includes water-use rights, the right under permit or license, property right over water,
but also includes the property right relating to water service, water project, etc..
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not recognize the changing nature of water use. However, a marketoriented approach does introduce commercial risk and it is clear that
changing water rights could be difficult to identify, transfer and
negotiate in the Chinese market system.
The 2002 China Water Law provides for a more unified and
scientifically-based planning system. Of fundamental importance to
the success of this approach, however, is the substantive content of
such plans, including details of the procedures to be employed to
ensure the feasibility and viability of such plans, and the mechanisms
to monitor implementation and ongoing compliance with these plans.
The water withdrawal permit system is the essential tool through
which water plans are implemented. The permit system also plays a
vital role in protecting the resource and in ensuring the stability of
water rights. Critical to the success of the water permit system is its
conformity with the planning efforts; a failure to achieve consistent
operational links between these efforts will result in a water-permit
systems will exists in form only, without any meaningful value.
The water permit system was implemented in line with the 1994
adoption of the Implementation Procedures for Water Drawing Permit
System. 9 ' Unfortunately, there have been serious shortcomings with
the permit system (e.g., the scope of the system, the conditions and
procedure of getting a permit, etc.), which have not adequately
addressed the continued problem of water shortage..
The notion of water pricing should be one of the most important
factors in determining whether, or not, the water resources in China
will be used rationally. However, a preliminary evaluation of the
current performance of China's water pricing system suggests that the
existing price structure lead to inequitable and sometimes
It proves difficult - and in some cases,
unreasonable results.
impossible - to compare water prices for water use in different sectors,
or in different regions and even in different units of the same sector or
region. As mentioned above, individuals or units pay water charges to
the supplying unit when they use water supplied by the waterworks, but
the units directly extracting water from ground aquifers in cities pay
only the water resources fee. Therefore, although sometimes the price
of supplied water is much lower than its cost, entities-especially
medium or large entities-prefer to obtain permits for withdrawing
water directly from ground aquifers. Reasons for doing this, include
the following: it is cheaper than purchasing water from water
supplying units, more freedom exists from such an approach, and it is
more likely to obtain water of better quality. The average water
charges for industry have been estimated to account for no more than
0.1-1.0 percent of average product cost. The water used for agriculture
is priced much lower than for industry.192 As a result, water used in
391. See Implementation Procedures for Water Drawing Permit System. art. 27.
392. See, Deng Wei & He Yan, Water Resources, One of the Most Important Resources
Problems to be paid More Attention in the World in 21st Century, 2 SCIENTIA GEOGRAPHY
SINICA 99 (1999).
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industrial, commercial, and agricultural activities is often wasted.
Irrational irrigation methods, such as flooding of upper or middle
reaches of a river or irrigation system, results from the imbalance
between price and true cost. The effects do not stop with waste: the
high water table caused by such water recharge is the main reason for
farmland salinization in western China. 93
The idea that the water pricing system should be reformed in
China has interested many scientists and politicians over the past six
years,3 :4 but effective changes in this sector have lagged far behind
activities in the other economic sectors in China. The present water
pricing system does not fit the market economy mechanism and is of
limited value in regulating water use. Under a reformed water pricing
system, all relevant factors and circumstances should be taken into
consideration when calculating water charges. Among these factors
and circumstances are: regional characteristics; human rights; the
nature of different industries; political and social influences;
conservation, protection, development, and economy of the use; and
the availability of alternatives of comparable value.
Although agriculture accounts for about seventy percent of total
water use in China, some agriculture producers (due to economic
About 768.5
necessity in most cases) pay no water charge at all."
million people live in rural areas. 3 9' Almost all live on individual pieces

of land approximately 1,000 M 2. RCEOs allocate the land to each
individual.- 7 In the last two decades, the heavy burden of charges and
fees has made it difficult for people to survive in most regions of the
state, and every year about 0.6 million peasants commit suicide.398 A
preferred water tariff scheme in China would consider water charges
for peasants under the rubric of human rights, as an important
political and social issue. Therefore, under 2002 China Water Law, the
water pricing scheme, under the water permit system, should not apply
to water-use by RCEOs or their members using waters in ponds or
reservoirs owned by the RCEO itself. 99 The user-pays approach
adopted under the 2002 China Water Law requires payments by users
to the supplying unit in accordance with State provisions. 4 0 The price
for this water is determined by factoring cost, reasonable interest,
393. See Jiang Keiping, Stepping Up Large-scale Irrigation District Water-saving
Rehabilitation is the Important Content of InfrastructureDevelopment in the West Developing
Strategy, 9 CHINA WATER REsOURCES 32-34 (2001).
394. See, e.g., Water Pricing Study Groups, Reports on Water Pricing Study in One
Hundred Water Management Units, 9 China Water Resources, 21-30 (2002).
395. See id.
396. See NATIONAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT STATIsTICS BULLETIN

OF

PRC

(2003), Chinese version available at National Bureau of Statistics of China web page
(last
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20040226_402131958.htm
visited Mar. 1, 2004).
397. Id.
398. Ling Jianfang, Poverty Not the Vital Reason for Peasants to Commit Suicide, China
Youth Daily, Nov. 21, 2003.
399. 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 7.
400. Id. art. 55.
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The National
water quality, price, and equitable burden.4'
Development and Planning Committee and Ministry of Water
Resources promulgated the Management Rules on Price of Water
Supplied by Water Project, in accordance with 2002 China Water Law
and Prices Law of PRC, on July 3, 2003. The Rules became effective on
January 1, 2004.4 The impact of these reforms has yet to be felt by
those who need it most. The water pricing system must take into
account the differing levels of regional economic development across
China, together with such other considerations as the need for social
stability, national and regional economic development and the real
need for conservation and protection of the resource, in terms of
water and the more broad environmental concerns. Water prices must
be reformed and implemented in a way that reflects the differences
between rural and urban areas, domestic and industrial uses, and
subsistence agricultural uses and commercial agriculture. The pricing
regime must also re-evaluate the quota requirements across the
spectrum of uses and users. There is a real need for a more
comprehensive review and harmonization of the water tariff and
charging system in China.
Transfer of Water Rights
The transfer of water rights has been discussed more in the last
Unfortunately, many people in China fundamentally
three years.
misunderstand, or only partially comprehend, the meaning of the
term "water rights." In the Amendment Draft, one provision governed
the transfer of rights concerning water, i.e., Article 45.2, which
provided that:
[a]ny unit or individual which has obtained the right to draw water,
and has saved water... within the duration and quantity of the

relevant permit, are entitled to transfer the saved water resources
after the aproval of the authorities which issued the relevant
permit ...

Because it generated much controversy and debate, the provision
was finally deleted. However, the water rights system should be further
perfected, as the efficient transfer of water rights can only occur under
an improved system.
D. PROMOTING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND CONSTRUCTING
INFORMATION-COLLECTING SYSTEM

The important role of civil society in the effective management of
401. Id..
402. MANAGEMENT RULES ON PRICE OF WATER SUPPLIED BY WATER PROJECT, Chinese
web
page
Water
Resources
at
Ministry
of
version
available
http://www.mwr.gov.cn:8160/ztbd/sjglbf/20030722/15547.asp

(last visited Dec. 12,

2003).
403.

See Desheng Hu, Research on the Delimitation of Property Rights of Water Resources, I

Journal of Henan Finance & Taxation College 37 (2004).
404. Amendment Draft art. 45.2.
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water resources has been confirmed around the world. China needs to
promote the more effective involvement of its public in the design and
delivery of its water management plans. Engaging the "public"
(broadly defined) has direct benefits, and many lessons can be learned
from examples of public participation across the world. Central to
effective public participation is access to relevant and useable
information. In China, improving public participation, including
access to information, would require a number of reforms and new
laws and administrative systems. The basis for such a regime 5is
recognition of the fundamental right to environmental information. 4
In developed countries, a great number of laws and policies are
employed to encourage, promote, or guarantee public participation.
On the one hand, the water laws in China provide a simple system for
public participation, the majority of which relevant provisions exist
only in principle, and are weak (if non-existent) in practice. There
appears to be a prevailing misunderstanding among the water
administrative bureaus at all levels that the public at large is
resources
uninterested
and
unknowledgeable
about
water
management and its issues. It is the responsibility of government to
involve the government: "Governments at national, regional and local
levels have the responsibility for making participation possible. This
involves the creation of mechanisms for stakeholder consultation at all
spatial scales; such as national, basin or aquifer, catchment and
community levels. ' 006 Moreover, "[g]overnments also have to help
create participatory capacity, particularly amongst women and other
,,1117
marginalized social groups.
We propose that the public be able to identify local water
problems, and help provide suggestions regarding water resource and
environment planning. Public participation in planning and decisionmaking would be extremely beneficial in achieving effective water
management and encouraging sustainable development. Although
the 2002 China Water Law does not provide substantive and
procedural rules that promote public participation, the Law on
Administrative Licenses of PRC (enacted at the 4th Session of the
Standing Committee of the Tenth NPC on August 27, 2003, and
effective on July 1, 2004) introduces principles of transparency,
fairness, and justice and provides a foundation for more effective
public participation. Chapter Four of this law provides a detailed
process for conferring licenses, which emphasizes, in particular, public
participation. 4°5 The approval procedure for water-withdrawal permits
405. STUART BELL & DONALD McGILLVRAY, BALL & BELL ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 215-218 (5th
ed. 2000).
406. Integrated Water Resources Management, TAC GROUND PAPERS No. 4 (Global Water
Partnership Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)), Mar. 2000, at 16.
407. Id. at 16-17.
408. See Law on Administrative Licenses of PRC at art. 5.1, Chinese version at
7
6
4
(last
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/145 6/28320/29258/292 1/20 1117.html
visited Oct. 10, 2003).
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is required to comply with the provisions of the Law on Administrative
License. 4 9 Thus, the implementation and effective enforcement of the
Law on Administrative Licenses by the PRC should, to a great extent,
promote increased public participation in the area of water resources
management across China.
Access to quality information, in the context of the promotion of
effective public participation, will require adequate and timely
information regarding the legal categories and related quality of
classified water; the identities of existing and new water users; and the
purposes for which the water is or will be used. Also it must be
recognized by China that "effective water management systems require
adequate official surveys, inventories, and cadastres of water sources
and water supplies, as well as up to date registers and records of water
uses and discharges into waters, water rights, and beneficiaries of such
Regrettably, no
rights, with their respective water allocations.""'
unified institution to provide this information exists in China, as
different sectors and different bodies at the provincial level or below
manage monitoring systems and the data recorded. This situation
limits effective information exchange and impedes effective water
management. Therefore, the CDWA or relevant BMI should establish
and supervise a unified monitoring body. Fortunately, two provisions
exist in 2002 China Water Law to regulate the information on
hydrology and water resources. Article 16.2 provides that
[pleople's governments at or above the county level shall strengthen
the establishment of [an] information system on hydrology and water
resources.

The

departments

of water

administration

and

administrative organizations for river basins of the people's
governments at or above the countyllevel shall strengthen the
dynamic monitoring of water resources.

Article 16.3 states, "[t] he basic hydrologic materials shall be made
known to the public in accordance with the relevant stipulations of the
State. 41 It seems that information collection on water resources has
awoken the government to pay attention to the people.
The 2002 China Water Law provided the PRC with a broad range
of new legal tools, which can assist in addressing the nation's serious
over-use problems and to manage this vital resource in a more
sustainable manner. The provisions for Integrated Water Resources
Management conform to the emerging world norm for water
resources planning, although the provisions for public participation
and transparency'need improvement.
409. Id. art. 3.
410. The Dublin Principles for Water as Reflected in a Comparative Assessment of
Institutional and Legal Arrangements for Integrated Water Resources Management, TAC
GROUND PAPERS No. 3, (Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee
(TAC)),JUne 1999, at 25.
411. 2002 Water Law of the P.R.C. art. 16.
412. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As a policy problem, the struggle to equitably apportion water
resources among competing interests has received mounting attention
throughout the arid West in recent years. The prior appropriation
system underscores the importance of distributing water resources.
The system, which governs water allocation in Colorado, was one of
the first legal doctrines adopted in many western states. Even among
these states, however, Colorado finds itself in a unique position
because its mountains serve as the headwaters to several interstate river
systems including the Missouri, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado.
Colorado is contractually obligated to assure the delivery of set
quantities of water to numerous adjacent and non-contiguous states,
leaving Coloradans with limited quantities of usable water. Rapid
population growth has strained and continues to pressure already overappropriated river systems. Drought conditions are common in the
summer months, and agricultural interests often find themselves in
conflict with municipalities in struggles over water use.
The competition for finite water supplies has hampered efforts to
maintain adequate flow levels in Colorado's rivers and streams.
Although the State developed a system nearly thirty years ago to
address the public's concern over dwindling instream flows ("ISFs"),
many argue room for improvement exists in the system that has failed
to accomplish its goals. Others believe the existing system threatens
individual water rights. Thus, questions of policy implementation
often give rise to disputes between environmental and agricultural
interests, while municipalities vie for water rights against both
competing interests. These disputes have created a public discourse
infused with rhetoric and intense emotion.
Across the West, competing stakeholders have waged a continual
debate over the most beneficial course of policy formulation. While
agricultural interests have formed community alliances in opposition
to environmental interests, their conservationist counterparts have
developed coalitions to advance agendas sometimes overtly hostile to
agrarian interests. Luckily, however, some concerned, forward-looking
organizations have undertaken the arduous chore of devising mutually
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acceptable solutions in arid regions facing pending water crises. In
some cases, members of these two seemingly divergent factions have
negotiated successfully. This article evaluates several instances in
policies
both
created
and compromise
which
concession
groundbreaking and effective. Specifically, the article examines water
right leasing as one of many alternative approaches to instream flow
("ISF") protection currently employed by other states.
Most western states still operate under the principle that charging
a sole state agency with guardianship over the public's interest in
protecting the state's water resources is preferable to allowing the
private acquisition of instream rights. However, Oregon and Montana
have implemented progressive programs through which private
entities may lawfully possess or facilitate the acquisition of ISF rights
under lease agreements. In most cases, conservation organizations
acquire these leases from agricultural users who, for one reason or
another, prefer to forgo their full appropriative use rights by leasing
them either to the organizations themselves or to state entities, which,
in turn, leave the water instream.
As a relatively new organization dedicated to acquiring and using
water rights for conservation purposes, the Colorado Water Trust
("CWT") has sought to determine the feasibility of and impediments
to Colorado's adoption of legal leasing mechanisms similar to those
Oregon and Montana have implemented. The ability to lease water in
a free market, CWAT believes, significantly expands its ability to protect
Thus,
and restore Colorado's vital free-flowing water resources.
through the work of water attorneys, concerned water users, and
organizations in lease-friendly states, CWT is working to develop a
coherent blueprint for the expansion of allowable ISF acquisitions,
particularly those based on lease transactions.
In assessing the feasibility of ISF leasing in Colorado, this article
asserts that despite the rigidity of its body of water law, Colorado is
poised for a more progressive approach to streamflow protection. The
article first presents a history of Colorado law pertaining to ISF
acquisition and then details the legal caveats that have prevented the
adoption of a more dynamic flow preservation scheme. Section II
identifies the primary stakeholders a new mode of right transaction
would affect. Section III introduces the leasing models, contrasting
the relatively restrictive Colorado framework with those of Oregon and
Montana whose laws are more accommodating to the private
acquisition of ISF rights. Accordingly, this section offers a background
of the grassroots, political, and legislative histories of these states'
acquisition laws, while paying particular attention to what has worked
and what has not. Section IV presents a number of limitations
associated with ISF right leasing. Section V recounts some of the
recent developments in Colorado water law that reflect the growing
pressure across the West to loosen restraints on free market ISF
Finally, Section VI presents a feasibility analysis of
exchanges.
Colorado's prospective adoption of instream leasing statutes in light of
the existing legal framework and political environment.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION REGIME
In Colorado, where the sun shines over three hundred days a year
and leaves the land dry and thirsty in most months, water is
increasingly becoming the state's most threatened natural resource.
Average precipitation in Colorado totals a mere sixteen and a half
inches per year.' As evidenced by the numerous water use restrictions
imposed statewide in 2002 and into 2003, the limited amount of
surface water produced by this relatively scant rain and snowfall barely
serves the current use practices of Colorado's burgeoning population.
Those wishing to preserve water in the state's rivers and streams have
experienced increasing frustration both with the lack of water after
senior agricultural and municipal users fulfill their rights and with the
rigidity and limited scope of the preservation programs. The problem,
as many see it, is that "Colorado ... has had in-stream flow protection
to keep bare minimum flows trickling ... during dry times. But the
provision is essentially useless. It protects a tiny percentage of streams
and is unenforceable, collapsing when senior water-rights holders call
for more water., 2 Others expressed their disfavor in more provincial
terms. As a recent comment in the Rocky Mountain News griped:
"Colorado's water allocation system is older than outhouses" and
needs substantial reform.!
The policy problems related to water use today can be traced to
the water development policies of the past. In 1902, Congress passed
the Reclamation Act.4

The Bureau of Reclamation, created shortly

after passage of the Act, "embarked upon a program of huge taxpayersubsidized dam and diversion projects to irrigate croplands and attract
more people to the region."
The plan worked, attracting many
potential farmers to the state who fervently applied their earlyacquired water rights to inefficient processes of cropland irrigation.
In terms of acre-feet of water used to achieve a given result, irrigation
is a costly endeavor, particularly when wasteful practices are employed.
One acre-foot of water ordinarily suffices to irrigate just one-half acre
of typical Colorado cropland each season.' This same amount of
water, which covers an acre of land to a depth of one foot, equals
1. Colo. River Water Users Ass'n, ColoradoState Profile, at
http://www.crwua.org/co/crwua-co.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
2. Ed Dentry, Go with the Flow: Conservationists Want State to Adjust Water Levels,
ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 9, 2002, at 17C.

3. Id.
4. Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 371-616 (2002).
5. News Release, Western Water Alliance, 100 Years Later, U.S. Reclamation
Bureau Stuck in 19th Century (June 17, 2002), at
http://www.westernwateralliance.org/news-pr_061202.html.
6. See Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 657-58 (1989).
7. See, e.g., Robert Benjamin Naeser & Lynne Lewis Bennett, The Cost of
Noncompliance: The Economic Value of Water in the Middle Arkansas River Valley, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES.

445, 458 (Summer 1998).
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roughly 326,000 gallons "or enough water to supply an urban family of
four for a year.""
While prior appropriation has demonstrated overwhelming success
over the years in apportioning water for consumptive uses, its
efficiency in doing so has in many ways stymied development of an
effective means to reserve water for non-consumptive, environmental
purposes. One fundamental premise of the prior appropriation
doctrine is "first in time is first in right."9 This legal adage means that
in times of low stream flow those who "appropriated" water rightsand were granted a legal right to a certain quantity of use-may divert
their decreed amounts of water to the detriment of 'Junior" users who
perfected a water right at a later time. Thus, the farmer with the
earliest appropriation on a river may divert the decreed amount, even
if that amount represents the entirety of the river's carriage at the
time.
Most rivers in Colorado are over-appropriated 0 because the
municipal and agricultural users who hold the majority of water rights
in the state sought, early on, to apply as much water as possible to
The
offstream uses in order to establish large senior rights.
unforeseen and unfortunate consequence of the prior appropriation
doctrine is that it "promoted the very depletion of the West's rivers
that is now a source of serious environmental concern.""
Consequently, there is virtually no water within the state's rivers and
streams available for environmental organizations to claim.
The prior appropriation doctrine exacerbates this problem by
intrinsically favoring the practice of diverting water out of a river
rather than leaving it instream. The traditional "use it or loose it"
principle demands that a user not only remove water from its course to
use.12
perfect a right but also apply the water removed to a beneficial
Historically, courts have not considered it a beneficial use to leave
water instream for environmental purposes." As such, virtually all
senior water rights in the state historically have been applied to
irrigation or other uses that require a user to remove water from its
natural course rather than leaving the water instream. Under present

8. THE NEW CACHE LA POUDRE IRRIGATING Co. & THE CACHE LA. POUDRF REsERVOIR
Co., GENERAL WATER INFORMATION: IRRIGATION WATER AND YOUR RIGHT TO USE IT, at

http://www.newcache.com/html/information/generalinfo.php
2004) [hereinafter GENERAL WATER INFORMATION].

(last visited Feb. 12,

9. COLO. WATER PROJECT, TROUT UNLIMITED, A DRY LEGACY: THE CHALLENGE FOR
COLORADO'S RIvERS 3 (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter DRY LEGACY 1].

10. Id. at 7.
11. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 261, 268-69 (2000).
12. Dentry, supranote 2; see generally Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d 798,800 (Colo. 1965).
13. The Colorado Constitution mentions certain beneficial uses, instream flows not
among them. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.,
406 P.2d at 800 ("[T]he right to the maintenance of the 'flow' of the stream is a
riparian right and is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of prior

appropriation.").
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law, therefore, some senior users are weary of temporarily converting
their rights to instream uses under lease agreements, even when they
would otherwise be so inclined, because they fear that such
conversions might deprive them of their historical use allotment. 4
Despite this hostility toward environmental concerns, the state
legislature implemented some degree of statutory override to appease
environmentalists and recreational water users. By 1973, popular
support for guardianship over minimum stream flows reached
sufficient heights to induce state legislation."5 That year, with the
threat of a citizen referendum hanging over its head, the Colorado
General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 97, codified as the Colorado
Water Right Determination Act ("WRDA")."
The bill's sponsor,
Senator Fred Anderson of Loveland, touted the legislation as a tool
that could "open the door to the state, as well as private individuals, to
begin buying up water rights for recreational and wildlife17 preservation
purposes, which [could not] be done under present law.
Under the WRDA, the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB"), a publicS entity,
possesses the sole capacity to acquire and
18
hold instream rights.
In granting this authority to CWCB, the
legislature redefined "beneficial use" to include "the appropriation by
the state of Colorado in the manner prescribed by law of such
minimum flows between specific points or levels for and on natural
streams and lakes as are required to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree." 9 Thus, CWCB may accept existing water
14. See generally Thompson, supranote 11, at 274-75.
15. Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969,3 U. DENV.WATER L. REV.58, 61 n.24 (1999).
16. S. 97, 49th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1973) (codified at COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1973)); see also Colo.Water Conservation Bd., Colo.'s Instream
Flow Program, at http://cwcb.state.co.us/isf/Programs/isfl.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2004).
17. Richard J. Schneider, Water Appropriation Bills Introduced, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Jan. 20, 1973, at 28 (emphasis added). Interestingly, in the same year Anderson
introduced Senate Bill 97, which vested authority with the CWCB to establish
minimum stream flows. Representative Michael Strang, a fellow republican, also
introduced a constitutional amendment that would "perpetuate the same basic system
of water right appropriation [found in the state constitution] but add to the system
provisions assuring minimum stream flows and lake levels."
Id.
Under the
amendment, the legislature would have the power to set these minimum levels. For
this reason, Senator Anderson questioned the amendment, noting that this legislative
power could "turn into a political football." Id.
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-102(3) (2003).
19. § 37-92-103(4) (1990).
In the years following the adoption of the ISFP
Program, and up until the Colorado General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 156 in
2002, a precise definition of "necessary instream flows" remained somewhat elusive:
[T]he policy in Colorado... is to protect only those flows necessary to
maintain existing resources. Flows at levels that would enhance resource levels
are denied. But in practice, flows identified by the Division of Wildlife as
necessary for fish fall somewhere between what one might consider 'bare
survival' and optimum. Bare survival flows would allow survival of a small
population [of aquatic life] in the short run. Optimum flows would include
occasional vary large habitat-modifying flows.
DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
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rights or appropriate new rights for conversion to instream use.
While this legislation can be credited for some measure of
preemptive and restorative success, many feel that the law is too
restrictive regarding the acquisition of ISF rights. In 1999, CWCB
failed to file for a single ISF right; in 2000, CWCB filed for eight; and,
in 2001, CWCB filed for just one.20 Would-be legal revisionists have
therefore argued that loosening traditional prescribed obstructions
and opening up instream water right transfers to the market economy
represents the best way to meet the "rapidly emerging market for
environmentalists, agency officials, ranchers,
farmers, and others"
2
1
interested in leasing or acquiring ISF rights.
1I1. THE COMPETING USES
A. AGRICULTURE

The agricultural stake in sustaining the state's water resources rests
on its ability to apply those resources to agrarian needs. These needs
are substantial. "In Colorado, irrigation water use (measured as
withdrawals and deliveries) accounts for more than 90% of total used
for all purposes on a state-wide basis. 22 This vast percentage of
resource allocation cannot be summarily dismissed as a wasteful use of
a public good because agriculture is one of the state's most vital
economic sectors.
Each year, Colorado's agricultural industry
accounts for approximately $4.4 billion of the state's GDP.
With the above considerations in mind, offstream users should top
the list of non-political actors involved in the policy formation process.
As Irving L. Janis has suggested, effective policy will often remain
elusive in the absence of qualified experts working in conjunction with
traditional political actors. This premise is strongly supported by the
fact that rural ranchers support and have participated in the

BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 130 (1997).
20. TROUT UNLIMITED, A DRY LEGACY 2: PROGRESS AND THE NEW THREATS IN A
DROUGHT YEAR 2, availableat

http://www.cotrout.org/CTU%20DRY%20LEGACY%2OLoRes.pdf
(Jan.
2003)
[hereinafter DRY LEGACY 2].
21. Prop. & Env't Research Ctr., Saving Our Streams Through Water Markets: A
Summary, at http://www.perc.org/publications/guidespractical/save-streams.php?s=2
(last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
22, COLO. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., IRRIGATION WATER CONSERVATION:
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITATIONS IN COLORADO: A REPORT OF THE AGRICULTURAL WATER
CONSERVATION TASK FORCE 1, at

http://cwrri.colostate.edu/pubs/series/completionreport/CR19O.pdf

(Oct.

1996)

[hereinafter IRRIGATION WATER].
23. NATURAL REs. CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WEATHERING TOUGH
TIMES--THE COLOR nO DROUGHT, at http://www.co.nrcs.usda.gov/news/pas/audiovisuals/weathering-tough-times.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter
WEATHERING].

24.

IRVING L. JANIS, GROUP THINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS &

FIASCOES 266-67 (2d ed. 1982).
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progressive approaches to ISF protection detailed below.15
B. URBAN EXPANSION

Presupposing that input from agricultural water users is essential to
the formation of sound conservation policy, both politics and
practicality demand that decisions regarding future ISF protection
incorporate a diverse array of concerns. As romantic as the rural
landscape and tradition may be, those practices pose very real threats
to the vitality of the state's watercourses. Fresh water is a limited
commodity; sooner or later, rivers and streams will simply go dry, or
flow so scantily that all possibilities of continued aquatic and riparian
life are foreclosed. This scenario, which is already occurring in some
areas,16 would be catastrophic to agricultural and environmental
interests alike. Continued adversity between the two camps is mutually
unconstructive.
In recent years, issues related to Colorado's urban sprawl,
particularly the accompanying need for water, have moved to the
forefront of the state policy agenda. The conflict that results when
residential and commercial developments collide-sometimes quite
literally-with rural needs is one reason growth has become such a
huge issue. As the urban infringes upon the rural, impassioned
tensions surrounding water rights commonly emerge. 7 One company
in the business of selling water rights to agrarian users noted: "As
development has moved into agricultural areas, problems have
developed concerning irrigation water. Some landowners are at odds
with ditch companies over the maintenance of ditches running
through their property. 28' The frustrations associated with population
growth also extend to efforts to preserve the natural condition of the
state's watersheds. As one recent study concluded, the expansion of
instream rights can "impair the ability of headwater communities to
meet growing demands for resorts and recreational industries." '
The problem became particularly intense within the metropolitan
area on the Front Range, most of which is encompassed by the South
Platte River Basin. Substantial population growth throughout the
South Platte Basin has made the area one of the fastest-growing
regions in the country."' Home to Denver, as well as Douglas County,
25. Dentry, supra note 2.
26. For instance, on Bear Creek, a popular foothills trout stream southwest of
Denver, suffers from warm temperatures and low flows. Rapid urban growth has
exacerbated the problem, leading to several trout kills in recent years. DRY LEGACY 2,
supra note 9, at 11.
27. For a thorough discussion on the effect of urban sprawl on Colorado's finite
water resources, see generally PETER D. NICHOLS ET AL., WATER AND GROWTH IN
COLORADO: A REVIEW OF LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES ix (Univ. of Colo. Natural Res. Law
Ctr. ed. 2001) [hereinafter WATERAND GROWTH].
28. GENERAL WATER INFORMATION, supra note 8.
29. WATER AND GROWTH, supra note 27, at x.
30. COLO. WATER RES. RESEARCH INST., COOPERATION AND COMPROMISE-A PUBLIC
PRIVATE IMPERATIVE FOR THE SOUTH PLArTE RIVER, at
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one of the fastest-growing counties in the United States, 3' the Basin
contains two-thirds of Colorado's population.n The rapid expansion
of the metropolitan region into the Eastern Plains resulted in the
conversion, between 1987 and 1997, of 1.4 million acres of agricultural
land to other uses.3 3 Nevertheless, the vast majority of the Basin's overThe
appropriated water is still applied to agricultural uses.34
agricultural users, however, no longer have the run of the land as they
once did, as competing concerns have created a political and
hydrological time bomb. Without effective communication among
those who represent developmental, agricultural, and environmental
concerns, all stand to lose.
C. CONSERVATION

Often lost in the strife between development and agriculture is the
dedicated voice of the conservationists. Because wildlife and waterway
protection offers fewer opportunities for economic gain than
development or agriculture, such environmental interests are often
dismissed as "fringe" concerns of little importance. Nevertheless, the
conservationists are not going away and will likely strengthen their
resolve as the problem escalates. As Colorado Attorney General Ken
Salazar observed: "environmental demands for water are now a part of
the radar screen for predicting the future .... These environmental
realities are now part of the legal and political landscape. Twenty-five
years ago these environmental demands were nonexistent. " 5
According to free market proponents, the creation of a market
system enables the State to both avoid impacts beyond harms to
aesthetic and ecological values and avoid fiscal downfall. Colorado
Trout Unlimited ("CTU") points out that continued reductions in
stream flows inevitably will wreak havoc upon two of the state's primary
(Dec.

http://cwrri.colostate.edu/pubs/newsletter/1996/dec/dec9622.htm

1996)

[hereinafter COOPERATION].

31. Douglas County grew by 13.6% in just a little over a year from April 2000 toJuly
2001, at which time the population was estimated to be nearly 200,000. News Release,
U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Most of Nation's 10 Fastest-Growing
Counties in South, Census Bureau Reports, at http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2002/cbO2-59.html (last revised Apr. 29, 2002).
32. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., SOUTH PLATTE/REPUBLICAN RIVER BASIN
FACTS, at

http://cwcb.state.co.us/FactSheets/SPlatte-fs.pdf

(Mar.

2002)

[hereinafter

S.

PLATTE].
33. Coto. STATE UNW. COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, SUMMARY SHEET: COLORADO DATA
FOR COOPFRATIVE EXTENSION DECADE PLANNING: REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS, available

at http://www.ext.colostate.edu/staffres/planning/COplanningdata.pdf
Mar. 2, 2003) [hereinafter COOPERATIVE EXTENSION].
34. IRRIGATION WATER, supra note 22, at 1.
35.

(last revised

COOPERATION, supra note 30. Mr. Salazar, a fifth generation Coloradan from the

San Luis Valley, made this statement while still in private practice as a natural
resources attorney, two years before being elected state attorney general. Before
entering private practice, he worked as a farmer and a small business owner.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

OFFICE,

BIOGRAPHY

OF ATTORNEY

GENERAL

http://vw.ago.state.co.us/BIOAG.HTM (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).

KEN

SALAZAR,

at

WATER IA W REVEW

Volume 7

sources of recreational income: the $1.3 billion fishing industry and
the $122 million rafting industry.16 Instream flows are necessary to
protect riparian ecosystems, wildlife habitat, and, in some cases, sectors
of the state's economy. At present, however, the sole mechanism for
assuring such flows is for CWCB to unilaterally decide to exercise its
authority.
As a public agency, CWCB must remain politically responsive to
many competing interests. Additionally, budgetary constraints and
legal limitations hamper CWCB's ability to acquire ISF rights.
Moreover, the prior appropriation doctrine demands that CWCB
acquire no junior rights that would interfere with a senior right.
Because so many of Colorado's major rivers and tributaries are overappropriated, there are few, if any, surplus flows available for
appropriation. With these factors in mind, many believe the law
should be revised to enable private entities, such as CWT, to play a
more effective and meaningful role in the conservation process-in
particular, by directly utilizing funds to establish temporary ISFs
through lease agreements.37
Pigeonholing each of these interests is somewhat misleading,
however. In the quest to preserve water resources, the distinction
between agricultural and environmental interests has, in some cases,
become somewhat blurred. Across the state, agricultural associations
have begun to develop amiable, productive relationships with
environmental groups, consulting on best available irrigation practices
and technologies. At events such as the February 2003 Agricultural
Outlook Forum, for instance, "[m]any in [the agriculture] industry are
finding creative ways to adapt to changing conditions. 3' As a result,
Colorado's lead agricultural organizations and agencies are
emphasizing traditional water efficiency methods 3as9 well as exploring
new and innovative ways to manage water quantity.
One should also note that the "competing" interests involved
appear more divergent than they actually are. The conservation
community is intrinsically comprised of individuals from the very
communities that continue to demand more water for municipal use.
In those instances where the interests actually diverge, the will for
cooperation exists-the law of the state need only catch up with the
aspirations of the state's water users.

36.

News, The Forecastfor Colorado's Rivers and Streams is Dy (Colo. Rivers Alliance

Feb. 2002), at
http://www.coloradorivers.org/Resources/News/nwSG202.htm (Feb. 3, 2002).
37. COLO. WARER TRUST, INTRODUCING THE COLORADO WATER TRUST, at
http://www.coloradowatertrust.org/
38.

WEATHERING,

39.

Id.

supra note 23.

(last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
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IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: A GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL SPLITSEASON AND DRY YEAR LEASING PROGRAMS
The private acquisition concept still represents the exception to
the majority rule among the western states. As it stands, "most [ISF
protection] programs currently in place provide primarily for State
ownership of instream rights. '4 In many cases, private parties cannot
even facilitate offstream to in-stream use transactions, "[I]nstream
flow rights held by private individuals or organizations are often
As a
perceived as constraints to future water development.
consequence... most western state legislatures have authorized only
governmental agencies to hold in-place water rights under programs
that balance competing instream and consumptive uses."'"
Colorado is not alone in its continued adherence to this principle;
neighboring states also have shown a comparable dedication to
maintaining unabashed state guardianship over ISFs. Nebraska and
Wyoming follow a protocol most similar to Colorado-state agencies
retain the exclusive authority to both identify and apply for instream
use rights. 42 In Utah, two distinct agencies may apply for such rights,
the perfection of which is contingent on approval from the state
legislature.3 In Kansas, the legislature possesses the sole authority to
designate ISFs.'
While the above models remain the norm, some western states
nonetheless carved out statutory exceptions to the traditional legal
doctrines that otherwise prevent private sector involvement in the
establishment of ISFs. Particularly in the Pacific Northwest, "[b] uying
5
the region
water for instream flows ...is no longer a novel concept,"M
has been cited as the "leader in the free-market approach to increasing
stream flows. 46 Unlikely is it a mere coincidence that those states that
have chosen to embrace water markets are geographically clustered in
the Northwest. The sweeping introduction of private instream flow
transfers to the region's market economy is often attributed to the
need to protect decreasing salmon runs, particularly in the Columbia

40. Jack Sterne, Instream Rights & Invisible Hands: Prospectsfor PrivateInstream Water
Rights in the Northwest, 27 ENvrL. L. 203, 203 (1997).
41. Steven J. Shupe & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Recognizing the Value of In-Place Uses
of Water in the West: An Introduction to the Laws, Strategies, and Issues, in INSTREAM FLOW
PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 1-9 to 1-10 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds.,
rev. ed. 1993).
42. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 121-22 tbl.5.1.
43. Id. at 122 tbl.5.1.
44. Id. at 121 tbl.5.1.
45. CLAY LANDRY, Abstract, POL. ECONOMY RESEARCH CENTER, INSTREAM FLOW
MARKETING IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1 (July 1998),
at http://www.pnrec.org/1998/papers/clandry.pdf.
46. Id. See also Shupe & MacDonnell, supra note 41, at 1-10 ("Despite the fact that
several western legislatures have explicitly prohibited the creation of in-place water
rights held by the private sector, individuals and organizations in some other western
states are asserting this appropriation strategy.").
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River Basin.47 In addition, states in the Northern Pacific typically
experience greater precipitation than the High and Central Plains
states.
As such, farmers and ranchers are more likely to hold
expendable stream flows then their neighbors to the south.44
Although Colorado's climate is both significantly more arid than
the Northwest and devoid of salmon stocks, a water leasing scheme is
not necessarily unsuitable for Colorado. Any such program, however,
needs to address the particulars of the state's economy, geography,
and most importantly, its existing legal framework. Leases to instream
rights in the Northwest are often funded through the economic
benefits garnered from improved salmon populations. 9 Similarly, the
approximately $8.5 billion 0 brought into Colorado's economy each
year from recreational expenditures could conceivably subsidize
broader acquisition rates.
Of course, the imposition of an instream right leasing system
would inevitably displace a certain degree of agricultural production in
the state. By definition, water left instream is not applied to cropland,
livestock needs, or other offstream uses. Increasing the value of water
for municipal and non-agricultural uses, however, already has this
effect, since water districts in more populous areas routinely outbid
farmers and ranchers.5 A leasing system allows farmers and ranchers
to cut their losses while maintaining their permanent rights to the
water they cannot or decide not to use. A former Colorado governor
noted the economic benefits of instream flows almost twenty years ago.
[I] n a 1985 water policy speech by then-governor Richard Lamm of
Colorado, the wisdom of perpetuating historic water uses at the
expense of instream values was questioned. To emphasize this point,
the governor stated that alfalfa, which consumes 27 percent of
Colorado's water, injected only $156 million/year into the state's
economy, while recreation and tourism accounted for more than $4
billion in annual statewide benefit. 2
As the governor suggested, the state holds a vested interestbeyond catering to special interest groups-in preserving natural flows
in its streams and rivers. Leaving water instream not only enables the
preservation of ecologically vital resources, but also serves an
invaluable fiscal purpose. By granting current users the ability to lease
their rights to those users who would apply the rights to instream use,
the state would be taking a step toward insuring a financially sound
future. As the state witnessed in the months following the devastating
47. See, e.g., Landry, supra note 45, at 3. "[A] 1997 Oregonian newspaper poll
showed that the decline of salmon constitutes the number one environmental concern
in the state." ERIN SCHILLER, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., THE OREGON WATER TRUST, at
http://www.cei.org/gencon/025,01354.cfm (Nov. 1, 1998).

48.
49.
50.

GILLILAN& BROWN, supra note 19, at 99.
See LANDRY, supra note 45, at 3.
COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, supra note 33, at 2.

51.
52.

See generally Shupe & MacDonnell, supra note 41, at 1-2 to 1-4.
Id. at 1-2 to 1-3.
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2002 forest fires, the condition of Colorado's natural environment is
inexorably tied to its economy. Moreover, private ISF leasing would
allow financially strapped agricultural users to apply their rights in the
manner they see fit and to their greatest benefit.
A. SPLIT-SEASON AND DRY-YEAR LEASES

Within the broader context of instream right leasing, two
innovative techniques-split-season and dry-year leasing-have arisen.
The two practices are similar, yet distinct in a number of ways: "A 'splitseason' lease allows a portion of a water right to be used for irrigation
during mid-summer," while the remaining portion is left instream
"during critical periods when fish are migrating and spawning., 5' A
"dry-year" lease, on the other hand, provides an occasional water
transfer from offstream to instream use depending on weather
patterns and local flow conditions. 4 Both approaches have been cited
as valuable tools not only for those users who would prefer a direct
return on their right but also for water users who are at risk of
forfeiting their water rights due to non-use.55
1. Split-Season Leases
Structurally, split-season water leases are generally similar to the
commonplace lease contract. If an owner decides to temporarily forgo
a possessive right during a specified part of the year, the owner conveys
that right to a willing lessee whose use of the right is more valuable
than the conveyors. In this sense, split-season rights are built not only
upon a free-market mentality, but also on notions of practicality. For
instance, the first private lease executed in Montana established a tenyear split-season agreement through which eight landowners agreed to
let 1.3 cubic feet per second ("cfs") flow past a diversion dam for six
months of each year.55 In return for the seasonal conversion to
instream use, Montana Trout Unlimited ("MTU") paid for the removal
of an unwanted diversion dam on the creek." This agreement, as
many others like it, demonstrates the possibilities for innovation and
coexistence of divergent interests when free-market acquisition
techniques are made possible.
Absent the strongly established tenets of prior appropriation, split-

53.

WASH. DEPT. OF ECOLOGY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: WASHINGTON WATER

ACQUISITION PROGRAM, at http://ww.ecy.wa/gov/pubs/0211013.pdf (Nov. 2002).
54.

Id.

55.

OR. WATER RES. DEP'T, RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT DIVISION:

STAFF STRUCTURE,

ORGANIZATION, AND TOOLS 3,

at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/pdfs/rmd.reorg.pdf (last visited April 13,
2004).
56. Clay J. Landry & Clint Peck, Dealingfor Water: Western States Are Creating Water
Markets Without Compromising the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, MONTANA FARMERSTOCKMAN (Dec. 1998), retpinted in OR. WATER TRUST, OWT IN THE MEDIA,

at http://www.owt.org/owtmedia.html#anc-mtfarm.
57. Id.
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season leases would probably occur routinely and without much
fanfare. Prior appropriation controls western water law, however, and
presents obstacles to these otherwise appealing transactional
arrangements. The first problem is that water rights in a prior
appropriation system are not akin to personal property rights. In
Colorado, the state constitution clearly states that the waters of the
state are the property of the public. 8 Thus, the State must ensure that
one individual's exercise of a use right does not infringe upon
another's similar right. In the context of prior appropriation, splitseason rights give rise to some interesting problems. These issues are
addressed in Section IV.
2. Dry Year Leases
The attractiveness of dry-season leases is the ease of acquiring
agricultural water on a short term, emergency basis. In a state such as
Colorado, where free-market acquisitions remain relatively untested,
agricultural users generally feel weary of transactions that may impair a
permanent use right. The dry-season alternative thus has great
appeal.' While generally long-term and predictable, the terms of dryyear leases nonetheless call for intermittent, rather than permanent
transfers.r1 The State of Washington-which has taken progressive
measures, in law if not in practice, toward more permissible private
acquisitions-recognizes three distinct types of dry-year lease
arrangements:
Under an "insurance" dry-year lease, a water-right holder or
lessor is paid a yearly amount as insurance against the possibility that
a dry year will occur. In a dry year, lessors agree not to use the water
and receive a yearly insurance payment whether there is a dry year or
not. Some versions use one-time rather than yearly payments against
the occurrence of a dry year. A trigger event such as stream flow
levels, precipitation, snowpack, runoff or storage must be identified
to provide an objective basis for determining when the lease is
exercised.
Under the "option" dry-year lease, a contract agreement provides
an option where a lessee has first call of the water in a dry year and
the water-right holder receives a payment, regardless of whether
there is a dry year or not. An option payment is made either at the
initiation of the contract or annually to ensure that a valid contract
exists. An additional payment is made, however, when the lessee
exercises the dry-year option, usually at a predetermined price. With
an option lease, the trigger is less important because the lease will be
58. COLO. CoNST. art. XVI, § 5.
59. ADRYLEGACY2, supra note 20, at 6.
60. For a specific discussion on the history of fear associated with the loosening of
instream acquisition rules, see GILLILAN & BROwN, supra note 19, at 123.
61.

WATER RES. PROGRAM, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, WASHINGTON WATER

AcQuISTON PROGRAM: FINDING WATER To RESTORE STREAMS 2 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/Images/strategy/stratl pdf
[hereinafter FINDING WATER].
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paid only when use of the water by the lessee is necessary.
Another version, the "predictive" dry-year lease, was developed
by the Oregon Water Trust for a dry-land irrigator to run over a 10year period. The trust and farmer determined that on average
irrigation was needed three out of 10 years. A contract between the
trust and the irrigator included an up-front payment for forgoing
irrigation when it would have been needed (three out of the 10 years)
and water was donated for the other seven years. As a result, the
61
contract essentially required the irrigator not to irrigate for 10 years.
The diversity represented among the split- and dry-season
approaches demonstrates the creativity possible when water users with
varying objectives have the opportunity to craft their own solutions to
water management issues without legal hindrances. At times, the
entirety of a right may be leased for the duration of lease with the right
holder diverting no water during the lease period. These types of
arrangements are less common than the split- or dry-season
Most instream lease rights are conveyed under splitalternatives.
season agreements. 3 However, when permitted, the dry-year-option
ISF
approach is most common, and, in addition to its use in
'
protection, is "increasingly used to enhance municipal supplies."1
Aside from the split-season/dry-season distinction, instream leases
may provide for either a long- or short-term transfer of rights. For
instance, during a severe drought, a water user may enter a one-season
lease to head-off the permanent destruction of a fishery. As discussed
in Section V. below, Colorado recently passed legislation that allows
state acquisition of ISFs in a manner reminiscent of dry-year leasing.
As the legislation is written, such leases are not meant to provide
permanent benefit to habitually low-flowing rivers and streams, but are
meant as a stop-gap measure in times of severe drought. In Oregon,
recent legislation providing for short-term leases was intended to
complement the existent program that allowed long-term leases. In
or constant-are
most cases, ISF leases-split-season, dry-season,
66
renewable for given periods, but not indefinitely.
B. How LEASE ACQUISITIONS ARE FACILITATED: TWO PROGRESSIVE
STATE MODELS

The Oregon and Montana models illustrate similarities and
differences in ISF programs. The marked similarities begin with the
fact that both Montana and Oregon have long overcome prior
appropriation's traditional prohibition against recognizing ISFs as a
beneficial use. Second, each state has taken measures to secure senior

62. Id.
63. See generally MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS, 2002 ANNUAL PROGRESS
app. A (2002) [hereinafter FWP PROGRESS REPORT].
64. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 147.
65. See discussion infra Section V.
66. FINDING WATER,.supra note 61, at 1-2.
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priority dates of such rights when conveyed through lease
The two programs are distinguishable by their
agreements.1 7
receptiveness to private sector involvement in the offstream-toinstream water right conversion process.0 This is particularly true
insofar as such conversions are accomplished through lease
agreements. Finally, each state has received extensive praise for both
implementing and expanding pioneering ISF protection frameworks.69
The fact that the two programs are commonly viewed as successes by
both agricultural water users and environmentalists ensures that both
may aptly contribute to an adaptable blueprint for agenda setting in
states such as Colorado.
While either the Montana or Oregon framework alone would
provide a strong argument in favor of expanding ISF leasing
opportunities, an appraisal of the two different approaches offers
further benefits. First, a comparison of the programs demonstrates
the flexibility possible in the policy development and legal evolution
processes-even when only one relatively specific strategy is employed.
Second, the values protected-and the needs served-vary somewhat
between the two subject states. By examining these contrasting
purposes, however, a better case can be made that leasing approaches
may feasibly incorporate any number of values the ISF proponent
seeks to protect. Finally, the histories, procedures, and limitations of
the two programs differ in many respects. There is value purely in
examining these differences, as they serve as an indication of the best
means of policy formulation and implementation.
1. Montana: The Journey Toward Private Acquisition
a. History and Statutory Construction
The Montana Supreme Court developed an "activist approach"
towards interpreting environmental provisions within its constitution
in the late twentieth century. 7° The elements defining this movement
represent a profound departure from the traditional environmental
activism that spurned the promulgation of limitless state and federallyimposed regulation over the last three decades. Whereas regulatory
initiatives generally seek constraint and sacrifice among competing
interests, Montana's "new activism," and its embracing freely
transferable rights tends toward cooperation, non-conflict, and mutual
67. Matthew J. McKinney, lnstream Flow Policy in Montana: A History and Blueprintfor
the Future, in INSTRFAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 15-1, 15-29 (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993); Michael J. Mattick, Instream Flow
Protection in Oregon, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at 18-1, 18-1 (Lawrence
J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
68. Compare McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-31, with Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-1.
69. See McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-1, 15-29 to 15-30; see Mattick, supra note 67, at
18-1 to 18-2, 18-9.
70. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and
Future ofMontana's
EnvironmentalProvisions,64 MoNT. L. REv. 157, 159 (2003).

Issue 2

LEASING WA TER RIGHIS FOR INSTREAM FLOWPROTECTION

325

benefit." Assuming such political leanings and considering Montana's
vast reaches of pristine-yet threatened-river and stream flows, the
state was the quintessential breeding ground for a conservation
strategy that rejects traditional command and control approaches to
environmental protection, and has embraced free-market principles.
Montana's ISF program embodies a unique appeal, attributable to
its collaborative roots. Nevertheless, the Montana model warrants a
closer look for reasons beyond the fact that it represents a product of
divergent interests forging a common solution. Today, the Montana
model stands as "one of the most progressive sets of instream flow
protection laws in the Western United States," and "[a] mong the arid
Rocky Mountain states, Montana has the most extensive and flexible
The Montana experiment
instream flow protection regime. 7'
provides a useful starting point not only for evaluating strategies of
cooperative effort, but also in discerning what principles and
approaches Colorado water users, conservationists, and legislators
might rely upon in creating a more legally and politically receptive
atmosphere for water leasing.
State efforts aimed at protecting ISFs in Montana began in 1969,
when the state legislature enacted laws allowing the state Fish and
Game Commission to file for "Murphy Rights" on the unappropriated
waters of twelve "blue ribbon" trout streams." The legislature defined
these rights simply: those streamflows necessary for the preservation of
fish and wildlife habitat.74 In 1973, the State passed the more
aggressive Montana Water Use Act, through which the state or federal
government may acquire a water reservation in order to maintain a
The act only 76applied to
minimum flow, level,
.... or quality of water."
certain enumerated basins and for determinate durations. Thus, at
the time, only the State, or some political subdivision of the state
(interpreted to include the federal government), could apply to the
Board of Natural Resources to reserve water for instream uses.' No
state law allowed for the conversion of an out-of-stream right to an
°
instream use.
Over the next fourteen years, the state achieved incremental
progress in the development of its ISF protection program. In 1987,
for example, the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation ("DNRC") instituted a new policy whereby potentially
affected water users were offered more involvement in departmental

71. See generally id. at 157-73 (explaining Montana's constitutional provisions
regarding the environment).
72. Memorandum from Laura Ziemer, Director, Trout Unlimited's Montana Water
Project, to Dave White, NRCS State Conservationist (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with the
University of Denver Water Law Review) [hereinafter Ziemer Memorandum].
73. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-4.
74. Act of March 13, 1969, ch. 345, 1969 Mont. Laws 879-81.
75. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-4 to 15-5.
76. See id. at 15-4 to 15-7.
77. Id. at 15-5.
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decisions concerning changes of use. T8 With the passage of this
legislation, universal involvement in the policy and managerial process
became a central and long-standing theme to Montana's water
management approach, as it remains today.7 9 The passage of Senate
Bill 447 in 1988 marked another important development in Montana's
ISF program. 0
Senate Bill 447 struck a compromise between
conflicting conservation and agricultural users by assigning a priority
date for state-held instream rights upon the submission of a qualified
agency's notice to convert rights to instream use."
While the preceding developments did ensure the preservation of
some natural stream flows, the provisions failed both to introduce a
market element to state acquisitions and to open up the instream
acquisition game to interested private parties. All instream rights were
the result of new appropriations by the State, rather than bargaining
between the State and private entities, or among private entities
themselves.
In 1989, the Montana legislature passed a statute allowing the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks ("MFWP") to acquire lease
82
rights for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing stream flows.
The 1989 leasing statute was considered "the most controversial, and
perhaps the most far-reaching spin-off of the state water plan. 33 One
observer noted that the original proposal to establish a voluntary
instream acquisition program in Montana "created a public
controversy seldom seen in the halls of the Capitol."8'4 Why did the
introduction of a bill touted as mutually beneficial to both agrarian
and environmental interests set off such a firestorm; how were tensions
quelled to such an extent as to not only uphold the program, but in
fact expand it?
To begin, the bill the state eventually adopted was a shadow of the
bill as originally proposed. Pressure from agricultural interests caused
vast modifications to the proposed legislation before both houses and
the governor agreed to enact it.1 In hopes of appeasing all interests,
DNRC fashioned a working group comprised of the Montana Water
Resources Association, the stock growers association, the association of
conservation districts, the Montana Farm Bureau, the Montana
Wildlife Federation, and the Montana Council of Trout Unlimited"
While initial discussion centered on allowing private sales and
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 15-21.
See id. at 15-21.
Id. at 15-24.
Id. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-316(9) (a) (2003).
82. LANDRY, supra note 45, at 2.
83. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-28.
84. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274 (quoting MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF FISH,
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PARKS, FISHERIES DIVISION, ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT: WATER LEASING STUDY

1999, at 2 (Dec. 1999).
85. POLICY CONSENSUS INITIATIVE, PROTECTING INSTREAM FLOWS IN MONTANA 2, at
http://www.policyconsensus.org/casestudies/pdfs/MT streams.pdf (Feb. 2004).
86. Id.
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purchases, the group-ultimately realizing that in-fee transfers would
be unacceptable to some of the agricultural interests representedinstead focused on a leasing approach .
The Montana Consensus Council ("MCC"), a state entity charged
with mediating the disputes that arose in the drafting process,
declared the working group an abounding success. Interestingly, the
MCC attributed the group's success, at least in part, to the fact that
"key decision makers with a potential interest in the issue
(representatives of the governor, legislature and state agencies) were
not invited to the table. . Only the affected stakeholders crafted the
groundwork legislation that presently guides Montana's ISF
protection. The final bill called for a temporar "leasing study," with a
The success of the
sunset provision ten years after its passage.program, however, prompted the legislature to renew its terms in
1999. Thus, leases may be acquired under the temporary program
untilJune 30, 2009.90
Originally, the State or its approved subdivisions could lease rights
only within five particular basins for the maintenance or enhancement
of streamflows for fisheries." An irrigator could also lease water rights
to MFWP in order to improve fishing conditions." Initiation of the
program thus "provide[d] an opportunity for all affected interests in
the state to study and evaluate the social, economic, and
environmental impacts of transferring water from traditional uses to
The subsequent legislation that increased the
instream uses. ' '
number of stream reaches upon which leases could be acquired from
an original five to ten in 1991 and to twenty in 1993 evidenced the
success of the program.9 4 Today, MFWP is statutorily authorized to
apply for leases on up to forty stream reaches in the state.9 ' For the
most part, however, the state limited its acquisition efforts to small
leases. As of 1998, no state lease called for leaving more than 2,000
acre-feet of water instream.99
results,
study produced positive
Although
the leasing
environmentalists recognized the need for private sector participation
in one form or another. Water attorney Jack Sterne detailed the
events leading to the 1995 expansion of the temporary study allowing
private sector participation;
The bill was the culmination of six years of work on the part of
instream advocates. Other bills that would have allowed the purchase
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 2 (internal quotation omitted).
89. Act of March 31, 1995, ch. 322, 1995 Mont. Laws 990.
90. MoNT. CODEANN. §§ 85-2-436(4), -437, -438 (2003).
91. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
92. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-436(2)(b) (2003).
93. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
94. Id.
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2437(3) (2003).
96. LANDRY, supra note 45, at 10.
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or lease of existing ights... were introduced in both the 1991 and
1993 sessions of the Montana Legislature but failed to attract
adequate support. The difference in 1995 was that instream flow
advocates worked with agricultural and development interests to ease
fears about creating a private market for instream rights. Agricultural
and development interests opposed the bill in the beginning, but
they later realized that an alternative citizen initiative could produce
a stronger piece of legislation. After polls in Montana showed broad
public support for such a measure, agricultural and development
groups decided that they would rather work with environmentalists
than risk a major overhaul of water rights laws through the initiative
process. The opposing groups [again] brought in a professional
mediation service to help broker a deal. As part of the resulting
compromise, instream advocates agreed to limit the bill to leasing
because agricultural interests were philosophically opposed to an
ownership statute that
they believed might permanently remove water
rights from the land. 97
Sterne's final statement regarding appurtenance is important.
Water rights in Montana are, and always have been, attached to the
lands they serve. Accordingly, the temporal nature of water leasing
helps to ensure rights remain appurtenant. Although conservation
groups may have preferred the security of purchase acquisitions, the
establishment of a leasing program helped to appease agricultural
users while advancing many of the objectives conservation groups
sought through ownership. The compromise, in conjunction with the
accomplishments achieved through the original leasing program,
eased much of the apprehension agricultural users held toward private
sector involvement. Today, Montana authorizes private individuals
and entities of any kind to lease water for instream purposes for up to
ten years, and in particular instances, thirty years.8
b. Legal and Procedural Requirements
Montana law currently provides three means to convert an existing
consumptive use water right to instream use. A person may convert
the right to an instream use without a lease, lease all or a portion of a
water right to MFWP, or lease the water to another party who holds the
right to benefit a threatened fishery. 9 This section does not address
the first option; it is irrelevant to leasing strategies. To date, most
leases in Montana are established under the second option, in concert
with MFWP.'t8 However, private organizations such as MTU and the
97.
98.
99.

Sterne, supra note 40, at 211-12.
Thompson, supra note 11, at 287; MoNTr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2) (f) (2003).
MONTANA DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION, WATER RIGHTS
MONTANA 18 (Dec. 2001), at http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/home.htm.
100. Id. The statute provides:
The state, any political subdivision or agency of the state, or the United States
or any agency of the United States may apply to the department to acquire a
state water reservation for existing or future beneficial uses or to maintain a
minimum flow, level, or quality of water throughout the year or at periods or
for a length of time that the department designates.
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newly created Montana Water Trust actively participate in the lease
acquisition process and have rigorously pursued ISF lease rights in
numerous river basins across the state.
The procedural requirements for public and private acquisitions
are quite similar-most importantly, the "beneficial use" requirements
in a private acquisition are the same as State-acquired leases in that
acquisitions must "restore and enhance streamflows to benefit
Montana's native fish species.",1 2 However, private organizations
receive more leeway than MFWP; unlike MFWP, private organizations
may obtain lease rights in any river basin in which willing lessors exist.
Furthermore, private entities do not need to maintain political
responsiveness. These facts alone open up leasing opportunities for
conservation organizations in areas where MFWP would otherwise be
precluded from acting.
(Temporary) Water leasing study - State leasing
Under the 1989-authorized temporary leasing study, "[t]he
department of fish, wildlife, and parks, with the consent of the [Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks Commission], may lease existing rights for the
purpose of maintaining or enhancing streamflows for the benefit of
fisheries in [designated] stream reaches.. .

.",'

MFWT "may declare a

stream eligible for leasing ...only if it finds that water leasing is
necessary to maintain or enhance streamflows for fisheries.1 4
Presently, leases may not be issued to MFWP for a term of more than
ten years unless the water to be leased is considered "salvaged" waterwater made available for leasing through the application of watersaving methods such as ditch lining or improved irrigation practices.' °5
If the subject water meets the definition of salvaged water, the State
may approve a lease to convert the saved amount to instream purposes
for up to thirty years. 0 6 Whereas traditional law in prior appropriation
this statutory
states tends to discourage salvaging projects,"
construction provides a strong incentive for users to integrate watersaving measures into their use practices.
MFWP initiates the leasing process by filing an application for a
temporary change with DNRC.'O' The required form is a standard
MONT. CODE ANN.
101.

§ 85-2-316(1) (2003).

MONTANA WATER TRUST, INSTREAM FLow ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK: WORKING

TO BENEFIT STRFAMFLOWS AND WATER RIGHT HOLDERS 5 (n.d.)
[hereinafter INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK].
102. Id.
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2436(2) (b) (2003).
104. Id. § 85-2-437(2).
105. Id. §§ 85-2-436(2) (f), 102(16).
106. Id. § 85-2436(2) (f).
107. This is particularly the case in Colorado, where the state supreme court has
expressly held that water saved through salvaging initiatives, for example by removing
phreatophytes from one's land, is "subject to call by prior appropriators" and thus
must "return from whence it comes-the river-and thereon ... to those the river
feeds in turn." See Southeastern Colo.Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc.,
529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974).
108. See MONTANA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. AND CONSERVATION, FORM 606: APPLICATION
COOPERATELY
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change of use application, the same application that an offstream
agricultural user would file when seeking a change in point of
diversion, type of [other offstream] use, or place of use.' ° The
application carries a $400 filing fee and must specify, among other
things, the amount of water involved, the purpose of the change, and
the proposed method of measuring the carriage rate involved in the
transaction.1 ° In addition, a valid application must include a detailed
map of the stream reach involved.111
After a preliminary review of the change application, DNRC must
serve notice of the application to potentially affected parties including:
(1) an appropriator of water or applicant for or holder of a permit
who, according to [DNRC records], may be affected by the proposed
appropriation;
(2) any purchaser. .. of property that, according to the records of
the department, may be affected by the proposed appropriation; and
(3) any public agency that has reserved waters in the [area]. 1 2
After notifying the above parties, DNRC must publish notice of the
1
pending change in a locally circulated newspaper."
The notice must
indicate all "facts pertinent to the application ' 14 to alert any
potentially affected water users whom DNRC did not directly inform of
the proposed change.
The extensive notice requirements provide a strong safeguard
against harm to downstream users not party to the lease transaction.
As previously mentioned, Montana was careful not to expand its ISF
protection strategies at the expense of the prior appropriation
doctrine's no harm rule. As such, change applications do not receive
ultimate approval until MFPAT overcomes all objections filed with
DNRC pursuant to the statute."' DNRC, in turn, reserves the right to
"modify or revoke the lease authorization if an appropriator, other
than one involved in the initial change of use proceeding, proves by
substantial credible evidence that his water right is adversely
affected. ''1 6
Leases involving conversions from offstream use to instream flow
may be renewed once for an additional ten years." 7 Upon submission

TO

CHANGE

A

WATER

RIGHT,

Aug.

2003,

http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/home.htm [hereinafter FORM 606].

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. MONT.CODEANN. § 85-2-307(1) (b) (2003).
113. Id. § 8 5-2-307(1)(a).

114. Id.
115. Id. §§ 85-2-308,-436(2) (c).
116. McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-30.
117. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2436(2) (a),

(f).

available

at
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of a renewal request, however, DNRC must alert any user who may be
adversely affected by the renewal." 8 This alert may trigger objections
from users claiming potential harm, and therefore may re-initiate the
process described above. Those leases involving water made available
from the development of water conservation or storage projects are
restricted to a term equal to the expected life of the project but not
T19
more than thirty years.
Each year, MFWP must compile a comprehensive report on all new
In fact, in drafting the 1989
and existing ISF lease holdings.2
legislation, the state senate viewed the creation of ISF lease rights as
pressing enough to compel MFWP to provide, in the annual report,
convincing justification for its failure to establish such rights if no new
lease agreements are established throughout the year.'
Recognizing the overriding importance of seniority in the prior
appropriation system, the legislation also specifically indicates that
"[t]he priority of appropriation for a lease ... is the same as the
priority of appropriation of the right that is leased.",22 This clause
ensures that waters left instream under lease agreements are protected
from claims by competing users and that leased waters have
appropriation dates established at the time of the lease execution.
For comparative purposes, MFWP performs a function similar to
CWCB. Both are the sole state agency entrusted with the ability to
acquire existing water rights for conversion to instream uses.
However, MFWP, unlike CWCB, actively pursues leased rights. The
dissimilarity reflects under Montana law transfers to ISF use are limited
to lease agreements under the state's temporary leasing study; no
provisions allow for outright government purchases of ISF rights.
MFWP's stated mission is
However, the distinction may exist because
12
3
more conservation oriented than CWCB's
(Temporary) Changes in appropriationrights - Private leasing
Notwithstanding the fact that permanent ISF conveyances are
prohibited in Montana, the state's 1989 statutory components parallel
Colorado's ISF protection framework in structure, if not in practice.
However, Montana's 1995 amendments signify a considerable
departure from such "traditional" methods of publicly administrated
ISF establishment approaches. The 1995 legislation carved out two

118. Id. § 85-2-436(2)(f).
119. Id.
120. ld. § 85-2436(3) (a); see, e.g., FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63.
121. Id. § 85-2-436(3) (a).
122. Id. § 85-2-436(2) (h).
123. Whereas Montana FWP's stated mission is to provide "for the stewardship of the
fish, wildlife, parks and recreational resources of Montana, while contributing to the
quality of life for present and future generations," CWCB directives extend well
beyond such conservationist notions. FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63. In
addition to facilitating and holding ISF rights, CWCB is also charged with the
development of the waters of the state, which in practice includes the financing and
oversight of out-of-stream diversion projects. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-121 to -125
(2003).
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significant exceptions to historical prohibitions against converting
existing water rights to instream uses. First, it allowed existing users to
unilaterally convert their consumptive uses to ISFs on a temporary
basis without transferring the right to a public entity through a
purchase or lease agreement1 4 Second, and for conservationists most
importantly, the legislation opened the door to private transactions
between existing users and non-profit conservation groups.15
Montana's expanded program now allows private persons to enter
lease agreements with existing users; the existing user is able to change
a consumptive use to an instream use through whatever terms the
lessor and lessee
agree upon in return for compensation from the
2,
private lessee.1
The statutory language defines "person" broadly, and any
"individual, association, partnership, or corporation" may lease 1 water
7
2
for instream enhancement providing certain conditions are met.
Although MTU has been the most active lessor of ISF rights in the
years since the legislation's passage, other organizations have begun to
These
vigorously pursue lease rights in the state as well. 2
organizations receive considerable leeway regarding the leasing
methods at their disposal. Rather than specifying split- or dry-season
leasing methods, the statute allows considerable room for flexibility,
stating that a change of use approval may be granted for either
"consecutive or intermittent use [s].""9
To reiterate, all changes to instream use in Montana must be
temporary. For all practical purposes, then, the conversions are "lease
agreements" because-as with transactions involving MFWP-the law
"authorizes private individuals.., to lease water for [only] up to ten
Like leases entered under the
years for instream purposes. "' 3 .
temporary leasing study, temporary changes of use are renewable for
up to ten years upon mutual agreement between the contracting
parties.'
The program originally terminated in 2005, but its success
prompted the state legislature to extend its terms effective upon its
original termination date ofJuly 2005. 2
In 2005, private entities will also be able to broker longer-term ISF
deals with those willing to make improvements to their diversionary,
irrigation, or storage practices. At that time, statutory authorization
becomes effective and allows private organizations to enter lease
agreements for up to thirty years with appropriators who possess
124. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-408(2) (a) (i) (2003).
125. Id. § 85-2408(2)(a)-(b).
126. Id. § 85-2-408(2)(a) (ii).
127. Id. § 85-2408(b).
128. The Montana Water Trust, for instance, recently acquired a lease right for 300
acre-feet per year. Telephone Interview with John Ferguson, Director, Montana Water
Trust (July 9, 2003) [hereinafter Ferguson Interview].
129. MONT. CODEANN. § 85-2-407(2) (2003).
130. Id. §§ 85-2-407 to -409; Thompson, supra note 11, at 287.
131. Id. § 85-2-407(3).
132. Id. § 85-2-407.
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surplus water made "available from the development of new water
conservation or storage project development."' l1 Again, provisions of
this type weaken historical disincentives to salvaging while encouraging
irrigators to develop creative conservation strategies.
Procedurally, private interests must comport with guiding legal
language similar to the language governing the establishment of
publicly held lease rights. Like those established through MFWP, all
leases entered under the 1995 statute must benefit fisheries and must
demonstrably not inflict harm upon non-party users. 4 The same
"Application to Change a Water Right" form must be filed with
DNRC. 31 5 After DNRC determines the application is complete, the
water right sought to be changed is "subject to a critical and intense
review" even before notice of the proposed change is published.'3
Upon publication of notice, water users adverse to the use change may
submit objections to DNRC1 37 Those opposed to the change may also
object during a renewal process and once during the term of the
Contingent on whether the change request
change permit.'"
overcomes such objections, DNRC may grant or deny the parties'
request to enter the lease agreement."" Nevertheless, if it approves a
lease, DNRC reserves the right to modify or revoke its authorization if
it determines that others' rights are adversely affected by the change at
any point.r 0
Perhaps the most important aspect of Montana's statutory
framework is "the ability to change the purpose of an irrigationwater
right to an instream water right, and retain the priority date of the
original water right."14 1 As with State-held lease rights, "[tihe priority
of appropriation for a temporary change in appropriation right is the
same as the priority of appropriation of the right that is temporarily
changed."

42

Again,

conservationists

adamantly

fought

for

the

inclusion of a provision guaranteeing that appropriation dates would
remain unaffected by temporary transfers of rights or changes in use.
Since the 1988 passage of Senate Bill 447,141 maintaining the seniority
of ISF rights has remained a paramount concern to those seeking to
establish and preserve ISF rights in Montana, a concern that gained
victory in the letter of the law.

133. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 85-2-407(9) (2001) (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-407
(1979)).
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-408(3) (a)-(b) (2003).
135. See FORM 606, supra note 108.
136. INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 43.

137.
138.
139.

MONT. CODE ANN.

Id. at 43-44.

§ 85-2-407(4)(b) (2003).
McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-29.
§ 85-2-407(4)

140.

MONT. CODE ANN.

141.

Ziemer Memorandum, supra note 72.

142.

MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 85-2-407(5)

(a) (2003).
(2001).

143. Codified at § 85-2-316(9) (establishing methods for determining priority of
appropriation).
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2. The Oregon Water Trust: Innovator in Private Facilitation
a. History and Statutory Construction
Oregon is commonly identified as the first state to proactively seek
to protect ISFs when, in 1915, it took measures to protect natural
stream flows along the Columbia River Gorge.' 44 Since that time, the
rules governing streamflow protection have witnessed tremendous
evolution; in 1955, Oregon became the first state to establish a
minimum stream flow program, and in 1970, it created the Scenic
Waterways program, which-by its very nature-serves to maintain
healthy stream flows.14
Oregon's aggressive approach to river and
stream protection lives on today, as the state "continues to lead the
development of instream flow markets" in the West.' 6
Oregon's current ISF protection scheme was solidified in 1987 with
the passage of Senate Bill 140.147 Building on Oregon's progressive
history of instream protection, the new legislation authorized any
person, public or private, to "purchase or lease all or a portion of an
48
existing water right ... for conversion to an in-stream water right.'
This transfer of private rights was considered "critical.. . because it
offered the only route for an in-stream water right to obtain a valuable
senior priority date."'49 The other water right transfer methods in the
bill could not offer priority dates prior to 1955.'5
On overappropriated rivers and streams, such junior appropriation dates
would fail to guarantee the actual preservation of necessary minimum
flows in dry years when senior right holders could conceivably divert
water beyond the full call of the river. 5'
Though private ISF purchase acquisitions are lawful and not
uncommon in the state, Oregon specifically recognized the right to
lease water for instream purposes with the passage of the 1987
legislation. 52 Amendments to the statute in May 2001, however,
moved beyond mere authorization and specified that use of a water
right could be "split" between the lessor and the lessee within a given
calendar year.' 53 To date, the only requirements for split-season
leasing are that (1) the original right holder must refrain from
144.
145.

GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 137. See also Sterne, supra note 40, at 212.
GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 137; Sterne, supra note 40, at 212.

146.

CLAY

J.

LANDRY,

POL. ECONOMY

RESEARCH

CENTER, SAVING OUR STREAMS

THROUGH WATER MARKETS: A PRACrICAL GUIDE 32 (1998).
147. S. 140, 64th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1987) (codified at OR. REv. STAT. §
537.332-360 (1987)).
148. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2001).
149. Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading Into the Water Market: The First
Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 135, 138 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mattick, sufira note 67, at 18-4.
153. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3) (2001). See also Oregon: Water Resources Department
Adopts New Rules Addressing Split-season Leasingfor Instream Use, 6 W. WATER L. & POL'Y
REP. 100, 101 (Feb. 2002).
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diverting water out of stream while water is concurrently left instream
under the lease agreement, and (2) the parties to the transaction must
measure the amount of water applied to each use and report the data
to the Oregon Water Resources Department ("OWRD") on an annual
basis. 1 4 Although not expressly allowed under the statute, dry-season
leasing would not appear to offend the broad statutory language that
allows leasing of "all or a portion of the existing water right ... for a
specified period. '"'' Dry-season leases merely specify lease periods with
regard to natural conditions rather than time.
The majority of states that allow ISF right transactions do so only
when special circumstances exist on the proposed reach of a river or
stream. In Montana, parties may enter lease agreements only when
15 6
doing so will demonstrably benefit or enhance a recognized fishery.
In Colorado, environmentalists have long decried a system that (until
recently)157 restricted CWCB from obtaining any rights other than
those that would maintain "the minimum flow necessary to protect the
natural environment to a reasonable degree. ' '58
Oregon, however, decided to cast off the shackles of prior
appropriation, disregarding traditional limitations on how much and
for what reasons water could be applied to ISF maintenance.
According to OWRD, almost any valid water right may be leased for
instream purposes in the state, if doing so does not cause injury to
existing users.59 Thus, instream water rights may be transferred on a
temporary basis to protect a diversity of needs including the protection
of fish and wildlife, scenic values, and water quality. ' In addition,
This allowance
OWRD may hold ISF lease rights for "public use."'
has opened the door to many leasing opportunities since inclusive in
the definition of public use are threatened recreational values."'
The provisions in Oregon law regarding salvaged water are similar
to those of Montana law. Whereas "[miost western states do not allow
users to keep or sell water that becomes surplus through conservation
efforts such as installing more efficient irrigation systems, lining
ditches, or repairing pipes," Oregon water users not only maintain a
right to such waters, but may, in fact, be rewarded financially for their
efforts.'6 In Oregon, salvaged, or "conserved water" is created when a
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.348(3) (a), (b) (2001).
Id. § 537.348(2).
156. MONT. CODEANN. §§ 85-2-436(2)(b), 85-2-408(3) (a) (2001).
157. See discussion infra on Colo. Senate Bill 156 accompanying notes 337-347.
158. A DRY LEGACY 1, supra note 26, at 6 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)
(2001) (emphasis added)).
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 540.578(2) (2001); see also Oregon Water Resources
Department, Instream Leasing Program,at
[hereinafter
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/instreams.shtml
OWRD LeasingProgram].
160. OWRD Leasing Program,supra note 159.
161. OR. REv. STAT. § 537.332(3) (2001).
162. Id. § 537.332(5)(a).
163. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA S. SNYDER, POL. EcONOMY RESEARCH CENTER,
154.
155.

PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP

(1997),
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right holder reduces the amount of water traditionally diverted to
satisfy an existing beneficial use by "improving the technology or
method for diverting, transporting, applying or recovering the
water... .""' The right to the amount of water conserved maintains
"the same legal status as any other water right for which a certificate
has been issued.""" Thus, agency rules state that such rights may be
freely transferred, or leased for instream use, as if they were originally
perfected through diversionary means.'66 Once again, this allowance
represents a significant departure from historical prior appropriation
restrictions and "aims to correct the misguided incentives of the
beneficial use requirement by giving water right holders an incentive
to conserve water."57
Although Oregon law is quite favorable to private involvement in
the ISF conversion process, some ambiguity remains as to whether
private individuals may hold instream rights.6 8 An instream right is
defined as a "right held in trust by the Water Resources Department
for the benefit of the people ....
This language contradicts that
authorizing "any person" to lease existing rights for conversion to
instream use." Until 1998, the State maintained the position that the
former wording was controlling, requiring title to each instream right
obtained by a private entity in turn be transferred to OWRD."' After a
decade of adherence to this condition, some private groups began to
argue vociferously that ownership was essential to the success of their
efforts.
In response, OWRD began issuing "flow enhancement water
rights," which are essentially the same as ISF rights, but private
organizations may hold the right.' 71 Thus far, however, the state has
declined to issue such rights for temporary lease transfers, opting to
limit this declaration to rights acquired permanently by sale, grant, or
donation.'71
While some organizations may see possession as an indispensable
component of successful flow protection, the prudent conservationist
must realize that the importance of maintaining title to a right is
secondary to the ability to facilitate acquisitions.
The primary
organization in Oregon's emergent ISF water market, the Oregon
http://www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/priming-full.php?s=2.
164. OR. RFv. STAT. § 537.455(1), (2) (2001).
165, Id. § 537.500(1).
166. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(1).
However, the law only allows the user
employing conservation measures to keep 75 percent of the saved water for additional
use, sale, or lease. The remaining 25 percent must remain instream. GILL1LAN &
BROWN, supra note 19, at 162.
167. Schiller, supra note 47.
168. Telephone Interview with Fritz Paulus, Executive Director, Oregon Water Trust
(uly 10, 2003).
169. OR. Rv.SrAr. § 537.332(3) (2001).
170. Id. § 537.348(1).
171. LANDRY, supra note 146, at 33.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 33-34.
174. Id. at 45 n.49.
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Water Trust ("OVAIT"), has shown a remarkable ability to preserve
water in threatened areas without maintaining possessory rights. In
fact, more has been accomplished under the Oregon program-which
generally precludes private, organizational, or corporate ownership of
instream rights-than under the Montana legal framework, which
openly permits non-government possessory interests. What must also
be remembered are the numerous benefits conservation groups reap
from State oversight. While the majority of these will be discussed
below, it suffices to say here that state agencies are able to provide
continuity of stewardship, while administering the transaction process
with a greater degree of impartiality than organizations with vested
interests.
OWT's creation was directly attributable to the 1987 legislation
that recognized the validity of ISFs in the context of Oregon's prior
appropriation system.'75 Nonetheless, it would not be until six years
later, in the winter of 1992, that "a small group of individuals
representing agriculture, environmental, legal, and tribal interests got
together ...to discuss possible alternatives" to the existing utilization
of the law." 6 Shortly thereafter, OWT emerged as the state's primary
"broker for private parties interested in donating their rights to the
State for instream flow."17 7 Over the next decade, OWT-modeling its
conservation efforts after successful land trusts such as the Nature
Conservancy and the Trust for Public Land-broadened its strategic
approach to ISF protection by pursuing creative and mutually
beneficial lease transactions based on free market ideology.1" Today it
OWT
is said that "[mlore than any other private organization,
79
demonstrates the applicability of markets to water policy."'
As might be expected, OWT's efforts were not universally
accepted. In fact, "[t]he Trust began its activities in a polarized
Even in
atmosphere that had set farmers against environmentalists.".
the face of continuing success in improving the state's waterways,
legislative challenges invariably arose in an attempt to restrict the ease
with which consumptive water users could lawfully transfer rights to
those such as O"AT who would convert them to instream uses. For
example, in both 1995 and 1997, state lawmakers introduced
legislation that would have severely limited the transferability of out-ofNeuman & Chapman, supranote 149, at 167.
Schiller, supra note 47. Originally, OWT was comprised of:
[T]he president of a large land management company who was also a
member of the Oregon Cattleman's Association; the director of Oregon
Trout, Oregon's leading wild fish environmental group; the manager of one
of the state's largest irrigation districts; and an attorney who had been a longtime activist for in-stream flows .... The Trust founders recruited four more
Board members, two academics and two tribal representatives, and waded
into the water market.
Neuman & Chapman, supranote 149, at 135-36.
177. Sterne, supra note 40, at 214.
178. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 139.
179. Schiller, supra note 47.
180. Landry & Peck, supra note 56.
175.
176.
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stream water to instream rights. 81 Under the terms of the 1997 bill,
water rights originally "issued for agricultural purposes [would have
been transferable] only to other agricultural uses." ' Fortunately, the
state legislature failed to adopt the regressive measures, and OWT was
allowed to flourish.
Over its first summer, OWT entered into five lease agreements for
ISF rights."" Under the terms of its first negotiated lease, OWT agreed
to purchase hay the lessor would have otherwise grown on his riparian
land to feed cattle; 8 4 another lease was donated; and the Trust

provided monetary compensation at market value for the remaining
three.' 8s5 By 1998, OWT had completed thirty-one transactions and by
the end of 1999, its portfolio included fifty-one instream rights-the
majority of them established on a temporary basis.' These temporary
rights accounted for about 28.71 cfs of the total 32.28 cfs left instream
that year under OWT-facilitated agreements. 8 7 By the 2001 irrigation
season, OWT was involved in eighty-two projects, preserving 101.66 cfs
of natural flows-93.56 cfs of which were preserved under temporary
leases. 188

Other private organizations in Oregon have also played a part in
For instance, in 1994, the
the state's ISF restoration program.
Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA") and an agricultural user
entered into an instream flow lease. Under the lease, which included
an option to purchase the rights, BPA left 150 cfs in the Snake River
Nonetheless, leases involving
and 68.4 cfs in the Malheur River.'8
private parties other than OWT are rare. As a result, OWT is the most
prominent player in Oregon's ISF protection regime and is now widely
respected as "the oldest and most active private acquirer of instream
rights" in the West.' 90
b. Legal and Procedural Requirements
Keeping in mind recent debate over the issue, the general rule is
that only OWRD may hold leased rights to instream water for any
Notwithstanding the issuance of "instream
meaningful period.
enhancement rights," the State's position is that "any person who
leases, purchases, or receives.., a water right and converts it to
instream flow must transfer the right to [OWRD] to hold in trust for

181. Richard G. Hildreth, Water Law at the Crossroads,14J. ENVrL. L. & LrITG. 11 n.53
(1999).
182. H.R. 2628, 69th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997).
183. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 148.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 148.
186. Id at 149.
187. Id.
188. Oregon Water Trust, 2001 OWT Projects, at
http://www.owt.org/deals2001.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
189. Sterne, supra note 40, at 214.
190. Thompson, supra note 11, at 271.
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the people of Oregon."' 9' However, unlike the Colorado system,
private parties are granted substantial leeway in targeting reaches of
stream, facilitatin various transactions, and holding ISF rights, even if
only temporarily.'
The differences in the developmental histories of the Montana and
Oregon leasing laws create a sharp distinction between the two states'
statutory structures. Montana, over a six-year period, experienced an
evolution in its leasing flow program. The program originally called
for a state-only acquisition program but later created an allowance for
private-sector involvement in ISF acquisitions.'" Because Montana
initially prohibited non-agency involvement in stream protection
efforts, the legislature drafted the original legislation to allow
flexibility in the State's dealings with private right holders-thus, the
temporary leasing study. Were the State restricted to acquiring
permanent rights through donation or purchase, it would have lacked
the flexible nature of leasing strategies necessary to restore healthy
flows in threatened basins where users were unwilling to completely
relinquish their rights.
The Oregon experience was quite different. When the Oregon
legislature drafted its ISF enabling statute in 1987, it simultaneously
created the first avenues for both state- and privately-initiated ISF
transactions. As such, the state legislature perhaps did not feel
similarly compelled to draft specific language decreeing a State's right
to enter lease agreements. Instead, the mission of the State would
hinge more on the "establishment of new in-stream water rights."194
This somewhat subtle variation in the creation of the two states'
leasing laws has had a profound effect on the manner in which
government agencies and public interest groups have pursued
available rights. In Montana, MFWP, in a sense, competes for the same
rights sought by non-profit groups. Although guided by different laws,
they are nonetheless governed by virtually the same standard of nonharm.' 95 In Oregon, however, state agencies and public interest groups
each have specific areas of interest and, for the most part, operate
within two different legal frameworks. While the nature of the law
focuses state efforts on the establishment of new ISF rights,
conservation groups-most notably OWT-tend more to seek out and
develop ISF rights through the right transfer process, often on a
stringently
temporary basis.' 9" ...Moreover, State acquisitions are more
..
197
reviewed than transactions between two contracting private parties.

191. Sterne, supra note 40, at 213.
192. Thompson, supra note 11, at 270-71; see Sterne, supra note 40, at 213-14.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 103-123.
194. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138 (emphasis added).
195. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2407(4), 85-2-408(3)(a) (2001) (private lease
transfers); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2) (g) (2001) (FWP Leasing Study).
196. See Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138.
197. Telephone interview with Fritz Paulus, supra note 168.
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State Powers - OWRD issuance of 1SF water right certificates
Prior to the 1987 legislation that in effect "converted all existing
minimum flows into instream rights," OWRD could unilaterally
"investigate adoption of minimum perennial streamflows" for
The new legislation, however, precluded the
threatened areas. 9
agency from establishing a right on its own motion. '99 Instead, OWRD
may now consider requests to establish ISF rights only from three state
agencies: Fish and Wildlife, Environmental Quality, and Parks and
Recreation.2 0 0 That the statutory language expressly calls for flow
requests from agencies with a broad range of responsibilities is
indicative of the numerous ISF purposes that may qualify as beneficial
uses.
In Colorado, however, requests from secondary state agencies are
neither necessary nor expressly solicited. CWCB must considerrequests
from any persons or governmental agencies and request
recommendations from the Division of Wildlife and the Division of
Parks and Outdoor Recreation prior to its initiation of the ISF
appropriation process. 20 ' However, a 1987 amendment to the WRDA
made clear that "the authority of the Board to file for instream flow
rights, or rights to maintain natural lake levels, [is] exclusive. 20 2
Although outside agencies play a large part in Oregon's instream
appropriation scheme, new ISF rights are established through a
certification process ultimately overseen by OWRD. OWRD grants
certificates for new rights only after the applicant agency submits a
valid application including, but not limited to the following: (1) a
detailed description of the particular reach of river or stream to be
protected; (2) the public use to be served through establishment of
the right; and (3) the amount of water requested, the period of its use,
and the technical methods to be used to determine the requested
In addition to the mandatory requirements, the
amounts. 2 3
requesting agency is encouraged to include: "(a) [the] means and
location for measuring the instream water right; (b) [t]he strategy and
responsibility for monitoring flows for the instream right; and (c)
[a]ny provisions needed for managing the water right to protect the
,,214
public uses.
Upon receiving an application from one of the three certified
agencies, OWRD embarks on a lengthy bureaucratic certification
process. Prior to final certification, OWRD must perform (1) a
completeness review; (2) an initial review to determine whether the

198. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 139; Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
199. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
200. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 138 (1999); OR. REv. STAT. §
537.336(I)-(3) (2001).
201. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
202. JAMES N. CORBRIDGE,JR. & TERESA A. RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATIER LAW 4041 (James N. CorbridgeJr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
203. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0020(4) (2003).
204. Id. § 690-077-0020(5)(a)-(c).
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requested water is available and whether granting the certificate would
run contrary to statutory law; and (3) an issuance of public notice to
potentially affected state and federal agencies, Indian tribes, and
persons on OWRD's weekly mailing list. ° At the completion of this
process, OWRD may either approve the new instream right as
requested, issue a certificate for a new right for a lesser quantity than
requested, or deny a certificate for a new ISF right upon a
determination that doing so would either benefit or run contrary to
the public interest. 0°
Privatelyfacilitatedagreements includingsplit-and dry-season leases
Individuals may acquire existing rights, or portions thereof, and
take responsibility for changing the use to instream purposes in an
administrative hearing, but then must turn the right over to OWRD to
be held in trust for the people of the state.07 All leases entered into
under the program are "short-term" leases because under no
2 08
If
circumstances may the lease terms exceed a period of five years..
the agreement specifies split-season use, the lease may be valid for only
one year.20 9 However, there are no limitations on renewals in Oregon
for either full- or split-season ISF leases. 2' Leasing to private parties is
thus an attractive prospect to many landowners, as it gives them the
chance to "test the market waters," and either negate their
commitment after a short period, or continue to operate under a
"temporary" agreement for as long as they wish.
Transferring water rights through private contract rather than
through governmental channels in many cases allows grantors to avoid
cumbersome bureaucratic processes. For example, in Oregon, the
issuance of a new certificate is not mandated when private parties draft
ISF lease agreements among themselves; rather the temporary right is
established by the lease agreement itself.2 ' OWRD may, however, at
the request of the lessor, issue a new certificate for the instream water
right indicating the priority date. 112 Nevertheless, parties who convert
all or a portion of a water right to instream use through a lease
the standard statutory requirements for
agreement must comply with
2 12
the transfer of a water right.
Applications for instream right transfers are submitted to the
Oregon Water Resources Commission ("OWRC"), a seven-member
board appointed by the governor to oversee the activities of OWRD." 4
205. Id. § 690-077-0027, -0029,-0031.
206. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.343(1)(a)-(c) (2001); OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-0770047(3) (a)-(c) (2003).
207. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 122.
208. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(1) (2003).
209. Id. § 690-077-0079(1).
210. Id. § 690-077-0077(14),-0079(1).
211. Id. § 690-077-0000(3).
212. OR.REv. STAT. § 537.348(1) (2001).
213. Id.
214. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0070 (2003); see also OREGON WATER REs. DEP'T, ABOUT
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First, OWRD reviews all lease applications to ensure the application
itself is in compliance with agency rules, and, "if possible, to develop
conditions to prevent enlargement of the original right or injury to
In order for a lessor to receive agency
other water right owners.
approval, "[i]nstream transfers must show that injury will not occur
and that a beneficial use will be made of the water during the lease
period. 2 16 As previously mentioned, the later qualification is relatively
easy to satisfy-OWRD rules ask: (1) that the lease agreement state
how the lease will serve a public use;1 7 and (2) that the application
specifically identify the public uses, which include pollution
of aquatic and wildlife habitat, or
abatement,• improvement
218
recreational values.
In most cases, applicants need only fill out a standard "Short-Term
Water Lease Agreement," 21 9 specifying standard information such as
the party names, amount of water to be leased, and the public value
sought to be protected or improved. If the right conversion is to occur
on a split-season basis, the contracting parties must file a simple
addendum in conjunction with the standard form, stating the periods
when the right will be applied to its historical use and when it will be
left instream.20 In addition, the application must convey the location
and type of device to be used to measure the flows, the frequency with
which such measurements will be taken, and 22the identity of the parties
1
responsible for recording the measurements.
Perhaps in an effort to reduce burdensome red tape, and to
establish more effective basin-wide conservation efforts, OWRD has
shrewdly devised a procedural framework for those situations where
multiple landowners are attracted to the idea of leasing rights on a
collective basis. Rather than having to process multiple change
applications from users within a single basin, Oregon law encourages
the pooling of multiple requests to enter lease agreements. Instead of
requiring each individual right holder to enter separate lease
agreements with interested conservation groups such as OWT,
irrigation districts may enter such agreements on the landowners'
behalves via the submission of a "pooled lease form 2 2 2 containing
THE OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION, at

http://www.wrd.state.or.us/commission/about.html.
215. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-065(2) (2003).

216. OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON: AN INTRODUCTION TO
OREGON'S WATER LAWS AND WATER RIGHTS SYSTEM 33 (2002).
217. OR.ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(3)(d) (2003).
218. Id. § 690-077-0000(3).
219.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE

(Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/StandardLeaseForm03.doc.

220.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SPLIT SEASON INSTREAM LEASE 1

(Dec. 2003), available at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewar-dship/forms/SplitSeason.doc.
221. Id.
222.

See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE

POOLED LEASE FORM 1 (Dec. 2003), available at
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water right information from each participating landowner.22 3
Although an application submitted in this fashion must be
accompanied by individual forms completed by each right holder,24
the OWRC reviews and approves or denies the conversion request as it
would a lease agreement executed between a trust and a single right
holder.
Following the receipt of the change application, the OWRD
Director, under authority of the OWRC, must make a determination
whether "[t]he amount and timing of the proposed instream flow is
allowable within the limits and use, including return flows, of the
original water right; and [t]he proposed reach(es) is (are)
appropriate." 22

If OWRD determines the proposal may inflict injury

upon existing rights, or cause an enlargement of the original right, the
lease is not necessarily rejected. The agency retains the authority to
modify the agreement to prevent enlargement or injury.226 Following
approval, OWRD "may [also] revoke ...the temporary
transfer at any
"
time if [it] finds that the transfer is causing injury. ,2
Thus, while the Oregon system resembles that of Colorado in
vesting power with a single entity to maintain ISF rights, the similarities
do not carry much further. Notwithstanding that OWRD, much like
CWCB, is empowered with the sole authority to hold ISF rights in trust
for the people of the state, the Oregon system grants broad
permissibility as to who may originally acquire the right. This
distinction, perhaps more than any other, sets the Oregon approach to
preserving its natural river and stream flows apart from the Colorado
approach. Unlike Colorado, "Oregon actively enforces its rights,"
provides market incentives for acquiring instream rights, and provides
that ISF decrees
may automatically stop additional future
22
development.

http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/RevisedPooledDistrictForm
.doc.
223. See OWRD Leasing Program,supra note 159.
224. See OREGON WATER RES. DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR SHORT-TERM INSTREAM LEASE,
POOLED LANDOWNER FoRM 1 (Jan. 2004), availableat
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/stewardship/forms/RevisedPooledLandownerF
orm.doc.
225. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0075(2)(a), (b) (2001).
226. Id. § 690-077-077(8).
227. Id. § 690-380-8000(6).
228. Melinda Kassen, Legal Protection for Instream Flows 2 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
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GROWING INTEREST AND COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES TO
PRIVATE ISF RIGHTS

Stakeholders across the West have advanced multiple justifications
for expanding the breadth of private-sector involvement in the ISF
preservation game. Arguably, a market approach creates flexibility in
the system, eliminates political and bureaucratic barriers to
meaningful conservation efforts, and allows public interest groups'
direct involvement with agricultural users, which in turn enables the
establishment of mutual trust between agricultural and environmental
interests. However, from an economist's point of view, the overriding
attractiveness of introducing market forces to a given endeavor is that
doing so promotes financial feasibility while maximizing benefits to
the contracting parties. In states that limit instream acquisitions and
transfers to agency action, fiscal constraints have tended to severely
limit the number of ISF conversions that governing agencies can
reasonably complete each year.22 g Those systems that allow private
money to filter into the acquisition scheme, however, have shown a
much greater ability to stave off harmful river and stream depletion. 2 °
In market systems, water trusts and other conservation groups are
often able to successfully fulfill their missions without resorting to
costly and harmful adversarial battles with competing interests.
Litigating suits under federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), or Clean Water Act ("CWA"), or under state regulation
necessitates quick and severe drains on organizational funds. Political
campaigning and lobbying for more stringent flow regulation are also
costly, not to mention time consuming. In many cases, efforts to
protect threatened waterways are time sensitive-the areas that
organizations are fighting to protect suffer while opportunities for
cooperation among the two sides wane. Lease transactions, on the
other hand, enable conservation groups to apply their resources
directly to mending the threat, thereby maximizing their spending
efficiency. Lease transactions also benefit water right owners in any
number of ways depending on the type of transaction owners feel is
right for them: "Water leases provide cash and flexibility, purchases
23
offer large cash payments, and donations can provide tax relief. 1
Those who view with skepticism the ability of emergent ISF water
markets to continue to grow need only look at the statistics: Overall
expenditures on instream rights have grown tremendously in recent
years. Whereas outlays among the northwestern states for ISF leases
and purchases were almost undetectable in 1990, they grew to $6
million in 1994, and to $9 million in 1996. 32 From 1990 to 1998, "an
estimated $36 million was spent on leases and purchases of water for
229. See generally Sterne, supra note 40, at 221-22.
230. Id. at 222.
231. Landry & Peck, supra note 56 (quoting Andrew Purkey, former director of the
Oregon Water Trust) (quotations omitted).
232. Landry, supra note 45, at 5.
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instream use" in the Pacific Northwest.' 13 The vast majority of this
money ($30.5 million) was applied to lease purchases.
Although
state and federal governments are still the dominant investors in the
establishment of ISF rights, "private acquisitions... are increasing in
size and number," and if focused on small tributaries, "may represent
the entire flow of the stream.,
In Montana, MFWP-held rights still account for the majority of the
total number of ISF flows held in the state.2 36 However, MFWP has not
negotiated a new lease since 2001.27 Moreover, most of the fifteen
lease rights it holds are for relatively small amounts of water ranging
from 1.0 cfs to 41.4 cfs annually, with the majority of them coming in
at the lower end of that range.
While MFWP has been relatively
hesitant to lease any new or larger rights, MTU now holds five ISF
leases that leave over 250 cfs instream during critical periods.2 9 Taken
together, three of these leases-all executed with the same offstream
user under a single agreement-represent "the largest lease of its kind,
not only in Montana, but also in the West., 24 MTU purchased the
split-season rights, collectively named the "Sun Ranch" leases after the
lessor's farm, in order to protect flows on three separate tributaries of
the Madison River.2 4' The three flows account for approximately 220
cfs of water previously diverted out of stream; this is approximately the
same amount of water left instream each year under all fifteen MFWAp
leases during times of minimum diversion. 4 The impressive growth in the number of private acquisitions is
attributable to an influx of funding to privately sponsored public
interest organizations, all of which were made possible by the
aforementioned developments in Montana and Oregon law. OWT
began in 1994 with an annual operational budget of approximately
$120,000.! 4 By 1998, the budget more than doubled to $264,000;
between 1994 and 1998, OWT's funding for acquisition of water rights
235

233. Id. at 3.
234. See id. at 6.
235. Id. at 8.
236. ZiemerMemorandum, supra note 72.
237. FWP PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 63, at app. a.
238. Id. It should be noted that some of the leases included in the "fifteen" involve
multiple users. In some cases, as many as six water users pooled their existing rights
into a single lease transaction with MFWP. Taking into account the pooled lease
agreements, approximately twenty different right holders currently convert their
offstream uses to instream flow, all on a seasonal basis.
239. Letter from David Collinge, Montana Trout Unlimited to Jason Wells 2-3 (July
30, 2003) (including Laura Zeimer's responses to questions posed by Mr. Wells) (on
file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
240. News Release, Montana Trout Unlimited, Historic Water Lease Benefitting
[sic] Madison River Fishery Announced I (Sept. 5, 2001), at
http://www.outdoorrelease.com/newsreleases/news-detail.aslD=162&cat=13.
241. Id.
242. Id. Nine of the fifteen FWP leases call for differing flow amounts at different
times depending on time of year and seasonal conditions. See FWP PROGRESS REPORT,
supra note 63, at app. A.
243. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 140.
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totaled $284,000. 44 Additionally, the Trust acquired $370,000 worth of
donated water rights. 4 5 In 1993, OWT started out merely as an idea to
test a free-market environmental protection policy. By 1998, the Trust
had protected over 450 miles of threatened river throughout the
The appearance on the water market horizon of new
state.
organizations such as CWT and the Montana Water Trust, which
recently negotiated its first ISF lease right,2 47 evidences a burgeoning
interest in privately facilitated transactions.
As a final note on the economics of instream right transactions, a
glaring cost discrepancy exists between purchase acquisitions and lease
transactions. In 1998, the mean price for purchased ISF rights in the
Pacific Northwest was $151.38 per acre-foot; leased rights were valued
at a more affordable $30.40 per acre-foot.2 48 Comparing these figures,
it becomes immediately evident why the majority of conservation
efforts focus on the establishment of lease rights. Taking into account
the finite budgets of organizations operating in the market, leased
rights offer the best way to keep the most water instream during late
summers or dry years. In many cases, purchased rights provide no
conservation benefits beyond those a lease on the same watercourse
establishes. Yet purchased rights demand massive commitments of
financial resources, which may foreclose the possibility of other
acquisitions. While leases may fail to offer guarantees for perpetual
natural flow preservation, there is little doubt the public interest
groups' expenditures have, nonetheless, translated into noticeable
improvements to the natural conditions of depleted rivers and streams
throughout the Northwest.
V. POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS OF OFFSTREAM TO INSTREAM
LEASE TRANSFERS: WHAT BARRIERS EXIST?
To be sure, "voluntary market transfers of water rights are an
increasingly important means of shifting water from out-of-stream uses
to in-stream uses. ,249 Nevertheless, one should be careful not to hail
rivers
the free market as a universal panacea for Colorado's
25 depleted
and streams. Regulatory safeguards such as the ESA ' and the CWA,51
together with judicial declarations upholding such legal principles as

244. Schiller, supra note 47.
245. Id.
246. IUCN-THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, VISION FOR WATER AND
STRATEGY FOR CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE
RESOURCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 25-26 (2000), available at
WORLD

MANAGEMENT

NATURE, A
OF WATER

http://www.iucn.org/webfiles/doc/WWRP/Publications/Vision/VisionWaterNature.
pdf.
247. The MWT lease memorializes an agreement whereby 300 acre-feet will be left
instream each year for the duration of the lease. MWT has also negotiated a purchase
agreement for 100 acre-feet. Ferguson Interview, supra note 128.
248. Landry, supra note 45, at 9.
249. Hildreth, supra note 181, at 11.
250. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
251. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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and the validity of federal reserved rights,

23

play a vital role in the continuation of effective stewardship. Most
conservationists remain doubtful that absent these safeguards a free
market approach to ISF protection would manage, on its own, to
sustain natural streamflows to the same extent as under the present
regulatory and common law framework.5
Indeed, many see free market transfers merely as a valuable
complement to the broader existing methods of river and stream
protection. Some, meanwhile, believe the free market has no place
whatsoever in the allocation scheme of a public good such as water. In
either case, it market transfers have limitations, and, in fact, drawbacks
of which advocates of private instream leasing should be acutely aware.
The following list is not meant as an exhaustive summary of the
problems that arise with ISF leasing; it merely highlights some issues
that surface and, in some cases, offers solutions or clarifications:
1. Restricted reach and duration. The first fundamental limitation of
voluntary leasing programs is that they represent just one potential
tool for restoring and preserving ISFs. For rapid, far-reaching change,
voluntary acquisition programs fall short. As previously mentioned,
most lease agreements leave relatively small amounts of water
instream. Therefore, to restore natural historical flows to an entire
basin, one must look beyond leasing strategies for answers. Likewise,
lease agreements invariably fail to offer restoration in perpetuity due
to their temporary nature. If a landowner has a change of heart,
transfers title to the land to which the water is appurtenant, or if the
market no longer provides the best opportunity for profit, the lease
may expire without renewal.
Some environmental organizations may be leery of entering short
term ISF leases out of fear that the original right holders will use such
arrangements to "park" their water rights until a more profitable
option presents itself. The potential for water parking occurs when a
consumptive right holder anticipates that an appropriative right will
have significant market value as a different out-of-stream use in the
near future-municipal consumption for instance. A temporary
conveyance of that right to an instream use may allow a part5 to profit
The
from the right until its consumptive value nipens.
environmental objective of ISF leasing thus becomes confounded as
right holders maximize their financial gain under the guise of
ecological responsibility, with little or no intent for their right to serve
the goal of maintaining healthy streamflows in the long-term. In such
252. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709,
712 (Cal. 1983).
253. Primarily as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 577 (1908).

254. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 11, at 314 ("Public good markets are a simple
extension of regulatory markets," and thus should act as a means of fine tuning
regulation, rather than as a substitution for regulation.).
255. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, Colorado Trout Unlimited (Dec. 16,
2003).
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circumstances, the lessee water trust serves merely as a pack mule,
carrying the right until the consumptive worth of the right surpasses its
ISF lease value.
The lure of water parking is particularly powerful in Colorado,
where urban sprawl promises to continue its advance into presently
underdeveloped areas. Rapid commercial and residential growth
continues to thrive in areas where agricultural water users hold
numerous senior rights. The majority of all water rights changes in
Colorado in recent years have involved changes from agricultural use
to municipal and other non-agricultural uses.256 Agricultural users
eager to profit from their rights may be tempted by the prospect of
leasing these rights to water trusts while they survey other options.
Leasing in this manner gives potential opportunistic lessors a means of
warehousing a right on a temporary basis. Conservation groups, on
the other hand, are denied the promise of continued streamflow
preservation.
The contrapositive condition is that those organizations in the
business of acquiring rights are not tied to long-term stewardship
commitments on particular reaches of river or stream. Leasing
options allow organizations to "assess how effective water rights are in
If, for some reason, the
protecting stream flows" in a given area.
need to maintain or augment flows in a certain region decreases-for
instance if a stream becomes so depleted by subsequent diversions that
the lease, if renewed, would no longer serve its purpose-the lessor
can decide to let the agreement expire. The ability to discontinue
conversion agreements thus enables such organizations to dedicate
This
funds to more imminently threatened segments of river.
flexibility allows conservation groups to "yield significant ecological
benefits" with relatively small budgets. 58
2. Willing lessors and the consumptive use requirement. Obviously,
conservation groups cannot enter ISF leases with unwilling parties.
Leases, whether split- or dry-season, offer a viable conservation option
only when parties on both sides are eager to execute the transaction.
Those interested in free-market transfers have found that "[f]inding
willing sellers is one of the most challenging tasks in acquiring water
rights for instream flows. ' 2 59 Locating sellers willing to temporarily
convey water rights to financially strapped non-profits may be an
exceptionally daunting task in Colorado, where such groups must
compete with deep-pocketed cities and municipalities eager to find
new water sources. Unfortunately, "streams that suffer from low flow
almost invariably have cities on them." These cities will usually have

256. See TEREsA A. RICE & LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF LAW,
NATURAL RES. LAw CENTER, AGRIcULTURAL To URBAN WATER TRANSFERS IN COLORADO:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3-5 (1993).
257. LANDRY, supra note 146, at 21.
258. Id. at 18.
259. Id. at 15.
260. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, supra note 255.
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superior financial and political resources at their disposal to pursue
and acquire available senior water rights.
A scarcity of willing lessors could present a particularly problematic
stumbling block in Colorado, which holds steadfastly to consumptive
use requirements. Under statutory law, a right holder may change
only that portion of a water right for which a consumptive use can be
As Professor Corbridge notes, however, "[i]nadequate
established.
analysis of historical utilization or ambiguity in the law as to how that
historical use should be measured can lead to uncertainty and
confusion in the administration of the transfer system. '"2 When an
appropriator temporarily forgoes a diversionary right, electing instead
to leave water instream for a specified period, this non-consumptive
period may create more ambiguity as to the status of the right. "This
uncertainty [in turn] may dissuade creative transfer proposals and
thereby ultimately stand as an impediment to the efficient allocation of
water."263
Some potential lessors may feel uneasy about entering agreements
that would have them leave water instream due to the potential for
adverse users to claim the right abandoned. Abandonment of a right
precludes its transferability.26 In Colorado, abandonment is defined as
"the termination of a water right in whole or in part as a result of the
intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all
or part of the water available thereunder." ' Because ISF leasing in
almost all circumstances involves the conversion of a previously
consumptive and active use to a passive benefit, leases for extended
periods may give rise to the presumption of abandonment in the face
of a challenge. Conceivably, a water court hostile to the notion of an
instream flow as a continued use could find that the lease itself satisfies
the intent requirement. As such, a leased ISF right may be declared
abandoned and therefore available for appropriation or for satisfying
the rights of existing downstream users. With such concerns in mind,
an agricultural user interested in a split- or dry-season arrangement
may opt to enter a more traditional agreement with a consumptive
user after weighing the conservation alternative.
Lease transactions between willing parties serve a valuable purpose
by providing environmental benefits while avoiding the inevitable
imposition
tension that arises though the
•
• •
266of traditional "command and
Nonetheless, they are quite
control" mechanisms on private entities.
limited by their strictly voluntary nature. Some believe that since
instream uses tend to serve the public in general, it "make[s] sense

261. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-302(2) (a), -92-305(4) (2003); Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo. 2001).
262. James N. Corbridge, Jr., HistoricalWater Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A
Challengefor Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503, 504 (1998).
263.

Id.

264.

CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 202, at 245.

265. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(2) (2003).
266. See GILLIIAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 301.
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that public agencies should have control over instream protection
activities" in a state. 67 Absent legal safeguards that allow the State to
establish and maintain minimum stream flows in depleted and heavily
appropriated basins, it seems doubtful that enough willing and able
lessors exist to support a water marketing approach in isolation of
Others have warned that if water users become
other mechanisms.
too reliant on the market system, offstream users may cease converting
their rights to instream uses when there is no financial incentive to do
so. 26 ' Thus, ISF water marketing may be a viable option only in those
regions where there are both lessees with the ability to purchase ISF
rights and willing lessors.
3. Existing streamfiows. There are few areas in Colorado, if any,
where more water flows than has been claimed for consumptive uses;
This is not the
almost every stream in the state is overappropriatedF.'
case in some of the more humid areas of the West, such as the
northwest coast, where unappropriated water still flows through
sparsely populated areas. In such places, or wherever surplus water is
available, water leasing does not provide a mechanism for the
Because a lease agreement
preservation of these existing ISFs.
memorializes a temporary transfer of a right, they cannot establish new
rights.
Gillilan and Brown have suggested that private involvement in the
establishment of instream rights would be possible save a few
interceding factors. First, "water users, water agency officials, and the
general public" tend to lack a general understanding of instream
rights. 72 This lack of understanding, particularly where property rights
are at issue, has caused a widespread aversion to instream conversions,
even when existing water is available. Second, they outline the belief
that establishing new ISFs limits possibilities for future economic
development. 272 The potential for such a limitation, they concede, is
partially true. However, if more users were aware of such strategies as
split-season leasing, these users would realize that the establishment of
new ISFs "does not categorically exclude offstreamn uses."27 4 As with
existing rights, there is no reason a newly-established right could not
be shared by different users and serve different values during different
seasonal periods depending on needs and conditions.
One final concern with instream apprtpriationsis that if permitted,
"private environmental groups could seek to appropriate all remaining
unappropriated waters ...for speculative reasons, preserving the water

267. Id. at 120.
268. See id. at 302.
269. See generally Thompson, supra note 11, at 277-80.
270. See COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION SYSTEM,
at http://water.state.co.us/surfacewater/priorasp (last visited Feb. 26, 2004).
271. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 99.
272. Id.at 302.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 303.
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along."
in the river only until a good marketing opportunity comes
Agricultural and other users thus fear that speculators, under the guise
of environmental protection, will buy up the entirety of a surplus flow,
forcing out current water users through high prices. However, while
speculation has been common in domestic and municipal water
purchases, little evidence exists thus far of widespread speculation in
the instream sector.
4. Standards of oversight. Some have warned that states run the risk
of imposing different standards or quality of stewardship by opening
water markets to the public. 77 Public entities generally have an
established protocol for overseeing the maintenance and enforcement
of acquired rights. Letting many players in the ISF acquisition game,
the argument progresses, can destroy continuity of oversight. A host
of organizations could potentially employ disparate standards of
management, monitor their rights with varying frequency and
accuracy, and participate in ISF programs for different reasons. From
the policy and legal perspectives, agency oversight is preferable to a
review of complaints under differing enforcement standards. Courts
would likely prefer the imposition of a single standard applied to
disputes arising under a lease agreement.
On the other hand, restricting ISF acquisitions to public entities
creates inconsistency of care. According to Sterne, the bureaucratic
process inherent in public acquisitions "prevents instream rights from
being fully integrated into the prior appropriation system," and
thereby relegates minimum streamflows to a status of "second-class"
water rights: 7 Without the status as a full private property right,
courts and public agencies are less likely to vehemently uphold the
terms of an instream transfer. Moreover, "[i]nadequate funding may
be the biggest impediment to vigorous enforcement of public instream
27 9
When a private organization invests significant time, money,
floWS."
and ideological commitment to acquire a right, that organization is
more apt to avidly enforce the right than a public agency with limited
resources.
5. Inordinate expenditures. In most cases, water transfers entail
"substantial transaction costs." 280
These may include "gathering
information, overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, and meeting legal
A 1990 study found that transaction costs in
requirements. 2 1 '
Colorado ranged from thirty-seven cents ($0.37) to $1702.00 per acrefoot of water transferred. 282 Agricultural users thus often cite the
275. Thompson, supra note 11, at 289.
276. See LANDRY, supra note 146, at 14.
277. Telephone Interview with Anne Janicki, Colorado Water Conservation Board
(July 17, 2003).
278. Sterne, supra note 40, at 219.
279. Id. at 217.
280.

GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 101.

281.
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282. LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE WATER TRANSFER
PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENI OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMAND 26 (1990).
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financial burdens associated with lease transactions as a deterrent to
selling unused or unwanted water. While lease transactions often
necessitate the same up-front expenditures in terms of measuring
requirements and administrative or adjudicative costs, the return on
investment is smaller than a permanent conveyance provides.
While all lease transactions require significant expenditures, the
"transactions costs for instream flow acquisition are likely to be higher
Thus, those
than for water rights purchased for off-stream uses."'
with marketable offstream water rights might find it more appealing to
sell their rights to those who would apply the right to other offstream
uses rather than incurring the additional costs of leasing rights for
instream uses. Moreover, potential lessors "often face opposition by
neighboring water users who fear the flexibility of their own rights will
Thus, high costs are incurred in overcoming
be constrained.
objections to the proposed new instream use of the water rights." 4
With the aggressive presence of municipal water seekers on Colorado's
Front Range, acquisition costs for potential lessees are driven upwards
beyond those that water trusts would expect to pay in more rural areas
of states like Montana and Oregon. 85
The fiscal concerns with transferring rights from offstream use to
instream uses are indeed genuine. Nevertheless, these concerns are
often premised on the relatively short history of dealings with public,
rather than private, entities. Often, bureaucratic stepping-stones and
multi-departmental review translate into high transaction costs, which
the lessor, lessee, or both must absorb.
In what is a relatively new approach to flow protection, these costs
will come down as the acquisition system becomes streamlined and
familiar. As private organizations gain more experience in the market
process, transaction costs will tend to decrease as the experience level
of an organization with leasing increasesws Moreover, in states that
have allowed private sector involvement in public leasing, increased
cooperation among public and private entities has also reduced
costs. 217 Finally, private organizations tend to have more financial
resources than public agencies to cover such costs.288 In a free market
system, potential parties to a lease contract can always choose not to
execute the lease. If they choose to do so, they incur the costs
themselves; in most existing systems, the costs associated with
establishing instream rights must be absorbed by the public, sectors of
which may not support the acquisition program and are thus hesitant
to pick up the tab.

283. Bonnie G. Colby, Benefits, Costs and Water Acquisition Strategies: Economic
Considerationsin Instream Flow Protection, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE

6-2, 6-21 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell &Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
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286. See LANDRY, supranote 146, at 24.

287. Id.
288. See generally Sterne, supra note 40, at 221-22.

WEST,

at

Issue 2

LEASING WATER RIGHTS FOR INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION

353

6. Bureaucraticred tape and the Colorado Water Court distinction. When
state agencies acquire the responsibility to request and hold ISF rights,
they must establish guidelines and agency rules that balance the need
to protect downstream, non-party users against the need to process
right changes in a timely fashion. The process called for by such
guidelines may have substantial impacts on policy implementation.
For instance, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ'), in response to the state's adoption of an ISF program,
established a set of rules that would employ a rigorous methodology of
flow rate determination.'gq However, in the four years following the
enactment of the statute, the DEQ had failed to file for a single ISF
right. 90 The Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife's ("DFW") selfimposed requirements29' are less strenuous; DFW filed 900 applications
for instream right certificates during the same period.9 2
As the Oregon DEQ-DFW distinction indicates, the bureaucratic
process can vary significantly among agencies even within the same
state. However, in states such as Oregon that allow both public and
private establishment of instream rights, the general rule is that "an
agency that wishes to set a minimum flow or acquire an instream right
must develop more data and endure a much longer and more timeconsuming hearings process than a private party seeking a new
consumptive appropriation or transfer. ' 29' As noted above, this rule
may apply to new acquisitions and transactions involving transfers from
one offstream use to another and may also apply to agreements that
convert offstream uses to instream rights. Again, in Oregon, agencies
must comport with certain filing and application requirements that do
not apply to private actors.294
Although the bureaucratic process for privately obtained or
facilitated rights is generally less arduous than that for agency-funded
rights, transfers negotiated among private parties may require a time
consuming, bureaucratic effort. In Montana, for example, the private
right transfer process is more rigid than the process required under
Oregon law. The Montana Water Trust advises potential lessors that
completion of a change of use process could take anywhere from six
months to a year.2 6 Unlike state water agencies, private organizations
are not 197susceptible to political pressures in the right establishment
This reality negates the need to balance the importance of
process.
establishing an ISF right against other competing public interests.29 8
289. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
290. d.
291. See OR. ADMIN. R. 690-400-0015 (2004).
292. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
293. Sterne, supra note 40, at 218.
294. SeeOR. REV. STAT. § 537.338 (2001).
295. FergusonInterview, supra note 128.
296. INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 44.
297. Cf Sterne, supra note 40, at 218 (describing that state water agencies are
susceptible to political pressures).
298. Id. (explaining that all instream flow statutes require public instreamn rights be
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Moreover, as with the burden of high transaction costs, the lengthy
bureaucratic process associated with ISF conversions is due, at least in
part, to the relative novelty of the ISF leasing approach."" As the
practice becomes more commonplace, agencies should be able to
process requests from private organizations in a more streamlined and
timely fashion.
While Montana and Oregon have clearly defined protocols for the
private establishment of instream leases, the means for doing so in
"Colorado law provides limited
Colorado remains opaque.
opportunities for temporary water transfers," of any type, much less
temporary transfers to ISFs. 00 Because private ISF leasing is generally
untested in Colorado and the law is void of legal provisions specifically
addressing the issue, if allowed by law, leasing mechanisms would
presumably need to operate within the existent water transfer
framework. Colorado's water law system is unique in that the water
judges of the state's seven water districts-rather than administrative
agencies as is the case in virtually all other western states-grant water
right transfers and changes in use through an adjudicative process.301
In Oregon the OWRD and in Montana the DNRC-agencies with
relatively conservationist mandates- ultimately approve offstream to
instream conversions.
In Colorado, however, CWCB must file
through the state attorney general
in the water court in order to
30 3
establish an adjudicated ISF right.
The water court distinction could have profound ramifications on
the operation of a leasing system. If the State were to allow private
entities to facilitate and fund temporary ISF conversions, it would
likely do so on the condition that CWCB be involved in the leasing
process. Lawmakers would likely demand significant CWCB oversight
of the transactional process and would ensure the agency holds leased
water rights in trust for the people of the state. Under the current
legal framework, each transfer request would require review through
the adjudicative process, with CWCB sitting as the petitioning party.
Such adjudication of the right could lead to lengthy, adversarial
contests straining both agency and private party resources. Even when
there is little or no resistance to an adjudicative
change, water court
104
determinations can take years to complete.
This process, in itself,
would produce a disincentive to ISF leasing and impose damaging
time-consuming requirements on potential lessors and lessees.
Considering the likelihood of lengthy and costly adjudicative
in the public interest).
299. See Colby, supra note 283, at 6-21.
300. CORBRIDGE & RiCE, supra note 202, at 275.
301. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN ANUTSHELL 153 (3d ed. 1997).

302. OR. ADMIN, R. 690-077-0075 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2A408 (1) (2003).
303. Steven 0. Sims, Colorado's Instream Flow Program: Integrating Instream Flow
Protection into a PriorAppropriationSystem, in INSTREAM FLow PROTECTION IN THE WEST, at
12-7 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
304. E.g., Michael F. Browning, Substitute Supply Plans: Recent Water Law Developments,
31 COLO. LAw 67, 67 (Aug. 2002).
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approval of ISF leases, instream advocates should seek excuse nonpermanent right transfers from the adjudicative process-at least for
an interim period while the transfer is under water court
consideration. In 2002, the Colorado General Assembly granted such
an exemption for Substitute Supply Plan ("SSP") requests.8 , SSPs are
plans for augmentation through which persons seeking to make a new
use of water agree to replace depletions resulting from the new use
with an alternate water supply equal in "amount, location, time and
quality" to the new use.0 6 In other words, SSPs allow out-of-priority
diversions by providing the stream with a substitute water supply.
House Bill 02-1414 granted the State Engineer the authority to
authorize SSPs while a change of use approval is pending in the water
court system, and even under certain circumstances when there is no
parallel water court change application pending.3°7
SSPs requests differ from requests for ISF lease authorization in
that they involve diversionary rather than instream water uses.308
Nevertheless, amendments to the new legislation could easily make a
The
similar administrative allowance for ISF lease agreements.
statutory construction created by House Bill 1414 already provides a
"mechanism to allow new uses of water to occur while an applicant
Thus, through its
seeks to obtain formal Water Court approval."'
enactment of House Bill 1414, the Colorado General Assembly has
demonstrated a willingness to provide water users with a less formal
administrative avenue when a protracted adjudicative process
threatens to defeat a use change without a sound justification.
"Colorado's change of water procedures could be modified to facilitate
temporary water transfers by streamlining the approval process.,,1
This streamlining would not necessarily compromise the no-harm
principle. The plain language of House Bill 1414 prevents the State
Engineer from approving any plan that would inflict injury on other
decreed water rights within a basin. 11 Therefore, a safety net exists to
preclude approval of any ill-conceived transactions.
7. Dismantling traditional tenets of law and tradition. Many in the
water law community have argued that any type of statutory adoption
that usurps historic water users' control over watercourses would lead
to a "slippery slope" and enable further intrusion on long-established
possessive rights.32 The concern is that when the private right to leave
water instream gains legal recognition, the holder of the right may
305. H.R. 02-1414, 63d Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-92-308 (2003)).
306. Browning, supra note 304, at 67.
307. H.R. 02-1414 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(4) (a), (5) (a) (2003)).
308. See Browning, supra note 304, at 67.
309. Id.
310. CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 202, at 276.
311. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(4) (a) (IV), (5) (a) (IV) (2003).
312. Sherry A. Caloia et al., The Water Rights Determnination and Administration Act of
1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 39, 53
(1999).
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gain not only a very senior appropriation date for the quantity of water
leased, but also a vested right to have the water left instream beyond
the period of the lease. Thus, the fear is that legislation embracing
and encouraging private leasing agreements marks a dangerous
departure from legal norms. The mere recognition of such rights
poses a problem for some: "The legislative adoption of an instream
acquisition program endorses the importance of instream flows and
undercuts the traditional preference in western water law for
consumptive uses."'" Instream acquisition programs, by this logic,
"undermine
policy arguments
against involuntary
instream
reallocations.'"3
While some fear that allowing private organizations to acquire
rights through lease purchases serves as a premonition for heightened
involuntary intrusion on property rights, others believe severing
appropriative water rights from property is alone condemnable. Those
in the latter camp object to the expansion of instream protection
programs for the simple reason that it marks a break with longstanding tradition. "Many individuals, therefore, do not look kindly
on the idea of separating the water from the land .... [T] hey view a
complete separation of the two as a direct threat to their way of life." 15
The arguments against water leasing come from more than just
agricultural or municipal users. In fact, many environmentalists
believe such strategies signal a regression in sound environmental
policy.'1 6 First, if the programs are strictly government-run, as they
usually are, "legislative appropriations are unlikely to fully reflect
public support for instream acquisitions."3 7 Although allowing the
influx of private funding to acquisition schemes would resolve this
issue, some in the conservation field nonetheless believe "by paying
some water users for instream flows, the government may undercut the
argument for direct regulation. 318
The alternate argument rests on the presumption government will
step in to maintain and restore ISFs if market activity does not protect
them. If concerned parties cannot agree upon devices such as ISF
leasing statutes, farmers and ranchers may lose their rights without
compensation. This scenario is not merely conjectural; numerous
judicial decisions have affirmed that existing rights to water are not
always absolute and may be subject to loss with little or no
compensation under either the public trust doctrine or federal law.
8. Expansion of historic use. Some resistance to broader ISF leasing
laws emanates from a concern lessees will gain temporary title to

313. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274.
314. Id.
315. Schiller, supra note 47.
316. Thompson, supra note 11, at 276.
317. Id.
318. Id.at 277.
319. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983).
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greater amounts of water than historically applied to consumptive uses.
Those with such concerns seek assurances leases will not expand
historic use.32° Shortly after Oregon adopted its ISF program in 1987,
OWRD began receiving complaints "from agricultural, municipal, and
rural domestic interests., 32' The complaints included allegations that
applications for instream rights under the program "requested flow
levels greatly exceeding what is naturally possible," and that such
requests sought flows in excess 2of those that historically remained in
2
the streams after appropriation.
Statutory language guarantees, at least on paper, that lessors
cannot temporarily transfer more water than historically diverted
through offstream use practices.323 Given the difficulty of measuring
historical and current use, however, there have undoubtedly been
circumstances in which more water remained instream under lease
agreements than has historically been applied to out-of-stream uses.
The response to such concerns must involve the establishment of strict
measuring requirements. Although monitoring requirements may
impose a burdensome cost, paying for such costs is preferable to
having a lease right invalidated because it causes an expansion of
historical use.
9. Colorado'sheightenedstate of water administration. As demonstrated
earlier, a region's hydrological backdrop profoundly affects that
region's approach to water management. In states such as Oregon
and Montana with less heavily appropriated rivers and streams, more
laxity exists concerning changes in use and user. In Colorado, by
contrast, tremendous growth, delivery obligations under interstate
compacts, and severely over-appropriated rivers and streams have
fostered an environment with no tolerance for slack in the
administration of the state's water resources. The fact that Colorado's
State Engineer administers water rights with unmatched rigidity is a
vital point to consider when contemplating an ISF leasing allowance.
IO.Delayed return flows and - potential for harm. One of the most
hardened of all principles embodied by the prior appropriation
doctrine is the "no harm rule."2 4 The most pressing issue associated
with ISF lease transfers-and that which has caused the most resistance
to the adoption of leasing statutes in general-is the potential for
harm to non-party downstream users:

320. Interview with Michael Browning, President, Colorado Water Trust (July 18,
2003).
321. Mattick, supra note 67, at 18-5.
322. Id. at 18-6.
323. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436(2)(e) (2003) (clarifying that "[t]he
maximum quantity of water that may be leased is the amount historically diverted by
the lessor"); see also OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-077-0077(3) (c) (2001) (demanding that all
lease agreements include conditions which would "avoid enlargement of the original
right").
324. Farmer's Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 63132 (Colo. 1954).
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Downstream water users, for example, fear that reallocations will
negatively affect the timing of flows that are crucial to their
operations. In the dry season, farmers often depend on the return
flow from earlier upstream irrigation; if an upstream irrigator
transfers his water to instream flow, the delaed return flow upon
which the downstream users rely will disappear.
Indeed, some allude to this potential for harm as a reason to
expand state programs rather than to establish a truly free water
market. There are benefits to delayed return flows upon which many
offstream users have historically depended. When a conflict arises as
to whether a downstream user or the natural condition of a river or
stream will suffer harm, the downstream user typically wins the battle.
Thus, politically accountable state agencies, such as CWCB, must
consider not only the benefits lease transactions could afford
contracting users,3 26but also the potential detriment that downstream
users might incur.
States that have chosen to adopt aggressive ISF conversion
mechanisms have not done so oblivious to this risk, however. As
discussed in the preceding section, state legislatures are heedful of the
need to incorporate vigorous initial review processes, standards of
notice, opportunities for airing grievances, and, if necessary, the denial
of ISF conversions-if it becomes evident at any time throughout the
process that a non-party water user may suffer harm to his or her
existing right. The adoption of such vigilant laws, however, does
necessitate a trade-off. States such as Montana, which boasts an
overwhelmingly stringent review process, tend to experience less ISF
marketing activity than states such as Oregon where the conversion
311
process is more permissive.
Considering the rigid standards CWCB already employs in its
establishment and acquisition of instream flow rights,3 21 it would seem
doubtful that more lax criteria would apply to privately funded
institutions, should they participate directly in the acquisition
process.3 2
Historically in Colorado, "[a] water right cannot be
changed in... type of use, place of use, or otherwise if the change will

325. Thompson, supra note 11, at 274.
326. Telephone Interview with AnneJanicki, supra note 277.
327. Ferguson Interview, supra note 128.
328. SeeColo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102 (3)-(4) (2003).
329. Scholars of instream acquisition programs have specifically remarked on the
relative strictness of Colorado's administrative review process when CWCB seeks to
establish an instream right versus the review called for when a private party seeks to
establish an offstream right:
For example, Colorado's Division of Wildlife must submit applications to the
staff of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, which then makes a
recommendation to the Board. If approved by the Board, the application is
submitted to the state attorney general's office, which then takes the
application before one of the state's water courts. Offstream water rights
applicants can go directly before a water court.
GILLILAN & BROwN, supra note 19, at 135.
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result in material injury to other water rights."30 If temporary, private
transfers were legally permissible, one would assume they would
require lessors and lessees alike to maintain strict adherence to this
principle throughout the duration of a transfer. As noted below, the
limited legislation that has moved Colorado toward greater
permissibility tends to incorporate strong language meant to protect
the interests of all potentially affected water users.
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN COLORADO LAW: STEPS TOWARD
FREE-MARKET EXCHANGES
The statutory language authorizing CWCB to lawfully acquire
"such waters of natural streams and lakes as the board determines may
be required for minimum stream flows"3 ' represented a significant
departure from the traditional diversion requirement whereby water
3 3
must be removed from the watercourse in order to perfect a right.
As with most laws, however, its limits would ultimately be tested and its
scope redefined.
In 1986, the City of Fort Collins sought to obtain an instream right
on the Cache La Poudre River to return water to its historic channel
and support a boat chute and a fish ladder for recreational purposes.33
In a challenge to the City's proposed "instream diversion," the
Colorado Supreme Court held that under the statute, "It]he exclusive
authority vested in the CWCB to appropriate minimum stream flows
[did] not detract from the right to divert and to put to beneficial use
unappropriated water by removal or control.3 4 Because Fort Collins
controlled the water within its natural course for a beneficial use using
a structural device (i.e. a nature dam), the court held the instream use
was a valid appropriation.333 In so holding, "the court took pains to
point out that the appropriation by the City of Fort Collins did not
constitute an3 'instream flow right,'" the type that only CWCB could
appropriate .336
In May 2002,3' nearly ten years after the Cache la Poudre case,
Colorado Governor Bill Owens signed Senate Bill 02-156 ("Senate Bill

330. Michael Browning & Steve Bushong, Ditch Lining: The Water Right Issue, 21
COLO. LAW. 1155, 1155 (1992).
331. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
332. E.g. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594
P.2d 570, 572 (Colo. 1979).
333. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1992). For an
extended discussion on the case and its impact on the development of Colorado's
instream flow laws, see Christopher H. Meyer, Instream Flows: IntegratingNew Uses and
New Players Into the Prior Appropriation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE
WEST, at 2-8 to 2-9 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
334. 830 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added).
335. Id.
336. GILLItAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 118.
337. J. CRAIG GREEN, INDEPENDENCE INST., USE IT OR LOSE IT: COLORADO'S OLDEST
AND BEST RECYCLING PROGRAM, ISSUE PAPER NUMBER 3-2002, at 8 n.14 (2002).
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156").'s" The bill, as originally introduced, contained language that
ISF rights. 3 )
would have allowed for the private acquisition of
However, the governor opposed such a radical alteration of the
existing scheme; proponents of an expanded Rrogram were forced to
settle on the amendment as it presently stands.
Nevertheless, the legislation effected the most reaching alterations
to Colorado's ISF protection program in some time and may have
significant implications for its future operation. Senate Bill 156 made
essentially two changes to the WRDA. First, where the former statutory
language allowed CWCB acquisitions only "by grant, purchase,
bequest, devise, lease, exchange, or other contractual agreement," the
enactment specifically added the acquisition of 1SF rights by
This inclusion, however, was more or less a formality.
donation.!'
Since the passage of the original 1973 legislation, CWCB has always
operated under the assumption that it could secure ISF rights by
donation. 42 The second provision, however, fundamentally altered the
program's guiding language-where the statute formerly allowed the
CWCB to acquire "interests in water as [it] determine[d] may be
required for minimum stream flows," CWCB may now appropriate
"water in such amount as [it] determines is appropriate for stream
flows." '" While the original language effectively put a cap on the
amount of water CWCB could convert under the ISF protection
program-namely that necessary to preserve streamflows to support
aquatic life-the new language permits appropriations beyond those
necessary to merely sustain the rivers; the statute now allows for the
acquisition of rights that will improve currently degraded environments.
Supporters of Senate Bill 156 touted the legislation as "a powerful
new tool for instream protection" that could facilitate a significant
However, if the political
improvement to Colorado's rivers.
environment plays its typical part in the policy implementation stage,
this provision of SB156 could conceivably go by the wayside:
"[o]pponents worry the bill would prevent agricultural and
development interests from completely draining rivers and streams in
times of need. '' " Moreover, the language "may acquire34 suggests
338. S. 02-156, 63d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)).
339. See CTU Supports Bill to Give ColoradoansNew Tool to Protect Free-FlowingStreams,
CURRFNTS FEBRUARY 2002, (COLORADO TROUT UNLIMIrED, BOULDER, CO), at
http://www.cotrout.org/CenturyClub/currents/currents2.2002.htm (Feb. 2002) (last
visited Apr. 13, 2004).
340. Telephone Interview with Melinda Kassen, Colorado Trout Unlimited (Oct. 5,
2002).
341. S. 02-156 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
342. Telephone Interview with AnneJanicki, supra note 277.
343. S. 02-156 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)) (emphasis
added).
344. Media Advisory, Trout Unlimited, Trout Unlimited Applauds Enactment of SB 156
(May 21, 2002), availableat
http://www.cotrout.org/SB%20156%20becomes%201aw.htm.
345. Theo Stein, Bill Protects 'InstreamFlows,'DENVER POST, Apr. 26, 2002, at 14A.
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that CWCB retains broad discretion in deciding when, where, and if to
apply the new standards.
In view of CWCB's friendly disposition toward consumptive users,
it seems more likely that CWCB will employ the provisions of Senate
Bill 156 sparingly rather than liberally. The extent and incidence with
which CWCB applies these new provisions may depend on continuing
pressure from the bill's original supporters. "SB 156 enjoyed support
from a diverse range of interests including Trout Unlimited, the
Colorado Water Congress, the Colorado Cattlemen's Association,
Denver Water, the Northwest Colorado Council of Governments, the
Colorado River Water Conservation District, Environmental Defense,
Audubon, and Clean Water Action ....,,317
While public interest groups statewide were scrambling to find
ways to effectively implement the conservation components of Senate
Bill 156, the Colorado legislature took yet another significant step
toward flexibility in 2003 when it adopted House Bill 03-1320 ("House
Bill 1320") .4 Signed by Governor Bill Owens in June 2003, House Bill
1320 was part of a larger "drought package," which was the direct
result of the crippling drought conditions Colorado experienced in
2002-2003, and included three other bills aimed at mitigating the
Whereas CWCB could
effects of future drought conditions.
previously acquire only permanent rights, House Bill 1320 allows water
users to loan water to CWCB for instream purposes, so long as the
water left instream flows through a basin or county in which the
350
governor has declared a drought emergency.
Following a preliminary review by CWCB in order to determine
whether the loan would interfere with other decreed water rights,351
the right holder interested in conveying the temporary loan must file a
proper request together with a $100 filing fee. 35 The request for State
approval must include:
(A) Evidence of the proponent's legal right to use the loaned water
right;
(B) A statement of the duration of the proposed loan;
(C) A description of the original points of diversion, the return flow
pattern, the stream reach, and the time, place, and types of use of the
loaned water right;
(D) A description of the new proposed points of diversion, the
return flow pattern, the stream reach, and the time, place, and types
346. S. 02-156.
347. Media Advisory, Trout Unlimited, supra note 344, available at
http://www.cotrout.org/SB%20156%20becomes%201aw.htm.
348. H.R. 03-1320, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (a) (2003)).
349. News Release, Office of Colorado Governor Bill Owens, Governor Signs SB 236
- Initiative to "Save Colorado's Water" (June 5, 2003), available at
http://www.state.co.us/owenspress/06-05-03b.htm (last modified June 06, 2003).
350. H.R. 03-1320.
351. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (a) (1) (2003).
352. Id. § 37-83-105(2)(b)(I).
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of use of the loaned water right; and
(E) A reasonable estimate of the historic consumptive use of the
loaned water right. s
The Division Engineer ("Engineer") must then review the
request.34 In deciding whether to approve a voluntary loan, the State
Engineer's central task is to determine whether granting the5
rights.1 1
temporary instream flow would injure others' existing water
In so doing, the Engineer must ensure the proponent has provided
proper notice to potentially affected usersand that the proposed use
356
of the water is for instream flow purposes.
Following the public notice period, concerned water users have
fifteen days to submit comments to the Division Engineer. 5 7 The
comments may claim potential injury, or recommend terms the
petitioner(s) believes are necessary in order to avoid such injury.3 58 In
response to such comments, the Engineer may either hold a hearing
to address the issues raised or, without conducting a hearing, impose
such terms and conditions as are necessary to ensure the no-harm
standard is met.3 9 The statute thus calls for a redundant review
process under which both CWCB and the Engineer's office must
review loan proposals in order to verify that the temporary transfer will
not harm non-party users. Those proposing the use change also enjoy
the protection of the courts; if the Engineer rejects a loan proposal,
the proponent may appeal the decision to ra water judge in the
appropriate water division within fifteen days.
It remains unclear whether Colorado will follow in the footsteps of
other states by allowing loan transfers only when low flow levels
threaten fisheries. Alternatively, courts will interpret the statutory
language to allow temporary transfers for the benefit of a broader
range of interests including recreational use. Since waters loaned to
CWCB under the statute are valid instream rights for the duration of
the loan,6' the guiding principles of Senate Bill 156 should apply. This
being the case, CWCB could lease waters in order to "improve the
natural environment to a reasonable degree." 6 However, House Bill
1320 contains language that significantly constrains the applicability of
loan transfers. First, no loan may exceed a period of one hundred
twenty days.
In most cases, loan transfers would fail to provide an
adequate mechanism to effect lasting ecological benefits. Second,

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. § 37-83-105(2) (b) (I) (A)-(E).
Id. § 37-83-105(2)(b).
Id. § 37-83-105(2) (a) (III).
Id. § 37-83-105(2) (b)(II), (III).
Id. §37-83-105(2)(b)(V).
Id.
Id. § 37-83-105(2)(b)(VI).
Id. § 37-8S-105(2) (b) (VIII).
See id. § 37-83-105(2)(a).

S. 02-156 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)).
363. H.R. 03-1320 (codified at COLO.REv. STAT § 37-83-105(2) (a) (2003)).
362.
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considering drought conditions must be present before a water user
may permissibly loan a consumptive use right to the State, 4 any waters
acquired would fail to augment streamflows beyond minimum flow
rates. Nevertheless, the terms of House Bill 1320 offers a viable
preventative measure insofar as private loans during drought may head
off total depletion and ecological devastation during times of extreme
need. Furthermore, if the water loaning experiment meets with
success, non-profits will have more cause to argue for the
establishment of a leasing program.
OWRD has already implemented a plan not unlike that
contemplated under House Bill 1320, except Oregon offers
compensation for the drought-time transfer.
Agency rules permit
"any person holding a water use subject to transfer [to] enter into a
temporary drought instream lease agreement to convert a water right
or a portion of a water right to an instream water right. 36 The OWRD
director will approve such leases provided: "(a) [t]he temporary
instream lease shall not result in injury to an existing right; and (b)
[tiotal water use for the proposed instream lease [does] not exceed
the amount in the leased right."'67 Such leases cannot last for periods
beyond one year.68 Moreover, if the governor declares an end to the
drought before the lease period expires, the lease agreement
automatically terminates. 9
Although Colorado law has opened the door to permanent, and
now temporary, right transfers to instream use in the last two years, it
has nonetheless stopped short of creating market incentives for
temporary conversions. Although CWCB may enter lease agreements,
the financial lure private involvement otherwise provides is still nonexistent within the Colorado legal framework. Agencies such as CWCB
must operate on limited budgets, and are subject to political
constraints. Thus, while CWCB is presently party to five different lease
agreements, 70 other opportunities that arise could go by the wayside
due to fiscal restraints.

364. See id.
365. See STATE OF OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT, TEMPORARY DROUGHT
INSTREAM LEASE AGREEMENT 2.4 (2003).
366. OR. ADMIN. R. § 690-019-0058(1) (2001).
367. Id.§690-019-0058(1)(a), (b).
368. Id. §690-019-0058(4).
369. Id
370. Three of the leases call for specific quantities of water; the other two provide
for established flow amounts. Of the first three leases, two are 99-year agreements for
142.71 acre-ft. annually, the third, an annual lease, calls for a 3155 acre-ft. release from
Steamboat Lake into the Yampa River. COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD,
STATUS OF LEASES AND CONTRACTS FOR WATER 3 (Dec. 2002), available at

http://cwcb.state.co.us/isf/Programs/AnnualProgramStatus.pdf.
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VII. SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE PARTY INVOLVEMENT?
Although virtually every state in the West has adopted the prior
appropriation doctrine, each has done so differently by adopting
unique rules for water management. In no area of water law is this
more true than in the promulgation of ISF protection statutes, where
"[e]ach state has had to work within the context of its own geography,
climate, and legal, political, and social institutions."371 Because the
notion of providing legal protection to non-consumptive uses is a
recent development and generally runs counter to the basic principles
of prior appropriation, the approaches of the various states differ
widely.37 2 One must take special note of a state's legal particularities in
order to determine whether implementation of the legal principles
Any analysis must begin with an
adopted in another state is feasible.
understanding of the legal domain within which the adopted laws
case, the ISF program that has grown out
would apply-in Colorado's
4
of the 1969 WRDA. 5
While numerous state programs exist with a greater tolerance
toward private sector involvement in ISF acquisitions, "[i] ntegration of
instream flow rights as 'appropriations' with priorities ... has not been
widely accepted outside of Colorado as yet." 5 For over thirty years,
CWCB has had the authority to "appropriate" instream rights under
the same constitutional provision through which consumptive uses are
established. 7 6 That Colorado has specifically recognized ISF rights as
valid within its hallowed legal dominion of prior appropriation is
significant. Some might assume that Colorado's long association with
natural flow protection would equate to a more acquiescent
atmosphere. Why then has Colorado been so tentative in the face of
growing pressures to allow private actors into the ISF transfer game?
To begin with, CWCB came into being in 1937, lone before it
From its
received exclusive oversight of Colorado's ISF program.
inception, CWCB has had many mandates under Colorado law
More
unrelated to the preservation of natural stream flows.
specifically, CWCB "has been statutorily assigned a pro-development,
371.

GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 111.
372. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK
IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 204-05 (4th ed. 1993).
373. Interview with Michael Browning, President, Colorado Water Trust (July 18,
2003).
374. S. 81, 47th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1969) (codified as amended at
COLO. Rv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602) (2003).
375. TARLOCKETAL., supra note 372, at 205.
376. S. 97, 49th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1973) (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2003)).
377. CompareH.R. 6, 1937 Gen. Assem., 31st Sess. (Colo. 1937), with S. 97 (showing
that although CWCB came into being in 1937, it did not have the authority to acquire
instream appropriations until 1973).
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pro-water project mission.""" By charging the agency with WRDA
oversight, the 1973 legislation forced CWCB, at the onset, to balance
conflicting directives; leaving water instream is not the agency's central
concern under every circumstance.
For example, when a Colorado water court granted a use right to
the City of Golden to leave 1000 cfs instream for a kayak course,
CWCB opposed the grant of the right in subsequent litigation. T9 In an
official statement, CWCB noted that its opposition stemmed from the
fact that such a right would preclude all future development upstream
of the park.n ° In so noting, CWCB Director Rod Kuharich expressed
that the agency's duty is to "ensure the maximum utilization of water,"
not necessarily to rubberstamp any permit request that comes across
the desk.'
Under the letter of the law, "CWCB does not have much room to
negotiate an agreement that strikes a balance between the desire for
recreational instream flows and the needs for future water
A recent ballot proposal,
development in a given watershed."' '
submitted to the electorate in the November 2003 general election
On November 4, 2003,
would have compounded this problem.
Colorado voters considered Referendum A, which would have allowed
CWCB to borrow up to $2 billion through the issuance of revenue
bonds."3 The borrowed money would have been earmarked for the
Local
construction of new storage and water delivery projects.
environmental organizations took a strong stand against the
referendum, claiming it failed to protect communities, existing water
users, or the environment. At the time, the Sierra Club claimed,
"[t]he large dams and diversions that Referendum A is designed to
fund would likely harm the environment and cause great concern to
existing water users because there is [sic] no specific mitigation
strategies required for the projects it would finance." 84 The measure
would have further compromised CWCB's position as the state's lead
water resource conservation agency by entrusting it with the authority
to approve massive infrastructure-altering projects that would
conceivably conflict with CWCB's conservation mandates.
A second point to consider is the manner in which ISF leasing
statutes have found a place in states' existent water law structure. The
378. Sims, supra note 303, at 12-2.
379. Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo.
Water Ct. Div. No. 1,June 13, 2001), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/watercourts/wat-divl/ordergolden.htm.
380. News Release, Colorado Water Conservation Board, State Water Policy and
Planning Board Appeals Water Use Decision 1 (Aug. 1, 2001).
381. Id.
382. Memorandum from Dan McAuliffe et al., to Colorado Water Conservation
Board Members 3 (July 17, 2000) (on file with the University of Denver Water Law
Review).
383. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF THE 2003 BALLOT
PROPOSALS 11 (2003).
384. Steve Glazer, Referendum A Doesn't Solve Anything, PEAK & PRAIRIE (Rocky
Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club), Oct.-Dec. 2003, at 1.
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Montana and Oregon models detailed above developed in states
already receptive to instream flow protection initiatives occurring
outside the confines of prior appropriation. In Oregon, for example,
a citizens' ballot initiative created the 1970 Scenic Waterways
Program. 85 In Montana, the original "Murphy Rights" carried no real
appropriation date; under the 1969 statute, the previously
unappropriated waters left instream held "a priority over other uses
only until the district court ... determine[d] that such waters [were]
needed for a more beneficial use.""8 Ultimately, Oregon and Montana
repealed these and other conservation strategies or assimilated them
into their prior appropriation systems.
Notwithstanding the fact that free market transfers gained
acceptance free from the hindrances posed by prior appropriation, the
introduction of market mechanisms in each state was, and remains, a
laborious chore. In Colorado, lawmakers have been careful to draft
ISF protection laws so as not to offend the prior appropriation
doctrine. The enduring need to reconcile fully new ISF legislation
with the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado has hampered legal
receptiveness to concepts such as private ISF leasing.
Some have posited that prior appropriation and free-market
However, although the doctrine
policies naturally coalesce.
emphasizes "the allocation of water to and by individuals," most
western states treat the transfer of ISFs quite differently than they do
State government has
the transfer of more traditional rights.3
assumed much of the control over protection activities, and has
constrained individuals in their opportunities to protect ISFs. 3 9 "The
legal nonreceptivity to private instream acquisitions found in most
states is, more likely, a vestige of the historic prohibition of private
Prior
instream flow rights in the West, 3 8 which is misplaced.
appropriation has historically "sought to ensure that unutilized water is
available free of charge to anyone seeking to put it to a reasonable and
beneficial offstream use. ''-91 Now that Colorado has recognized
protection of the natural environment as a beneficial use, the State
should hold water transfers for instream use to the same standards as
those for offstream uses.
Putting aside the legal idiosyncrasies that separate Colorado from
other states, one sweeping question remains: is it legal for private
individuals to actively pursue existing offstream rights in order to
convert them back to natural flows? This question raises compelling
considerations regarding the proper steward of the public trust.
"[Legislatures may view instream flows as uniquely public in
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Scott v. State exrel. State Highway Comm'n, 541 P.2d 516, 517 (Or. App. 1975).
McKinney, supra note 67, at 15-4.
Id.
GILLILAN & BROWN, supranote 19, at 120.
Id. at 111-18.
Thompson, supra note 11, at 289.
Id.
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character, reflecting collective decisions about the commonweal.,
Should ISFs become freely tradable within a market system, some may
view the move as an intrusion on a domain legally reserved to the
state's regulatory bodies.
It would be presumptuous to assume that the existing structure of
ISF rules and regulations would systematically embrace the
introduction of a leasing program. In order for ISF leasing to work in
Colorado, program proponents would need to introduce legislation
respectful of the existing methods of ISF establishment. In balancing
this need against the necessity to institute a workable means of
transferring rights, the plan must work within some existing
parameters and require the modification of others. For instance, a
proposal might seek adjudicative bypass of lease agreements while
stopping short of an overhaul that would preclude CWCB approval of
all lease conveyances. Presently, no legal barriers exist to prevent
CWCB from entering lease agreements. In 1997, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service entered into a five-year lease agreement with CWCB
under which USFWS would release 2000 acre-feet of water from
Steamboat Lake in late summer at the rate of 25 cfs in order to protect
pikeminnow habitat.9 3 Again, the only major impediment to broader
leasing is the legal recognition of private funding mechanisms, which
could coexist within the exiting program given some fine-tuning of the
law.
B. POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE?

In 1989, Colorado's State Engineer noted that the 1973
amendment to the WRDA, which authorized CWCB limited instream
appropriations, grew at least in part out of a fear that "lunatics" would
appropriate all the state's water and wastefully leave it instream 94 By
leaving matters of ISF reservation in the hands of a gubernatoriallyappointed body, the Colorado Legislature could hold radical
environmentalists at bay. Thus, some saw the grant to CWCB of
exclusive authority over the establishment of new ISF rights as a
calculated move to deny private sector influence and funding in the
3 95
If true, from its inception CWCB has maintained an
ISF sphere.
institutional bias against the infiltration of private interests.
If CWCB indeed holds such a predisposition, this could be
problematic for those seeking to append a free market element to the
state's ISF protection program. The successes in Oregon and Montana
were attributable in no small part to the political support of existing
administrative entities. In Montana, for example, House Bill 472which allowed private sector involvement in ISF leasing-had the full
392. Thompson, supra note 11, at 288.
393. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV,, COLORADO RIVER REcOVERY PROGRAM, FY 2001
ANNUAL PROJECT REPORT, at

http://mountain-prairie.fws.gov/crrip/arpts/2001/wac/01-67.pdf.
394. GILuILAN& BRowN, supra note 19, at 123.
395. See id.
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support of MFWP. 396 MFWP believed a private market would serve as a
positive complement to the state program and would allow for more
involvement among agricultural users who were "reticent to deal with
the state." 9 7 Likewise, in the formative years of Oregon's ISF transfer
program, OWT staff members worked closely with OWRD and were
"key participants in a two year process of rule development for a
leasing program. '' "98
At present, CWCB support for leasing legislation would likely be
lesser than that offered by its counterparts in Oregon and Montana.
CWCB believes, perhaps rightly so, that its extensive experience,
uniformity of oversight and monitoring techniques, and ability to
identify and avoid potential harm to downstream water users justify its
position as the state's exclusive holder and steward of instream
rights. 9 With this in mind, the conservation sector should seek
passage of legislation providing more opportunities for public interest
groups to fund as well as target and solicit rights on endangered river
and stream reaches. Presently few codified means exist through which
such organizations may facilitate the leasing of ISF rights, even if only
to be held in trust by CWCB.
As a politically responsive executive body, 400 CWCB sentiment in
large part depends on the prevailing disposition of its "constituency"the state's (mostly agricultural and municipal) water users. Colorado's
competing water users still have a long way to go to achieve a complete
reconciliation of interests. Much can be learned from the experiences
of senior right holders in Oregon and Montana who-while similarly
situated in confrontational deadlock for a number of years 4-were
nevertheless able to fashion a leasing program suitable to all interests.
The principal variable in achieving this success was knowledge.
"Lack of information may be the single largest factor preventing the
further protection of instream flows. 4 02 Many fears could be allayed
and tempers quelled if stakeholders knew more about the benefits of
market transfers and the prevalence of harm-preventing safeguards in
To inform themselves, however, the
successful leasing systems.
concerned stakeholders must first create an environment wherein they
can exchange ideas and express perspectives.
A quest for a political resolution that satiates all concerns may
bring innate conflicts of interest to the surface of the debate.
However, this is not to say that a workable solution is entirely elusive.
From a practical standpoint, reconciliation will entail bringing a
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 212.
Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 173.
Interview with Anne Janicki, Colorado Water Conservation Board (July 17,

2003).
400. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-60-104(1) (2003) (describing CWCB members,
including nine members appointed by the governor).
401 See GiLLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 123; see also POuICV CONSENSUS
INITIATIVE, supra note 85, at 1-3.
402. GILLiLAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 132.
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diverse array of interests to the bargaining table including senior
agricultural users, conservationists, agency officials, hydrologists, policy
makers, and others. Any working group so comprised, however, must
maintain a collective willingness to forgo traditional biases in favor of
universal betterment, and they must not only listen to each other's side
but also understand it. Professor Donald Snow of the University of
Montana has devised a "list of ingredients and attributes that seem to
be present in successful collaborative conservation efforts:"
(1) There has to be something significant to negotiate. And there
has to be the potential for net environmental gains or improvements
that could come about through negotiation.
(2) There is a perceived threat, major challenge, or new opportunity
[B]ut one does
for a power shift felt by all of the stakeholders ....
not need to place a negative spin on it. Sometimes, it is instead the
power of a perceived opportunity ....
(3) Creative, open-minded, courageous leaders have to be at the
table. They provide positive examples to each other and to their
constituents. They are capable of both learning and teaching, and
they are willing to engage in open conversation that may lead to
Collaborative conservation is
entirely unpredictable results.
fundamentally about flexibility, innovation, and cross-fertility. These
are all, ultimately, functions of mature leadership. Organizations
with names that include an exclamation point usually have the
hardest time with this form of leadership.
(4) Collaboration probably has to be viewed strategically, in large
measure as a means of overcoming political inertia. Another way of
saying this: The parties must realize that by working together, they
have real potential to create good outcomes that none of them could
create alone. As Matt McKinney of the Montana Consensus Council
puts it, "If you think you can get a better result another way, do it."
(5) There has to be a roughly equal power equation, not an equality
of magnitude among the parties at the table (a parity that almost
never exists), but rather within the context of the issue at hand.
There are many western resource issues in which environmentalists,
despite their scarce resources, hold very significant powers-instream
flow allocations, for example. As long as environmental organizations
can be granted water rights to protect rivers and streams, they are
powerful players under law. Perhaps it comes to this: the parties all
must have at least enough power to be able to block each4 °3others'
initiatives, but not enough power unilaterally to win the issue.
Professor Snow's observations are remarkably on-target in regard
to water market resistance in Colorado. That these elements are

403. Donald Snow, Some Lines Cast From Troutdale, in Consultative Group on
Biological Diversity, A Report From Troutdale: Community Based Strategies in Forest
Stewardship and Sustainable Economic Development (Mar. 1998), availableat
http://www.cgbd.org/visitor/publications/troutdale.doc.
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particular
to
successful conservation efforts
should
provide
encouragement to senior water users and private leasing proponents
alike. The first two criteria appear satisfied in Colorado, and the
development of a competent consensus group would go a long way
toward fulfilling the final three. Coalitions of water interests that
could serve as guiding models for working groups have already begun
to appear on the horizon. The Western Water Alliance ("WWA"), a
Seattle-based coalition of diverse interests has sought to bring
sustainable water management practices to the forefront of the policy
agenda across the West. In so doing, the organization promotes
building "the intellectual capital of the progressive western water
movement by collecting case studies, best practices and critical
information and commissioning studies that present West-wide
perspectives."0 4 Groups such as the WWA could thus prove a valuable
resource in the negotiation and policy formulation process, should
instream leasing receive a serious look in Colorado.
Looking back on successful negotiation efforts may be as valuable
as looking forward. For instance, the Policy Consensus Initiative issued
a case study regarding the Montana ISF leasing program.0 5 The study
addressed the tensions that arose during Montana's early attempts to
adopt legislation that would allow farmers and ranchers to sell
voluntarily their consumptive rights to interested parties. In the years
that followed, the study found, the working group of divergent
interests "spent several meetings learning about each other's needs
and interests," ultimately "refram[ing] the issue from one of winners
and losers to a perspective that the right solution would benefit
everyone."0 6 In so doing, the group settled upon proposed legislation
that would allow for the temporary leasing study. 0 Important to the
legislation's adoption, however, was the fact that during the drafting
process, the working group participants-namely agricultural users
and environmental interests-routinely "asked for advice from key
legislators and representatives from the office of the governor, the
[MFWP], and the DNRC." 0 8
In Colorado's political environment, advocates of broader free
marketing should be careful not to "put the cart before the horse."
The adoption of less invasive leasing legislation, however, would
"provide an opportunity for everyone to 'test the waters' at little
cost," 09 with CWCB maintaining its relative sovereignty and oversight
within a broadened ISF program. Implementing a temporary "leasing
study"-like that in Montana-might be appropriate. Legislation with
a sunset provision would take away any implications of finality while

404. Western Water Alliance, Approach and Method, at

http://www.westernwateralliance.org/aboutwho.html (2002-2003).
405.
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406. Id. at 1, 2.
407.
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offering "a way for water right holders and organizations to become
comfortable with the idea of instream flow marketing." 0 If either
public interest groups or agricultural users were unhappy with the
result, they could either abandon the program or remedy its faults in a
subsequent incarnation of the statute.
C. PRACTICAL CONCERNS

1. Beneficial?
Under even the most collaborative environment, campaigns to
conserve natural resources oftentimes necessitate practical problemsolving at the implementation stage.- The protection of ISFs presents a
paradox in that it is often during times of water scarcity or low flow
Thus,
that competing stakeholders desire water the most.
"governmental agencies.., have found it politically difficult to seek
enforcement of instream flow rights during drought periods when the
instream flows are most needed, but when cities and farmers are also
frantic for water., 41 Even though Colorado legally recognizes ISFs as
valid appropriative uses, non-profits may struggle to find water users
willing to temporarily convert their rights when conditions are most
dire. If consumptive users are willing to transfer rights only during
times of high or normal flow, it is unclear whether a lease right would
in fact promote a beneficial use and thus satisfy the tenets of prior
appropriation.
Complicating the situation is the inherent interplay between
transferred rights and other decreed rights. When numerous users
with valid rights divert water on an overappropriated river, prior
appropriation permits those with the earliest appropriation dates to
remove their allotment to the detriment of junior users.412 If a junior
user in such a situation leases water under the condition that the lessee
leaves it instream, there are no guarantees the water will in fact be
available should flow rates become inordinately low. It may therefore
be difficult to determine before hand whether the leased right will
assuredly preserve the natural environment as a "beneficial use" under
all conditions.
The positive side is that many dry- and split-season lease
agreements result from the fact that during times of exceedingly low
flow-particularly late summer-the water remaining in a stream will
often not be nearly enough to satisfy the consumptive user's right.
Irrigators thus find themselves in possession of surplus water, as they
cannot effectively apply it to cropland or other consumptive uses.
Although flow rates may be insufficient to irrigate crops, they may
suffice to protect aquatic habitat or other beneficial instream needs.
Lease agreements under these circumstances present the right holder
410.
411.
412.

Id.
Thompson, supra note 11, at 283.
See City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 366 P.2d 552, 555-56 (Colo. 1961).
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with a tempting opportunity to benefit from the remainder of their
right without either abandoning it or wasting it.
Even though a water user is unable to achieve a beneficial use
through the traditional application of a right, that user may not
temporarily transfer the rights on a whim, In keeping with the
beneficial use requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine, ISF
leasing laws universally demand that the water leased in fact benefit a
recognized conservation value 4 3 In part for the reasons listed above,
this prerequisite-while steadfast-does not necessarily provide a
clear-cut resolution. MFWP has compiled a simplified checklist for
determining whether an instream lease would be appropriate-the
lease must "be Advantageous to the fishery, include Actual water
dedicated to instream flows, be Administrable by the Department or
other appropriate entity, and be Affordable." 4 Although the "four A's"
are meant to provide guidance for state acquisitions, they are
nonetheless applicable to potential private transactions. Following
MFWP's advice, targeted flows should meet the following criteria:
1. Advantageous to the fishery.

Attractive leasing opportunities are

those that address a stream flow problem that significantly limits
potential fishery values.
2. Actual water dedicated to instream flows. Leases must involve
valid water rights, and quantities leased should be large enough to
benefit the stream.
3. Administrable by the Department or other appropriate entity.
Leases should involve a reasonable combination of water right
seniority and advantageous location so that the instream flow
contribution can be ensured and defended through the lease
period....
4. Affordable. Do the benefits... justify the cost of the lease or the
project creating the leasing opportunity?
Concerning the first requirement, Colorado would afford water
marketers more leeway than Montana. As previously mentioned, the
Montana Legislature drafted leasing laws solely with the preservation
of fish stocks in mind. In Colorado, CWCB may acquire or establish
ISFs for the broader
purpose of preserving or improving the natural
416
environment.
What remains unclear is whether CWCB could temporarily convey
existing rights to or through private actors for the benefit of

413. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-102(3) (2003).
414.
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(2002), availableat
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recreational activities. The answer is likely that it could not. Since the
Civil War Era, Colorado water law has refused to recognize recreation
as a valid purpose for seeking an instream flow water right.) Although
the Fort Collins"" decision tempered legal hostility toward ISF
reservations for recreational purposes, the Colorado Supreme Court's
holding nonetheless failed to officially condone recreation as a
legitimate beneficial use. 1 9 Recently, however, the legislature and the
courts substantially eased this restriction. A 2001 amendment to the
WRDA recognized a municipality's right to file for a "recreational inchannel diversion" ("RICD") and called on CWCB to promulgate rules
detailing theprocess through which cities and towns can request such
This statutory validation was upheld last year by
reservations.4
operation of law when the Colorado Supreme Court was equally
divided; the decision affirmed the Division 1 water court's approval of
These
an in-channel appropriation by the City of Golden.4 2
developments are certainly a boon for public interest proponents of
Nevertheless, those who advocate
enhanced recreational flows.
enhanced recreational opportunities through the establishment of
ISFs will likely need to work exclusively through civic channels as the
new laws confine the establishment
422 of RICDs to requests submitted by
enumerated government entities.
2. Enforceable?
Aside from advocating that ISF rights meet the statutorilymandated beneficial use requirement, MFWP guiding principles also
present issues in need of assessment at the operational level following
the establishment of a lease right. The two major components that
stand out are the acquisitions' enforceability and affordability. The
enforceability of a water right transferred under a lease depends
initially on whether the transfer would enlarge the existing right or
somehow inflict harm upon another non-involved water right. CWCB
has had over thirty years to hone its competence in evaluating the
propriety of converting consumptive rights to instream rights. The
agency has extensive experience in both ascertaining the extent of
decreed rights and in weighing the potential for material injury to
417. See Karen Abbott & Charley Able, Kayakers' Rights Stand: Split Supreme Court Gives
More Power to Recreational Users, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 19, 2003, at 5A.
418. City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 929-30 (Colo. 1992).
419. GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 19, at 119.
420. S. 01-216, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-102(5), (6)).
421. State Eng'r v. City of Golden, 69 P.3d 1027 (Colo. 2003), affd by an equally
divided court In re Application for Water Rights of Golden, No. 98CW448 (Colo. Water
Division Ct. Div. No. 1,June 13, 2001).
422. See Christopher L. Thorne, Colorado Board Adopts Rules For "Recreational InChannel Diversion" Water Rights, WESTERN WATER LAw (Jan. 15, 2002), at
Authorized government entities
http://www.westernwaterlaw.com/ABAarticle.htm.
include "any county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation
district, water conservation district, or water conservancy district." COLO. REV. STAT.
37-92-102(5) (2003).
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water users within river basins of proposed ISFs.4 2 There is perhaps no
agency in the West better equipped to appraise the suitability of
potential ISF rights than CWCB.
CWCB has hesitated to permit ISF appropriations that might
enlarge a transferred right or cause harm to existing rights. If CWCB
were to permit ISF leasing in Colorado while maintaining a leadagency oversight position, those involved in the conveyance process
would have to meet stringent standards of beneficial use and nonharm. CWCB's record on enforcing ISF rights after they have received
approval, however, is not nearly as unblemished. In 1995, the supreme
court compelled CWCB to enforce an instream right it held-even
though CWCB sought allowance of a diminution in flow. 4 4 The case
pitted conservationists against the state agency and raised important
questions regarding CWCB's fiduciary duty to the people of the state.42'
Ultimately, the court held that CWCB must refrain from
administratively relinquishing ISF rights while circumventing the
adjudicative process.426 This decision implies private interests would
have a receptive forum in the state's water courts in which to air
potential grievances and would have strong legal standing to enforce
lease rights in the appropriate court should the terms of such
agreements be contravened. 27 However, any legislation would also
need to spell out mechanisms through which funding would be
generated in order to cover enforcement costs. "[T]he [CWCB] has
equipment to monitor its rights;
no field personnel and quite limited
'
thus, enforcement rarely occurs. 11
Although competent enforcement of privately leased ISF rights
would benefit the public at large, water trusts and other public interest
groups should be careful in requesting a provision in the law that
would require the State to bear the financial burden of monitoring
expenses. The introduction of an ISF leasing allowance within the
WRDA would stimulate an influx of decreed temporary rights
throughout numerous river basins. Rather than asking the State to
pick up the tab on these monitoring costs, private facilitators could
help defray the expenses.

423. CWCB agency rules require that even before it initiates a water right filing, the
Board find that any proposed ISF appropriation: (1) will benefit the natural
environment; (2) entails the appropriation of available water; and (3) can exist
without causing injury to other decreed water rights. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-2(5i)

(2003).
424. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1261 (Colo. 1995).
425. See Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and Environmental Protection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L.
REv. 70, 75-76 (1999).
426. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1261.
427. In fact, current CWCB rules permit any person that provides the Board water
for instream use to enforce the transfer arrangement "in the water court having
jurisdiction over the water right according to the terms of the contract or agreement."
2 COLO. CODE.REGS. § 408-2(6d) (2003).
428. Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 58, 65 n.47 (1999).
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Under the first option, organizations active in privately funding
transfers could audit temporary rights directly-under CWCB
authorization and in accordance with agency guidelines. Under the
second option, these organizations could compensate the State
appropriately through use of a fee schedule. CWCB, in turn, would be
responsible for monitoring privately facilitated rights in the same
manner as it monitors rights in its current portfolio. Other states have
tackled the enforcement cost issue and have come up with workable
solutions. For example, in 1991, the Nature Conservancy of Montana
committed funding to help establish the Montana Water Leasing Trust
Fund, which "served as a repository for contributions from private
individuals, foundations, and corporations who wanted to help
implement the [state] leasing program. 429
The Nature Conservancy approach represents just one potential
way to generate revenue to cover enforcement costs, and there is
certainly room for creativity in devising new approaches. Regardless of
how such revenue is raised, it is important that ISF leasing laws clearly
define who pays monitoring costs and how the costs will be divided.
3. Affordable?
The final factor MFWP addresses is cost effectiveness. While issues
of enforcement and beneficial use often involve legal determinations
and agency collaboration, the true test of a water right's value in a free
market is largely determined by the market itself:
The motivating force behind water markets is mutual perception by
potential buyers and sellers that economic gains may be captured by
transferring water to a place or purpose of use in which it generates
higher net returns than under the existing use patterns. Economic
returns to buyers must be large enough (or be perceived as large
enough)430to outweigh the costs of obtaining water through the market
process.
Water marketing-particularly the buying and selling of
consumptive use rights-tends to obey general laws of economics;
parties enter contracts to acquire goods when doing so will maximize
their interests.
41
Although water is essentially a public resource across the West, "
water rights applied to traditional consumptive purposes have long
been freely transferable subject to certain criteria, including the no
harm rule.432 Over the years, water brokers have contrived elaborate
methods for determining the value of water as applied to particular
out-of-channel uses. Those involved in off-stream water marketing

429.
430.
431.

Landry, supra note 45, at 8.
Colby, supra note 283, at 6-15.
GETCHES, supra note 301, at 82-83.

432. See generally id. at 156, 161-62 (describing the no harm rule's role in changes of
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have developed valuation methods for the many means of transferring
water, which include sales, exchanges, and leases. In fact, proponents
of consumptive-use leasing have looked no further than Colorado for a
blueprint for expanding market approaches to water management.
One of the best-established markets for water operates in the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District. "About 30 percent of ' the
4
district's 310,000 shares move through its rental market each year. '
Although cost determination methods are established in markets
for diverted water, approaches to appraising instream rights are still in
their relative infancy. Valuation methods for instream rights are both
less common and more difficult to develop than those for consumptive
rights. As discussed earlier, several reasons exist for this. First, and
most notably, most state laws prohibit the existence of an open ISF
market.4 34 The absence of legal mechanisms for converting water to
instream use has offered little incentive to develop techniques for
determining the value of instream flows.4n
Second, the
aforementioned administrative process associated with ISF transfers
assigns external costs to the transactions. Because ISF leasing is
relatively untested even where allowed, it may be difficult to quantify
these external costs ahead of time in order to factor them into a final
appraisal. 3 Finally, "instream flows have 'public good' characteristics
which make it difficult to translate the economic benefits provided by
streamflows
into money" to be used to compete for rights in a free
43 7
market.

Despite the factors working against free ISF leasing, a rapidly
emerging market has driven the need to devise means of assigning
dollar values to ISF lease rights. Clay Landry, founder of WestWater
Research, a firm specializing in water rights valuations, offers four
methods.4"3 The first, the "sales comparison approach," assigns a dollar
value to a right based on a comparison of the subject water right with
similarly situated water rights.3'
The second, the "income
capitalization," or "farm-crop budget analysis," approach was that
which OWT first employed, and is the most popular method of
valuation for lease transactions. This method involves estimating the
revenues an agricultural user would forego because of production
decreases resulting from a water lease."' The third, the "land value
differential approach," calculates the value differential between the
worth of agricultural land with and without appurtenant water rights.44'
The final method, "the development-cost approach," assigns an ISF
433. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER: WATER
PUMP 103 (1997).
434. SeeColby, supranote 283, at 6-21.
435. Id. at 6-21.
436. See id.
437. Id. at 6-22.
438. Neuman & Chapman, supra note 149, at 154.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 154-55, n.58.
441. Id. at 155.
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value based on the price consumptive users would be willing to pay to
develop
new water supplies in lieu of continued use of the exiting
44
right.
Each method has its own benefits and shortcomings. Use of the
sales comparison method is appealing because of its "straightforward
443
However, a lack of comparable water rights in the area
approach."
The income
of the targeted right may preclude this method.
capitalization approach allows lessees and lessors to arrive at a figure
that reflects the lessor's true economic loss from the agreement. This
method has received criticism for simplifying the relationship between
water and the rest of the agricultural production process. 4" The land
differential value has received praise for being "easy to observe and
calculate." 45 Nonetheless, it offers only a rough estimate of a right's
value, which it tends to overestimate.146 Finally, the development-cost
approach works well when alternative sources-particularly
groundwater-are available for the lessor to develop in lieu of
continued use of the existing right. 44
This approach has two
limitations: OWT has yet to test its effectiveness, and it may be used
only when alternative sources are available.4 s
The above methods offer a useful toolkit for upstart water trusts
and conservation groups. Nevertheless, their use must include due
regard for the broader picture and the numerous external
circumstances that inevitably influence the market worth of surface
water rights. For instance, in areas where little urban demand exists,
such as Montana, "valuation is based largely on value of crop
production foregone in converting an irrigation right to an instream
right., 449 While this income capitalization approach may be applicable
in some areas of Colorado, in other areas it may not be feasible. On
the Front Range, where agriculture and municipalities compete
fiercely for water, ISF water brokers could expect to pay inordinate
lease rates. Landry's 1998 study found that in regions that anticipate
growth and corresponding municipal water needs, private institutions
4510
In areas
could expect to pay up to $200 per acre-foot to lease water.
lessors acquired ISF rights for
not susceptible to such encroachment,
41
as little as $0.08 per acre-foot. 5
Even within a specific geographical region or river basin, each
transaction deserves consideration "on a case-by-case basis, and the
dollar value of each deal [must reflect] the unique characteristics of
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that particular transaction."452 The seniority of a right is certainly an
important determining factor, thus "a senior water right that
historically receives its full rate and duty is normally more valuable
than a junior right.' 3 Another important factor to consider is the
extent to which a given right will benefit a coveted conservation value.
A public interest organization may be willing to pay much more for a
late-season lease involving 15 cfs that would restore historical habitat to
a threatened species than it would be willing to pay for a 50 cfs lease
that would not.
Colorado's sparse history of ISF leasing gives organizations such as
the CWT little to go on for comparative purposes. CWCB has entered
a limited number of leases, such as the Yampa River lease, through
which it obtained 2000 acre-feet of water at a rate of $16.00 per acrefoot.454 Ultimately, however, rights simply carry a value equal to that
which a potential lessee is willing to pay to see the water left instream.
The crux of the argument for instream right leasing, after all, rests on
the premise that water users should be able to deal with more than just
other consumptive users. If public sentiment believes ecological
restoration and protection are as important a value as consumption, a
market will develop, and with it, competitive bidding on available
rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the continuing dialogue regarding Colorado's water
management policy, water users, environmentalists, politicians, and
others have presented arguments as diverse as the stakeholders
themselves. At the center of debate, however, is one fundamental
truism-the state's water resources remain finite while contending
needs demand increasing amounts of water. The solution to this
conundrum lies in alternative methods of apportionment among
historically adverse parties. Although budding alliances among various
water users have been encouraging, mere amiable conditions alone are
far from enough to solve the problem. Regardless of the successful
cohesion of the state's water interests, they will still need to overcome
numerous legal, logistical, and political barriers.
Financial support will continue to fund an ever-solidifying
conservationist agenda. The only question that remains is how that
money will affect the management of water in Colorado. To date,
public interest groups' primary recourse has been to invest vast
percentages of their resources in attempts to litigate and regulate river
basins back to health. At times, the end result is the non-consensual
imposition of regulatory or judicial constraints on property owners,
which only fuels resentment toward the environmental cause. In other
cases, restoration and preservation initiatives are either defeated or
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compromised. Regardless of the outcome, reformists and proponents
of the status quo continue to waste significant amounts of energy and
money in legal entanglements with each other. Current trends in the
law have cultivated this adversarial atmosphere.
However, the
implementation of a free market leasing allowance presents a way not
only to quell historical hostilities but also to forge solutions to
impending water crises.
This proposition is not merely speculative. States such as Oregon
and Montana have proved that the introduction of free market
principles to ISF preservation schemes does not ineluctably contravene
the tenets of prior appropriation. On the contrary, these states have
managed to reconcile ISF preservation and prior appropriation, and in
so doing have spawned numerous success stories. The influx of private
funding into restoration and conservation efforts has enabled the
protection of hundreds of miles of previously depleted rivers and
streams. As demonstrated by the discrete approaches detailed above,
states are free to develop leasing strategies uniquely tailored to the
states' political nature and existing water management structure. For
example, organizations that obtain privately facilitated and funded
leases may hold them directly, or the state may hold them in trust for
the people. Although administrative barriers at times hinder active
trading, recent years have nevertheless witnessed substantial overall
growth in private ISF marketing throughout the West.
Lease rights by their very definition offer only temporary fixes, and
alone they cannot offer universal redress to water shortage issues.
However, given stringent pre-conversion review, and mechanisms to
fund sound monitoring and administrative oversight, temporary free
market transfers can be an extremely effective tool for leaving water
instream. Public interest organizations are able to broker deals with
existing water users without acquiring permanent interests, thus
maintaining their spending flexibility.
Agricultural and other
consumptive water users, meanwhile, can exercise free will in terms of
how to best utilize their rights. Moreover, market incentives, when
properly administered, do not create the same negative connotations
as command and control methods for environmental stewardship, and
thus foster cooperation instead of conflict.
Colorado was the first state to formally adopt the laws of prior
appropriation, which it did in its original constitution in 1876. 455 The
principles embodied in that doctrine have held strong through many
years and in the face of mounting pressure for change. Nevertheless,
as in any legal domain, the state's water laws have shown a degree of
adaptability. Indeed, state lawmakers have demonstrated a willingness
to institute change to many aspects of the ISF protection program. In
what may possibly be measured advances toward private involvement
in preserving instream flows, the State may now appropriate flows to
improve rather than to merely maintain the environment. Although it

455. See IRRIGATION
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fails to introduce market incentives to ISF conversions, the new
legislation permitting water users to loan rights to the State during
drought conditions nonetheless took an important step in recognizing
the legal validity of temporary water right transfers.
In addition to expanding the reach of the existing ISF program,
CWCB has shown more activity in establishing new appropriations of
late. Although it filed for just one ISF right in 2001, "in 2002, the
CWCB filed for instream flow rights on 21 river segments across the
state.,,45 , In one case, CWCB partially relied upon citizen-submitted
data in its decision to establish a new ISF appropriation. Colorado
Trout Unlimited touted this move as "an important demonstration
457
that the public can be a partner" in the ISF protection program.
Nonetheless, for every principle in Colorado water law that has yielded
to the outcry for expanded instream enhancement opportunities,
many more have steadfastly resisted change. The state has stopped far
short of allowing private actors to exercise fully their purchasing power
through the direct funding of ISF transfers. Permitting non-profits
such as CWT to engage in such participation, even if merely on a trial
basis, would seem to be the next logical step in the continuing
evolution of sensible water management policy.
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1. INTRODUCTION

It has been said that, "there is a dire need for improvement in the'
manner in which water rights are evidenced, conveyed and exercised.'
The conveyance of a water right is accomplished by preparation of a
recordable deed and is a fairly straightforward process, although it may
require the inclusion of warranties on title and historic use, affidavits
of historic use if a change is contemplated, and other similar
documentation. The issue of exercise has received, and will continue
to receive, such aggressive, sophisticated attention in the courtroom,
in academia, and elsewhere, that it is unnecessary to address it here.

t Amy W. Beatie is an associate at the law firm of Porzak Browning & Bushong,
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Instead, this article will focus on the third suggested area for
improvement: evidencing a water right, especially as related to its
chain of tide.
Evidencing a water right has always been an important and
uncertain issue, but legislation passed in Colorado in 2003 has the
potential to bring the issue to a head. The passage of Senate Bill 032782 requires the owner of any absolute water right adjudicated for a
direct flow rate of at least 1.0 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") or a
storage volume of at least 100 acre-feet ("a-f") to pay the State
Engineer an annual "water administration fee.",3 At a conference in
Denver on October 8, 2003, State Engineer Hal Simpson explained
that the determination of ownership for purposes of assessing these
fees would be one of the bigest hurdles the State Engineer's Office
While the State Engineer's Office
would have to overcome.
contemplates how to accomplish this-a registry?-the insurance
industry has proposed what may be a potential solution: the use of title
insurance for evidencing and insuring title to water rights.!
The concept of using title insurance for water rights has inspired a
wide range of reactions, from outright skepticism to cautious hope that
These reactions are understandable
the process will succeed.
considering the unique nature of water rights and their status in the
West as one of the most valuable property rights. This article presents
a critical examination of utilizing title insurance to convey water rights
in Colorado. The article begins by examining the steps currently used
to evidence a water right in the context of a water rights purchase. It
discusses in detail the most widely accepted method to evidence that
right, the water attorney's due diligence analysis. The article then
provides an overview of title insurance in general, and examines the
use of title insurance in the water rights context. Finally, the article
concludes by discussing the potential hurdles the tide insurance
industry must overcome before it will be possible to extend title
insurance to water rights.
2. S. 03-278, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified at CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-80-121,-92-502,-92-503).
3. See § 37-80-121 (1)-(2) (setting out the water rights subject to the new water
administration fee); §§ 37-92-502(5)(c), -503(8) (establishing State Engineer's
authority to collect the water administration fee).
4. State Engineer Hal Simpson, Administrative Perspective: What is Working for
Water Administration Officials and What is Not, Keynote Address at the Seminar of
the Colorado Bar Association, CLE presenting a Retrospective of the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969: 34 Years of Perspective (Oct. 8, 2003)
(transcript available from the Colorado Bar Association CLE).
5. See Stewart Taps into the Water Rights Title Insurance Business, The Legal
Description: Legislative and Legal Analysis for the Real Estate Industry, Feb. 17, 2003,
at 1. The authors note that they made several attempts to obtain a copy of a water
rights title insurance policy to review for this article from Stewart Water Information,
the subsidiary of Stewart Information Services Corp. that intends to issue water right
title insurance policies, but Stewart declined. In addition, the authors scheduled a
meeting with the water rights title department at Stewart Water Information but, upon
submitting questions as requested prior to the meeting, were informed that Stewart no
longer wished to participate in the meeting.
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II. EVIDENCING A WATER RIGHT
The unique nature of water rights and water law complicates the
process of evidencing a water right and assessing its tile. The due
diligence process for water differs significantly from that of land. 6
Consequently, those steeped in the field of water law traditionally
evidence water rights. For quite some time, water rights have been
evidenced by attorneys using a variety of methods of due diligence
review, who then issue written water rights due diligence analyses,
sometimes in the form of title opinions.7 The due diligence review is
"a methodical approach by which an attorney can be reasonably
certain of reaching a supportable conclusion as to the ownership,
extent and validity of a claimed water right."8
Thus, the attorney conducts due diligence by assessing three
This
attributes of a water right: ownership, extent, and validity.
information is not easily ascertainable by simply examining records in
a county clerk and recorder's office. Several steps in the due diligence
process are necessary. They include (1) identification of the water
right to be purchased, (2) examination of title documents related to
the water right, (3) determination of the current validity of the right,
(4) determination of the historic use of the right, and (5)
identification of possible restraints on change in the event a change is
contemplated." Each one of these steps is necessary for a thorough
analysis of the extent of the water right, and who may convey the right.

6. Real property records in Colorado have never been designed or used
exclusively to provide a chain of title for water rights. Rather,
[b]ecause a water right in Colorado is valid only by meeting the three
elements of appropriation: intent to divert, diversion and application to a
beneficial use, records alone do not establish title to a water right. Records
may, however, help to document that these elements have been met. There
is no equivalent to the recorded land patent, recorded with the county, which
initiates the chain of private interests in land. Rather, facts must be gathered,
often from several sources, in order to prove the extent, validity and ownership of a
water right.
JAMES N. CORBRIDGE JR. & TERESA A. RiCE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 232 (rev.

ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part lI.F.
Davis, supra note 1, at 509.
Id.
See CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at 232-36 (listing and explaining the

considerations for evidencing title and conveying water rights). It is important to note
the extent to which an attorney analyzes a water right will depend upon the client's
wishes. Also, additional considerations for due diligence are necessary for conveying a
right, but because this article focuses on evidencing a water right, those other
concerns are only mentioned where pertinent to the topic at hand. Typically, upon
conducting due diligence, an attorney will draft a due diligence written analysis;
prepare conveyancing documents such as a recordable deed; obtain warranties on tide
and historic use; obtain an affidavit of historic use if a change is contemplated; execute
a dry-up covenant, if necessary; and obtain a stock transfer order for share certificates.
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A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE WATER RIGHT TO BE PURCHASED

The first step in the due diligence process involves identifying the
water right to be purchased or conveyed. The typical starting point of
,this analysis is the review of any information the current owner
provided regarding the water right, including any proposed contract
or conveyancing documents. After reviewing these materials, the
attorney must obtain copies of all decrees and related documents,
including, if involved in the sale, water well permits," stock
certificates,', allotment contracts,' 3 and similar documents.' 4 The
attorney must then review the documents to determine if they refer to
additional materials such as articles of incorporation or bylaws that
were not mentioned or included in the information the owner
originally provided to the attorney. The attorney may also need to
interview the current and, if possible, former water users for any
information that may not be readily ascertainable from the
documentation provided.
Maps are another helpful tool for identifying water rights. Maps
may show the location of the ditch, diversion structure, irrigated
11. Often, information in the decrees and well permits may not be enough. Thus,
attorneys should obtain the entire file for each decree or well permit. The entire file
may provide the attorney with information otherwise difficult to obtain, for example
any potential conflicts or concerned parties (particularly if the water right has a welldocumented history).
12. Early pioneers settling the West often pooled resources for purposes of
bringing water, too expensive and difficult an endeavor for one person or family, to an
area where there were several farms with inadequate supplies of water. CORBRIDGE &
RICE, supra note 6, at 277. Joint ditches, mutual ditches, and carrier ditches evolved
from this arrangement. Id. In the mutual ditch arrangement, the consuners own the
water, the ditch, and the diversion works and share the cost of operation without
profit; with carrier ditches, the water, ditch, and ditch structures belong to the carrier
and the carrier is entitled to a return on its investment by charging delivery rates. City
& County of Denver v. Miller, 368 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo. 1962). See generally COLO.
CONS-. art. XVI, § 8 (establishing authority of boards of county commissioners to set
the maximum rates individuals or corporations can charge for the use of water);
COLO. REV. STx. § 37-85-103 (2003) (granting boards of county commissioners
authority to consider applications for carrier ditches and related issues). A joint ditch
is the least formal of the three arrangements. CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at 27778. A mutual ditch company usually issues shares of stock associated with the water
rights in the ditch and is organized similar to a nonprofit organization, but with
statutorily governed differences that control the operations of the mutual ditch. Left
Hand Ditch Co. v. Hill, 933 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Colo.1997);Jacobucci v. Dist. Court, 541 P.2d
667, 672 (Colo. 1975). See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-42-101 to -117 (2003) (setting
forth the provisions used to organize a ditch corporation).
13. An allotment contract is a contractual right to the use of water that is "far
different" from a water right acquired under application of water to beneficial use. See
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 60 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Green v.
Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 779 (Colo. 1962)). The use of water under an
allotment contract is determined by the terms of the contract. Id.
14. Stock certificates, allotment contracts, and any other similar documents, e.g.,
articles of incorporation and by-laws for a mutual ditch company, are significant
because they may clearly delimit the exercise of a water right and procedures for or
restrictions on transfer, and any other issues related to use of assets of the company.
See §§ 7-42-101(1), -107; City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 60;Jacobucci,541 P.2d at 672.
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acreage, reservoir, or other important features related to the water
right. For older water rights, water users may have filed a map and
The attorney should
statement with the State Engineer's Office.
obtain and review the map and statement, any other maps, and any
engineering reports available. If a reservoir is involved in the sale, the
attorney may need to obtain documents related to the approval and
construction of the reservoir, as well as dam safety inspection reports
and other related documents.' G Next, the attorney must identify any
other water rights used on the property or in connection with the right
in question. This process requires examination of decrees involving
other owners of the water right if 7the current owner does not own a
full, one hundred percent interest.'
The purpose of obtaining this information is to clearly identify the
right available for purchase. For example, a client informs you he
needs to obtain six c.f.s. for year-round purposes. You learn of a 6.67
c.Ls portion of a very senior ditch right (with now-multiple owners of
various proportions that have been changed and re-changed from an
original decree of twenty c.f.s.) that might satisfy the client's need.
The current owner provides you with three documents: (1) an
agreement regarding the ditch, executed in one of the numerous
change cases; (2) a two-decade old engineering analysis of the 6.67
c.f.s. portion of the right; and (3) a decree that relates to the water
right. You would start by reviewing these documents, obtaining any
other documents cited therein, and assessing the status of the ditch
(mutual, carrier, or neither). You would discuss the use of the right
with the current owner and former owners, if possible. You should
also find out what other water rights are decreed to the ditch. From
reviewing this information, you determine the right at issue is indeed a
paper right for 6.67 c.f.s. That will not end the analysis, however,
because there might be practical, contractual, and decretal limitations
on the amount of water available to this water right. Notwithstanding,
at this point, you have a fairly good start to identifying the water right,

15. From the time of the 1881 Adjudication Act to the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"), a person proposing to construct a ditch
or to extend an existing ditch submitted to the State Engineer a map and statement,
which would include a map with a name of the structure and a ditch statement.
CORBRIDGE & RCE, supra note 6, at 233. The ditch statement would include specific
information related to the ditch, a legal description of the point of diversion, and
other important information related to the location and uses of the ditch. Act of Feb.
11, 1881, § 2, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 161, 161-62. While the enactment of the 1969 Act
discontinued the requirement for these filings, CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at 233,
maps and statements remain very helpful tools in the assessment of the extent and
validity of an existing water right.
16. A person desiring to construct or modify a dam for storage purposes must meet
certain specific guidelines and apply to the state engineer for approval. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-87-105(1) (2003).
17. This step is particularly important if a water appropriator contemplates a
change in use as a condition of or upon purchase because Colorado law protects other
vested rights from injury during change proceedings. § 37-92-305(3) (2003) ("A
change of water right ... shall be approved if such change ... will not injuriously
affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right .. ").
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but it will certainly be just that-a start. Next, you must ascertain
whether title to the 6.67 c.f.s. interest lies with the seller.
B. TITLE DOCUMENTS EXAMINATION
Once the attorney clearly identifies the water right to be
purchased, he or she must then examine title to the right by obtaining
a copy of the seller's deed and reviewing an abstract, if applicable and
available, for the land upon which the seller uses those water rights.'
The attorney should also conduct a stand-up examination of the
grantor/grantee records and develop, as best as possible, a chain of
title for the water right. 9 Generally, the process for examining the
chain of title for a watef right is the same as that of an attorney's
assessment of title to land (absent title insurance) Y This is because a
water right is an interest in real property,2 ' and the same formalities
the conveyance of real estate apply to the conveyance of a
that apply to
22
water right.

18. Obtaining the land title is important because parties may convey a water right
as an appurtenance to the land without specifically mentioning the conveyance of
water rights. See, e.g., Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Woolley, 76 P. 1053, 1054 (Colo.
1904). If a particular water right has historically served a particular parcel, and the
land has been divided, the water right may have been divided as well, simply as an
incident to the transaction or in agreements related to the transaction. See id. It is also
important to note that a party may convey a water right separately from the land and
an abstract of title to a particular piece of property may not reflect such conveyance.
Id.
19. It might also be prudent to trace title to the ditch to determine whether the
ditch rights were conveyed separate from the water rights. Colorado law recognizes a
distinction between water rights and ditch rights, CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at
61, although the two are often mistakenly conflated, id. at 239 (noting that many
Colorado cases obscure the distinction between water rights and ditch rights).
20. Davis, supra note 1, at 510.
21. In Colorado, unlike in riparian states, a water right is a real property interest,
separate and distinct from the land on which it is used, which can be and routinely is
conveyed independently of other real property interests. Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of
Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951) ("It is elementary learning in Colorado
that a water priority is a property right-not a mere revocable privilege; that it is not a
fixed appurtenance; that the right to change its place of use and the point of diversion
is an inherent property right.. . ."). As such, it is subject to the same conveyance
requirements as-and has a full, separate, and independent existence from-other
real property interests. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-102 (2003) ("In the conveyance of
water rights ... the same formalities shall be observed and complied with as in the
conveyance of real estate.").
22. § 38-30-102. Chains of title for water rights can be simple or, especially where
older water rights are involved, very complex. If a stock certificate is involved, the
attorney must examine stock transfer records and restrictions on transfer, if any.
Mutual ditch company shares generally are transferable. § 7-42-104(4) (2003) (stating
"shares of stock shall be deemed personal property and transferable as such in the
manner provided by the bylaws"). However, the statute excepts them from the general
conveyancing requirements for a water right. See, e.g., § 38-30-102 ("In the conveyance
of water rights in all cases, except where the ownership of stock in ditch companies or
other companies constitutes the ownership of a water right, the same formalities shall
be observed and complied with as in the conveyance of real estate."). Thus, the
The
company may prescribe certain procedures or restrictions on transfer.
restrictions might involve the requirement that water be used on a fixed amount of
irrigated acreage, that the ditch company's board of directors approve the transfer, or
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The purpose of the title review is to create, as best as possible, a
chain of title to the water right in order to ascertain whether the right
is transferable as offered. Continuing with our example from Part
II.A., you will want to obtain a copy of the seller's deed to be certain
the seller has title to the right offered for sale, at least as far as the
deed shows. You will also want to review abstracts for the land upon
which the seller used the 6.7 c.f.s. interest, and the grantor/grantee
index to be certain that no one transferred all or a portion of the 6.7
c.f.s. interest separately from the property.
Unfortunately, assessing the chain of tide to a water right can be
one of the more difficult and uncertain aspects of the due diligence
process. Water rights do not have the equivalent of recorded land
patents initiating ownership in the chain of interests; instead, human
actions initiate a water right, and allow it to mature into a protected
interest. 2 Furthermore, water rights in Colorado may pass with the
land even in circumstances where the deed does not specifically
mention the conveyance.2 ' Land conveyances often include language
conveying "all other appurtenances," which may or may not include
water rights. Typically, in construing conveyance documents to
determine whether water rights passed under such a clause, courts will
look to the intent of the parties and surrounding circumstances.2- For
purposes of assessing title to water rights in the due diligence review,
you may have to assume the deeds did indeed convey the water at issue
in the event the early deeds-or any-in the chain of title used only
appurtenance clauses and failed to mention water rights specifically.
The problem with this method is that, in effect, you are assuming your
conclusion.
Notwithstanding the problems associated with assessing title of
water rights, the title analysis should inform you of the ownership of
the purported "paper" amount of the water right. But, a truism,
record ownership of 6.7 c.f.s. in a ditch that carries a number of other
rights may not translate to 6.7 c.f.s. of wet water for your client's
intended purposes. Many factors play a role in determining how the
right may be exercised. Thus, the next step is the determination of the
historic use and current validity of the right.

that water must be used on a specific piece of land. The unique corporate legal status
of mutual ditch companies in Colorado make these restrictions possible. See Left
Hand Ditch Co. v. Hill, 933 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Colo. 1997). If an allotments contract is
involved, the attorney must examine the contract, any relevant company transfer
records, and, again, restrictions on transfer. If any fixtures or personal properties are
involved, the attorney must search the Uniform Commercial Code records.
23. CORBRIDGE & RiCE, supra note 6, at 232.
24. E.g., Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Woolley, 76 P. 1053, 1054 (Colo. 1904).
25. Cooper v. Shannon, 85 P. 175, 177 (1906) (explaining that the grantor's intent
determines whether a water right is appurtenant).
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C. DETERMINATION OF CURRENT VALIDITY

Often as important as the decree or the title to the water right is
how the right has been used and administered. After reviewing the
title documents, the attorney must determine the water right's current
validity.
This is accomplished by reviewing the tabulations,
abandonment list, and diversion records, and may involve a discussion
with the local water commissioner.
The tabulations will provide a current listing of the right.6 While
the tabulations are known to occasionally contain mistakes and should
always be independently verified, they provide an invaluable tool for
referencing the water right vis-a-vis other water rights in the system and
for discovering additional information about the water right for sale
that may not already have been provided by the seller. The attorney
must also review the abandonment list to be certain the subject water
procedures
right has not been abandoned.2 7 While there are • statutory
28
for protesting inclusion on the abandonment list, the purchase of a
potentially abandoned right or one that has endured a period of
Also
nonuse can create problems for the potential purchaser.
important are diversion records, " which purport to show how much
water was diverted in a given year under a particular water right. The
diversion records in some cases may not provide any diversion
information for a particular water right (in some cases, the diversion
records read "water taken - no information available"), but they
26. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-401 (2003) (addressing the tabulation of water
rights). To "facilitate certainty in deternining the status of water rights, Colorado
adopted a system by which all water rights are tabulated." CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra
note 6, at 174. The tabulations are lists of water rights within each water division that
"take or will take water from the same source and are in a position to affect one
another." § 37-92-401 (1)(a). The lists are presented in order of seniority, and provide
descriptions and amounts as established by court decrees. Id. The tabulations also
may include information regarding subsequent cases affecting or involving the water
right that may not be otherwise available.
27. See § 37-92-401 (1)(a). The abandonment list is a decennially produced list
compiled by the Division Engineer comprising all absolute water rights "which he has
determined to have been abandoned in whole or in part and which previously have
not been adjudged to have been abandoned." Id. In Colorado, abandonment is"the
termination of a water right in whole or in part as a result of the intent of the owner
thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all or part of the water available
The "continued and
thereunder."
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(2) (2003).
unexplained nonuse of a water right for an unreasonable period of time creates a
rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon." City and County of Denver v. Snake
River Water Dist., 788 P.2d 772, 776 (Colo. 1990). The determination of what
constitutes an unreasonable amount of time varies with the facts of each case. Id. A
period of ten years of nonuse creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment for
purposes of the Division Engineer's abandonment list. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-

402(11) (2003).
28. § 37-92-401(5).
29. The State Engineer's Office maintains records of the quantities of water
diverted under a particular water right. These records are available, for at least the last
decade, electronically in a database maintained by the State Engineer's Office records
department. Older diversion records are also available but in other formats, such as
microfiche.
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should nonetheless be reviewed because they provide perspective on
the State Engineer's administration of the right and evidence of the
extent of use.
It is often advisable to interview the local water commissioner.'°
The water commissioner may have an on-the-ground administration
perspective that is not available through documents or any other
means. For example, if the diversion records show that no water was
diverted under the water right for seven years, it may be that no water
was available to the right in priority, information that might be more
difficult to obtain otherwise. The water commissioner may also have
information about diversions that are not recorded in the diversion
records.
If the right is a conditional water right, 31 an attorney must establish
if all past diligence filing deadlines have been met and if all required
diligence decrees have been entered by the water court. All diligence
decrees should be obtained and reviewed. Without this information,
the potential purchaser will be unable to determine whether all
conditionally decreed uses and amounts have been preserved.
The process of determining the historic use of the water right will
help significantly with the process of determining how the "paper"
water right will translate into wet water. For example, you may obtain
the tabulation and find the 6.67 c.f.s. water right is listed, but (1) the
water right is indicated as abandoned, (2) the tabulations do not
indicate abandonment but the water right is listed on the most current
abandonment list, (3) you obtain the diversion records and they
indicate that no water was taken under the water right for the past
fifteen years, or (4) the water right is decreed for year round purposes
but it is only used for irrigation in the summer. Each of these
situations would require additional research, of course, but more
significantly, each might result in a determination that the water right
is not viable, or as valuable, as purported. These are critical steps in
the determination of the extent and validity of the right to be
transferred.

30. Division engineers appoint water commissioners. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92202(3) (2003). Water commissioners administer waters within their water district in
accordance with decreed priorities. § 37-81-102; Bd. of Comin'rs v. Hider, 107 P. 1068,
1069 (Colo. 1910); see also Daniel S. Young & Duane D. Helton, Developing a Water
Supply in Colorado: The Role of an Engineer,3 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 373, 383 (2000).
31. A conditional water right is an inchoate water right whose appropriation date
relates back to the date the appropriator conducted certain acts that signaled the
commencement of the intent to appropriate a water right. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 3792-103(6) (2003) (defining a conditional water right as "aright to perfect a water right
with a certain priority upon the completion with reasonable diligence of the
also City of Thornton v.
appropriation upon which such water fight is to be based"); see
Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 31 (Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. Fort Collins, 830
P.2d 915, 924-25 (Colo. 1992). The right is perfected, or becomes absolute, by the
placing of water to beneficial use. Mun. Subdist. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Rifle Ski Corp., 726 P.2d 635, 636 (Colo. 1986).
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D. DETERMINATION OF THE HISTORIC USE OF THE WATER RIGHT AND
POSSIBLE RESTRAINTS ON CHANGE

Estimating the historic consumptive use may be important, or
critical, depending upon the water right and the buyer's need. If the
buyer intends to change the type of use, place of use, or time of use of
the water right, the process is critical. A historic consumptive use
analysis can be extremely technical in nature, and therefore should
involve a water engineer s contribution. The water engineer should
review of all diversion records, local call records, " local administration
records, historic diversions, aerial photographs of the site of water use,
and any other documents or information relevant to defining the
extent and location of use of the water right, and its administration visA-vis other water rights. Using this information, the water engineer
can calculate the historic consumptive use and the historic return
flows. Lastly, the engineer should determine the physical supply
reliability. 34 This information will be extremely helpful in the event a
change is contemplated.3'
A historic use analysis is a necessary component of determining the
extent and validity of a water right. It is a result of the "no-injury"
provision in Colorado water law, which prevents certain practices like
changing water rights from injuring other water rights, eitherjunior or
senior.
Take, for example, the 6.67 c.f.s. that your client may be
interested in purchasing (as originally described in the hypothetical in
Part II.A.). If your client intends to change the place of diversion and
the place of use, the other holders of interests in the ditch could assert
injury to their water rights unless you propose terms and conditions to
32. See generallyYoung & Helton, supra note 30 (providing an analysis of the role of
a Colorado water engineer).
33. "A call is placed on a river when a senior appropriator forces upstream juniors
to let sufficient water flow to meet the requirements of the senior priority." USI Props.
E., Inc. v. Simpson, 938 P.2d 168, 171 n.2 (Colo. 1997). Local call records show when
a senior water user whose water right is not being satisfied "calls" the river to provide
water to satisfy his right. CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at 27-28.
34. For example, the engineer should determine the amount of water available in
the system at times when the subject water right is called by downstream senior water
rights. If the exercise of downstream calls, the water right may not be reliable enough
for your client's purposes. See, e.g., Young & Helton, supra note 30, at 382-87.
35. If the attorney foresees a change as part of the transaction-something that
should be clear from the first communications with the client regarding the purpose
for the acquisition-he or she must determine the potential restraints. This process
may also involve the use of an engineer, especially to help develop terms and
conditions a change application may necessitate, for example, whether the change
may require a dry-up covenant or a relinquishment of some of the right to the ditch or
stream. Id. at 387. The existence of Colorado Water Conservation Board instream
flows should also be determined, along with the presence of any federal reserved
rights. If a ditch company is involved, the ditch company bylaws must be reviewed for
change restrictions.
36. See Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo.
2002) ("Flexibility emanates from the fact that the right of water use can be changed,
subject to quantification of the appropriation's historic beneficial consumptive use
and prevention of injury to other water rights.").
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prevent such injury. For example, dedicating some of the right to
remain in the ditch after changing the place of use and point of
diversion may be necessary to avoid injury. Determining the historic
consumptive use will help you determine how much of the water right
you will actually be able to change without injuring other water rights
in the ditch.
E. CONSIDERATIONS IF SOME OF THE RIGHT IS RESERVED OR CONVEYED
TO OTHERS

An additional layer of complexity will be added to the transaction
and the due diligence analysis if the seller or grantor intends to reserve
some of the right, or to convey the right in parts to different owners.
The first step will require the clear identification of the rights to be
reserved and the rights to be conveyed, or in the case of conveyances
in part, how much of the right will be conveyed to which purchaser. In
addition, care must be taken to set out the exact mechanism for
An agreement should be drafted
allocation in times of shortage.
establishing the responsibilities for joint use and maintenance of any
shared facilities and, if the shared facilities involve a ditch, the parties
In
should consider the creation of a mutual ditch company.
preparation for the drafting of any agreements, an attorney should
determine if rights-of-way for ditches or other off-site facilities are
necessary.
F. THE AYORNEY'S POST-DUE DILIGENCE WRITTEN ANALYSIS

After collecting evidence related to the water right's identity, title,
current validity, historic use, and restraints on change in the event a
change is contemplated, the water attorney will issue a water rights due
diligence analysis. This analysis, typically in the form of a letter, will
invariably be prefaced by a disclaimer stating that the analysis is not a
title opinion and should not be construed as such. The disclaimer is
evidence of the discomfort with which water attorneys proffer analyses
regarding the ownership, extent, and validity of a water right." The
use of the attorney's written analysis, which is the current trend, rather
than the use of a title opinion, is also a clear sign of that discomfort.
Whether title insurance will be able to play a role in the due diligence
process will depend on a number of details related to how the tide
insurance industry intends to compensate for the unique nature of
37. In times of shortage, some of the mechanisms to use in the event of partition
are (1) requiring a pro rata reduction based on each owner's share of the original
total amount of the right, (2) establishing a rotation system whereby the parties
alternate who may take and for how long each rotation will last, or (3) establishing a
private priority among the users. Typically, formal or informal agreements establish
these mechanisms.
38. Attorneys offering opinions related to title are liable for defects in their work
product; however, they may provide these disclaimers to limit their liability. See
Charles B. Sheppard, Assurances of Titles to Real PropertyAvailable in the United States: Is a
Person Who Assures a Quality of Title to Real Property Liable for a Defect in the Title Caused by
Conduct of the Assured?, 79 N.D. L. REv. 311, 339 (2003).
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water rights.39
III. A TITLE INSURANCE OVERVIEW
Title insurance is America's contribution to the insurance41
industry.40 It developed in the second half of the nineteenth century
as a response to the unique nature of real estate transactions and the
inadequate protection afforded by the prior title assurance methods of
abstractor- and attorney-opinions. In contrast to casualty and hazard
insurance, which generally protects against injury or loss caused by
future events, 43 title insurance protects against existing, but unknown,
problems that may cause defects or failures of title." Such hidden risks
include outstanding rights or interests in the property (an inchoate
lien or survey error, for example) and conveyancing defects (perhaps
due to fraud, forgery, incompetence and the like) that cannot be
ascertained from a title search or inspection of the property. 45 In the
event such a defect causes an insured to suffer
loss or damage, tide
right of indemnification.46insurance provides a relatively secure
A.

BRIEF HISTORY

Prior to the development of title insurance, real estate title was
assured similar to the way water right titles are sometimes assured7
today: through written opinions of title based upon title searches.1
After reviewing the chain of tide, an attorney or lay conveyancer would
provide an opinion in a signed title abstract. 48 The opinion would

39. One commentator ascribes the preference for water attorneys to draft due
diligence written analyses (rather than providing a title opinion) to the inadequacies
of public records rather than to the uniqueness of water rights as real property
interests. See WILLIS V. CARPENTER, COLORADO TITLE INSURANCE PRACTICE § 2.08, at 2-10
(3d ed. 2000). These considerations, he opines, are the same for title insurance
companies. Id. According to Mr. Carpenter, because water rights are often included
in a deed as an afterthought or are included in an appurtenance clause, title insurance
companies did not feel as though they could produce an accurate chain of title for
water rights. Id. at § 2.08, at 2-9. Commentators in the water rights field do not
unanimously share this view.
CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 6, at 232 (stating
"[b]ecause of the nature of water rights, title insurance companies will generally not
insure their title."). As explained in this article, both factors have clearly played a role
in preventing the development of title insurance for water rights.
40. BARLOw BURKE, LAwOF TITLE INSURANCE § 1.01, at 1-3 (3d ed. Supp. 2003).
41. Quintin Johnstone, Title Insurance,66 YALE LJ. 492, 492 (1957).
42. 3 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 42:2 (2003).
43. Charles B. DeWitt, III, Title Insurance: A Primer,3 TENN.J. PRAC. & PROC. 15, 17
(2000).
44. 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATRON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 41, at 126-27 (3d ed.
2003); see also Johnstone, supra note 41, at 492 ("Tide insurance is a means of
protecting against the risks inherent in the uncertainty of land titles by delineating
some defects of title and by insuring against potential losses from others.").
45. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 126-27;Johnstone, supra note 41, at 495-96.
46. See l PALOMAR, supranote 44, § 41, at 127.
47. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 16-17.
48. Id.
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describe all rights, liens or ownership interests in the property.Y This
system, like the bulk of American property law, was imported from
England during the Colonial Era. 5° It provided the chief means of
securing land title throughout the United States' early years and into
Under this system, however, real estate
the twentieth century."
purchasers suffering loss occasioned from tide defects not reasonably
discoverable from a property inspection or public record search, or
resulting from discovered facts that were improperly, but nonetheless
reasonabl y, evaluated, had no recourse against a conveyancer or
attorney.- Title insurance evolved as a means of remedying this3state
of affairs by offering protection against such undiscoverable risks."
The modern title insurance industry traces its origins to the 1868
54
Watson v.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion Watson v. Muirhead.
Muirhead addressed the extent of a lay conveyancer's liability over an
allegedly inadequate title search undertaken in connection with the
sale of a ground-rent apartment in Philadelphia.55 The purchaser
employed a lay conveyancer to handle the sale and to "ascertain the
title of the vendor and whether it was free from encumbrances."' 6 The
conveyancer, Charles H. Muirhead, indeed discovered a lien against
the apartment that had not yet been executedY. After consulting an
attorney, Muirhead represented that the lien did not constitute an
encumbrance.58 The apartment was later subjected to a sheriffs sale in
order to satisfy the judgment, and the purchaser brought a negligence
suit against Muirhead.
The trial court examined Muirhead's conduct and found him not
liable for negligence." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 6"
In doing so, the court established that questions of a lay conveyancer's
liability would henceforth be governed by negligence principles-the
652
same standard that applies to attorneys. As a result, a negligence suit
became a purchaser's only recourse for recovering losses attributable
to a conveyancer's mistake in professional judgment. 63 Under this
49. Id.
50. Id. at 15-16.
51. 1 PALOMAR, supranote 44, § 41, at 124.
52. Comment, Title Insurance: TheDuty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161, 1163-64 (1962).
53. Id. at 1164.
54. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. 161 (1868); BURKE, supra note 40, § 1.01[A], at 1-5.
Although a Pennsylvania entity known as the "Law and Property Assurance and Trust
Society" began selling a form of title insurance in 1853, most commentators credit
Watson v. Muirhead with spurring the industry's growth. BURKE, supra note 40,
§ 1.01 [A], at 1-4.
55. Watson, 57 Pa. 161.
56. Id. at 161.
57. ld. at 161-62.
58. Id. at 162, 168.
59. Id. at 161.
60. Id. at 167.
61. Id. at 168.
62. Id. at 167-68; BURKE, supra note 40, § 1.01[A], at 1-5.
63. BURKE, supranote 40, § 1.01 [A], at 1-6.
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fault-based standard, real estate purchasers could not recover against a
conveyancer for losses caused by title defects not reasonably
discoverable, or, similar to the situation in Watson v. Muirhead,
resulting from discovered facts that were improperly, yet nevertheless
reasonably, evaluated. 64 Moreover, even in cases where a purchaser
could possibly establish negligence, the cost and uncertainty of
bringing such a suit would prohibit full recovery. 5 By providing a
contractual right of recovery for title defects regardless of fault (so
long as it is covered by the policy), title insurance helped resolve this
situation.6
In 1876, the nation's first title insurance company, the Real Estate
Title Insurance Company, was incorporated in Philadelphia-not
surprisingly, given the locus of Watson v. Muirhead.67 By the 1880s, title
insurance companies spread to other metropolitan areas such as New
York, Washington D.C., Chicago, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Los
Angeles.8 In the early twentieth century, the use of title insurance
expanded corresponding with the increased use of mortgages and
It became
deed of trust loans to finance real estate transactions.
popular with high-volume, third-party lenders as an auxiliary service
and as a means to standardize their mortgage product. ° With the
federal government's entrance into the housing and lending markets
in the 1930s, the real estate finance industry became increasingly
standardized and the use of title insurance further expanded, as more
and more lenders required it as a prerequisite to obtaining a
mortgage." By 1950, title insurance was the primary title assurance
method in the country. 2 Title insurance's popularity surged further
with the rise of the secondary mortgage market in the 1970s, because
its standardized coverage offered lenders and investors a more
reliable, simplified means of assuring title than the attorney opinion
method.3
Today, title insurance remains the predominant means of assuring
title to land in most regions of the United States." In Colorado,

64. Comment, supra note 52, at 1164.
65. BURKF, supra note 40, § 1.01 [A], at 1-6.
66. See Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Kiapow, Attorney Malpracticefor Failureto Require
Fee Owner's Title Insurance in a Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
407, 440 (2000); Comment, supra note 52, at 1164.
67. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 17. The company's enabling legislation passed in
1874. BuRKu, supranote 40, § 1.01 [A], at 1-4 to 1-5.
68. BURIK, supra note 40, § 1.01 IB, at 1-7; DeWitt, supra note 43, at 17.
69. BURKE, supra note 40, § 1.01 [B], at 1-8.
70. Id.
71. Id.; DeWitt, supra note 43, at 17.
72. BuRKE, supra note 40, § 1.01 [B], at 1-9.
73. 1 MARIE L. FRANco & WARD P. GRAHAM, MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, INC., REAL ESTATE TiTLE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS § 4.1.1 (2003).
74. BURKE, supra note 40, § 1.01[B], at 1-9 to 1-11. Although the predominant
method of title assurance nationwide, title insurance is not routinely used in New
England and portions of the Southeast and Southwest. Id. at 1-11; 1 PALOMAR, supra
note 44, § 41, at 123. Also, the State of Iowa has prohibited the sale of title insurance
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attorney title opinions are still occasionally sought in rural areas for
transactions involving farms and ranches (and sometimes for their
associated water rights),75 but title insurance is used for nearly all land
transactions.76
B. How TITLE INSURANCE OPERATES

for a
In short, title
insurance is an indemnity agreement purchased
71
•
77
It does,
Title insurance does not guarantee ttle.
one-time fee.
however, protect against discoverable and undiscoverable defects,
liens, encumbrances, adverse claims and other risks to title, other than
those expressly excluded or excepted from coverage, that can result in
loss or damages to the insured, and that exist as of the date the policy
is written. 9 Risks commonly covered include title examination errors
(both negligent and non-negligent) by the title company or its agent;80
some disclosed, minor defects such as covenants, easements, or
encroachments that the title company deems negligible or
unenforceable; defects not revealed because the title company
intentionally restricted the scope of the title search; and defects that
would not be revealed by a reasonable public records search. 81 This
last category includes title defects resulting from conveyances affected
and has adopted its own unique tide assurance system, the Iowa Title Guaranty
Program. Iowa Code § 515.48(10) (2003); Shannon S. Strickler, Note, Iowa's Title
Guaranty System: Is it Superior to Other States' Commercial Title Insurance?,51 DRAKE L. REV.
385 (2003).
The Title Guaranty Program functions essentially the same as tide
insurance, but at a lower cost. Id. at 388-89. Those desiring greater assurance of title
than that afforded by an attorney abstract opinion can purchase a Title Guaranty
Certificate from the state's Finance Authority. Id. at 389. These certificates offer the
same protection as American Land Title Association policies. Id. at 390.
75. CARPENTER, supra note 39, § 1.01.
76. See, e.g., Mark E. Welch, Covering the Gap and OtherArcane Title Insurance Tips, 12
COLO. LAw. 1785 (1983).
77. BURKE, supra note 40, § 2.01, at 2-3. The premium, the so-called "national
rate," is usually based upon the amount of the mortgage, approximately one-half to
one percent of the loan. Id. § 1.01[C], at 1-12; Strickler, supra note 74, at 387.
Generally, the national rate charged by title insurance companies is $2.50 per
$1,000.00 of coverage to mortgage lenders, and $3.50 per $1,000.00 of coverage to,,
purchasers or owners or real estate. BURKE, supra note 40, § 1.01[C], at 1-12. The
term "national rate" appears to be something of a misnomer, as premium rates vary
regionally. Id.
78. See 1 F ANco & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 4.1.2.
79. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 125-26; Charles Szypszak, Public Registries and
Private Solutions: An Evolving American Real Estate Conveyance Regime, 24 WHrTIER L. REv.
663, 685-86 (2003).
80. Although the role of a "title insurance company" differs from that of a "title
insurance agent," for purposes of this article they will be treated the same. Title
E.g.,
insurance companies insure real property titles and underwrite policies.
Cameron County Savings Ass'n v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 819 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex.
App. 1991) ("[The titie insurance] agent is usually a title and abstract company which
provides assorted services to its clients, such as selling tide insurance, researching the
title for that insurance, surveying the realty, and 'closing' through escrow agents.).
Title insurance agents are generally limited to selling insurance, collecting premiums,
and countersigning binders and policies. See, e.g., id.; see also COL. REv. STAT. § 10-11102(9)-(10) (2003) (defining title insurance agents and companies).
81. Johnstone, supra note 41, at 495.
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by fraud, forgery, duress, or incompetence; or by undisclosed
marriages, divorces, wills or83 heirs. 82 Also, title insurance commonly
insures marketability of title.
As one might glean from the preceding list, title insurance is
primarily intended as a method of protecting against undiscoverable,
rather than discoverable, risks to title.8 4 Insurers will generally not
cover defects revealed by a title examination or by a physical
inspection or survey of the property. 85 However, most title insurance
policies also expressly exclude some undetectable (through a public
record search) title risks from coverage. 816 Such excepted matters
typically include adverse possession claims; unrecorded leases, liens or
easements; governmental laws, ordinances, land use restrictions and
rights of eminent domain; claims arising under bankruptcy or creditor
laws; and problems discoverable only by survey.87 Further, standard
title insurance policies also do not insure against defects assumed by or
known to the insured prior to the issuance of the policy or against any
defect created after the policy date.88
The numerous standard exclusions aside, title insurance provides
the insured party with two forms of protection."8
First, the title
insurance company has a duty to defend any claim disputing the
insured's title to ownership of property. 0 As long as a claim arguably
falls within the insuring provisions of the policy, the title insurer must
provide (i.e. pay for) a legal defense. 9' Given the substantial costs
associated with defending, even successfully, an adverse claim, some
observers view the title company's duty to defend as the principal
benefit to the insured.2 Second, the insured party also has a
contractual right to indemnification." Provided the policy covers the
matter causing loss or damages, the insured, unlike Mr. Watson, need
not initiate a lawsuit to show the insurer was at fault in order to
recover.9 If a claim is ultimately determined to be valid, the title
insurer must reimburse the insured for actual losses, subject to the
limits of the policy.5
As expected, given its primary role of protecting against

82. Id., 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 125-26.
83. Johnstone, supra note 41, at 496.
84. Szypszak, supra note 79, at 686.
85. Id.;Johnstone, supra note 41, at 496.
86. Szypszak, supra note 79, at 686.
87. Id.
88. Id.;Johnstone, supra note 41, at 496.
89. 1 FRANCO & GRAH-lAM, supra note 73, § 4.1.
90. Id.§4.1.1
91. Id.
92. Id. ("The added significance to this benefit.., is that the attorney fees and
expenses are in addition to the face amount of the insurance provided by the policy.");
BuRKE,supra note 40, § 6.01, at 6-3.
93. 1 FRANCO&GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 4.1.1.
94. Id.; Malloy & Klapow, supra note 66, at 440.
95. 1 FRANCO & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 4..1.
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undisclosed risks, the title insurance process begins with a title
search."' The title search and examination serves an informational
function that protects both the insurer and the prospective insured. 9
Rather than rely on public records, many title companies invest in
"title plants," which are databases containing comprehensive title
information." Because title plants generally contain more complete
and more efficiently organized information than public records, they
help limit title companies' potential liability by reducing the chance
that title defects will go undiscovered. "9 Should a search reveal an
existing defect in a title, a title company can either refuse to insure
title or can tailor its coverage by requiring removal of the defect,
insuring it with adequate bonding or indemnity, or issuing the policy
with an appropriate exception. " The title search benefits the
prospective insured by revealing valuable information concerning the
Armed with information of identified
real estate in question.1
defects, the prospective buyer may choose not to R urchase a property
or can attempt to renegotiate the terms of its sale.'
C. THE TITLE INSURANCE COMMITMENT AND POLICY

Before underwriting a policy, the title insurance company issues a
preliminary "binder" or "commitment" which reports the status of title
and sets forth the terms of the prospective policy.'0 9 Essentially, a
commitment constitutes an offer by the insurer to issue a title
insurance policy subject to the matters discovered in the title search. 0
The commitment usually "expires ninety days after its effective date, or
when the title insurance policy is issued, whichever occurs first ....10,
In most states, Colorado included, title insurers use standard
commitment forms promulgated by the American Land Title

96. BURKE, supra note 40, § 12.01, at 12-3. In Colorado, title insurance companies
must conduct a title examination before issuing a policy. COL. REV. STAT. § 10-11106(1) (2003).
97. See Malloy & Klapow, supra note 66, at 439. In fact, some states require by
statute that title insurance companies maintain in-house title plants. 1 PALOMAR, supra
note 44, § 41, at 127-28.
98. BURKE,supra note 40, § 12.01, at 12-12 to 12-19.
99. See id.
100. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 18.

101.

Malloy & Kiapow, supra note 66, at 439.

102. Szypszak, supra note 79, at 687. Of course, this statement presupposes that the
tide insurer will inform the prospective purchaser of the defects revealed in the title
search. The extent of a title insurer's duty to search for and disclose defects varies by
jurisdiction. 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAw § 12:3 (rev. ed. 2002). Colorado

is among the jurisdictions holding that title insurers owe no duty to disclose every
matter revealed in a title search. Id,at n.6; see also COL. REV. STAT. § 10-11-106(2)
(2003) (listing certain recorded documents that tide insurance companies are not
obligated to disclose).
103. BURKE, supra note 40, § 12.02, at 12-19 to 12-20.
104. Id.
105. Frank Oliver, Garrett and McDaniel:DTPA Liabilityfor Issuance of a Title Insurance
Commitment, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 857, 859 (1995).
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These forms contain an initial offer of
Association ("ALTA")."'
insurance; 117 conditions and stipulations of the commitment, the most
notable of which limits the title company's liability to the 0proposed
insured for good faith reliance upon the commitment;' a more
detailed statement of the proposed policy in Schedule A;' 9 and a series
of standard and specific exceptions from coverage listed on Schedule
B."0 While ALTA commitment forms do not provide a strict list of
standard exceptions, in Colorado these exceptions typically include
rights of parties in possession, easements, surveys, mechanic's liens,
subsequently attaching defects, and frequently, water rights claims."'
The specific exceptions will include impairments revealed in the title
search." 2 When a commitment identifies specific exceptions to
coverage, a title insurance company will not insure them unless a
subsequent endorsement specifically refers to the exception and 3states
the company's intent to protect against the item's enforcement.1
Once presented with a commitment, the purchaser or lender may
then negotiate with the seller or borrower to remove listed defects,
bargain to pay a lower amount to take subject to those risks, or
terminate the deal."' Prior to closing, the binder or commitment is
often revised as the parties negotiate the terms of sale or complete a
survey of the property."5 Before issuing a policy, insurance regulations
in Colorado require title insurance companies to update the
disclose all recorded impairments to the prospective
commitment and
6
policyholder."
Most title insurers use standard ALTA policy forms."7 Although
ALTA offers several varieties of title insurance policies, including
owner's, lender's, and leasehold policies, these forms all consist of the
Similar to the format of ATLA title
same basic components."'
commitment forms, they generally begin with a short introductory
statement of coverage; followed by a list of exclusions from coverage;

106.

CARPENTER, supra note

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. § 2.07.
Id.§ 2.08.
Id. §§ 2.10, 2.16.
Id.

112.

See id. § 2.10.

39, § 2.05.

113. Id.
114. See Szypszak, supranote 79, at 687.
115. Oliver, supra note 105, at 859.
116. CARPENTER, supra note 39, § 2.10; see also id. app. III at 11. In Colorado, a title
commitment for a residential property must also include information disclosing that
the property may be located in a special taxing district, a certification of taxes due
listing taxing jurisdictions shall be obtained, and that information regarding the
location and boundaries of other special service districts is available. COL. REV. STAT.
§ 10-11-122 (2003). Title commitments for owner's policies must notify prospective
insureds of the existence of a severed mineral estate. COL. REV. STAT. § 10-11-123(2)

(2003).
117. BURKE, supra note 40, § 3.01, at 3-3;
118. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 18.

CARPENTER,

supranote 39, § 4.01.
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next, a series of conditions and stipulations; then a more detailed
statement of coverage in Schedule A; and last, Schedule B, a detailed
list of exceptions from coverage.119
ALTA policy forms first set forth the offer of insurance. 12 0 Rather
than provide a detailed statement of coverage, this initial declaration
simply references the information contained in Schedule A, which in
turn identifies the proposed insured, the policy amount, the effective
12
date of the policy, and the legal description of the subject property. '
Although the precise coverage varies depending upon the particular
policy form, the initial statement of coverage generally provides that
the company agrees to insure against loss or damage sustained due to
defects, liens or encumbrances, unmarketability of title, and lack of
right of access to and from the land. 122 Also, this statement provides
that the company agrees to pay costs, attorney fees and
expenses
1 3
incurred in defense of title matters covered by the policy.
Next, 124
ALTA policy forms list a number of standard exclusions from
coverage.
These exclusions are not customized to an individual
transaction; they apply to every policy issued on that particular form.2
These standard provisions exclude coverage against governmental
laws, ordinances, regulations, rights of eminent domain, and other
police powers; rights under bankruptcy and creditor's laws; and defects
known 2 to the insured or attaching subsequent to the date of the
policy.

126

The "conditions and stipulations" portion of an ALTA policy form
contains the bulk of the policy's terms.

12

7

This "boilerplate" section

defines the policy's terms, prescribes conditions under which the
coverage will or will not continue, sets forth claim notification and
processing procedures, establishes the insured's duty to cooperate with
the insurer as well as the insurer's duty to defend title and right to
cure defects, describes the method of determining amounts payable
under a claim and provides for arbitration of disputes between the
insurer and insured.
Finally, Schedule B of the policy identifies matters expressly

BURKE, supra note 40, § 3.01, at 3-3.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 18; see ALTA Loan Policy, Form No. 1056.92, Form 1
(October 17, 1992); ALTA Owner's Policy, Form No. 1402.92 (October 17, 1992);
ALTA Plain Language Policy, Form No. 1341.87 Uune 1987).
123. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 18; see ALTA Loan Policy (1992); ALTA Owner's
Policy (1992); ALTA Plain Language Policy (1987).
124. BURKE, supra note 40, § 3.01, at 3-3.
125. ALTA Loan Policy (1992); ALTA Owner's Policy (1992); ALTA Plain Language
Policy (1987).
126. BURKE, supra note 40, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
127. Id.; see ALTA Loan Policy (1992); ALTA Owner's Policy (1992); ALTA Plain
Language Policy (1987).
128. BURKE, supra note 40, § 3.01, at 3-3; see ALTA Loan Policy (1992); ALTA
Owner's Policy (1992); ALTA Plain Language Policy (1987).
119.
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excepted from coverage.' 29 In addition to certain standard exclusions
from coverage, such as losses caused by easements, covenants,
servitudes, encroachments, liens, taxes and other interests or
restrictions that may or may not appear in the public records, 13
Schedule B lists particularized exceptions unique to that individual
property. 3 ' These exceptions include any risk to title revealed in the
title search and examination. 131 In the event the insured desires
coverage of a specific exception, for an additional premium the
policyholder may be able to obtain a special endorsement to the policy
insuring the matter. 3 '
D. SOME PROS AND CONS OF TITLE INSURANCE

Compared with other methods of tide assurance, tide insurance
offers several distinct advantages to the insured. Most important, title
insurance remedies the limitations of the attorney opinion and title
abstract methods.14 As discussed previously, a search of the public
records or physical inspection of the property may not reveal some
matters affecting title.
Thus, even if acting with the utmost
competence, an attorney or title abstractor cannot guarantee for
certain that no clouds on title exist. "5 A purchaser of mortgage relying
on an attorney opinion or abstract cannot recover for a loss unless the
lawyer or abstractor makes an unreasonablemistake in the title search or
evaluation-a rare event. 6 Tide insurance fills this gap by providing a
relatively easy to obtain, non-fault37 based remedy for loss or damage
caused by undetectable title risks.
Title insurance is also generally more efficient and accurate, and
less expensive, than an attorney abstract opinion.' 38 While attorney
abstract opinions may take a significant amount of time and money to
produce, title insurance can usually be obtained very quickly and
inexpensively.3 9 This speed is due in part to the fact that, unlike
attorneys or title abstractors, title insurance companies often do not
investigate every possible contingency affecting title-they can simply
insure over possible defects.'9 Further, the greater accuracy and cost
effectiveness of title insurance can be attributed to the use of company
maintained title plants.' 4 '
Because many tide plants are more
129. BURKE, supranote 40, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
130. See ALTA Loan Policy (1992); ALTA Owner's Policy (1992); ALTA Plain
Language Policy (1987).
131. BURKE, supranote 40, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
132. Id. at 3-4.
133. Id.
134. Strickler, supra note 74, at 392.
135. Id.; Malloy & Klapow, supra note 66, at 440.
136. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 125; DeWitt, supra note 43, at 21.
137. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 125; Malloy & Klapow, supra note 66, at 440.
138. See Strickler, supra note 74, at 392-93.
139. Id. at 393.
140. See id.
141. Szypszak, supra note 79, at 690.
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effectively organized than pubic records, and may also contain more
complete title information, they provide a more efficient means of
1
evaluating title than does a search through public records.
Ironically, the industry practices that produce title insurance's
greater efficiency also give rise to one of its great criticisms-that it4
1
decreases the quality of titles and the reliability of public records.
"Instead of taking the time to do a chain-of-title search and prepare a
tide opinion, title insurance companies will, in most instances, assume
the title is clear and insure it."'" Also, because they rely on the
preprinted exclusions of standard policy forms, title insurers may not
fully search for the types of defects ordinarily excepted. 45 If a title is
indeed defective, the decision to insure over the impairment risks the
chance it will be transferred again. 146 As title insurance companies
continue to insure, rather than document and cure clouded titles,
impairments stay off the public records, thereby decreasing their
quality.' 47 In turn, the reduced quality of
48 public records may foster an
increased reliance upon title insurance.1
Many critics of title insurance also note that homeowners often do
not recognize the importance of excepted title defects 49 or that under
certain policies, they are not the beneficiaries of the insurance, even
though they have paid for it."" Generally, title insurance companies
issue a lender's, rather than an owner's policy.' As the name implies,
a lender's policy protects against title defects of interest to the
lender."12 To the extent the interests of the owner and lender overlap,
However, under a lender's policy,
the owner is protected.'"
mortgagees can only assert claims for title matters that affect their
ability to recover the full amount of the loan. '54 But some title matters,
although causing loss or damage to the owner, will not affect the
For example, a minor boundary line dispute might not
lender.
affect the mortgagee, but could affect the owner's use of the property
or decrease its market value.' 6 Moreover, in many instances title
companies issue lender's policies that protect against encroachments

142. Id.; BURKE, supra note 40, § 12.01, at 12-17.
143. Strickler, supra note 74, at 393.
144. Id.
145. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 44, § 41, at 131.
146. Strickler, supra note 74, at 393.
147. Id.
148, See id.
149. 1 PALOMAR, supra note 102, § 13:17.
150. Strickler, supra note 74, at 395.
151. See DeWitt, supra note 43, at 22.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. See Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-Empirical
Evidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 445 n.89 (1999). Title insurance
companies generally have no duty to explain that a lender's policy does not fully
protect the owner. Id. at 445.
155. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 22.
156. Id.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 7

or easements, but will except the very same encroachments from the
owner's policy. 1 7 Also, if relying solely upon a lender's policy, in the
case of a total title loss the owner would not recover the equity in the
property. ' Further, without an owner's policy, the owner will be
saddled with litigation expenses over claims affecting only the owner's,
Owners are often unaware that the
but not the lender's, interest.
standard lender's policy provides them no coverage in these
circumstances.160
IV. TITLE INSURANCE AND WATER RIGHTS
In Colorado and other western states, water rights may be
conveyed and encumbered like real property."' However, as one
commentator has noted, historically title insurance companies have
refused to insure them. 62
As explained above, the previous
unavailability of tide insurance for water rights may be changing.
However, whether a market exists for water rights title insurance will
depend upon title insurance aiding in the process of establishing a
water right's ownership, extent, and validity.
At the present time, many title companies add a specific exclusion
or exception for water rights to land title insurance, which excludes
water rights from title insurance coverage, even if a description of the
water rights is carried over to Schedule A of the policy with the legal
description of the lands."" For a real estate purchase that depends on
a reliable source of water, a separate review of the water rights-the
due diligence analysis-must be conducted, as previously described
above. What role water rights title insurance might play in the due
diligence analysis process will depend upon the title insurance
industry's ability to resolve issues related to the unique nature of water
rights. That will necessarily involve applying attention to detail and a
knowledge of arcane legal issues related to water that current tide
insurance practice has yet to build into their processes.
The issues the industry will have to confront are many. They will
include, at a minimum (1) providing value in the insurance of "naked
legal title" where "naked legal tide" is only one aspect of conveyancing

157. Palomar, supra note 154, at 445.
158. DeWitt, supra note 43, at 22.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 21-22.
161. See supra text accompanying note 21.
162. CARPENTER & RCE, supra note 39, § 2.08(i). Title companies often refuse to
insure mineral rights as well. Id. § 2.08(j) ("When the mineral estate has not been
severed from the surface, an owner's title insurance policy containing no specific
exceptions will insure title to both the minerals and the surface"). Yet some title
insurance companies refuse to offer any coverage for mineral interests whether
severed or not. Id. Title companies are generally reluctant to insure a severed mineral
interest, and very few will insure oil and gas or mineral leaseholds. Id.("Title insurers
consider a developed or to-be-developed leasehold mineral estate too great a risk for
the premium that could be charged.").
163. Id. § 2.08(i).
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a water right; (2) establishing methods to shore-up chains of title
notwithstanding the irregularities associated with water right
conveyances; (3) adjusting to the industry's inability to rely on title
plants for water rights title insurance; (4) addressing under what
circumstances the duty to defend may be invoked; (5) addressing the
industry's tendency to insure over clouds or defects in title, and what
affect that will have on a water right conveyance; and (6) creating a
mechanism to address abandonment and requantification while
protecting the insurer's interest with necessary exceptions to the
policy, but not, in the meantime, rendering the insurance meaningless
by the inclusion of these exceptions.
Presumably, water rights title insurance will address only "naked
legal tile." Using our example from above, tide insurance would
insure tide to the 6.67 c.f.s. Ascertaining naked legal tide, however, is
only one aspect of a wide variety of tasks that must be accomplished to
Naked
assess the viability of a water right for a particular purpose.
legal tide cannot account for considerations like physical supply and
legal supply, issues of undecreed but possible abandonment, and
calculation of historic consumptive use. In other words, naked title
provides little information regarding the extent and validity of the
water right, even if it provides proof of ownership. It may be that the
role for water rights title insurance is only as a part of the due diligence
process, one that would eliminate the need to conduct certain aspects
of the due diligence review, such as the stand-up review of the
grantor/grantee records. 6 This does not make water rights title
insurance anywhere near a panacea to the complicated process
involved in evidencing a water right.
Tide companies are not alone in their hesitance to guarantee
water title. Recently, water attorneys, instead of providing formal title
opinions, have attempted to ascertain whether evidence consistent
with ownership of the right in question exists. This information is
presented as only one aspect of an attorney's66 due diligence written
analysis provided to the prospective purchaser.
Some of the reasons why ascertaining water title differs from land
title are (1) water rights are commonly decreed to ditches and other
water carrying structures, not to owners of land or tracts of land; (2)
water rights may be conveyed separate and apart from land; (3)
abstract of title to a particular piece of land historically served by a
water right might not show a conveyance separate and apart from the
land; (4) the owner of paper title to a water right might not have legal
title to the water right; (5) deeds will often confuse ditches and ditch
rights with water rights; and (6) deeds commonly use appurtenance
clauses to convey water rights. To be sure, title of water rights does not
pass cleanly. In fact, in situations where deeds simply rely on "and all
other appurtenances" language, or even more vague descriptions,
164. See generally supra Part II (reviewing all aspects of water rights due diligence).
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra Part IIF.
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Colorado courts must rely on the intent of the parties, especially the
grantor, and surrounding facts and circumstances to determine
whether water rights passed under that language. 67
This ambiguity and uncertainty is not an issue in land conveyances.
As previously discussed, if deeds in the chain of title were silent as to
water rights, to provide a chain of title, one must assume title passed.
However, it is common to have interests claimed in a particular water
right in excess of the original decreed amount, as a result of owners
with unrecorded interests and other problems.' 6
Another problem posed by insuring title to water rights lies in the
title insurance industry's reliance on title plants.
Information
contained in title plants typically falls into two groupings of records:
the property index and the general index. 169 Documents containing
legal descriptions of real property are included in the property
index.10 These documents include deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust,
and rights of first refusal.'
The general index typically includes
documents that affect title to property, but do not provide a legal
description of the property affected by the document, such as
judgment liens or bankruptcy petitions. 72 Given the limited nature of
these two indices, it is doubtful that title plants have a mechanism to
track water conveyances. Therefore, the industry would likely be
forced to examine recorded documents in the same manner as a water
attorney conducting his or her due diligence review: by traveling to the
recording office where the water right is located. If the industry
intends to establish water rights title insurance similar to land title,
changes will be necessary for industry record keeping that would allow
for the same efficiencies title plants provide for land title. Otherwise,
one of the main benefits of title insurance-its efficiency-is lost.
An additional common title insurance practice that may not
translate to the water rights context is the industry's tendency to insure
over clouds on title. Water right adjudications often involve numerous
parties, and accurate quantification is the only means of protecting
their interests. Failure to conduct thorough title research for water
rights may potentially result in water rights decrees based on incorrect
data. Not only are the owner's interests then affected, but also any
other party who participated in an adjudication that resulted in a
decree relying on that faulty information may be affected. The
inaccuracy in title could reopen long-settled adjudications.
It is
important to remember that title insurance provides two types of
protection: the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. As

167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See, e.g., Stipulation and Declaration of Interest, Town of Breckenridge,
Reception No. 275525 (Apr. 4, 1984) (recorded with Summit County Clerk and
Recorder).

169. Sheppard, supranote 38, at 335.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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discussed, the duty to defend applies to disputes over the insured's
title to the property. As long as the insuring provisions of the policy
arguably cover a claim, the title insurer must mount a legal defense.
In the water rights context, given the uncertainty of legal title, this
duty takes on a significance unlike insurance of title to land. Would
the duty to defend apply under the circumstances explained above?
Furthermore, there are a number of ways a water right, despite
being a legally protected interest, may be lost. A water right may be
lost by prescription, in whole or in part,'7 3 if another party uses and
possesses water diverted under the water right openly, exclusively,
adversely, and without interruption for a period of eighteen years.
Loss by prescription is not unique to water, but there are other ways a
water right can be lost. Consider, for example, abandonment. Quite
different from the land context, a water right may also be lost by
abandonment. 7' Abandonment occurs where there is a period of
nonuse for an "unreasonable" period of time, coupled with the intent
to abandon the water right."76
Consider also change proceedings, wherein water rights owners
seek changes as to type of use, point of diversion, place of use, or time
of use. These proceedings typically result in conditions placed upon
future exercise to prevent injury to other water users.
These
conditions may limit the extent to which the water right may be
exercised temporally 77 and physically, and may often result in
requantification. To that end, one of the most important issues a
potential water buyer should consider is the scope of the title
insurance policy. For example, if title insurance addresses only the
legal title without insuring the physical supply, the legal supply,
relative priority, prescription or abandonment issues, and the actual
amount of water that may be transferred to a different use, the
insurance may be subject to so many exceptions they will potentially
swallow any protections the insurance is intended to afford to the
purchaser.

173. See, e.g., Kountz v. Olson, 29 P.2d 627 (Coto. 1934).
174. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-41-101 (2003).
175. See, e.g., Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775 (Colo. 1962).
176. COLO. REv.STAr. § 37-92-402(11) (2003).
177. For example, if a water right is decreed and used for irrigation, its historic use
will have been limited to the irrigation season. If the water right is changed to
municipal use, a year round use, certain limitations may be necessary to prevent injury
to other water users.
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V. CONCLUSION
Providing value in naked legal tide, shoring up chains of tide,
adjusting tide plants, defining triggers for the duty to defend, clearing
clouds or defects on tide, and supplying a product whose exceptions
will not swallow its benefits are only some of the issues with which the
title insurance industry will have to grapple in order to present a
product with a viable consumer base. But, the interest in the product
exists.
Notwithstanding the issues the industry will have to confront in
order to establish a market for water rights tide insurance, recent
trends and occurrences have created an atmosphere more conducive
First, more sophisticated and
to water rights title insurance.
comprehensive records are being kept because of the issues created by
the ambiguities from early conveyances. 78 Second, the passage of
Senate Bill 03-278, 1 9 requiring owners of absolute water rights of a
certain size to pay the State Engineer an annual "water administration
fee," provides a clear impetus for establishing a mechanism to
As the state engineer's office attempts
ascertain ownership interests.
to establish a system to determine the ownership of the water rights for
the purpose of billing water rights holders, tide insurance may be able
to help. However, whether water rights title insurance can eliminate
the inherent uncertainties in conveying water rights will be revealed as
more people are willing to pay title insurers to develop the capability
to accommodate the unique nature of water rights. During the
development process, the devil will certainly be in the details.

178. While better records and deed descriptions cannot correct the problems
associated with the ambiguities of conveyances by appurtenance clauses, for more
recently developed rights, chain of title may likely be much easier to establish.
179. S. 03-278, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-80-121, 37-92-502, and 37-92-503 (2003)).
180. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-121(1)(a) (2003) (setting out the water rights
subject to the new water administration fee); §§ 37-92-502(5) (c), -503(8) (establishing
in the State Engineer the authority to collect the water administration fee).

POETRY
SELECTIONS OF POETRY BY JUSTICE GREG HOBBS
In Volume 3 / Issue 2 and Volume 5 / Issue 2 of the Water Law
Review, we published selections of poems by Justice Hobbs. In the
tradition of updates to previous publications, we hope you enjoy this
additional selection we have made.

MOTHER OF RIVERS
When I was young the waters sang
of being here before I am,
of falling sweet and soft and slow
to berry bog and high meadow.
And held me in her lap and cooed
the willow roots, the gaining pools,
and called me through bright dappled grass
and called me 0, My Shining One;
And shaped a bed to lay me on
and played the flute so high and clear.
And shape the stones to carry me,
when I am young and full of fight
for roaring here and roaring there,
for pouring torrents in the air.
When I am young as mountain snow
in crag and cleft and cracked window;
I call the green-backed cutthroat trout,
I call the nymph and hellgrammite,
I call the hatch to catch a wind,
I call upon the mountain track;
I call the scarlet to the jaw
as morning calls her own hatchlings,
call Yampa, White, the Rio Grande,
SanJuan, the Platte, the Arkansas.
(in celebration of the 30'h year
of Colorado's instream flow law)
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O YOU DMDERS OF ME
An Ode
A. Act of 1879
"It shall be the duty
of said water commissioners
to divide the water
in the natural stream or streams
of their district
among the several ditches
taking water
from the same,
according to the prior rights
of each respectively;
in whole or in part
to shut and fasten,
or cause to be shut and fastened,
by order given
to any sworn assistant sheriff
or constable of the county
in which the head
of such ditch
is situated,
the head-gates of any ditch
or ditches
heading in any
of the natural streams of the district,
which, in a time of a scarcity of water,
shall not be entitled
to water
by reason of the priority of the rights of others
below them on the same stream."
1879 Colo. Sess. Laws at 99-100.

B. Voices of the NaturalStream
0 you Commissioners
0 you dividers of me
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O you who deliver me
plum peach cherry grape
Cow fox egret sheep
Rapid kayak turbine reach
Fire plug 0 garlic sprout
black diamond run
The greenback trout
O sudsy mug
My river call
My head gate wheel
My tumble weir
O falling wild
Delivery room
My civilizing scarcity.
(in celebration of the Water Commissioners
on their 1251h)

DROPLET
Sometimes I'm a pouter
Sometimes a spouter
Sometimes I'm pouring
Precious liquid
Fresh from silver pewter.
Sometimes I'm the spark
Sometimes the wick
Sometimes I'm a candle tall
Shining from a silver candlestick.
Sometimes I'm a telescope
Sometimes the microscope
Sometimes I see the universe
Ablaze a precious droplet.
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THE TIGER AND THE CHALICE
There's a tiger on their lifeboat,
A chalice for their lips,
Readers at their stations
Discuss great mysteries,
How the peoples may survive
By learning not to trust
Monger-roaring advocates
Ofjugular politics,
How men and women serve
By being solar stills,
Leaching out the salt
To fill a water cup,
How men and women carry
A code that's hardly secret,
Hand the cup of water out
Is written plain and simple.

SAM AND JACQUELINE, JACQUELINE AND SAM
Sam andJacqueline, Jacqueline and Sam,
To her he was always returningShe would send him out by day
To gather the news,
In gathering the news, he was always thinkingAwl Here's something interesting
Jacqueline would like to hear-she his
Compass, he her map.
There were so many places she could never go
She didn't need-content with his going
On the promise of his many, very many,
Returnings-he for her, she for him,
In this, their love would fill every distanceCapitols, important people, many good deeds,
The great ideas, yes, but Aw! her grace!
Home to Sam-dearJacquelineKind and lovingJacqueline, devoted Sam.
Such a gift as partners may bring to each other,
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Children, grandchildren, their joy, their fearsIn the house on the hill, where the sun
Above the Florida fills a breakfast nook,
Arcs over the land of the Utes, sets to the West
Of the La Platas-hill-on-hill to reach such
A sky as river blessings drop such
A great and holy love from-Sam and Jacqueline.
(For Sam andJacqueline Maynes)

CALIFORNIA WATER
California water starts in the heart
Of the Sierra and the Rockies, in
Oregon north of the Lassen country,
Up in the mother lode of snow.
So many rivers, so much beauty,
Land of the Golden Trout and
The Monterey Bay fandango,
A place where many peoples sail
To where the rails begin to intercept
A nation made of so many nations,
Its water law reflects a polyglot
Of doctrine-continuous flow and the
Mining camp, of pump whenever you
Can and leave it alone to shape
The fish and the land-where Delta
and Omega tap the Range of Light
And nobodies out of Oklahoma and
China lent their muscle and were
Spat at. It's a wonder the way golden
I Poppies and the sea otter dance
Upon the hills, in the waving kelp forest,
And the remnant Giant Sequoia still
Hope their chance to keep on standing
Depends, really depends, doesn't it?
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FARMING FOR BIRDS
The improbable Sally Shanks of Staten IslandFar from the Eastern Shore, this is the California Bay Delta
Staten Island-farms for birds, cows, and humans,
Corn, wheat, and tomatoes.
Ibis, trumpeters, sand hill cranes delight in Sally's place,
Taking off and crying out, they tuck their prehistoric toes
Behind a set of sleek and lovely wings, hooting
Sally's contemporary into the next field.
Improbable, the means and pattern of irrigation, too.
Levees make the island whole and possible, Sally lets
The water in for standing birds to feed, pumps
The water out to grow the crops.
Just over there, the Sacramento ship channel, down
The line a massive set of pumps to take the water south
To other farms, many people. Salmon get confused
About which the Sacramento, where the
SanJoaquin? the place isn't what it used to be
For anyone or anything-California, I mean-so improbable
To a purpose, Sally and her crew of worker-birds
Muck and call for Re-Beginnings.
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ONE BODY, ONE SPIRIT, MANY FUTURES
Those who came before-yes,
they are with us still.
We know them by their names:
Need, Conflict, Confusion, Good
Will. They made-as best they coulda compact, a basic apportionment,
based on the lay of the land
and the need of the people.
The idea is this: fifty-fifty,
the upper, the lower, head-to-toe,
joined at the gut and the hipmountains, the great Grand Canyon,
the vast Southwest-always
the River at the heart of all
Possibility. And, so, we go
one body, one spirit, many futures.
(in celebration of the Colorado River
Project Symposium, Santa Fe)
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COME ON BACK ALL YOU GRACES
Come
Come
Come
Come

on
on
on
on

back
back
back
back

all you graces,
to me now,
all you graces,
to me now.

Courage, patience, humor,
Plain speaking tolerance,
Grit, passion, wit to believe
My own special insignificance.
Come
Come
Come
Come

on
on
on
on

back
back
back
back

all you graces,
to me now,
all you graces,
to me now.

Those I've looked up to,
Those who said go to it,
Those who let go greatly when
They just knew it was time to.
Come
Come
Come
Come

on
on
on
on

back
back
back
back

all you graces,
to me now,
all you graces,
to me now.

Yes, you can. Yes, you will.
I'm so glad I could help.
Yes I believe you've got to
See, in your own way, through.
Come
Come
Come
Come

on
on
on
on

back
back
back
back

all you graces,
to me now,
all you graces,
to me now.
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BOOK NOTES
DONALDJ. PISANI, WATER AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: THE
RECLAMATION BUREAU, NATIONAL WATER POuCY, AND THE WEST,

1902-1935, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, Cal. (2002); 3 9 4pp; $49.95; ISBN 0-520-23030-2,
hardcover.
Water and the American Government traces the reclamation program
from its birth in 1902 to the completion of the Hoover Dam in 1935.
The book discusses how the program evolved in the shadow of federal
bureaucracy and local interests, its emerging relationship with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, and its importance in the development of
To illustrate his discussions, the author
hydroelectric power.
incorporates case studies of reclamation projects, including one study
of irrigation and community, focusing on Twin Falls and Rupert,
Idaho, and another on water and power, focusing on the Yakima
Indian Nation of Washington and the Pima Indians of Arizona.
In Chapter One, Saving Lives: Irrigation and the Ideology of
Homemaking, Pisani discusses the origins of the reclamation movement.
He contends that the program-the boldest economic and social
program ever to be initiated-began with the best of intentions: to
reclaim previously unusable land in the arid West, and on the
reclaimed land, create prosperous communities. The Reclamation
Act, signed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1902, directed the
federal government to construct irrigation projects throughout the
West in hopes of the resurrecting the American farmer, the
centerpiece of the American economy. Pisani also points out that
Reclamation was not solely a western issue. In fact, the Reclamation
Act led to extensive development of irrigation throughout New
England and the South. The author then delves into the ideology of
Reclamation, incorporating a history of the "big three"-George H.
Maxwell, William Ellsworth Smythe, and Frederick H. Newall-and
their individual viewpoints of how reclamation should transpire, and
for what purposes.
Chapter Two discusses the political, economic, and legal obstacles
the reclamation movement faced. The Perils of Public Works first traces
the development of water law and its emergence as a state issue and
state law, and then turns to how the reclamation projects created
federalism conflicts because of their interference with state
administration of water rights. Next, the author describes the various
"turf wars" that occurred within the federal government. He describes
how the Department of the Interior was charged with administration
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of the program, but its projects incorporated and encroached upon
authority delegated to the United States Geologic Service, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Army Corps of Engineers. Lastly,
Pisani discusses the tension between federal, state, and private
reclamation. The Reclamation Act did not specifically delegate certain
tasks or issues to these different entities, so the process of reclamation
caused many feuds between the federal governments, the individual
states, and private water companies and irrigation districts.
Chapter Three, entitled Case Studies in Irrigation and Community,
examines the effects of reclamation on two agricultural communities
in the Snake River Valley of Idaho during the first few years of the
twentieth century. By focusing on these communities, Pisani gives the
reader an understanding of national water policies from a local
perspective. The author compares and contrasts Twin Falls, the
location of a private reclamation project undertaken by the Twin Falls
Land and Water Company, and Rupert, the site for the Minidoka
Project, a federal reclamation project. He emphasizes the cooperation
and conflicts among and between farmers, ranchers, and business men
who lived in the shadow of the elite-in Twin Falls, the officers of the
company, and in Rupert, the governmental bureaucrats. The case
studies leave the reader with an insight into how reclamation projects
shaped communities.
Pisani then turns his attention to federal reclamation from 1909 to
1917.
Chapter Four, An Administrative Morass, begins with an
explanation of how the reclamation program, administered by the
Reclamation Bureau of the Department of the Interior, fell under
heavy criticism for its failure to succeed in the face of tension between
advocates of centralized control and advocates of local control. The
author then talks about the introduction of politics to the reclamation
program-the intervention of Congress with legislation to lessen the
Department of the Interior's autonomy and its attempts to resolve
conflicts within the administration-ultimately resulting in the passage
of the Reclamation Act of 1914. In effect, the 1914 Act gave Congress
the right to choose projects on its own, as well as decide which projects
proposed by the Reclamation Bureau should be built. Pisani describes
the 1914 Act as a serious blow to the Bureau, but with crop and land
prices rising post-World War I, its administrators hoped it had survived
its earlier problems and would enjoy a time of growth and prosperity.
Chapter Five, Boom, Bust, and Boom, traces the reclamation
program from 1917 to 1935. During this period, America experienced
a surge in industrialization, which resulted in mass abandonment of
farms and rural areas. Many farmers failed to pay back their debt to
the federal government, and the debt was forgiven. Despite these
setbacks, Congress continued to push for new irrigation projects, even
though no new farmland was needed, and the program began
hemorrhaging money. In 1924, administrators of the reclamation
program began to admit its weaknesses and offer sensible remedies,
such as designing farms and communities before actual settlement and
providing settlers with low-interest loans.
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In Uneasy Allies: The Reclamation Service and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Pisani changes course and discusses the effects of reclamation
on Native Americans. Chapter Six first addresses the relationship
between the Reclamation Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
and how reclamation served as a form of cultural imperialism with
respect to Native Americans. In this chapter, Pisani also describes the
Dawes Act of 1887, which forced allotment on tribes as means of
ending their dependence on the federal government, but produced
the direct opposite effect. Lastly, the author provides an overview of
Indian reserved water rights and their legal foundation, the Winters
doctrine.
Chapter Seven, Case Studies in Water and Power, examines two
Indian tribes greatly affected by federal reclamation. Pisani first
describes the Yakima Tribe of Washington, who, before white settlers
came to the area, survived on a diversified system of hunting, fishing,
gathering, and agriculture that enabled the tribe to easily adapt to
times of drought. With the onslaught of reclamation, however, the
Yakima were forced to abandon their varied lifestyle and focus on
agriculture. Compelled to desert their lands for life on a reservation,
their ability to fish was greatly reduced through irrigation, increased
diversions by white settlers and the fencing-off of riparian lands. Pisani
explains that most of these actions occurred at the hands of the
Reclamation Service. He then discusses the Pima of Arizona, and how
they were much more inclined towards agriculture before whites
settlers arrived. However, like the Yakima, the Pima were forced to
abandon much of their land; and due to diversions by reclamation
projects and white settlers, their water supply quickly diminished. The
author explains that although the Reclamation Service and the Bureau
of Indian Affairs claimed they were protecting the Pima, their efforts
changed a once self-sufficient people into one dependent on
government rations to keep them alive in the face of starvation. The
author's discussion of these two tribes presents a bleak picture of the
duplicitous nature of the reclamation administration.
Pisani then shifts gears and discusses how reclamation projects,
once used only to provide irrigation for agriculture, became creatures
of "multiple use"-they began to provide flood control, and more
importantly, power. Chapter Eight, entitled Wiring the New West,
examines the electrification of the West, beginning with the first
hydroelectric plant built at Niagara Falls. Pisani then moves into a
discussion of national hydroelectric policy from 1902 through 1917;
including how, during this time, Congress claimed jurisdiction over all
navigable waterways in order to implement its policy. Next, Pisani
turns his attention to the 1920 Water Power Act and the early
beginnings of the Federal Water Commission. After providing this
background, Pisani links the development of hydroelectric power and
the Reclamation Bureau with a discussion of this relationship before
the building of the Boulder (now Hoover) Dam. Although the Bureau
perceived the high value of hydroelectricity, it faced a limited budget
and opposition from private power companies, making its entrance
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into the power market a struggle. However, Pisani explains that with
the building of the Boulder Dam, the Reclamation Bureau became a
major player in the development of large-scale public power.
Chapter Nine, Water Politics, 1920-1935, addresses federal water
policy in terms of irrigation, flood control, and transportation. Pisani
describes this period as a "new era" in water policy-rivers were no
longer treated as disjointed parts of states or territories, but as units.
Pisani explains that at this time policyrnakers begin viewing the
nation's rivers as an integral part of its economy. He concludes this
chapter by describing the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and how it
shaped modern federal flood control policy.
Pisani concludes his book by weaving together the various issues
In Chapter Ten, Conclusion: Retrospect and
previously examined.
Significance, the author extracts three central themes from his
discussions that he believes characterize federal water policy from 1902
to 1935: a movement to transform natural resource into predictable,
manageable, and measurable unit; continental imperialism; and the
difficulty of maintaining centralized control and vision within a system
He closes by
designed to protect and promote local interest.
discussing the long-lasting effects of reclamation on American
government, and how reclamation markedly changed the nation. In
the end, Pisani claims that the federal government, through its water
policy from 1902-1935, consistently represented the values, ideals, and
aspirations of the nation, despite its times of weakness.
Water and the American Government provides a rich and detailed
history of national water policy during this dynamic time. The book
offers the reader multiple, varied perspectives of both the period and
of water policy. Pisani presents his information in a way that first lets
the reader decide what worked and what did not, before providing his
own thoughts. This book is a great resource for anyone interested in
the settlement of the West and the history and development of western
water law.
Kate 0. Lively

DIANE RAINES WARD, WATER WARS: DROUGHT, FLOOD, FOLLY, AND
THE POLITICS OF THIRST, Riverhead Books, Penguin Putnam Inc.,

New York, N.Y. (2002);
hardcover.

280pp; $24.95;

ISBN 1-57322-229-1,

While Ward's title evokes images of human warfare over water, it
refers more to humanity's unending war against nature. With an easy
clarity in her writing style, Ward surveys continuing struggles over
water in a series of topical case studies, ranging from low-lying coastal
communities' perpetual struggles to hold off the sea, to desert
communities' increasingly desperate struggles to maintain their
supplies of usable freshwater, to embattled riparian communities,
whose sustaining rivers, every so often, rise up and flush them out.
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Ultimately, her cases coalesce into a single issue: that humanity's water
problems are mounting, as its numbers grow and its environment
deteriorates. Ward's final point seems to be that the choices of the
past, many of which increasingly appear to have been errors, offer
guidance concerning the choices to be made in the next century,
when water issues may well eclipse other environmental concerns.
Water Wars hews closer to resource management than
environmental issues-though, as the book illustrates, the two are
often inseparable. The first chapter, however, addresses neither;
unless keeping a third of one's country from being submerged in the
ocean can be-with a straight face-described as resource
management.
Holland is locked in perpetual battle, pitting its
engineering against the North Sea's unrelenting urge to reclaim it.
Ward plainly admires the hybrid of stubbornness and technical
virtuosity that keeps Holland above water, but admires it through a
sideways look, because the magnitude of the efforts to hold off the sea
approach the absurd, and when the war finally ends, it will not end
well for Holland.
This dual sentiment carries through much of Water Wars, as Ward
examines the feats of engineering, politics, and resource management
theory by which humanity has made, and maintains, unlikely and
precarious balances between itself and nature. Humanity has planted
itself in flood plains and deserts, built massive dikes to keep water out,
and massive dams to keep it in. In the twentieth century, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers shrugged
off nature, and engineered oases in America's desert West, and
changed water development prospects all over the world. Now Las
Vegas shimmers in the desert, a monument to improvidence. In
Bangladesh, the people raise farms, which the Ganges and
Brahmaputra unceremoniously wash away. Then the people doggedly
start over on whatever landscapes the river has newly created. In
China, the ambitious Three Gorges Project promises to be the next
great feat of hydroengineering, and the next great environmental and
cultural catastrophe.
In each topical chapter, Ward describes current problems, but also
offers histories, interviews with some of those involved, and what the
regional prospects seem to be. In this way, Ward contextualizes and
humanizes each of the problems she discusses, giving each a place and
a culture. She also creates a continuum around each, revealing its
place in the history of water wars between humans and nature, and
Immediate problems and their
between humans and humans.
solutions-or lack of solutions-become moments in time, in a larger
sweep of history, and within the larger world. By the end of Water
Wars, one has a working knowledge of some of the most prominent
water-problem areas in the world, and an understanding of the greater
relationship between humanity and the world's water, and the endless
struggle that it is.
In her last chapter, Ward discusses a range of possible
improvements in the control of water, including new technologies for
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bringing it where it is needed-such as rainmaking, desalinization, and
advanced conservation technologies. She also offers the MurrayDarling Basin Commission in Australia as a model for progressive
watershed-wide, issue-inclusive water management, and suggests truecost accounting for water quantity and quality control projects, to help
impress upon project beneficiaries the need to conserve. She also
advocates grassroots activism, paying homage, in her epilogue, to
Marjory Stone Douglas, who founded the Friends of the Everglades to
promote restoration of the Florida Everglades.
Ward raises certain specters, but not in a sensational fashion. Water
Wars is an intimate but clear-headed look at a pressing global problem,
with some practical and palatable ideas about what to do now. Her
greater message is bookended, between its introduction and epilogue,
by a denuded landscape in rural India, indicative to Ward of a people
without choices, and Marjory Stone Douglas' choice to fight for the
Florida Everglades, which has bloomed into a movement. By the end,
one has a sense that Water Wars central theme is choice. She examines
some of the choices that have been made and offers her opinion on
which have been good and which have been bad. Ultimately, Ward
appears to offer Water Wars as something of a guide to decisions
concerning water management in the twenty-first century.
Owen Walker

HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS,

Second Edition, Burg Young Publishing, Denver, Colo. (2003);
340pp; $19.95; ISBN 1-893478-05-x, softcover.
What do blueberries and Atlantic salmon have in common? Not
much, one would likely guess, but ask geologist Herbert Young and he
would say that the connection between Atlantic salmon and
blueberries is substantial. According to his book, Understanding Water
Rights and Conflicts, the Atlantic salmon are on the endangered species
list because of decreased instream flows in the rivers of the
northeastern United States. Blueberry plants yield larger harvests if
supplied with more water. To yield larger harvests, farmers increase
irrigation, which in turn reduces instream flows. The salmon are very
sensitive to the reduced stream flows, in fact so sensitive, they refuse to
leave the ocean and spawn upstream.
Understanding Water Rights and Conflicts is a rewritten and updated
version of Young's original 1990 version. Although a somewhat
technical read, by providing concrete, thought-provoking examples,
like the plight of the Atlantic salmon, Young effectively presents the
reader with scientific and legal information regarding the labyrinth of
issues that surround water use. Young breaks his book into an
introduction and seven chapters: (1) physical supply, (2) legal
availability, (3) multiple use, (4) water projects and diversions, (5)
recreation, (6) the drought of 2002, and (7) water conflicts, wars and
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terrorism. Generally, in each chapter he provides a global perspective
by addressing international water issues first, after which he discusses
national and local issues.
In his introduction, Young explains that water disputes involve a
lack of physical supply, a lack of legal availability, or too many
conflicting uses. He asserts that all water disputes consist of one or
more of these three elements. On a global scale, fresh water makes up
about one percent of the earth's total water supply. He notes that
while the human population is increasing, the water supply is not.
This is physical availability. Many nations share rivers and negotiate,
through treaties, the amount of water each nation is permitted to use.
This is legal availability. Each nation needs water to support its
domestic, agricultural, and commercial needs. Those are conflicting
uses.
Chapter One deals with physical supply. Young begins with a brief
explanation of the earth's hydrological cycle-precipitation falling to
the earth, collecting into rivers which drain into oceans, then
evaporate and start the cycle over again. Worldwide, water comes in
the form of precipitation, rain or snow, and forms rivers from which
the world draws its water. The author then focuses on physical supply
in the United States. Generally, the East is wet and the West is dry,
with the dividing line being the one-hundredth meridian, which runs
from the middle of Montana to central Texas. Rain is the primary
source east of this line, while winter snow packs provide the source to
the west. Groundwater offers another significant supply of water. For
example, nine states in the West and Midwest rely upon the massive
Ogallala Aquifer for water.
Young then turns to legal availability. Globally, water is often
allocated via treaties between countries that share water systems. With
respect to legal availability in the United States, Young first discusses
the riparian doctrine governing water use in the East, and the prior
appropriation system of the West. Young gives a brief history of the
legal allocation of water rights in Colorado and explains how the State
administers those rights. He then discusses the legal allocation of
water between western states, and describes the nine water compacts
that govern water rights between Colorado and her sister states. Young
also explains the legal underpinning of two other potentially
conflicting water uses in the western United States-federal and
Indian reserved water rights.
Young devotes Chapter Three to describing the multiple uses of
water in the world, United States, and Colorado. Worldwide, the most
common use of water is for agriculture. Consumptive use is the loss of
water to the hydrological cycle that cannot be reused. Young, in
describing consumptive use, defines the processes of evaporation,
transpiration, and evapotranspiration. Evaporation occurs when water
changes from a liquid to a gas. Transpiration is the loss of water vapor
from plants. Evapotranspiration is a combination of the two. Much
water is lost in the hydrological system due to these processes. To
highlight the extent of these losses, Young provides several tables that
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demonstrate approximately how much water these processes
consume-including one calculating the large amount of water
consumed by Kentucky bluegrass. Young details the variety of human
uses of water, as well as the implications of that use. For example, he
notes that overuse of water results in the dilution of stream flows, a
situation that reduces water quality because the stream carries a higher
concentration of solids per unit of water than it normally would.
Chapter Four discusses water projects and diversions. Young
describes each of Colorado's major diversion projects-a subject that
holds special significance for Young, as he and his father worked
together on two large diversion projects, the Vidler Tunnel and the
Sheephorn project. He describes transbasin projects (moving water
from one river basin to another) and transmountain projects (moving
water across the continental divide). Young also examines two major
proposed Colorado water projects. The first, the Two Forks project,
was stymied after proponents were unsuccessful in obtaining permits
from the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The
project, which involved the creation of one or more large reservoirs on
the South Platte River, was intended to supply the populous Front
Range of Colorado with water to sustain the area's needs during
periods of drought. The second major water project, one currently
under consideration, is the Big Straw project. In essence, the rationale
behind the Big Straw proposal is the same as Two Forks-to supply the
growing Front Range with water. Aptly named, the project would draw
water from the Colorado River near the Utah-Colorado border in
order to recapture Colorado's unused portion of water allotted under
the Colorado River Compact, and then transport it east for use by the
Front Range population.
Next, the author examines water issues arising from recreational
uses of water. Cities experience water conflicts when in drought
periods, they must choose between supplying water for domestic use,
or supplying it for recreational activities, such as maintaining parks.
Young addresses Colorado's economic dependence upon the
recreation and tourism industries, and how these burgeoning,
economically significant uses of water compete with traditional uses.
In Chapter Six, Young turns his attention to drought, in particular
the drought occurring in the western United States in 2002. Droughts
impact society significantly. Young identifies six ways that droughts
impact society. First, a drought contributes to increased fire danger
because of lower water supplies and drier conditions. The dilemma
the West faces is whether there will be a large enough supply of water
to fight a catastrophic fire. The second way drought impacts society is
that it limits recreational activities. For example, in 2002, the city of
Denver shut down several golf courses because its water supply was too
low to maintain them. Third, drought affects fish habitat, as lower
stream flows result in an increase in the concentration of dissolved
solids, thereby affecting oxygen levels. In turn, this injures not only
fish species, but also local tourist economies because in drought years
Fourth, drought affects
streams may be closed to fishing.
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municipalities' ability to treat water. With the increased dissolved solid
concentration, water treatment plants are often unable to function
properly. In 2002, drought-imposed conditions forced some western
towns to shut their treatment systems down. Fifth, drought affects
population growth. Lower water supplies limit a region's ability to
sustain its current inhabitants, much less supply new growth. Sixth,
drought affects agriculture. In dry years, water applied to crops is
more likely to evaporate, leaving behind higher levels of salinity in the
soil. Young offers some strategies to deal with drought. For example,
Young discusses xeriscaping, a method of landscaping where specific
plants, rated according to their ability to survive dry climate
conditions, are planted in lieu of traditional landscaping.
Finally, Young explores two additional human threats to water
supplies-terrorism and pollution. As the author recounts, human
history reveals several instances in which water has been used as a
weapon of mass destruction. Young describes many such acts, for
example, he tells how Nebuchadnezzer blocked an aqueduct in order
to end the siege of Tyre in 596 B.C., and how, in 1938, Chiang KaiShek destroyed several dikes along the Yellow River in order to repel
the invading Japanese army. Although he was somewhat successful in
thwarting the invasion, he killed somewhere between 10,000 and
1,000,000 of his own people. Another human created threat to water
supply is pollution. Young again focuses on the United States where
fifty percent of the population resides in the coastal areas that
comprise only seventeen percent of the country's total land area. Due
to the confluence of the population and the coastal regions, oceans
receive more than their fair share of pollution. For example, nitrogen
from agricultural fertilizers enters the water system, and upon
reaching the sea, contributes to algae blooms, which in turn decrease
the ocean's oxygen levels during the decay process. Young concludes
this chapter by discussing some regional water conflicts within the
United States, such as the environmental devastation-in essence a
man-made drought-produced by the draining of the Florida
Everglades, and the controversy surrounding their restoration.
Understanding Water Rights and Conflicts is an informative
introduction to global, national, and local water supply challenges and
will appeal to anyone interested in keeping abreast of current events.
Water issues impact society substantially. Young not only makes that
point clear, but also informs the reader of potential solutions to water
supply problems and conflicts currently under consideration.
Robert E. Wells

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. 1537
(U.S.2004) (holding the Clean Water Act requires National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits for point sources that convey
pollutants into navigable waters of the United States, though they do
not themselves produce any pollutants).
The South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD")
appealed summary judgment entered by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida as affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, regarding whether one of its facilities
required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The facility
was an SFWMD pump station that pumped water from a canal into a
wetlands conservation area in the Everglades. The canal and wetlands
conservation area were separated by a system of man-made levees,
having once been parts of a single watershed. SFWMD pumped water
from the canal, which carried pollutants from upstream surface runoff
and groundwater discharge, into the wetlands conservation area. The
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") brought the action to prevent
SFWMD from operating its pump station without an NPDES permit,
asserting that the pump station was a point source that added a
pollutant to the navigable waters of the United States.
SFWMD argued the pump station was not a point source for
purposes of determining whether the CWA required SFWMD to obtain
an NPDES permit for its operation because the pump station itself
generated no pollutants. The pollutants originated, rather, from
surface runoff and groundwater discharge along the canal, upstream
of the pump station. The district court disagreed. The CWA defines
"discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source," and defines "point source" as
"any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance ... from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." The district court found that, in
the absence of language concerning the generation of pollutants, the
pump station constituted a point source, as defined above, if it
discharged pollutants from one water body into another, even though
it did not generate those pollutants.
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SFWMD further argued that it did not discharge pollutants into
navigable waters because the canal and wetlands conservation area
were, in fact, a single water body, separated only by human
interference with natural movements of water. SFWMD contended
that, if it did not operate the pump station, one result would be that
the canal would flood, and the artificially separated canal and wetlands
conservation area would flow back together. The pump station was,
therefore, not the but-for cause of canal water entering the wetlands
conservation area. Rather, the pump station merely put the water
where it would flow naturally, if not for the intervening system of manmade levees. The Tribe conceded that, if the canal and wetlands
conservation area were not distinct bodies, and the pump station was
not the but-for cause of water moving from one to the other, then the
pump station did not require an NPDES permit. However, the Tribe
contended that, as a matter of fact, the two bodies were distinct, and
the pump station was the only reason water entered the wetlands
conservation area from the canal. On its own determination that canal
and the wetlands conservation area were distinct water bodies and that
the pump station was the but-for cause of their waters joining, the
district court granted summaryjudgment to the Tribe.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court on both findings
and SFWMD appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari. The Court upheld the district court's holding that
the pump station was a point source that discharged a pollutant
because the CWA made "plain that the point source need only convey
the pollutant to navigable waters." As an example, the Court noted
that the CWA imposes NPDES requirements on municipal wastewater
treatment plants whose purpose is to "treat and discharge pollutants
added to water by others."
On the second point, however, the Court held that the district
court improperly granted summary judgment on the issue of whether
the canal and wetlands conservation area were "meaningfully distinct
water bodies," and remanded the case for further proceedings to
resolve that issue. The Court concluded that if SFWMD's factual
description of the canal, wetlands conservation area, and the
intervening man-made structures was correct, then its contention that
the canal and the wetlands conservation area were not meaningfully
distinct water bodies under the law would also be correct. At trial, the
parties did not dispute this point of law, but disputed whether the two
bodies were, in fact, meaningfully distinct. If they were not, the pump
station would not require an NPDES permit. The Court held that the
district court made its determination prematurely, disallowing valid
evidence contrary to its finding. Therefore, an unresolved factual
controversy remained, and the district court's summary judgment was
improper.
The Court did not resolve the issue, which SFWMD raised, of
whether the requirement of an NPDES permit turns on the question
of whether the two bodies are not distinct because "navigable waters of
the United States" refers to a unitary sum. The SFWMD argued that,
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because waters in the canal and in the wetlands conservation area were
both "navigable waters of the United States," the pump station could
not be said to "add" any pollutant to the nation's navigable waters,
whether or not it would otherwise constitute a point source. Because
SFWMD failed to raise the issue before the courts below, however, the
Court declined to address it, leaving it to SFWMD to raise it on
remand.
Owen Walker

Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598 (U.S. 2003) (holding in absence of
express grant of regulatory authority in interstate compact and
arbitration award governing Potomac River, each state was free to
regulate activities only of its own citizens with regard to use of the
river, and Virginia did not lose sovereign riparian rights by acquiescing
to Maryland's regulation).
The Commonwealth of Virginia sought a declaration from the
United States Supreme Court that it had a right to withdraw water
from and construct improvements appurtenant to the Potomac River
free from the regulatory authority of the State of Maryland. Maryland
objected to the Special Master's report recommending that the Court
grant Virginia's requested relief. A majority of the Court overruled
Maryland's exceptions in a 7-2 ruling.
The Potomac forms much of the boundary between Maryland and
Virginia as it flows from the Appalachians to Chesapeake Bay. Both
Maryland and Virginia claimed ownership of the river under
conflicting seventeenth century royal charters.
Virginia ceded
ownership of the river to Maryland in its 1776 State Constitution, but
specifically excepted from cession "the free navigation and use of the
Rivers Potowmack and Pocomoke, and all improvements made on
Virginia's shores." However, in the same year Maryland passed a
constitutional resolution rejecting Virginia's constitutional reservation.
In 1785, Maryland and Virginia appointed commissioners to
resolve their differences. The commissioners agreed on the Mount
Vernon Compact ("1785 Compact"), which the legislatures of both
states ratified. The 1785 Compact provided that the Potomac "shall be
considered as a common highway, for the purpose of navigation and
commerce.., and that all laws regulating fishing and navigation shall
be made with the mutual consent and approbation of both states."
Further, the 1785 Compact explained "the citizens of each state
respectively shall have full property in the shores of Potowmack river
[sic] ... and the privilege of making and carrying out wharves and
other improvements, so as not to obstruct navigation of the River."
The 1785 Compact did not, however, determine the precise
boundary line in the river. After nearly a century of conflict, the states
submitted the boundary dispute to arbitration.
The arbitration

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

culminated in the Black-Jenkins Award ("Award"), which placed the
boundary line at the low-water mark on the Virginia shore of the river.
While the Award gave Maryland entire ownership of the river's bed, it
granted Virginia the right to use the river beyond the low-water mark
as necessary to the full enjoyment of Virginia's riparian ownership.
Congress subsequently ratified the BlackJenkins Award in 1879.
In 1933, Maryland established a permitting system for water
withdrawals on the Potomac, and has since issued several permits to
In 1996, the Fairfax County Water Authority
Virginia entities.
("FCWA") applied for a permit from Maryland to build a water intake
structure extending 725 feet from the Virginia shore to improve water
quality for Fairfax County residents. The Maryland Department of the
Environment ("MDE") denied FWCA's application, citing Virginia's
lack of sufficient need for the structure. Virginia then filed a
complaint in the United States Supreme Court, invoking its original
jurisdiction to hear disputes between states.
The Court initially referred Virginia's complaint to the Special
Master. The Special Master recommended the Court find for Virginia,
concluding that (1) the 1785 Compact and Award gave Virginia the
right to construct improvements into the river and the right to use the
river beyond the low-water mark, (2) neither the 1785 Compact nor
the Award gave Maryland authority to regulate Virginia's activities, and
(3) Maryland had no defense of acquiescence by Virginia. Maryland
then filed exceptions to the Special Master's Report.
Reviewing the Special Master's recommendations, the Court
applied canons of statutory interpretation in reviewing both the 1785
Compact and Award. First, the Court held the 1785 Compact's plain
language guaranteed the citizens of each state the right to build
improvements regardless of which state was ultimately determined to
be sovereign over the river. Maryland argued that the 1785 Compact's
regulatory silence merely confirmed that its authority over the river
was well settled before the 1785 Compact. The Court rejected this
argument, identifying several cases showing that Maryland's
sovereignty was in fact in dispute.
Next, the Court turned to the Award. The Award held that
Virginia had gained ownership by prescription of the soil up to the
low-water mark. Maryland again argued that the Award simply
confirmed its well-settled ownership of the river. The Court again
disagreed, noting that the States would not have entered arbitration if
Maryland's authority was indeed well settled. Therefore, the Court
held that the right to use the river beyond the low-water mark was a
right of Virginia as a sovereign, and the Award's plain language did
not make this right subject to Maryland's regulatory authority.
The Court also rejected Maryland's argument that the Award
merely confirmed prior existing common law private property rights
which were subject to Maryland's regulation, finding that the
Arbitration proceedings occurred specifically to "ascertain and fix the
boundary" between the coequal sovereigns.
Further, the Court
rejected Maryland's claim that Virginia could only exercise its riparian
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rights "without otherwise interfering with the proper use of [the river]
by Maryland," holding instead that each state had a sovereign right to
build improvements appurtenant to the shore without interfering with
the other's proper use.
Finally, the Court considered whether Virginia lost its sovereign
riparian rights by prescription and by acquiescing to Maryland's
regulation of the river. To succeed on the affirmative defense of
acquiescence, Maryland must show: (1) a long and continuous period
of sovereignty over Virginia's riparian activities, and (2) Virginia's
acquiescence in its prescriptive acts.
Further, the period of
prescription must be substantial and Maryland must show
acquiescence by a failure to protest Maryland's asserted sovereignty.
Applying this standard, the Court concluded that negotiations during
the Water Resources Development Act of 1976 ("WRDA") and Low
Flow Allocation Agreement reached by the states pursuant to the
WRDA conclusively showed that Virginia vigorously protested
Maryland's claimed authority and explicitly asserted its sovereign
rights. Because Maryland failed to prove acquiescence, the Court
overruled Maryland's exceptions to the Special Master's report and
granted Virginia's requested relief.
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent, in which Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Stevens maintained that states may exercise their police
powers by controlling the initiation and conduct of riparian uses of
water. Because all riparian rights at common law are subject to the
paramount regulatory authority of the sovereign that owns the river,
Justice Stevens voted to sustain Maryland's exceptions to the Special
Master's recommendations.
Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy found that the 1785 Compact's plain
language showed that Maryland had long held title to both the river
and its bed, and the Award did not expand Virginia's rights beyond
those in the 1785 Compact. Further, Justice Kennedy found that a
party does not concede that its rights are unclear by arbitration or
compact negotiations. First, the 1785 Compact only gave Virginia
rights of a riparian owner beyond the low water line. Second, the
Award merely recognized Virginia's limited rights gained by
prescription.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy also voted to sustain
Maryland's exceptions and deny Virginia's requested relief.
JaredB. Briant
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CIRCUIT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(requiring analysis of whether increased storm drainage constituted a
taking of a flowage easement by inverse condemnation and holding
that property need not suffer an effectual destruction or a permanent
and exclusive occupation by government runoff for a taking claim
based on a flowage easement).
The dispute in this case arose just after the United States Postal
Service completed a new facility in mountainous West Virginia in late
1993. Due to the construction of the facility, the amount of storm
water runoff into South Hollow sharply increased. Ridge Line, Inc.
("Ridge Line") owned South Hollow. Ridge Line built a storm water
detention pond and requested contribution from the government.
The government refused to pay and Ridge Line sued in the United
States Court of Federal Claims ("claims court"), claiming that the
alleged taking entitled it to just compensation.
The claims court found that increased storm drainage caused by
the construction of the Postal Service facility and associated parking
lots and driveways did not constitute a taking of any real property
interest that justified compensation. The claims court also found that
the development of the Postal Service property caused seventy percent
of the increased runoff; however, while the water might have "invaded"
Ridge Line's property, the invasion was insufficient to constitute an
exclusive and permanent occupation. Moreover, since Ridge Line
added additional landfill to South Hollow and covered the original
storm water detention pond, insufficient evidence existed to
determine if there had been a temporary invasion of the property.
The claims court also found that Ridge Line could not prove damages
because it failed to appraise the property before and after the damage.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that
property need not suffer an effectual destruction or permanent and
exclusive occupation in order to be a taking and vacated and
remanded the decision back to the trial court.
On appeal, the court first addressed the takings issue. The court
reasoned that a permanent occupation need not exclude the property
owner or be continuous to be compensable as a taking. Furthermore,
the court concluded United States v. Dickinson established that the
government may not take an easement, or impose a flowage easement,
without just compensation. Although Ridge Line had raised a claim
for inverse condemnation of the water flowage easement and
contended that just compensation would be a proportional cost of the
building and maintenance of the flood control system, the claims
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court erred in failing to address this claim.
The court next addressed whether Ridge Line, by filling and
altering most of the area it complained the government eroded, had
suffered any loss of use of the property. Because Dickinson held that a
landowner's reclaiming his land does not disentitle him to
compensation for the original taking by the government, the claims
court was in error. The claims court also erred in finding that
damages could not be demonstrated simply because Ridge Line did
not provide appraisals of the land before and after the erosion.
Dickinson held that if the land erosion caused by a taking is
preventable, the cost of prevention is a proper basis for determining
damages.
Finally, the court identified the appropriate inverse condemnation
analysis to be used on remand. The court held that whether a
comipensable taking occurred in this case depended on whether Ridge
Line's loss may properly be analyzed under takings law as opposed to
tort law, and then on whether Ridge Line has a protected property
interest under West Virginia property law that a government actor has
infringed. For Ridge Line to establish that takings law analysis is
appropriate, the court held it must prove the taking was the direct,
natural, and probable consequence of the Postal Service development,
rather than just an incidental injury. The court also held that the
claims court must consider whether the government's interference
with any property rights of Ridge Line was substantial and frequent
enough to rise to the level of a taking. Finally, the court held that if
the claims court, on remand, determines that taking analysis is proper,
it must then address whether the steps taken by the government in
storm water retention and the amount that invaded Ridge Line's
property were reasonable under West Virginia law. Thus, because the
claims court did not address Ridge Line's inverse condemnation claim,
and therefore did not address whether takings or torts law analysis was
proper, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further analysis
consistent with its opinion.
ChristinaValerio

SECOND CIRCUIT
No Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir.
2003) (holding private citizens can sue under Clean Water Act
regardless of whether the claimed violation also constituted a violation
of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which does not
provide for citizen enforcement of suits).
In August 1999, several residents of Queens, New York
contracted the West Nile virus, a virus transmitted by mosquitoes. In
response, New York City sprayed pesticides designed to kill the
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mosquitoes during each subsequent summer. New York City, however,
did not obtain a requisite Clean Water Act ("CWA") permit to
discharge a pollutant into a navigable waterway. No Spray Coalition
("Coalition"), a group of citizen plaintiffs, produced evidence that
New York City sprayed pesticides over bodies of water in violation of
CWA permitting regulations, and sought an injunction against New
York City in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York to stop the spraying. The district court granted New York
City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that New York City's use
of insecticides substantially complied with the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") and at most constituted
mere "technical violations" of FIFRA. The district court reasoned that
Congress intended FIFRA to govern pesticide use, and FIFRA's refusal
to allow citizen enforcement should prevail over the CIA's allowance
of citizen suits. The district court determined the Coalition could not
enforce the CWA provisions under the circumstances. The Coalition
appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the Second Circuit examined the relevant provisions of
the CWA. The CWA's citizen suit provision provides that "any citizen
may commence a civil action" against a party in violation of a CWA
provision. The court found that the provision requiring permits to
dispense pesticides over navigable waters clearly allowed citizens to sue
to enforce its provisions. The court then assessed the relevant FIFRA
provision requiring certain chemicals, including pesticides, to be
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Under
FIFRA, the EPA issues a "label" for a registered chemical, and FIFRA
requires a registered pesticide to be used in a manner consistent with
EPA's labeling. Further, FIFRA mandates that only specified agencies
of federal and state governments may bring enforcement actions.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning,
holding the CWA and FIFRA statutes stand on their own and mean
what they say. Concluding no reason existed to eliminate the CWA's
citizen suit remedy and the CWA authorized the Coalition's citizen suit
to compel compliance with the CWA's terms, the Second Circuit
vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Becky Bye

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 358 F.3d 174
(2d Cir. 2004) (denying petitions challenging a final rule promulgated
pursuant to the Clean Water Act which attempted to minimize adverse
environmental impacts associated with cooling water intake structures,
but granting petition challenging the rule's allowance of restoration
measures because it conflicts with the Clean Water Act).
Congress amended

the Clean Water Act

("CWA")

in

1972,
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directing the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to regulate cooling water intake structures at power plants and
factories to minimize adverse environmental impacts such as trapping
("impinging") large organisms against intake points or drawing
("entraining") smaller organisms into the cooling system, both of
which injures or kills the organisms. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the EPA's first attempt at a
regulation for procedural reasons. After the EPA failed to promulgate
a new rule for years, environmental groups sued and won a consent
decree, pursuant to which the EPA agreed to promulgate regulations
under the CWA by specific deadlines. On December 18, 2001, the
EPA issued the first phase of regulations ("Rule"). The Rule applies to
all facilities constructed after promulgation of the Rule that withdraw
more than two million gallons of water per day and use at least twentyfive percent of that for cooling. Facilities whose cooling water
consumption falls below either of those thresholds are subject to
regulation on a case-by-case, "best professional judgment" basis that
had governed before promulgation of the Rule.
A new facility may comply with the Rule in one of two ways. Under
Track I(1) the intake system must either withdraw less than ten million
gallons daily or reduce its intake to a level commensurate with "closedcycle cooling;" (2) the velocity of water moving through the intake
must be less than or equal to 0.5 feet per second; (3) the facility
cannot withdraw a volume of water in disproportion to the size of the
water body; and (4) the facility must select and implement design and
construction technologies to minimize impingement and entrainment
if the capacity, velocity, and proportionality standards are insufficient.
Under Track II, a facility is not bound by the requirements of Track I
for capacity, velocity, or additional requirements, but must comply
with proportional flow requirements. However, a facility may take any
steps toward reduction provided it can demonstrate that the
technology they employ will reduce the adverse environmental impact
to a level comparable to that which would be achieved by using Track
I's capacity and velocity requirements.
In the first petition brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the environmental petitioners
("Environmentalists") asserted that the Rule conflicts with the CWA in
three ways. They argued that (1) Track II sets a lower standard than
Track I, which does not reflect the best technology available; (2) the
variance provision is precluded by statute; and (3) dry cooling is the
best technology available. The Utility Water Act Group ("UWAG")
and the Manufacturers Intake Structure Coalition ("MISC") petitioned
on behalf of industry, and challenged the Rule on eight grounds,
which fall into four categories: the Rule was insufficiently flexible, it
was too vague and malleable, it contradicted the statute, and it was
unsupported by the record.
Under Track II of the Rule, reduction is comparable if the facility
can show that its method will equal at least ninety percent of the
reduction in impingement and entrainment that Track I would yield
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or that its method will maintain a level of fish and shellfish in the water
body substantially similar to the level achievable under Track I. A
facility can accomplish this using restoration measures such as
restocking with fish from a hatchery or creating alternative habitats.
Additionally, a facility must comply with more stringent requirements
for the cooling water intake structure or monitoring requirements that
are reasonably necessary to comply with state law. Also, the Rule
contains a variance provision that allows for the facility to comply with
less stringent requirements than Tracks I or II if compliance would
result in costs disproportionate to what the EPA considered in
establishing the requirements or if it would result in significant adverse
impacts on air quality, water resources, or local energy markets.
EnvironmentalPetitioners
Under the Rule, a new facility may choose between either
complying with Track I's velocity and capacity requirements or
complying with Track II, implementing alternative technologies that
yield comparable results. The EPA argued that the two track system
gives facilities a choice between a fast track with EPA approval and a
more flexible permitting process. The Environmentalists asserted
Track II violates the CWA by allowing compliance with a lower
standard than that required by the best technology available or
through restoration measures unrelated to the location, design,
construction and capacity of cooling water intake structures under
EPA regulation. Additionally, the Environmentalists argued that,
consistent with the case-by-case determination that evolved from the
national, technology-based standards regime implemented by
Congress in the 1972 amendments, either of Track I1's compliance
methods requires a demonstration study.
The Environmentalists first challenged the ninety percent
threshold required by Track I in order to comply with Track II. CWA
section 316(b) appears to consider a single level of performance
applicable to all facilities by requiring a standard based on the best
technology available. The Environmentalists contended that Track II
violates this requirement by allowing facilities to demonstrate only a
ninety percent reduction in impingement and entrainment compared
to what Track I would accomplish. The EPA asserted that Tracks I and
II must reflect the same standard, and that ten percent is an
acceptable margin of error for measuring reductions. The Second
Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the EPA to leave
industry with only one way of reducing adverse environmental impacts.
Since measuring impingement and entrainment is not always precise,
the use of alternative technologies would require the EPA to make a
judgment call as to the comparability of results to Track I. Therefore,
the court held that it was reasonable for the EPA to designate in the
Rule how much ambiguity and margin of error is permissible and in
compliance in measuring the performance of different technologies.
The Environmentalists also argued that allowing restoration
measures as a means of complying with Track II was inconsistent with
the statute.
The CWA provides for minimization of adverse
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environmental impacts, but restoration measures do not minimize
these impacts, they only correct them. These measures would allow a
facility to impinge and entrain unlimited numbers of organisms
provided the industry took other steps to replace them and to
maintain acceptable water quality.
This was inconsistent with
Congress's intent that the EPA directly regulate the design of intake
structures based on available technology.
The court held the restoration measures provision inconsistent
with both the statute's text and Congress's intent in passing the 1972
amendments to the CWA. Additionally, the court found further
textual support that restoration measures were not an acceptable
means of minimizing the adverse environmental impact of intake
structures in the CWA itself, which counsels against including
restoration measures within the best technology available. Congress
also rejected a proposed amendment to section 316(b) that would
have specifically allowed restoration measures, which further shows
that the EPA's authority does not include the discretion to allow
restoration measures where it was previously disallowed. Therefore,
the court held that the EPA exceeded its authority by allowing
compliance with CWA section 316(b) through restoration measures
and remanded that provision in the Rule.
The Environmentalists also argued that Track II allowed permit
writers discretion in determining percentages of impingement and
entrainment permissible under the best professional judgment
standard which was inconsistent with the current national standard.
The court rejected this aspect of the appeal, determining that permit
writers do not have excessive discretion in determining whether
proposed technology will achieve ninety percent of the reduction
yielded by Track I.
The Environmentalists next argued the Rule conflicted with the
CWA regarding its variance provision. This provision allowed less
stringent alternative requirements than those specified in two
exceptions: if cost is disproportionate to the costs that the EPA
considered in establishing the requirement at issue or if there are
significant adverse environmental impacts on air quality, water
resources or local energy markets. The EPA countered that they
promulgated the Rule under sections 306 and 316(b) of the CWA, and
that because section 316(b) is silent as to variances, the statute is
ambiguous and therefore its variance provision is permissible in light
of similar variance provisions promulgated in the absence of clear
statutory authority that have been upheld by other courts.
The court held that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was
reasonable, but that section 316(b)'s silence with respect to variance
does not equal an unambiguous prohibition. However, in the absence
of a statutory bar, it was reasonable for the EPA to allow variances from
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 316(b) for a regulatory
system that allows flexibility. The court stated that since the EPA may
set less stringent requirements only where the particular facility faces
disproportional compliance costs or there will be significant adverse
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environmental impacts, and the alternative requirements can be no
less stringent than justified by those costs or impacts, then the variance
provision does not exceed the EPA's authority. This is because the
provision guides the permitting authority to consider appropriate
factors in allowing relaxation of the Rule's technology requirements
only as necessary to account for unusual circumstances not originally
considered by the EPA. Accordingly, the court upheld the variance
provision of the Rule.
The Environmentalists next contended that dry cooling was the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact because it minimizes impingement and entrainment since it
requires the least amount of water. This is contrary to the Rule, which
calls for a cooling water intake system that must either withdraw fewer
than ten million gallons each day or reduce its intake to a level
commensurate with closed-cycle wet cooling.
Additionally, the
Environmentalists argued that since section 316(b) did not mention
cost or other factors, the EPA could not weigh them when determining
the best available technology. Even if the EPA could consider these
factors, they argued, it abused its discretion in weighing them. The
EPA argued that closed-cycle wet cooling is the best technology
available because (1) dry cooling costs more than ten times as much
annually as closed-cycle wet cooling and it only reduces water intake by
an additional five percent relative to once-through cooling; (2) dry
cooling requires more energy, therefore yielding more undesirable air
emissions; (3) costs of dry cooling would be a barrier for some facilities
and discourage construction of new facilities, which generally have less
of an adverse environmental impact than old facilities; (4) dry cooling
is significantly less effective in warmer climates; and (5) dry cooling is
not technically feasible for some types of facilities.
The court held that the EPA can consider cost and energy
efficiency in determining the best technology available, asserting that
section 316(b)'s cross-reference to section 306 suggests it may consider
factors involved in setting discharge limits when regulating intake
structures, which include cost, environmental impact, and energy
requirements.
Additionally, the court noted that the EPA has
considerable discretion to balance the factors required by statute to set
new source performance standards and they have the authority to
make those determinations.
Industry Petitioners
UWAG first contended that the EPA's focus on impingement and
entrainment was unreasonable. They argued the EPA was incorrect in
assuming that all impingement and entrainment of species is adverse,
and conversely, that some intake structures remove dying or dead fish
from the ecosystem. Therefore, UWAG contended, the EPA should
have sought to regulate impingement and entrainment only where
they deleteriously affect overall fish and shellfish populations, which
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court deferred to
the EPA'sjudgment of how to minimize adverse environmental impact
and held that its focus on the number of organisms killed by cooling
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water intake structures was reasonable and that it considered all the
factors raised by UWAG.
UWAG then challenged the additional design, construction, and
operational requirements of the statute. The requirements called for
regulation of some aspects of intake structures on a site-specific basis.
UJWAG stated that this requirement was vague, inconsistent with EPA's
rationale for regulation, and unsupported by the record. The EPA
argued that the capacity, velocity, and proportionality requirements of
Track I were not enough to minimize environmental impact if a new
facility is located in an area where fish and shellfish require additional
protection. The EPA did not establish a national standard based on
the additional technologies required in these situations, and instead
required that, to further reduce impingement and entrainment, the
new facility research and implement the technologies appropriate to
its design and location as part of the permitting process. The court
held that requiring those technologies was consistent with the statutory
mandate to minimize adverse environmental impact, and fell within
the realm of the EPA's expertise. Accordingly, the court held that the
EPA's decision to regulate some aspects of cooling water intake
structures on a case-by-case basis was within its authority and
reasonable.
UWAG then argued that there was insufficient support in the
record for Track I's through-screen velocity limit of 0.5 feet per
second, and instead contended that the relevant velocity is the
approach velocity, stating that this is the point that fish may still be
able to escape. UWAG stated that the regulation on through-screen
velocity adds an unnecessary measure of stringency to the regulation.
The EPA countered that a through-screen velocity was the appropriate
measure because it is easier to measure accurately, many new facilities
are designed to meet through-screen velocity measurements, and it
provides a margin of safety. The court held the EPA's choice of
velocity limit was reasonable.
UWAG next argued the proportional flow limitations of the Rule
were not supported by the record. It argued that, given capacity limits,
these proportional flow limitations were redundant, rested on an
unsupported assumption that withdrawing a certain percentage of
water equals withdrawing the same percentage of larvae and eggs, were
arbitrary, effectively eliminated lakes and reservoirs from available
water bodies because any withdrawal disrupts natural thermal
stratification, were not technologically feasible, and were chosen
without regard for cost. The court held the EPA did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in choosing the proportional flow limitations since (1)
the number of entrained organisms was closely linked to the amount
of water passing through the intake structures; (2) the percentages
chosen were based on the EPA's conclusion that they are
overwhelmingly achievable for new facilities, as they can chose their
location; (3) most existing facilities meet the requirements; and (4)
that the EPA specifically considered cost and found that the limits
were economically practicable for the industry as a whole. The court
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stated that although the EPA recognized that choosing precise limits
involved a matter of judgment, it saw no reason to substitute their
judgment with the industry's, nor to remand this aspect of the Rule
because it involved an educated guess.
UWAG and MISC both argued the Rule illegitimately imposed
additional requirements as a means of ensuring compliance with state
law, arguing that the EPA lacked statutory authority to impose state
law-based requirements in the federal regulation. MISC also asserted
the EPA failed to provide notice of and an opportunity to comment on
the state law compliance provision before promulgating the Rule. The
EPA argued that the provision was merely a reminder to permitting
authorities of the authority preserved to states under other statutory
provisions, and by itself, imposed no additional requirements. The
court held this was a reasonable exercise of the EPA's authority under
the CWA to remind permitting authorities of the relevance of state
law. Additionally, the court concluded that the provisions, as well as
the statute itself, fairly apprised interested persons that facilities could
be held to requirements not yet specified based on more stringent
state law standards.
MISC then contended the EPA lacked statutory authority to
regulate below-threshold structures on a case-by-case, best professional
judgment basis, and that the EPA failed to give proper notice of and
an opportunity to comment on this provision. MISC argued the
regulatory approach to below-threshold structures exceeded the EPA's
authority to regulate through new source standards of performance, as
provided in section 316(b), and otherwise contradicted the statute's
provision with respect to case-by-case regulation. The EPA contended
smaller facilities are better regulated on a case-by-case basis, and that
the determination of what is best and available as to location, design,
construction and capacity of these structures is best determined this
way, as it was determined for all facilities before the Rule.
The court concluded that there was no textual bar in sections 306
or 316(b) to regulating below-threshold structures on a case-by-case
basis. The CWA does not forbid the EPA from addressing certain
environmental regulations on a case-by-case basis where categorical
regulation is technologically unfeasible or when it is consistent with
Congress's overriding goal of improving water quality. Therefore,
where the EPA is justified in not regulating uniformly, it should not
have to avoid all regulation, and it is reasonable for the EPA to
regulate on case-by-case basis. The court also ruled that as to the
notice and comment objection, the Federal Register indicates that
regulation on a case-by-case basis is possible.
MISC then argued the re-permitting process violated the statute by
requiring technologies beyond those designated as the best technology
available at the specific time the EPA granted the new facility's original
permit. MISC also contended that this provision conflicted with
section 306(d), in which Congress included a clause exempting new
facilities meeting existing discharge requirements from any more
stringent standards of performance for a maximum period of ten
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years. The court held that the provision in the Rule that allowed for
the review of the performance of the technologies implemented and
or different design and construction
additional
requiring
technologies, if needed to minimize impingement and entrainment,
was valid, since nothing in the statute forbids the EPA from reevaluating these specific requirements, which are set on a case-by-case
basis, during the re-permitting process. The court also held that the
provision did not conflict with section 306(d), since the statute did not
unambiguously compel the EPA to grandfather in new intake
structures.
MISC finally contended that the below-threshold, state law, and repermitting aspects of the Rule, which required case-by-case
determinations, were inconsistent with the EPA's older regulations
that did not address intake structures. The court held that the EPA's
failure to formalize its approach until the promulgation of the Rule
was irrelevant, since rulemaking is the process by which the EPA
explains the rule as it enforces it.
Therefore, the Second Circuit granted in part and denied in part
the Environmentalists' petition. The court denied UWAG's and
MISC's petitions in full, and remanded to the EPA the provisions of
the Rule that allows compliance through restoration measures.
Stacy Hochman

THIRD CIRCUIT
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 343
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that United States Army Corps of
Engineers' alleged failure to comply with its duty under the Water
Resources Development Act to include environmental protection as
one of its primary missions was subject to judicial review, but its
decision to generally reproduce natural flows in river was not arbitrary
and capricious).
Raymond Proffitt Foundation and Lehigh River Stocking
Association ("Foundation") brought an action against United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting the Corps violated
the Water Resources Development Act of 1990 ("WRDA") by not
including environmental protection as one of the missions for the
Walter Dam. The Foundation further asserted the Corps did not fulfill
its environmental protection mission because it released large amounts
of water during high flow periods, and failed to store water during
high flow periods to release during low flow periods. The district
court found that because WRDA did not provide any law to apply to
the facts of the case, the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore granted
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the Corps' motion for summary judgment. The Foundation appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which upheld the district court's decision, but for different
reasons.
On appeal, the Third Circuit first noted that WRDA requires the
Corps to include environmental protection as one of its primary
purposes in operating and maintaining its water resource projects.
The Foundation argued that the Corps violated this statute because
the Corps emphasized flood control and not fishery management as
the primary purpose of the Walter Dam Reservoir. However, the court
found Congress did not give the Corps specific instructions to carry
out this objective; therefore, the Corps retained a great deal of
discretion to determine where, when, and how much of WRDA's
environmental protection mission to implement at a given water
resources project. After determining that the Corps' actions were
indeed subject to judicial review, the court held that the Corps
satisfactorily demonstrated that it made environmental protection a
primary mission, and its actions were not arbitrary and capricious. The
court then held that the Corps included environmental protection in
its overall operation of its water resource projects, and more
specifically, at the Walter Dam.
In sum, the Third Circuit held the district court erred in finding
that the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial review. However,
Congress gave the Corps a vast amount of discretion to implement
environmental protection as one of the primary Corps' missions in
regards to water resources projects.
Therefore, that the Corps
emphasized flood control and not fishery management as the primary
objective of the Walter Dam Reservoir did not mean that it violated the
WRDA. Thus, the court held the Corps' decision was subject to
judicial review; however, it affirmed the district court's decision due to
the discretion afforded the Corps.
BrettJohnson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
that, for purposes of the Clean Water Act, the United States Army
Corps of Engineers had jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, and that a man-made
ditch was a "tributary").
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") brought an
action against Newdunn Associates, Orion Associates, and Northwest
Contractors (collectively "Newdunn") to enjoin them from draining
certain lands in alleged violation of the wetlands provision of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Virginia State Water Control Board
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("Board") brought a separate action in state court, the Circuit Court
for the City of Newport News, Virginia, which Newdunn removed to
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ("district
court"). The district court consolidated the two actions and denied
the Board's motion to remand its case back to the trial court. Finding
that the Corps and the Board both lacked jurisdiction over the
Newdunn property under the CWA, the district court ruled against
each in favor of Newdunn. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the Board's action, and that the Corps did, in fact,
have the asserted jurisdiction over the Newdunn property.
Newdunn owned a parcel of land in Virginia, the majority of which
The
was undisputedly "wetlands," as defined under the CWA.
Newdunn wetlands drained into a man-made ditch that, in turn,
drained into Stony Run, a navigable water-in-fact of the United States,
also as defined under the CWA. Although formerly linked by a natural
waterway, the wetlands and Stony Run, after construction of an
interstate highway, were now connected by the man-made ditch. The
Corps and the Board each attempted to assert jurisdiction over the
Newdunn property in order to prevent Newdunn from discharging siltladen waters into navigable waters without a permit. When Newdunn
rejected the Corps' jurisdiction and ignored an order issued by the
Board, both agencies brought actions asserting jurisdiction.
The Board brought its action in the state circuit court but
Newdunn removed it to the federal district court. The district court
took jurisdiction over the action based on federal question
jurisdiction. Finding the state action turned on the definition of
wetlands, which was common to both the state and federal statutes, the
district court reasoned it had subject matter jurisdiction, since the
federal definition controlled. The court reversed, finding the two
statutes' common definition served to scientifically define a wetland,
rather than to confer jurisdiction. Since the parties agreed the
property contained scientific wetlands, as defined under the CWA,
there was no disputed federal question, and no federal jurisdiction.
The court therefore remanded the Board's action to state court.
Turning to the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the Newdunn
property, the court noted first that the Corps had statutory authority to
require and issue permits for the discharge of dredge and fill material
into navigable waters under Section 404 of the CWA. Under the
Supreme Court case United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the
Corps also had authority to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent
to other waters. The Supreme Court came to this conclusion in
deference to the Corps' own determination that wetlands adjacent to
other waters should be subject to its CWA permitting authority, since
wetlands might function as integral parts of neighboring aquatic
systems. The Court held the Corps had jurisdiction over navigable
waters, tributaries to navigable waters, and wetlands adjacent to either.
While jurisdiction over waters having no connection to navigable or
interstate waters would overreach the authority Congress could
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delegate to the Corps under the Commerce Clause, the Court held the
Corps did have jurisdiction over waters with a sufficient hydrological
connection to navigable waters.
Thus, the Corps' jurisdiction could therefore reach any branch of
a tributary system that eventually flowed into a navigable body of water
or a water of the United States, and any wetland adjacent thereto.
Since the Newdunn wetlands were adjacent to the nonnavigable ditch
that drained into the navigable waters of Stony Run, the last question
was whether the ditch constituted a tributary of Stony Run. Noting
that rerouting the ditch did not meaningfully alter the wetlands'
longstanding connection to Stony Run, and that the Corps' definition
of "tributary" included roadside ditches, the court rejected Newdunn's
asserted distinction between natural and man-made watercourses for
purposes of defining "tributary."
Therefore, the Newdunn wetland was adjacent to a tributary of a
navigable water, and was subject to the Corps' jurisdiction for the
purpose of CWA permitting requirements.
Owen Walker

FIFFH CIRCUIT
In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that Oil
Pollution Act did not permit federal government to impose
regulations over tributaries that were neither themselves navigable nor
truly adjacent to navigable waters; bayou containing residue from oil
spill flowed directly into company canal that was navigable-in-fact and
was plainly adjacent to navigable waters, thus triggering federal
regulatoryjurisdiction pursuant to Oil Protection Act).
The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
Coast Guard (collectively "United States") filed suit against James and
Janell Needham ("Needhams") for reimbursement of cleanup costs
associated with an oil spill. The United States Bankruptcy Court
("bankruptcy court") for the Western District of Louisiana found that
the Needhams were not liable to the United States for the cleanup
costs because the waters in question were not navigable, and were
therefore beyond the reach of the Oil and Pollution Act ("OPA").
After the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana affirmed, the United States appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which reversed
and remanded the lower court decisions.
On January 25, 1995, an employee of Needham Resources, Inc.
("NRI"), owned by the Needhams, pumped oil into a drainage ditch.
Initially, NRI hired a private contractor to clean the spill, but lacked
the financial resources to complete the effort. The United States
finished the cleanup effort, expending $207,000. On February 8,
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1998, the Needhams filed for bankruptcy in the bankruptcy court.
The Needhams objected to EPA's proof of claim arguing they were not
responsible for the costs since the spill did not implicate any navigable
waters subject to federal jurisdiction, and therefore was not subject to
OPA regulation. The United States claimed that the incident was
subject to OPA regulation because the oil spilled into waters adjacent
to an open body of navigable water. Both parties agreed that the oil,
originally discharged into the drainage ditch, spilled into Bayou
Cutoff, and then into Bayou Folse. Bayou Folse flows directly into the
Company Canal, an industrial waterway that eventually flows into the
Gulf of Mexico. The bankruptcy court found neither the drainage
ditch nor Bayou Cutoff navigable-in-fact, nor were they sufficiently
adjacent to the navigable waters to support OPA jurisdiction, and thus
concluded the spill was not subject to federal regulation. The district
court affirmed, finding no basis to disturb the bankruptcy court's
conclusions. The United States then appealed the district court
decision.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower courts' findings
that the waterways were not navigable-in-fact for clear error. The court
first analyzed the language of the OPA. The OPA imposes strict
liability upon parties that discharge oil into navigable waters, a term
defined in the statute to mean the waters of the United States. Under
the OPA, each party responsible for a facility from which oil is
discharged into navigable waters or upon adjoining shorelines is liable
for the removal costs and damages resulting from such incident. The
OPA permits recovery of cleanup costs if oil spills into navigable-in-fact
waters or into non-navigable waters that are truly adjacent to an open
body of navigable water. The United States argued that "navigable
waters" covers all waters having any hydrological connection with
navigable water. The court held the OPA was not so broad as to
permit the federal government to impose regulations over "tributaries"
that are neither themselves navigable nor truly adjacent to navigable
waters. The court further stated a body of water is subject to
regulation if the body of water is actually navigable or adjacent to an
open body of navigable water.
Applying this interpretation of the OPA, the Fifth Circuit held the
lower courts' findings constituted clear error. Specifically, the court
held it was clear error to disregard the effects of the spill on Bayou
Folse and the Company Canal-the proper inquiry was whether Bayou
Folse, the site of the farthest traverse of the spill, was navigable-in-fact
or adjacent to an open body of navigable water. The court then
concluded that Bayou Folse was adjacent to Company Canal, an open
body of navigable water.
Next, the court examined whether Bayou Folse was adjacent to the
Company Canal. The court stated that the term "adjacent" implicates
a "significant nexus" between the water in question and the navigablein-fact waterway. Applying this standard, the court held Bayou Folse
was plainly adjacent to the Company Canal, as Bayou Folse flowed
directly into the canal. On this basis, the court held the oil spill
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implicated navigable waters and triggered federal regulatory
jurisdiction pursuant to the OPA. Thus, the court overruled the lower
courts' findings and remanded for consideration of the Needham's
remaining defenses.
Dave M. Shohet

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Le-Ax Water Dist. v. City of Athens, 346 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding rural water district could not use federal law-intended to
protect rural water associations from local governments taking away
customers-to require new customers outside of district's stateestablished geographic boundaries to use the district's services).
A judicial order created the Le-Ax Water District ("Le-Ax") as a
rural water district in 1980 after Le-Ax filed of a petition in the Athens
County Court of Common Pleas. The order specifically defined LeAx's geographical territory. University Estates owned 825 acres located
in close proximity to, but not within the geographic boundaries of, LeAx and the City of Athens, Ohio ("Athens"). For nearly twenty years,
Le-Ax maintained an eight-inch water main adjacent to the University
Estates property. After deciding to develop the property into a golf
course community, University Estates contracted with Athens instead
of Le-Ax for water service. Le-Ax then filed suit against Athens in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking
to prevent Athens from supplying water to University Estates. Le-Ax
argued the agreement for Athens to supply water to University Estates
violated 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b). After both parties moved for summary
judgment, the district court denied Athens's motion and granted
summary judgment in favor of Le-Ax. Athens appealed the summary
judgment rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first concluded that Congress enacted
section 1926(b) ("statute") as part of the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act to protect certain federal loans made to water service
associations by preventing competition with the recipients of the loans.
The statute prohibits local governments from expanding their water
service into a rural water district's territory. To use the statute to
prevent Athens from providing water services to University Estates, LeAx had to prove it: (1) constituted an association as provided by the
statute, (2) carried the federal loans defined in the statute, and (3)
provided or made services available to the area in dispute. The court
held undisputed evidence showed Le-Ax qualified as an association
with the proper federal loans under the statute. Additionally, the
court determined Le-Ax provided or made service available to the area
in dispute after Le-Ax showed it had the physical ability to provide the
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service and it held a legal right to do so. In this case, Le-Ax proved the
physical ability to provide water because the eight-inch water main
adjacent to the property could supply ample water with minimal
additional work. Further, Le-Ax proved the legal right to provide
water services to University Estates by pointing to Ohio law which gives
water districts the right to supply water inside and outside of the
district's geographic boundaries.
Even though the Fifth Circuit held Le-Ax met the usual
requirements to file a claim under section 1926(b), the court refused
to allow Le-Ax to use the statute in this case. Le-Ax claimed it could
use the statute to recruit new customers outside of its geographical
boundaries.
However, the court determined such a broad
interpretation would create a monopoly not intended by Congress.
The court turned to the legislative history to determine that rural
water districts could only use the statute as a defensive measure to
prevent local governments from taking the water district's current
customers or customers within the geographic boundaries of the water
district. The court held water districts cannot use the statute as an
offensive tool to force new clients to use the water district's services.
Since University Estates was located outside of Le-Ax's geographic
boundaries, the court found Le-Ax could not use the statute to force
University Estates to contract only with Le-Ax for water services.
Therefore, the court reversed the district court's ruling and remanded
the case with instructions to enterjudgment in favor of Athens.
One member of the court disagreed with the majority by finding
the statute does not limit a water district's protected area to politically
defined boundaries. Instead, the dissenting judge felt the statute
should protect a water district's service boundary from invasion by
competing service providers.
David B. Oakley

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
HighwayJ Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding an agency implementing a major federal project must
adequately take a hard look at any potential environmental impacts
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act; an agency must
sufficiently consider several reasonable alternatives to the extent
necessary to make a fully informed decision; and an agency may not
segment two projects for the sole purpose of avoiding an
Environmental Impact Statement).
The HighwayJ Citizens Group ("HighwayJ") filed an action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
against Norman Mineta, in his official capacity as Secretary of the
United States Department of Transportation ("U.S. DOT"), Frederick
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Wright, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Federal
Highway Administration ("FHWA"), and Thomas Carlsen, in his
official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of
Highway J
Transportation ("WDOT") (collectively "Agencies").
opposed the Ackerville Bridge/Lovers Lane Project and the County
J/Highway 164 Project. Highway J alleged a contamination plume
filled with arsenic and trichloroethylene migrated toward the
Ackerville Bridge because of the Ackerville Bridge Project. HighwayJ
asked the district court to enjoin the Agencies from proceeding with
the Ackerville Bridge Project until determination of the extent of the
contamination plume; to instruct the Agencies to pump grout around
the pilings already driven in the ground to support the Ackerville
Bridge; and to require the Agencies to complete an Environmental
Impact Statement ("EIS") for the Ackerville Bridge Project.
The district court denied Highway J's request for a preliminary
injunction and ruled against Citizens on the merits of their complaint.
On the merits, the district court found the Agencies took the requisite
hard look at environmental consequences of the Ackerville Bridge
Project; considered sufficiently reasonable alternatives and made a
fully informed decision to proceed; and reasonably decided to
segment the Ackerville Bridge Project and the County J/Highway 164
Project. HighwayJ appealed the ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On appeal, Highway J requested a
permanent injunction closing the Ackerville Bridge until the Agencies
pumped grout around the pilings; an EIS of the Ackerville Bridge
Project; a revised EIS of the CountyJ/Highway 164 Project to include
the Ackerville Bridge area; and a permanent injunction stopping the
County J/Highway 164 Project from continuing pending the revised
EIS. The court denied all of Highway J's requests and affirmed the
district court's judgment.
Highway J contested the Ackerville Bridge Project. Primarily, the
Ackerville Bridge Project addressed safety concerns that arose from the
road layout in close proximity to railroads. The Ackerville Bridge
Project also brought the existing bridge into compliance with
requirements necessary for the road to support truck traffic.
Secondarily, the Ackerville Bridge Project provided for future
expansion of the roadways. The Ackerville Bridge Project entailed two
overpass structures and a road connection. A former waste disposal
facility ("landfill") located about 2000 feet northwest of the bridge
The landfill leachate contaminated
leaked landfill leachate.
from the landfill ("contamination
flowing
underlying groundwater
plume"). Jeffrey Gonyo, a HighwayJ member, informed the Agencies
of the contamination plume in February 2000. Initially, the Agencies
concluded the contamination plume raised no significant concerns.
Further, the Agencies found the Ackerville Bridge Project required
limited excavation, thereby limiting contact with groundwater.
At a public hearing on March 23, 2000, Mr. Gonyo testified
regarding Highway J's opposition to the Ackerville Bridge Project.
Specifically, Mr. Gonyo stated the Ackerville Bridge Project's purposes
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could be accomplished by simpler, less costly means, the Agencies
improperly segmented the County J/Highway 164 Project, and the
landfill contamination posed great risks to private wells and drinking
water. On April 25, 2000, the Agencies finalized the Finding of No
Significant Impact ("FONSI") and the Environmental Assessment
("EA") reports. The FONSI and EA considered whether the landfill
significantly impacted the Ackerville Bridge Project and triggered a
Both reports
requisite Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS").
concluded the landfill did not affect the Ackerville Bridge Project and
an EIS was unnecessary. Additionally, the FONSI and EA addressed
joining the Ackerville Bridge Project and the County J/Highway 164
Project as one EIS. The FONSI and EA determined the Ackerville
Bridge best effectuated all of the Project's goals and stood on its own
merit.
Mr. Gonyo sent a letter to the FWHA on July 7, 2000, which
requested reconsideration of the FONSI and EA and the completion
of an EIS before construction began. Mr. Gonyo expressed concern
that the pilings driven into and below the groundwater table spread
Both WDOT and the FWHA responded to Mr.
contamination.
Gonyo's concerns through a memorandum that concluded the
Ackerville Bridge Project did not impact groundwater flow and no
private wells in the region demonstrated landfill leachate
Based on the findings enumerated in the
contamination.
memorandum, the Agencies re-affirmed the FONSI's and EA's validity.
Highway J then contacted the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") with their concerns. HighwayJ requested
an investigation of the landfill. The EPA responded by preparing a
Sampling and Analysis Plan for the Old Town Dump site, located
south of the landfill and a potential source of leachate contamination.
John E. Thresher, HighwayJ's groundwater expert, issued a report that
named the landfill as the sole source of contamination. The report
also stated arsenic near the landfill had migrated toward Ackerville.
Mr. Gonyo and Mr. Thresher publicly expressed their concerns during
a hearing on July 10, 2001. Mr. Thresher particularly stressed the
potential contamination of private wells and drinking water caused by
driving pilings into the ground. Although the Agencies admitted the
pilings extended below the groundwater level, they still asserted the
concrete-filled pilings insignificantly affected the groundwater flow.
On November 16, 2001, Mr. Gonyo sent a letter to WDOT that
discussed a Town of Polk resolution opposing the Ackerville Bridge
Project and requested its immediate termination. WDOT responded
through a letter and stated safety was the primary goal of the Ackerville
Bridge Project. The EPA sent a letter to Mr. Gonyo on December 13,
2001, explaining that it believed the EA for the Ackerville Bridge
Project and the EIS for the County J/Highway 164 Project adequately
addressed and resolved any potential contamination issues.
Additionally, the letter stated an EPA investigation revealed no release
of contaminated groundwater. At a public hearing on January 30,
2002, State Representatives and Senators requested monitoring wells

Issue

2

COURT REPORTS

The Agencies granted the request and installed
in Ackerville.
monitoring wells to determine the potential impacts of groundwater
contamination on areas surrounding the bridge pilings. WDOT stated
the Ackerville Bridge Project posed an insignificant risk to
groundwater and the monitoring wells would not delay or change the
existing Project in any way. A monitoring well report discovered no
significant impact on groundwater flow in the area. Construction on
the bridge began in May 2002 and by July 3, 2002, when Highway J
filed this lawsuit, the Agencies had already driven eighty-four percent
of the pilings into the ground.
First, the court addressed the standard of appellate review. An
appellate court may review an agency's action under the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act. In reviewing such action, an appellate court may only
set aside an agency's action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. In the NEPA
context, an appellate court must determine if the agency took a hard
look at environmental consequences.
Highway J claimed the Agencies failed to take a hard look at the
Ackerville Bridge Project's environmental consequences and that
NEPA regulations required an EIS for the Ackerville Bridge Project.
The court held the analysis turned on the existence of a nexus
between the Ackerville Bridge Project and the preexisting
contamination in the general area. NEPA governs the Ackerville
Bridge Project, but not any preexisting contamination. Highway J
alleged the bridge pilings worsened the preexisting groundwater
contamination situation, thus requiring the Agencies to complete an
EIS. However, the court noted the Agencies had adequately explored
potential contamination. The court further explained the Ackerville
Bridge Project did not significantly impact contamination, thus NEPA
did not apply. The Agencies do not need to remedy preexisting
contamination under NEPA.
In addition, HighwayJ contended the bridge pilings created a zone
of permeability that allowed contamination into private wells and
drinking water. The Agencies asserted the pilings insignificantly
affected the underlying groundwater. In resolving this issue, the court
emphasized its role was not to decide which environmental expert was
correct, but rather to determine if the agency took a hard look at the
relevant information and potential consequences resulting in an
informed judgment. After extensively reviewing the documentation
provided by both parties, the court determined the Agencies
adequately examined potential contamination in response to Mr.
Gonyo and HighwayJ's repeated concerns. Accordingly, the Agencies
were fully compliant with NEPA. Furthermore, the Agencies did not
ignore HighwayJ's anxieties over the Ackerville Bridge Project. At all
times, the three Agencies responded to concerns through their own
studies and experts, and the Agencies agreed to install monitoring
wells in order to calm HighwayJ's fears.
Highway J also argued the Agencies failed to consider the degree
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to which the project affected public health and safety, the degree to
which the effects on human environment were likely to be highly
controversial, and the degree to which the possible effects on the
human
environment
were
highly
uncertain
or
involved
unique/unknown risks. The court pointed out that even though the
experts disagreed about potential contamination, the Agencies did not
necessarily fail to meet their requirements. Through their hard look
at environmental consequences and conclusion of insignificant
groundwater impact, the Agencies reasonably determined an EIS was
not required.
Although HighwayJ urged the court to only look at the April 2000
FONSI and EA in the hard look analysis, the court held the Agencies
reconsidered their formal position at the request of Mr. Gonyo. Even
though the Agencies took a hard look at environmental impacts of the
Ackerville Bridge Project after the initial FONSI and EA, the Agencies
deemed both documents valid after the hard look analysis.
Construction commenced more than a year after the Agencies
engaged in a hard look regarding potential adverse environmental
consequences. Since the Agencies deemed the FONSI and EA valid
after an adequate hard look analysis, the Ackerville Bridge Project
needed no further supplementation.
Additionally, the Agencies
already placed most of the disputed pilings in the ground, so requiring
further supplementation at that point would have been futile.
Agencies must study, develop, and describe appropriate
alternatives to major federal projects under NEPA. Given the safety
purpose and future expansion purpose of the Ackerville Bridge
Project, the court held the Agencies had considered an adequate
number of reasonable alternatives and explored each alternative
sufficiently.
Finally, Highway J claimed the three Agencies improperly
segmented the Ackerville Bridge Project and County J/Highway 164
Project in order to avoid preparing an EIS for the Ackerville Bridge
Project. According to the court, segmentation represents an agency's
decision about one project's end and another project's beginning.
Segmentation requires three criteria: connect logical termini and be of
sufficient length to address environmental matters on a broad scope,
have independent utility or independent significance, and not restrict
consideration of alternatives for other reasonably foreseeable
transportation improvements. The court looked to see if the Agencies
ignored or gave insufficient weight to factors described in the NEPA as
an attempt to avoid NEPA requirements. Additionally, the court is not
responsible for determining whether the Agencies chose the best
alternative, only whether the Agencies made an informed and
reasonable choice. The court held the Agencies expressly considered
each segmentation criteria in the FONSI and EA and reasonably
justified each factor.
Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.
Susan Curtis
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EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. City of Little Rock, 351 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2003)
(reversing award of attorney fees to Sierra Club where it was not a
prevailing party as designated by the Clean Water Act, and affirming
denial of expert witness fees to the City).
Sierra Club brought a citizens' complaint against the City of Little
Rock ("Little Rock") and the Little Rock Sanitary Sewer Committee
("Committee") for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and their
respective National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems
("NPDES") permits by allowing untreated sewage to flow into Arkansas
rivers and streams. The Committee settled with Sierra Club. Sierra
Club pursued its claims against Little Rock in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas and obtained a partial
summary judgment ruling that Little Rock violated its NPDES permit.
However, the district court did not enter an injunction or grant any
other type of relief to Sierra Club. The district court awarded attorney
fees to Sierra Club, but denied Little Rock expert witness fees. Little
Rock appealed both fee rulings to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eight Circuit. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
award of attorney fees to Sierra Club and affirmed the denial of expert
witness fees to the City.
The CWA permits any prevailing or substantially prevailing party to
collect legal fees if the presiding court deems them appropriate. The
court reviewed de novo whether the Sierra Club was a prevailing party
and, therefore, entitled to legal fees. A party prevails by either
obtaining an enforceable judgment or comparable relief that directly
benefits the party at the time of judgment. Applying this definition,
the court held Sierra Club was not a prevailing party because although
the district court granted partial summary judgment in Sierra Club's
favor, the district court did not grant Sierra Club any relief. Because
Sierra Club was not the prevailing party, the court held they were not
entitled to legal fees, and reversed the district court's award of legal
fees to Sierra Club.
Next, the court reviewed the district court's denial of expert
witness fees for abuse of discretion. The NPDES permit required the
Little Rock to implement a comprehensive master planning process
("plan") to reduce pollution discharge. The court noted that the
United States Environmental Protection Agency, as grantors of the
permit, did not specify what constituted a plan and gave its permittees
considerable flexibility in creating plans. Because of the ambiguity
surrounding the plan's requirements, the court reasoned Sierra Club's
action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Therefore, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion
and affirmed the denial of the City's motion for fees.
CheryI Miller
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South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
North Dakota and South Dakota were not entitled to preliminary
injunctions barring the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
planned release of water from reservoirs within those states and that
the Corps must abide by its Master Manual guiding Missouri River
water uses and priorities).
The Federal District Court for South Dakota ("South Dakota
District Court") granted the State of South Dakota an injunction
barring the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") from
releasing water from an in-state reservoir along the Missouri River to
maintain downstream river flows. South Dakota's action caused the
Corps to seek the release of water from a reservoir further upstream in
North Dakota. The State of North Dakota responded by obtaining an
injunction from the Federal District Court for North Dakota ("North
Dakota District Court") barring the Corps from releasing water from a
reservoir in their state. In response, the State of Nebraska brought an
action in the Federal District Court for Nebraska ("Nebraska District
Court") and received an injunction requiring the Corps to adhere with
its initial planned action and to release upstream-reservoir waters to
maintain the downstream flows effecting Nebraska.
Although the period on the injunctions had passed, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals heard the Corps' appeal of each district
court's ruling so that the water use issues raised now could be
addressed before similar future actions occurred. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the judgment of the South Dakota and North Dakota District
Courts and affirmed the judgment of the Nebraska District Court.
This matter arose from prolonged drought conditions and the
resulting decreased water levels that occurred in the Missouri River
To meet its obligations in the
Valley in the spring of 2002.
management of the Missouri River under the Flood Control Act of
1944 ("Act"), the Corps chose to release water from a single main stem
reservoir on the river. The Corps determined that releasing water
from Lake Oahe in South Dakota would maintain the downstream
flows necessary for navigation and limit any short-term environmental
impacts to that one reservoir. On the other hand, South Dakota
sought to maintain the existing water levels and restore the walleye
fishery and the related recreational benefits in Lake Oahe. South
Dakota contended maintenance of minimum water levels was
necessary to increase the population of the walleye's main prey, the
rainbow smelt. Even a slight decrease in the reservoir water level
would lead to an unsuccessful spawning season and would negatively
impact South Dakota's efforts to restore the recreational value of the
walleye fishery within the reservoir.
South Dakota sued the Corps, arguing the Corps' actions to
maintain navigational water levels instead of maximizing recreational
benefits were arbitrary and capricious. South Dakota sought an
injunction barring the release of water from the reservoir until after
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the spawning season. The District Court of South Dakota granted a
preliminary injunction preventing the Corps from releasing water
from Lake Oahe and one other reservoir until the end of the spawning
season.
In response, the Corps planned to release water from Lake
Sakakawea in North Dakota to meet its obligations in maintaining the
navigational water levels on the river. North Dakota sued in the
Federal District Court of North Dakota and obtained an injunction
preventing the release of water from its reservoir. The South Dakota
District Court denied Nebraska's earlier request to intervene in the
South Dakota case. As a result, Nebraska brought an action and
received an injunction against the Corps in the Nebraska District
Court requiring the Corps to maintain navigational water levels as
prescribed under the Corps' Master Manual consistent with the Act.
Because of the three district courts' decisions, the Corps was unable to
meet its obligations under the Act.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the three
district courts erred in granting preliminary injunctions. The standard
of review of a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction
is for an abuse of discretion by finding the district court "erred in the
characterization of the facts, made a mistake of law, or abused its
discretion in considering the equities."
The Corps claimed its actions were not subject to judicial review.
The court disagreed, indicating that the Corps' actions were
reviewable under law from both the Act and the Master Manual. The
court found that while the Corps has considerable discretion under
the Act, that power is not unconstrained and the Corps' actions are
therefore subject to judicial review under the Act. Further, the court
found that the Corps' issuance of and adherence to its Master Manual
created a binding obligation on the Corps. That obligation is also
subject to judicial review to ensure conformity.
Finding the Corps' actions subject to judicial review, the court
looked first at the injunction issued by the South Dakota District
Court. South Dakota argued it was ended to relief on several claims.
It claimed first that the Act required the Corps to act in a manner
maximizing all benefits including recreation.
South Dakota also
claimed the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously by weighing
navigational interests more heavily over recreational interests.
With respect to South Dakota's first claim that the Corps must
balance all interests in its decision making process, the court found the
Corps' decision to prioritize navigation over recreational benefits is
not the type of standard the "courts regularly employ in reviewing
agency actions." The court stated the Act did not provide it the power
to review every decision of the Corps to ensure that all benefits were
maximized for all interests.
The court next addressed South Dakota's claim that lowering the
water level in Lake Oahe was arbitrary and capricious, citing the rule
that "[a] court may find an action to be arbitrary and capricious only
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when there is no rational basis for the policy choice." Here, the court
found the Corps' planned actions to be rational and based on facts
specifically relating to the affected reservoir. The planned draw of
water from the reservoir was consistent with the Master Manual and
would not result in long-term detrimental affects to the reservoir
fishery. The court concluded South Dakota's claim would not succeed
on its merits and therefore it was not entitled to the preliminary
injunction.
North Dakota's arguments to support the preliminary injunction
issued by the North Dakota District Court were similar to South
Dakota's. Like South Dakota's claims, the court found North Dakota's
claims would likely not succeed on the merits. The court therefore
held North Dakota was not entitled to the preliminary injunction.
Lastly, the court reviewed the injunction entered by the Nebraska
District Court. The court agreed with the Nebraska District Court,
finding the Corps bound by the policies adopted and listed in its
Master Manual. Specifically, the plan provided for the maintenance of
navigational water levels as a higher priority than wildlife and
recreational benefits.
Therefore, Nebraska was entitled to the
preliminary injunction as issued by the Nebraska District Court.
Chris Wittenbrink

NINTH CIRCUIT
County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding the Endangered Species Act authorizes the
United States Forest Service to restrict'rights-of-way in water ditches
within its boundaries, notwithstanding contrary state water law).
Okanogan County ("Okanogan") filed a declaratory judgment suit
against the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington after the
United States Forest Service ("USFS") limited Okanogan's use of both
the Skyline Irrigation Ditch ("Skyline Ditch") and the Early Winters
Ditch ("Winters Ditch"), both located in Washington state, to protect
certain species of fish. The district court heard cross-motions for
summary judgment, ruling in favor of the NMFS because the USFS had
authority to restrict the rights-of-way. Okanogan appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The original rights-of-way for the Skyline Ditch and Winters Ditch
dated from the early 1900s. The USFS previously issued several rightsof-way permits to Okanogan, all reserving the USFS's discretion to
revoke the permits. The rights-of-way terms permitted the USFS to
include new terms, and specifically stated that the permits transferred
no water rights to Okanogan. Following a 1998 assessment of special
use permits on the Chewuch River-the water source for both
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ditches-the USFS declared the Skyline Ditch's fish screen ineffective
and found that continued use of the ditch would harm steelhead trout
and Chinook salmon. Similarly, the USFS determined that use of the
Winters Ditch could harm steelhead and Chinook spawning areas.
Thus, the USFS issued the ditch permits with notices of their possible
revision, contingent upon the results of ongoing talks with the NMFS
and the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"). In 2000, after the USFS's
federally required consultation with the NMFS, the NMFS issued
biological opinions on both ditches. The opinions found that while
the plan proposed for the Winters ditch was not likely to harm the fish,
provided Okanogan implemented measures insuring the Chewuch
River's minimum instream flows, the proposed Skyline Ditch
modifications lacked protections for steelhead and Chinook
populations. Accordingly, the USFS amended the Skyline Ditch
permit, limiting its diversions, to maintain specified instream flow
levels.
On appeal, Okanogan raised two claims: (1) the USFS lacked
authority to implement instream flow requirements because such
requirements denied Okanogan its vested water rights, and (2) the
USFS lacked the authority to comply with the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") at the expense of Okanogan's vested state law water rights.
Regarding Okanogan's first argument, the court held the rights-ofway permits for the ditches allowed the USFS to terminate the permits.
Moreover, the language of the permits explicitly subjected them to
future amendment by the USFS when "necessary or desirable to
incorporate new terms, conditions... as may be required by law .... "
Further, the ESA required federal agencies, including the USFS, "to
consult with.., designated agencies whenever ... federal action 'may
affect' ... threatened or endangered species." Thus, the USFS had
authority to condition the use of the rights-of-way.
Examining Okanogan's second argument, the court stated that the
authority of the USFS to limit the use of the rights-of-way for
protection of endangered fish stemmed, in part, from the permits'
language, which reserved the USFS's "unqualified discretion to restrict
or terminate the rights-of-way." Further, the court held the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 empowered the USFS to set
flow levels for rivers within the boundaries of the Okanogan National
Forest for protection of endangered fish. Moreover, the court held
Okanogan had no vested property rights because the 1901 Act
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant ditch rights-of-way on
forest reservations stated that any permits issued "shall not be held to
confer any right... over any public land." Finally, the court held
Okanogan mistakenly relied on United States v. New Mexico because it
discussed water rights, whereas the instant case involved rights-of-way
running through federal government lands.
Based on these findings, the court affirmed the lower court's grant
of summaryjudgment in favor of the NMFS.
Jeff Gillio
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Envtl. Defense Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003)
(upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's Phase II rule
under the Clean Water Act, but remanding for revision portions of the
rule which allowed polluters to design their own stormwater programs
with minimal review, and which allowed the EPA not to disclose
Notices of Intent to comply with the Phase II rule).
The Texas Cities Coalition on Stormwater, the Texas Counties
Stormwater Coalition (together "Municipalities"), Environmental
Defense Center ("Environmentalists"), the American Forest and Paper
Association ("AFPA") and the National Association of Home Builders
("NAHB") challenged an administrative rule promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Natural Resources Defense Council intervened on
behalf of Environmental Defense Center. Three separate suits arose in
the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, and these suits were consolidated into a single suit heard by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Phase II rule, developed in response to the severe pollution
caused from storm water runoff, subjected pollutant discharges from
small municipal storm sewers and construction sites one to five acres in
size to the requirements of the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System. Under the rule, municipalities could evidence
their intent to comply with a general permit issued by an NPEDS
permitting authority by filing a Notice of Intent ("NOI"), or could
apply for an individual permit. General permits establish emissions
limits and technological requirements for multiple similar dischargers.
In either case, the rule required municipalities to develop waste
management plans containing six minimum measures: (1) education
on stormwater impacts, (2) encouraging the public to participate in
development of stormwater programs, (3) stopping illicit discharges,
(4) reducing emissions from one-acre or larger construction sites, (5)
reducing water quality impacts to a minimum, (6) reducing pollution
runoff from municipal activities. Municipalities could alternatively
seek permits through a process not requiring regulation of third
parties including illicit dischargers and small construction sites.
Construction sites could either comply with the general rule or obtain
individual permits. The court determined that AFPA lacked standing
because it failed to demonstrate actual imminent harm, and dismissed
most of the twenty-two challenges against the rule.
The court
remanded portions of the rule allowing limited oversight of
stormwater programs, and allowing approval of NOl's without public
comment.
The Municipalities raised several constitutional challenges to the
rule.
First, they argued that the EPA lacked congressional
authorization to develop a permitting program under the CWA. They
based this argument on the language in section 402 of the CWA
allowing programs to contain performance elements and guidelines,
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but which was silent as to permits. The court read this portion of the
CWA as establishing baseline requirements for programs rather than
listing the only factors that the EPA could use in developing programs,
and interpreted the omission of permits as an indication of the
flexibility granted to the EPA. The Municipalities also argued that the
EPA lacked authority because express language required permits for
large and medium municipal storm sewers, but no requirement
existed for small municipal storm sewers. The court held that a
provision for a moratorium on small emitters necessarily implied that
the EPA possessed authority to require permits after the moratorium
expired.
The Municipalities also argued the rule violated the Tenth
Amendment by forcing them to regulate third parties as a part of a
federal regulatory program. The court dismissed this claim, holding
the rule was not unduly coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment
because Municipalities could select alternative permitting not
requiring regulation of third parties.
The Municipalities challenged the provision requiring public
education arguing that it compelled municipal storm sewers to express
the political message of the EPA in violation of the First Amendment.
The court held that the required message about safe disposal of waste
was not ideologically grounded and as a result did not require the
municipal storm sewers to endorse a particular belief.
The Municipalities further asserted that the EPA failed to comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provisions for notice
and comment on proposed rules because the EPA omitted the
individual permit option from the proposed rule. The court held that
the EPA gave sufficient notice and opportunity for comment because it
had suggested an individual permit option in the proposed rule, and
therefore the final rule contained no elements absent from the
proposed rule.
The Environmentalists challenged the rule claiming that it
provided insufficient oversight and allowed polluters to design and
self-enforce their own programs. According to the Environmentalists,
the rule contravened the CWA command to maximally reduce
pollution. The court agreed, holding that stormwater programs
required review by the EPA to ensure that polluters sufficiently
reduced emissions.
In addition, the Environmentalists challenged the rule because
they claimed it denied the public opportunity to participate as
required by the CWA. The court determined that the EPA must make
NOI's submitted by municipal storm sewers public to provide a
sufficient hearing. Under the Phase II rule, NOI's contained all of the
relevant information about how pollution reduction would take place
and therefore necessitated public comment. As a result, the court
vacated the procedural portion of the rule allowing the EPA to prevent
public comment on NOI's and remanded the rule to the EPA for
action consistent with the CWA.
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The Environmentalists also claimed that the EPA's failure to
designate certain industries and forest roads under the regulation, and
failure to regulate forest roads violated the APA as arbitrary and
capricious decisions. With regard to the EPA's failure to designate
industries and forest roads, the court found the EPA acted reasonably
and established a rational connection because it possessed insufficient
data to justify nationwide designation. As a result, the court deferred
to the EPA's determination. With regard to the EPA's failure to
regulate forest roads, the court held the Environmentalists had
standing to challenge the decision. Because the EPA failed to address
the merits of the challenge, the court remanded the issue to the EPA
for consideration.
NAHB claimed that the EPA promulgated the Phase II rule
without necessary consultation with state governments. The court
found the EPA met its duty to consult states by circulating draft copies
of the final rule to state and local governments, and revising the rule
based upon the comments received. That some states and localities
disagreed with the rule did not disprove the EPA's consultation with
states.
NAHB also asserted the EPA acted in contravention of the CWA by
failing to base its Phase II rule on section 402 studies. NAHB claimed
the CWA required the EPA to solely base its program on studies, and
that the EPA failed to do so, instead basing its designation partially on
input from the public and additional research. The court determined
that NAHB had standing based on its assertion that the EPA failed to
comply with procedural requirements. On the merits, the court
affirmed the EPA's rule holding that the statute required the EPA to
base its program on studies and on consultation, and to make use of
all sources of information.
The Municipalities challenged designation of small municipal
storm sewers based on population density determinations taken from
the census as arbitrary and capricious because no connection existed
between urban density and pollution due to stormwater runoff. The
court deferred to the EPA and affirmed the rule, holding that the EPA
established a reasoned basis for its designation based upon evidence
demonstrating a clear connection between stormwater runoff and
decreased water quality.
NAHB argued the Phase II rule arbitrarily regulated one- to fiveacre construction sites because the evidence in the record only
considered the cumulative effect of small sites, not their individual
environmental impact. NAHB also claimed the EPA arbitrarily and
capriciously regulated small construction sites by applying different
standards to the small sites than to other sources of runoff. The court
held the EPA made its decision consistently with the record, and that
the EPA could legitimately extrapolate the effects of large and medium
sites to smaller sites. The court determined the EPA did not err in
regulating small construction sites since no evidence indicated that the
other sources of runoff were similar enough to merit regulation.
NAHB also argued that waivers for small construction sites shifted
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the burden of proof to businesses to demonstrate they did not
decrease water quality in contravention of the statute's requirement
that the EPA establish a program controlling sources. The court held
the waiver system was reasonable to allow exceptions for small sites that
would likely not damage water quality.
NAHB also claimed that the EPA improperly retained power to
designate sources of stormwater runoff in the future. NAHB argued
that Congress did not authorize the EPA to retain such power. NAHB
also claimed that such authority violated the non-delegation doctrine
because the EPA developed no "intelligible principle" to guide its
future discretion, and because the ability to designate in the future was
not disclosed for notice and comment. The court held the EPA's
authority to designate sources covered under the rule did not expire,
and that the issue of whether the EPA could designate a source
without determining its eligibility was not yet ripe for review. On the
non-delegation challenge the court held the overall purpose of the
CWA-protecting water quality-gave the EPA sufficient guidance.
Finally, the court held the power to designate future sources was a
logical outgrowth of continuing designation present in the draft rule,
and therefore provided sufficient opportunity for notice and
comment.
NAHB raised a challenge under the Regulatory Flexibility Act
("RFA"), arguing the EPA failed to conduct sufficient analysis and
ignored the substantial cost imposed on small entities by the Phase II
rule. The court found the EPA reasonably determined the rule would
insignificantly impact small entities, and even if the EPA improperly
complied with the RFA, its assessment of the economic impact made
the error harmless.
Justice Tallman concurred in part and dissented in part. He
believed the court should defer to the EPA, allow certain
determinations without review, and approve NOI's without comment.
JaredEllis

Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding National Park Service's (1) Merced Comprehensive
Management Plan violated Wild and Scenic Rivers Act because it did
not adopt specific limits on visitor use and improperly delineated
certain segment boundaries, (2) decision to prepare Merced
Comprehensive Management Plan as a programmatic document did
not violate Wild and Scenic Rivers Act nor National Environmental
Policy Act, and (3) failure to prevent sewage spills was actionable
under Wild and Scenic Rivers Act but did not violate that Act's agency
cooperation mandate).
This appeal arose from Friends of Yosemite Valley's ("Friends")
challenge to the National Park Service's ("NPS") Merced Wild and
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In the
Scenic River Comprehensive Management Plan ("CMP").
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California,
Friends alleged the NPS failed to prepare a valid CMP that would
adequately protect and enhance natural values on segments of the
Merced River flowing through Yosemite National Park and its
administrative site, El Portal, thereby violating the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act ("WSRA") and the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). Specifically, Friends claimed the CMP violated WSRA by
inadequately addressing user capacities, delineating river segment
boundaries in disregard of WSRA's mandate, and by failing to
cooperate with federal and state agencies to reduce pollution on the
Merced. Friends also alleged the NPS's preparation of the CMP as a
programmatic document violated NEPA and WSRA. After the district
court rejected each of these claims, Friends appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first held the CMP inadequately
addressed user capacities. WSRA requires administering agencies to
prepare CMPs to address resource protection, user capacities, and
other management practices necessary to achieve conservation goals.
Based on the plain meaning of the statute and agency interpretative
guidelines, the court concluded that WSRA requires CMPs to contain
specific, measurable limits on use and discuss the maximum number
of people that designated river segments can accommodate. Here, the
CMP addressed user capacities by relying primarily on an NPSpromulgated management element, Visitor Experience and Resource
Protection ("VERP"). The VERP framework provided a process for
determining desired conditions, selecting monitoring standards that
reflected those conditions, and undertaking management action when
those conditions were not met. The VERP framework, however, only
employed sample standards and indicators-it did not actually
Given the CMP's failure to provide a
measure user capacities.
concrete measure of use, the court remanded the CMP to the NPS
with instructions to adopt specific limits on user capacity and describe
an actual level of visitor use on the Merced.
The Ninth Circuit also held the NPS violated WSRA by defining
the El Portal segment boundaries too narrowly. WSRA requires that
CMPs delineate boundaries that "include an average of not more than
320 acres per mile measured from the ordinary high water mark on
However, in setting boundaries, an
both sides of the river."
administering agency must comply with WSRA's mandate to protect
and enhance "outstandingly remarkable values" ("ORVs"). Here, the
CMP recognized geologic, recreational, biologic, cultural, and
hydrologic ORVs. But the CMP boundaries for four miles of the El
Portal segment, although within the statutory range, included only the
greater of the River Protection Overlay (the statutorily established
minimum buffer zone) or the 100-year floodplain. The court ruled
that these boundaries insufficiently protected the El Portal segment
ORVs because the NPS had yet to fully locate many ORVs within this
segment. In particular, the boundaries did not sufficiently protect
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cultural ORVs because many river-related archeological sites lay
outside the 100-year floodplain. Accordingly, the court remanded the
CMP in order for the NPS to draw boundaries in compliance with the
WSRA's ORV protection mandate.
Next, the court rejected Friends claim that, because the NPS
prepared the CMP as a programmatic document, it did not contain
sufficiently specific data to satisfy WSRA and NEPA requirements.
WSRA only
instructs
administering
agencies
to
prepare
"comprehensive" management plans. Due to the lack of specificity in
WSRA language, the court concluded the Merced CMP, based on
nearly 100 years of study and the best available information at the
time, met the ordinary meaning of "comprehensive," thereby satisfying
statutory requirements. The court also held the programmatic CMP
did not violate NEPA requirements mandating full environmental
evaluation of site-specific impacts of agency action. Although the
programmatic CMP provided only broad guidelines to govern future
management decisions, because it contemplated full, site-specific
review of future agency action, the court held it contained sufficient
data to satisfy NEPA.
The court then turned its attention to Friends' allegation that the
NPS failed to cooperate with federal and state agencies in preventing
pollution on the Merced. WSRA directs administering agencies to
cooperate with the United States Environmental Protection Agency
and state water pollution control agencies to reduce pollution on
designated rivers. After a number of sewage spills into the Merced
from NPS facilities, including several that occurred after it received an
abatement order from the California Regional Water Quality Control
Board ("Board"), Friends charged the NPS with failure to comply with
WSRA cooperation mandates. The NPS challenged this claim on the
grounds that the Clean Water Act's ("CWA") authorization of citizen
suits provided the exclusive remedy for point source pollution
violations. According to the NPS, Friends' failure to comply with CWA
notice provisions barred assertion of the claim. However, the court
rejected this argument, relying on both the plain language of the
CWA, which expressly permits parties to seek relief under other
statutes, and precedent recognizing similar WSRA claims. Further, in
the court's view, to disallow Friends' claim under WSRA would ignore
an important distinction between the two statutes.
The CWA
authorizes suits to enforce effluent standards and its notice provisions
are intended to prevent litigation by allowing violators time to remedy
pollution. WSRA, on the other hand, requires agency cooperation to
prevent water pollution. Thus, permitting Friends' WSRA suit would
not thwart the purpose behind CWA notice provisions.
However, addressing the merits of Friends' claim, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the NPS did not fail to
cooperate with the Board. The district court found that following
pollution discharges the NPS complied with reporting requirements
and promptly remedied equipment failures. Hence, although the NPS
failed to prevent discharges, based on the record, the district court did
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not clearly err in rejecting Friends' claim. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part, reversed in part and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Arthur R. Kleven

Orffv. United States, 358 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
farmers were not third-party beneficiaries to a contract between a
water district and the federal government, where the water district
received water from a water management project, and the farmers thus
could not utilize a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity allowing suit
for intended third-party beneficiaries or other parties to a contract).
The Westlands Water District ("Westlands") brought suit in
California against the United States in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California challenging a reduction in its
allocation of Central Valley Project ("CVP") water as violating a 1963
contract. Landowners and water users (collectively "Farmers") and the
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") intervened in the suit.
In 1995, Westlands dismissed its complaint. The Farmers remained in
the suit and filed an amended complaint. In 1998, the district court
dismissed most of the Farmers' claims. The district court initially
decided that the Farmers acted as a contracting entity and the
government waived sovereign immunity. It then determined that it
had jurisdiction to hear the remaining claims. It threw out three of
the Farmers' claims and determined that the fourth claim raised a
triable issue of fact. In 2000, pursuant to a motion for reconsideration,
the district court altered its position on the sovereign immunity issue.
It entered ajudgment in favor of the federal government in 2000. The
Farmers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. NRDC and Westlands filed briefs as interveners in the appeal.
The CVP subsists as the nation's largest federal water management
project. Westlands receives water from the CVP pursuant a 1963
contract with the United States. A previous case in 1986 ("Barcellos I')
upheld the enforceability of the 1963 contract. In the early 1990s, the
government listed the Sacramento River winter-run chinook salmon
and delta smelt of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta as threatened
species under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The National
Marine Fisheries Service found that the operation of the CVP
jeopardized these species. The Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau")
reduced Westlands contractual supply of water by fifty percent. The
Bureau acted under authority of the ESA and the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act. The Farmers brought suit claiming that the
reduction violated the 1963 contract.
The court first addressed the sovereign immunity issue. It asserted
that it strictly interprets the extent of a waiver of sovereign immunity in
favor of the government. Farmers argued that issue and claim
preclusion barred the government's sovereign immunity defense.
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Issue preclusion requires litigated issues be identical to a previous case.
The court held that in Barcellos I, the district court rejected the
sovereign immunity claim based on the ultra vires doctrine and the
McCarran Amendment. In this case, the Farmers did not allege the
government acted in an ultra vires manner. The court also determined
that the McCarran amendment did not apply. Claim preclusion
requires the cases arise Out of the same cause of action. The court
determined that the issue in this case differed from Barcellos I because
it involved a reduction in water based on a listing under the ESA,
which occurred after the Barcellos I decision. The court dismissed the
Farmers' assertion that claim and issue preclusion barred the
government's sovereign immunity defense.
The court then addressed whether a statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity existed. It determined that the Farmers could proceed with
their claims if a waiver of sovereign immunity under 43 U.S.C. Section
390uu applied to them. Under section 390uu, the government waives
sovereign immunity in contract suits pursuant to federal reclamation
law that confirms, decrees, adjudicates, or validates the contractual
rights of a contracting entity and the United States. The Farmers
claimed that their status as intended third-party beneficiaries of the
1963 contract made them contracting entities. The court held that an
explicit reference to a third party in a contract was not dispositive of a
party's status as an intended beneficiary. It interpreted a portion of
the contract that referred to individual water users as not creating
enforceable rights. Instead, the contract created enforceable rights
with Westlands. The court conceded that various sections of the
contract mentioning individual users showed that the contracting
parties entered into the contract with the Farmers in mind. However,
that was not sufficient to create intended third-party beneficiary status
on the Farmers. The court also rejected the Farmers' argument that
the existence of subsequent contracts referencing the 1963 contract
failed to create third-party beneficiary status.
The Farmers then asserted that they sued the government as trust
beneficiaries. The claim rested on a theory that Westlands served as a
trustee for the Farmers and that Westlands failed to pursue a claim on
their behalf. The court stated that a beneficiary of a trust generally
may not sue on behalf of a trust unless a trustee will not pursue a cause
of action that a trustee should bring against a third party on behalf of
the trust beneficiary. In this exception, the beneficiary of the trust
may bring an action joining the trustee and the third party. The
beneficiary may sue the third parties who directly acted with the
trustee in the breach of the trust. The Farmers did not seek judicial
compulsion against Westlands, nor did they allege that the
government directly participated in the breach of the trust. Thus, the
court determined that the Farmers did not sue as trust beneficiaries.
The court concluded by vacating the district court's rulings on the
merits. It declared that without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the
court had no jurisdiction to decide any issues on the merits. The court
noted that in some instances, the merits are intertwined with the
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jurisdictional issues so much so that the resolution of the jurisdictional
issue depends on the merits. However, in this case, it did not need to
decide the merits to determine that it had no jurisdiction to hear the
case.
Adriano Martinez

United States v. Appel, No. 02-57182, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3006 (9th
Cir. Feb. 2, 2004) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency did
not err in utilizing the ordinary high water mark methodology to set
jurisdictional boundaries of the Ventura River under the Clean Water
Act).
John F. Appel challenged the United States Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") use of the ordinary high water mark
("OHWM")

methodology to set jurisdictional boundaries

of the

Ventura River as it traversed Appel's property. The United States
District Court for the Central District of California approved the
OHWM method and Appel appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that to determine a river's
jurisdictional boundaries under the Clean Water Act, the EPA may use
either (1) the ordinary high water mark, or (2) the limit of any
wetlands. The EPA used the high water mark because Appel had
bulldozed most of the area near the river on his property, rendering
The court reasoned that the CWA
any wetlands indiscernible.
commands the government to eventually settle upon a single
methodology. A court's task is to determine whether the method is
supported by the evidence. Because that was what occurred in the
initial case, the court found no error.
Appel argued that the district court relied on "flood flows" and he
proffered an expert witness to prove that the ordinary flow of the river
and not the peak flow or flood stage (so as to include overflow on the
flood plain) determines the high water mark. The government also
proffered an expert witness. The witness observed the physical
features of the river through field study, aerial photographs, and soil
samples to determine the location of the ordinary high water mark.
The court held that the district court was not in error when it chose to
credit the testimony of the government witness and conclude that
"flood flows" where not used in the determination. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
ChristinaValerio
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United States v. Phillips, 356 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the
jury conviction of a Montana land owner for violations of, and
conspiracy to violate, the Clean Water Act, but vacating and
remanding district court's sentence and penalties for re-sentencing).
David Phillips appealed his conviction in the United States District
Court for the District of Montana ("district court") for multiple
violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), conspiracy to violate the
CWA, and determination of sentence. A Montana jury found Phillips
guilty of CWA violations when he diverted a creek adjacent to land he
owned to fill twenty man-made ponds on his property.
The
government also cross-appealed the sentencing decision, claiming that
the district court erred in its interpretation of several sections of the
United States Sentence Guidelines. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and affirmed the
conviction, but upheld the government's claims of error to vacate the
sentence for re-sentencing.
Phillips co-owned a large plot of land in Montana as a potential
subdivision investment. During August 1996, in order to attract
potential investors to the land, Phillips hired and instructed several
employees to dig and fill twenty ponds. Phillips failed to obtain
required permits for the work, and instructed his employees to lie and
tell visitors that permits were filed. Knowing that an existing mine adit
on the property was inadequate to fill the ponds before several
investors were to tour the land, Phillips instructed employees to build
and conceal a french drain that diverted water from a nearby creek,
through the ponds, and back out to the creek, even though Phillips
had no water rights to the adjacent creek.
Downstream neighbors reported the diversion when they noticed
the creek drying up and depositing dark brown sediment. State water
authorities investigated Phillips' property and found significant land
disturbance, poorly constructed ponds, unstable soil berms, and
ditches connecting the ponds together to the creek. In addition,
authorities found that Phillips had failed to stabilize soil banks, causing
erosion of sediment and mine tailings in the creek downstream.
In a pretrial motion, Phillips challenged the jurisdiction of the
criminal conviction, claiming that the district court must construe a
water of the United States as only those waters navigable-in-fact.
Phillips maintained that because the creek was not navigable-in-fact,
the government lacked jurisdiction. The court held the district court
properly considered the question ofjurisdiction as a matter of law and,
using the long-standing interpretation of the Army Corps of Engineers
and other circuit courts, properly decided to include waters tributary
to navigable waters as subject to jurisdiction. Since the district court
only found that the creek was jurisdictional, and left to the jury the
issue of determining whether and where the crime had occurred, the
district court preserved Phillips' constitutional right to a jury
determination of the elements of his crimes.
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Additionally, both parties contested the sentencing. Using the
federal sentencing guidelines, the district court had calculated a
sentence of thirty-three to forty-one months and awarded $43,000 for
cleanup expenses to Ron Burgess, the subsequent owner of the
property, after Phillips failed to make payments. The government, in
its appeal, argued that the district court erred when it refused to
increase Phillips' offense level for any Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") cleanup
expenses related to the mine tailings. Interpreting the plain language
of the guidelines as well as other circuits' case law, the court
determined that a penalty award must include CERCLA-related
expenses. Despite the overlap in coverage between CWA convictions
and CERCLA regulation, depriving the government of cleanup costs
because it proceeded under one type of law and not the other would
undermine the congressional scheme of environmental laws.
Further, the court determined that the district court improperly
considered evidence that Phillips attempted to coerce co-owner Larry
Zinger from being a witness. The district court refused to increase the
offense level under the obstruction of justice guideline because
Phillips' threats to Zinger had not materially impeded the
investigation. The court held that Phillips' attempt to influence
Zinger triggered the guideline to increase the offense level, and did
not require proof of materiality.
The government also challenged the district court's heartland
analysis when it considered Phillips' prior state prosecution and
internal agency memoranda and legislative history to apply downward
departures to the sentencing determination. A downward departure is
a reduction in sentence, and the district court can depart from the
guideline range only when an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
exists. According to the court's holding, the district court exceeded
the limits imposed under the sentencing guidelines when it
considered internal agency memoranda. The court held that Phillips'
prior state prosecution, which was only a fine, was not an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance to warrant downward departure.
Finally, the district court denied restitution to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, finding that the government was
not a victim entitled to recover. The Ninth Circuit held that the
decision was in error, and the government can be considered a victim
for restitution purposes. However, the government is only able to
receive restitution for those costs incurred as a direct and foreseeable
result of Phillips' wrongful conduct, not for costs incurred during the
regular investigation of the criminal prosecution.
Overall, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Phillips' conviction of
violations under the CWA and conspiracy to violate the CWA, holding
that the district court properly considered the issue of jurisdictional
waters as a matter of law in its pretrial motion and did not impede
Phillips' constitutional rights in its jury instructions. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, but also ruled in favor of the government's
cross-appeal that the sentence determination was improper, and thus
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remanded to the district court for re-sentencing.
DaraLum

TENTH CIRCUIT
Pittsburgh County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358
F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that federal law preempts state or
local statutes that deprive a water district of the right to provide water
to customers within the district so long as the water district is indebted
to the federal government under 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and provides water
service to customers of the district).
Pittsburgh County Rural Water District No. 7 ("District") sued the
City of McAlester ("McAlester"), a competing water provider, and
additional entities in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. The District alleged that McAlester violated its
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by restricting its ability to provide water
to customers within a protected area designated by 7 U.S.C. § 1926 and
that McAlester violated federal and state antitrust law by refusing to
sell water to the District. The District requested a declaratory
judgment regarding McAlester's ability to market water in the District's
territory, and injunctions requiring McAlester to continue selling
water to the District. The district court granted McAlester summary
judgment on some of the District's claims, dismissed the remaining
claims under section 1926, and dismissed both the District's federal
and state antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held section 1926 could protect the District's rights, and
remanded the case to the district court for determination. The court
also held that section 1926 did not entitle the District to an injunction
requiring McAlester to sell the District water, and dismissed the
District's claim that McAlester violated antitrust laws because the
District failed to prove McAlester acted as a monopolist.
The District is an Oklahoma water association incorporated by the
Pittsburgh County Commissioners to provide water for rural residents.
An amendment to section 1926 authorized the Farmers Home
Administration ("FMHA") to loan money to water associations so that
they could assist with water development, use and conservation allowed
the District to finance its actions. Section 1926 prohibits outside
entities from limiting the area serviced by indebted water districts
either by inclusion of the serviced area within another provider's
service area, or by granting a franchise for service in the area served by
the indebted district. The District borrowed money from FMI-A in
1967 and remained indebted until 1989. The District again borrowed
money from FMHIA in 1994. The District serviced areas both within
and outside the borders of McAlester.
Following the District's first federal suit against McAlester, the
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Pittsburgh County Board of Commissioners ("Board") ordered the
District's deannexation, releasing lands served by the District within
McAlester. In June 1998, the McAlester City Council terminated water
sales to the District. The District appealed the deannexation decision
to a state district court that dismissed the appeal on the grounds that
the District had insufficiently served the Board. On appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the state district court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue since the deannexation
decision was a function of the legislature. On rehearing, the Court of
Civil Appeals reversed its earlier decision, holding that the state district
court properly exercised jurisdiction, and that the Board decision
bound the District even if the Board erred in applying federal law.
In the federal action, the district court held that the District lost its
protections under section 1926 when it paid off its debt. Thus, the
only viable claims arose after the District borrowed money in 1994.
The district court also held that the District lacked protection under
section 1926 because the supply lines in place were insufficient to
make service available to areas within the McAlester city limits. The
court reversed, holding that payment of debt did not remove
protections under section 1926 and that the district court improperly
failed to consider the District's ability to rapidly improve service. The
court remanded the case to a different judge for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.
The District filed an amended complaint, the subject of the instant
case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for
McAlester on the District's claims that McAlester violated section 1926,
state and federal antitrust law. The statute of limitations barred all
claims regarding customers served between July 1967 and February
1989. The District lacked rights to provide water to properties on
which it began providing service prior to 1994 because the District
paid off its federal loan. Because the District served the properties
prior to obtaining its 1994 FMHA loan, it lacked protection under
section 1926. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the district court's
lack of subject matter jurisdiction barred the District's claims involving
McAlester's sales to the deannexed area. Finally, the district court
found section 1926 did not prohibit local governments from altering
the borders of water districts.
On appeal, the court reversed the district court's finding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the federal court of jurisdiction.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a party from appealing a
decision by a state supreme court to federal court, barring two claims:
those actually decided by a state court, and those decisions intertwined
with the decision of a state court. Because the District's claims and
remedies resulted from McAlester's decision to sell water to the
District's customers, McAlester's termination of its contract to sell
water to the District, and deannexation, and because the decision by
the state court did not cause the injury which the District sought relief
for in the federal court action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
bar the District's claims.
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The court held that the district court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction. Issue preclusion did not bar the federal court case
because the state courts did not rule on section 1983 and federal
antitrust law claims. Claim preclusion did not prevent the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction because the Board could not decide all
of the issues in the District's lawsuit due to the Board's limited
jurisdiction and the narrow scope of the deannexation proceeding.
The court decided that under the Full Faith and Credit Act, the
federal court on remand had to abide by the decision of the state court
of appeals making the annexation decision binding. However, the Full
Faith and Credit Act did not bar other claims for relief.
The court held that the statute of limitations barred all section
1983 claims arising before May 1995 because claims under section
1983 were personal injury claims. The court reversed the district court
and held that the District had a right to serve water to customers even
if McAlester began serving them prior to the loan date. The district
court decision conflicted with prior case law requiring a district to
meet a two-prong test for protection: proving it received a loan from
the federal government, and provided water service.
The court then used the two-prong test to determine whether the
District possessed rights under section 1926. For the District's rights
claims after the 1994 loan, and prior to deannexation, the court found
that under the first prong of the test, the District had been indebted to
the federal government since 1994. However, under the second
prong, the district court only looked at the District's current service
capabilities and not at whether the District had sufficient capability to
provide service in a reasonable amount of time following a request.
Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the District could make service available in a
reasonable amount of time.
On the merits of the District's challenges under section 1926, the
Tenth Circuit held that section 1926 allowed states to adjust the
boundaries of water districts. However, the court adopted a broad
construction of section 1926, resolving doubts in favor of indebted
parties. Under this interpretation, federal law preempted any local or
state policy that deprived a rural water association of territory
protected under section 1926. If, on remand, the district court found
that the District's territories were protected by section 1926,
McAlester's sale of water to customers in the deannexed area would
violate section 1926.
The court rejected McAlester's argument that such a broad
construction would violate the spending clause of the United States
Constitution.
Oklahoma could make an informed choice about
whether to accept or refuse the money because the money was a loan
with clearly stated conditions. Further, because courts had construed
it broadly, the state was on notice when it approved borrowing funds.
McAlester also alleged a taking from application of section 1926
protections to customers served by McAlester prior to the 1994 loan
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date.
The court rejected this argument because the federal
government loaned Oklahoma money, negating an economic impact,
and prior notification prevented loss of any economic expectations.
Finally, the character of the government program that gave Oklahoma
the ability to end section 1926 protections by paying off the loan did
not resemble a taking.
The court also rejected McAlester's argument that preventing
deannexation of section 1926 protected water associations encouraged
monopolization. The court held that water districts were subject to
competition because they could lose their section 1926 protection, and
because a water district charging excessively high prices may not fulfill
the statutory requirement to provide or make services available.
The court affirmed the district court's decision refusing to order
McAlester to sell water to the District. No part of section 1926
required suppliers to deal with districts and refusing to sell water did
not constitute interference with boundaries of the water district. The
statute only prohibited encroachment, by competition, not anticompetitive practices, and the District had a remedy for the anticompetitive practices under antitrust law.
As for the District's antitrust claim, the court held that it failed on
the merits. The District claimed McAlester violated antitrust law under
the essential facilities doctrine, requiring an entity or group of entities
in control of "essential facilities" to allow competitors reasonable
access to the facility. McAlester did not act as a monopolist because
the District could access water supply alternatives, because water
treatment plants other than the one run by McAlester existed in the
county, and because the District could reproduce the facility run by
McAlester.
Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that section 1926 protected the
District's right to sell water to customers in the District's sale area, and
remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether
the District complied with its statutory obligation to make service
available to customers in that area. The court also held that section
1926 did not entitle the District to an injunction requiring McAlester
to sell water to the District, and dismissed the District's claim that
McAlester violated antitrust laws, finding that McAlester had not acted
as a monopolist.
Jared Ellis
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
environmental organizations were entitled to attorneys' fees and costs
for monitoring the Environmental Protection Agency compliance with
a 1997 consent decree).
The Sierra Club and other state environmental organizations
(collectively "Environmental Organizations") filed suit against the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the
Specifically, the Environmental
Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Organizations wanted the EPA to update Georgia's "water quality
limited segments" ("WQLS") lists and establish Total Maximum Daily
Loads ("TMDLs") for impaired streams. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment
in favor of the Environmental Organizations, thereby requiring the
While the
EPA to complete a TMDL list within five years.
government's appeal was pending, the parties entered into two
consent decrees obligating the EPA to update Georgia's WQLS list and
set a timetable for establishing TMDLs in each body of water. The
EPA fulfilled its obligations under the consent decree by completing a
list of proposed TMDLs. In court, the Environmental Organizations
claimed they were entitled to recover costs and attorneys' fees for their
work associated with monitoring the EPA's consent decrees
The district court awarded costs for experts and
compliance.
attorneys' fees to the Environmental Organizations and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Under the CWA, every state must categorize the designated uses of
each body of water and set water quality standards based upon those
uses. In addition, every discharger of a pollutant from a discrete
"point source" must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit from the EPA. In some areas, an NPDES
permit alone cannot control water quality due to extensive "non-point
source" pollutants. In these waters, the state must assemble a list of
"water quality limited segments" and establish a TMDL, the highest
level of a pollutant allowed within the water body for each day. If a
state fails to fulfill these duties, the CWA requires the EPA to take
responsibility for generating the list and standards.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit stated that under the terms of
the CWA, a court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially
prevailing party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate. Additionally, a court may award fees for post-judgment
monitoring of a consent decree.
Here, the court determined that examination of the TMDL and
WQLS list by the Environmental Organizations was necessary for
meaningful enforcement of the consent decree, and the especially
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complex litigation required the Environmental Organizations to hire a
Consequently, the court held the environmental
water expert.
organizations were entitled to fees associated with monitoring the
consent decree, including expert fees, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment.
Lisa M. Thompson

COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. C1. 246
(2003) (holding state implemented water restrictions to protect
salmon prior to the issuing of a biological opinion by the lead federal
agency did not represent federal action conferring liability on the
government for a taking; biological opinion issued by the federal
agency pursuant to the Endangered Species Act effected a taking of
water rights; Congressional statutory rate of interest set for inverse
condemnation cases is the appropriate rate of interest to be applied in
awarding damages for a federal taking of water).
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District ("Tulare"), Kern County
Water Agency ("Kern") and their subcontractors (collectively "water
contractors") contracted with the California Department of Water
Resources ("DWR"), operator of the State Water Project facility
("SWP"), and the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), operators of the
Central Valley Project ("CVP") for water distribution in southern
California. Pursuant to these contracts, the water contractors were
eligible for two categories of water: an annual entitlement, called
Table A water; and Article 21 water, also referred to as unscheduled or
interruptible water. Table A water is a percentage of available water as
determined by the DWR in a particular year. The DWR bases the
amount on the water contractors' requests or a portion thereof, up to
their entitled amount as determined by the contract (1,153,400 acrefeet per year for Kern and 118,500 acre-feet per year for Tulare).
Article 21 water is available at the request of the water contractors if
water is available in excess of the amount required to meet the needs
of the water project.
Integral to the water distribution system relied on by the water
contractors was the Delta Cross Channel. The Delta Cross Channel is
a federal facility that diverts fresh water from the Sacramento River to
the southern Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ("Delta") and toward SWP
and the CVP. In the late 1980s, the SWP and CVP noticed an increase
of fish kills at their facilities. The BOR and DWR contacted the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") who initiated a
consultation in early 1991 pursuant to the Endangered Species Act
("ESA").
On February 3, 1992, the BOR and DWR, upon the
recommendation of NMFS, closed the Delta Cross Channel in an
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attempt to protect the out-migration of winter-run Chinook salmon, an
NMFS issued a
endangered species protected under the ESA.
biological opinion on February 14, 1992, recommending that the
Delta Cross Channel remain closed. However, the opinion did not
mention any specific measures for the BOR and DWR to follow in
operating the SWP or CVP pumping plants. Concluding that the
incidental take of salmon was greater than anticipated in the biological
opinion, the NMFS set an agreed upon reduction in pumping, thereby
amending the February 14 biological opinion. NMFS imposed further
constraints on pumping in their 1993 biological opinion. In addition,
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued a third biological
opinion concerning the delta smelt, another endangered species
protected under the ESA. This biological opinion covered the period
from May 26, 1993, to February 15, 1994, and imposed further
restrictions on the pumping by SWP and CVP.
When the Delta Cross Channel is closed, fresh water from the
Sacramento River is no longer available, which leads to an increase in
the salinity levels of the water in the Delta. This increase in salinity
leads to a deterioration of water quality at the SWP and CVP pumping
stations, which results in violations of state water quality standard.
DWR and BOR, noticing a significant increase in salmon kills at their
pumping stations, reduced pumping on April 3, 1992, and April 6,
1992, respectively.
The Delta Cross Channel closure resulted in a loss of water to the
The water contractors sued the federal
water contractors.
government, claiming that the closing of the Delta Cross Channel and
subsequent curtailment of water pumping effectuated a taking of their
water rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Federal Claims
Court agreed in its opinion in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v.
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). The purpose of the instant
opinion was to determine the value of the water rights taken by the
federal government in its application of the ESA.
The court first needed to determine for valuation purposes when
the taking occurred. The water contractors argued that the taking
occurred on the date the BOR and DWR closed the Delta Cross
Channel. The court declined to follow this rationale, holding that
until the NMFS issued the February 14 biological opinion, the decision
to close the Delta Cross Channel was discretionary. The court held the
taking commenced on April 3, 1992, the first date that the DWR
restricted pumping. The issuance of the biological opinion was the
significant federal action that effectuated the taking, making the
federal government liable.
The next issue before the court was how much water the
government had taken. Both parties provided estimates of the water
that would have been allocated had the only restriction been state
water quality standards. The court accepted the water contractors,
experts' testimony. This testimony took into account the water that
would have been available from 1992-1994 and adjusted this number
to account for any water that could not be used or stored during that
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period and then assessed how much Article 21 water would have been
available to the water contractors. The government claimed that the
water contractors had no property interest in Article 21 water because
the availability of that water was subject to SWP having excess capacity.
The court noted that in past years, the DWR had made Article 21 water
available when the San Luis Reservoir was full, the contractors' Table A
requirements were met and sufficient water existed to meet state water
quality requirements. The court then determined that because these
three requirements were met in 1993 and there was excess water
available in early 1994, DWR would have likely granted Article 21
requests.
Therefore, the water contractors had a compensable
property right in Article 21 waters during the years in question. The
court found the amount of water taken by the government to be a total
of 235,527 acre-feet of Table A water and 94,367 acre-feet of Article 21
water.
The court determined the value of the water right by using the
price per acre-foot of water purchased from the Drought Water Bank.
Water from the Drought Water Bank is purchased in times of need,
such as a drought, to compensate for shortfalls in availability of water
through the contracts. The Drought Water Bank set the price for
Table A water at $68.38 per acre-foot in 1992 and $66.34 per acre-foot
for 1994. Valuing Article 21 water proved more difficult. Germane to
the availability of Article 21 water is the concept that all water needs
under Table A have been met. Therefore, the Drought Water Bank
would not have been in operation so no price comparison could be
made. The court decided that demand existed for Article 21 water
beyond what was delivered in 1993 and 1994 and a reasonable profit
margin above the cost of delivery was $3 per acre-foot.
The court next determined that the proper rate of interest was the
statutory formula set forth for determining interest in inverse
condemnation claims made against the federal government. The
court reasoned this was the proper rate because of its uniformity and
avoidance of discrimination against litigants. The calculation of the
interest rate is the average of a one-year Treasury bill rate for the
period prior to December 21, 2000.
The court held that the government owed the water contractors
$13,915,364.78 plus interest for the taking of their water rights.
Furthermore, the court ordered the parties to file ajoint statement on
or before February 2, 2004, proposing the amount due to the water
contractors.
Jason V. Turner
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DISTRICT COURTS
Am.Canoe Ass'n v. White, 277 F. Supp. 2d. 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(holding that an agency will not receive a dam permit when it makes
various assumptions but fails to take a hard look at the cumulative
effects of other proposed projects in the same water basin, the future
water quality of the proposed reservoir, and the downstream effects of
the dam.)
American Canoe Association ("American Canoe") sued the United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") under the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") alleging that the Corps' decision
to issue a permit pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act for
the construction of a dam and reservoir was arbitrary and capricious.
The complaint addressed three main issues: (1)whether the Corps
adequately addressed the need for an additional water source; (2)
whether the Corps, in issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI") rather than conducting an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"), failed to take a requisite "hard look" at the
environmental impacts of the proposed project; and (3) whether the
Corps made a convincing case for its FONSI. In essence, American
Canoe asked the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama to vacate the permit and order the Corps to perform an
EIS on the project. The court granted in part a motion for summary
judgment, denied the Corps' cross-motion for summary judgment, and
ordered the Corps to take a "hard look" at the issues as required by
NEPA.
The Cullman-Morgan Water District ("Water District") was
incorporated in 1993 and consists of Cullman County and the
southern portion of Morgan County, Alabama. The Water District is
served by Lake Catoma, a man-made reservoir. In 1995, the Nashville
District of the Corps prepared two reports that considered several
different options to satisfy the Water District's growing water needs.
The Corps selected the Duck River dam project as the preferred
option. The proposed dam would create a reservoir that would serve
as an emergency public water supply. In 1996, the Water District
applied to the Corps for a permit to build the Duck River Dam. In
2000, after receiving extensive input from several state and federal
agencies, the Corps issued a FONSI that indicated the proposed
project would have no significant adverse effects, and issued a permit
to the Water District to build the dam. Immediately thereafter,
American Canoe filed an action claiming the Corps decision to issue a
FONSI and not to prepare an EIS was arbitrary and capricious. They
requested the court vacate the Corps' FONSI and issue an order
requiring the Corps to prepare an EIS.
In determining whether the Corps' decision not to prepare an EIS
was arbitrary and capricious, the court applied the standard
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formulated by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hill v. Boy--when an agency has identified a relevant environmental concern it
must take a "hard look" at the problem. If an agency issues a FONSI, it
must be able to make a convincing case for its finding. American
Canoe asserted the Corps failed to take a hard look at the
environmental impacts of the Duck River Dam and that, even
assuming the Corps took the requisite hard look, the agency failed to
make a convincing case in its FONSI report.
First, the court addressed whether the Corps took a hard look at
The court
the environmental impacts of the proposed dam.
determined that the Corps made several misinformed assumptions
regarding the environmental impacts of the project and reliance on
such assumptions did not constitute a hard look. While the Corps
contended that they indeed took a hard look at the impacts, the court
noted that the agency made numerous assumptions about the
cumulative effects of other proposed projects. Specifically, agency
records indicated that the Corps ultimately issued the FONSI based on
its assumption, rather than any actual studies, that no cumulative
impacts would result because another project, the Locust Fork Dam,
had been postponed for at least ten years. Furthermore, the Corps
conducted no studies that considered the impact that the Duck River
Dam would have in conjunction with the Locust Fork Dam after the
ten-year delay. In addition, the court noted that the Corps made an
erroneous assumption about the future water quality of the reservoir.
The Corps had concerns that existing phosphorous and nitrogen in
the Duck River had the potential to cause accelerated eutrophication
in the reservoir. Therefore, the Corps implemented a watershed plan
to address the situation. However, in issuing the FONSI, the Corps
made the assumption, without conclusive evidence, that the watershed
plan would reduce current nutrient loadings by sixty percent. Finally,
the court noted that the Corps decided not to study the downstream
effects of the dam because one employee stated it was not necessary.
The Corps did not conduct any scientific studies and issued the FONSI
based entirely on the employee's assumption.
Second, the court discussed whether the Corps made a convincing
case for its FONSI. Even assuming that the Corps took a hard look,
the court held that the agency failed to make a convincing case for its
FONSI. The court held that the Corps blanket statement that any
cumulative environmental effects would be eliminated by a ten-year
delay in the Locust Fork project was illogical; especially in light of
earlier assessments that the cumulative impacts of the two projects
must be studied.
In conclusion, the court held the Corps decision to issue the
FONSI was arbitrary and capricious because it did not take the
requisite hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed dam
and it did not make a convincing case for issuing its FONSI. The court
held the Corps could not proceed with the project until it had taken a
hard look at the environmental impacts of the Duck River Dam.
Tonn K Petersen

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Am. Rivers v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 274 F. Supp. 2d 62
(D.D.C. 2003) (ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to comply with
a previous court order, or show cause why the court should not hold it
in contempt for failure to do so).
American Rivers filed a motion in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia for an order requiring the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to show cause why the court
should not hold it in.
contempt and sanction it for disobeying a prior
The court previously enjoined the Corps from
court order.
implementing its Annual Operating Plan ("AOP") for the Main Stem
System of reservoirs on the Missouri River in a manner that would
adversely impact three species protected by the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA"). The court's injunction contradicted an earlier injunction
the Federal District Court for Nebraska ("Nebraska court") issued
preventing the Corps from releasing flows below a certain level for
navigation purposes. The Corps asserted, in defense, that the earlier
injunction rendered adherence to the later injunction impossible.
The court granted American Rivers' motion, finding that the earlier
injunction must be specific to the AOP effective at that time, and that,
in any case, the Corps could not claim that it was impossible to obey
one order where it merely chose, instead, to obey the other.
The Corps operated the Main Stem System of reservoirs on the
Missouri River. In May 2002, the Nebraska court ordered the Corps to
maintain minimum flows of 26,000 cubic feet of water per second
("cfs") on the river to support navigation. In June 2003, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order. On July 12, 2003, the court
granted American Rivers' motion for a contrary injunction, ordering
the Corps to maintain maximum flows of 25,000 cfs for the latter half
of August. The Corps issued a press release stating that it would
maintain flows at the minimum of 26,000 cfs, and continued to do so.
American Rivers filed a motion for an order to show cause why the
court should not hold the Corps in contempt and levy sanctions
against it for disobeying its July 12 order.
In defense, the Corps argued that the Nebraska court's order of
2002 rendered adherence to the court's July 12 order impossible, since
the two orders were contradictory. In rejecting the Corps' argument,
the court found that the Nebraska court could not have intended that
its 2002 order apply to AOPs other than the one in effect at the time,
since such an order would preclude future operations not in
compliance with it. The court therefore found that the two orders
referred to different AOPs and were not in conflict. The court further
found that the Corps had chosen to obey the earlier order over the
later, and that the possibility presented by such a choice contradicted
the defense of impossibility.
Alternatively, the Corps argued that it was not subject to civil fines,
since it had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court held,
however, that the defense of sovereign immunity was inapplicable to
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coercive, rather than compensatory fines. Since American Rivers
sought coercive fines, the Corps was not immune.
The court entered an order for the Corps to show cause why it
should not find it in contempt and impose sanctions for the Corps'
refusal to obey the July 12 order. It also made a finding of civil
contempt conditional on continued refusal to comply with the July 12
order. It ordered further that continued refusal, past the deadline of
July 25, 2003, would result in a fine of $500,000 per day of noncompliance.
Owen Walker

Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Conm'rs of Calvert County,
301 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D. Md. 2004) (dismissing water cooperative's
federal claims that it had a right to provide water to new development
on summary judgment, and holding new development was not within
water company's franchise area).
Chesapeake Ranch Water Company ("Chesapeake") sued the
Calvert County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), seeking a
permanent injunction and Writ of Mandamus that it had rights to
supply water to a developing commercial park. Chesapeake sought to
provide water to a new commercial development across the street from
Chesapeake alleged the Board's denial of
the water company.
Chesapeake's right to provide water to the new commercial
development violated the Rural Development Act ("RDA") and several
Maryland statutes, and that Chesapeake had rights to provide water to
the new development because the development was within the water
company's franchise area.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Maryland initially addressed Chesapeake's federal claims under the
RDA. First, because the area in controversy was outside Chesapeake's
service territory and within the County's borders, the court held
Chesapeake failed to show the Board's action was a municipal
incursion on Chesapeake's franchise area under the RDA. Second, the
court held Chesapeake failed to satisfy the requirement under the
RDA that it show it previously made service available in the disputed
area. Specifically, the court rejected Chesapeake's argument that its
location across the street from the new development constituted
sufficient evidence that it could provide water to the development.
The court reasoned that Chesapeake must also prove it could provide
water under its permit, and that the permit limited authority to
specific subdivisions. Thus, the court dismissed Chesapeake's federal
claims as a matter of law.
The court then dismissed Chesapeake's remaining state law claim
under the Maryland statutes without prejudice. Specifically, the court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over "needless
questions of state law" in light of the court's disposition of the federal
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questions.
Holly Shook

City of Arcadia v. EPA, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(holding (1) Environmental Protection Agency had authority to
approve state-submitted total maximum daily loads, even after the
Environmental Protection Agency had established its own total
maximum daily loads; (2) Environmental Protection Agency's
procedure in approving state's total maximum daily loads was not itself
a "final agency action;" and (3) city's action was not ripe for review).
The City of Arcadia ("Arcadia") and other California cities brought
action against the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), the EPA Administrator, and the EPA Region IX
Administrator, challenging EPA's assertion of total maximum daily
loads ("TMDLs") for trash in the Los Angeles River Basin ("Basin"), as
wells as for its subsequent approval of the State's Trash TMDLs.
Development of TMDLs for trash in the Basin is normally a task given
to the Regional Board for the Los Angeles region ("Regional Board")
The Regional
in accordance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
Board adopted TMDLs for trash in the Basin on September 19, 2001;
the State Board approved the TMDLs on February 19, 2002; the Office
of Administrative Law ("OAL") approved them on July 16, 2002; and
EPA approved them on August 1, 2002. However, before approving
the State Trash TMDLs, EPA issued its own TMDLs for trash in the
Basin on March 19, 2002. In its August 1, 2002, approval of the State
Trash TMDLS, EPA announced that the State's Trash TMDLs
superseded the EPA Trash TMDLs set on March 19, 2002.
Arcadia asserted three claims for relief in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California. The first claim asserted
the following violations of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"):
(1) EPA acted without authority and arbitrarily and capriciously by
establishing the EPA Trash TMDLs prior to receiving for review the
State Trash TMDLs; (2) EPA acted without authority and arbitrarily
and capriciously by reviewing and approving the State Trash TMDLs
because EPA had already established the EPA Trash TMDLs; (3) EPA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of its jurisdiction with
regard to the manner by which it established the EPA Trash TMDLs;
(4) the collective actions of California and EPA relating to issuance of
the Trash TMDLs and subsequent approval of the State Trash TMDLs
constitute a "de facto TMDL procedure" that was arbitrary, capricious,
and contrary to law; and (5) EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
approving the State Trash TMDLs because those TMDLs were
"patently defective" and not established in accordance with the
procedures of the CWA and California law. EPA moved to dismiss this
claim, arguing that EPA has a statutory obligation under CWA to
review any proposed TMDLs submitted by a state and either approve
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or disapprove them, and that nothing in the CWA divests EPA of
jurisdiction to approve a state submitted TMDL once EPA issues its
own. The court dismissed this claim without leave to amend and with
prejudice.
Arcadia's second claim for relief challenged the validity of a "de
facto TMDL procedure." This procedure consisted of the initial
issuance of TMDLs by the Regional Board; second, EPA's own issuance
of TMDLs; third, State Board approval of the Regional Board TMDL;
fourth, submittal of the State Board TMDL to EPA; and finally, the
eventual "superseding" of EPA's TMDLs by the State approved TMDLs.
Arcadia asserted that they suffered from the effectuation of the de
facto TMDL procedure, and that they would suffer from the
procedure in the future. EPA argued that the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 permits challenges only
to "final agency action," and that the TMDL procedure was not an
agency action, let alone a final agency action. The court agreed with
EPA and dismissed the second claim without leave to amend and with
prejudice.
Arcadia also asserted under the second claim a challenge on the
merits of EPA's approval of the State Trash TMDLs. EPA moved to
dismiss this claim as unripe for judicial review because the State Trash
TMDLs did not impose any obligations on Arcadia. The court agreed
with Arcadia and dismissed this claim as unripe for judicial review.
Arcadia's third claim for relief sought a declaration under the
Declaratory Judgment Act as to which party's interpretation of the law
was correct and ajudicial determination of Arcadia's rights and duties.
However, since Arcadia's third claim relied completely on the first two
claims, which the court dismissed, the court likewise dismissed the
third claim. In sum, the court dismissed all actions that Arcadia
brought against EPA.
BrettJohnson

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (N.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding district court had jurisdiction over claim under
the Administrative Procedure Act where the Clean Water Act did not
subject the regulation to circuit court review, and Administrative
Procedure Act's six-year statute of limitations did not bar the claim).
On July 24, 2001, the Environmental Protection Information
Center ("EPIC") filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California alleging that the Pacific Lumber
Company and Scotia Pacific Lumber Company (collectively "PALCO")
violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants from
timber harvesting and road construction activity into Bear Creek
without a CWA permit. PALCO moved to dismiss the suit, based in
part on a silvicultural regulation promulgated by the Environmental
In effect, this regulation removed
Protection Agency ("EPA").
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nonpoint source silvicultural activities from National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit requirements. EPIC
filed an amended complaint adding the EPA as a defendant for
attacking the nonpoint source provision of the regulation.
Specifically, EPIC alleged that the regulation was ultra vires, as well as
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in
accordance with the law under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). EPA and PALCO argued that the court lacked jurisdiction
over EPIC's claim, and that the APA's six-year statute of limitations
barred the claim.
The court explained that the APA authorizes judicial review of
final agency action if no other adequate remedy exists in a court. The
EPA and PALCO claimed that the CWA allowed EPIC to bring its
claim in the circuit courts; therefore, EPIC could not have brought its
claim in the district court. To make their argument, the EPA and
PALCO claimed that the silvicultural regulation invoked circuit court
jurisdiction under certain sections of the CWA that govern NPDES
permitting requirements, and that circuit courts should review any
agency activity related to the NPDES program. EPIC countered, and
the court agreed, that since the regulation removed silvicultural
activities from NPDES permitting, the CWA sections cited by the EPA
did not support circuit court review of the regulation. The court
found unpersuasive the EPA and PALCO's argument that all activity
related to NPDES permitting improperly expanded the CWA's
jurisdiction; in fact, the court determined that the regulation did not
involve NPDES permitting.
Next, the EPA and PALCO argued that the applicable CWA section
governing agency approval or promulgation of effluent limitations
mandates direct appellate review of the action by the circuit courts.
Specifically, they alleged that the silvicultural regulation fell under this
section because in NRDC v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit found reviewable a
set of regulations that included the silvicultural regulation. However,
EPIC's argument that the silvicultural regulation was not specifically
challenged, nor specifically reviewed, by the D.C. Circuit in NRDC v.
EPA persuaded the court. The court also held the silvicultural
regulation was not an effluent limitation, and applicable CWA
provisions allowing direct appellate review of such actions did not
govern the regulation.
Lastly, the EPA and PALCO advanced policy reasons for circuit
court review of the silvicultural regulation. Specifically, the EPA and
PALCO argued that generalized rules are better suited for circuit court
review. However, the court was wary to expand CWA jurisdiction as
broadly as the EPA and PALCO proposed. In addition, the court
reasoned that because the D.C. Circuit previously took jurisdiction
over the original silvicultural regulation in NRDC v. Train, it was able
to take jurisdiction over the regulation as well.
The EPA and PALCO also argued that the APA's six-year statute of
limitations barred EPIC's claim. PALCO specifically argued that no
final agency action occurred within the time limit; and while the EPA
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acknowledged that a final agency action may have occurred, it argued
that the only reviewable action was a 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation-not the regulation itself. Since the 2000 EPA decision
marked the end of the agency's decisionmaking process, the court
held that the decision qualified as a final agency action. In response to
the EPA's argument, EPIC claimed it was bringing an "as applied"
action; or in the alternative, that the 2000 decision not to amend the
regulation opened the provision open for review, and therefore, open
The court found EPIC's "as applied" argument
to challenge.
unpersuasive since EPIC had not been the object of any EPA
enforcement proceeding, nor had EPIC directly petitioned the EPA to
amend the regulation. However, the court agreed with EPIC that the
2000 action opened the regulation to challenge since the agency
reconsidered the entire issue at the time and invited comments on the
provision. Thus, because the final agency action occurred on July 13,
2000, and the EPIC filed its complaint on July 24, 2001, the court held
that the action fell within the six-year statute of limitations.
Kate 0. Lively

Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (holding that, under the Clean Water Act, a claim alleging
increased logging in a watershed created increased sediment in a
creek and alleging ditch use to discharge storm water and pollutants
stated a claim for which relief could be granted).
Pacific Lumber Company and Scotia Pacific Lumber Company
("Lumber Companies") owned land located in a watershed the
Lumber Companies used primarily for logging. The Environmental
Protection Information Center ("EPIC") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California against the
Lumber Companies, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") Administrator, and the EPA. EPIC claimed the
Lumber Companies discharged pollutants without obtaining a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.
EPIC asserted the Lumber Companies violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by logging in a watershed causing a large increase in
sediment deposited into Bear Creek. The EPIC further argued the
Lumber Companies were using culverts and drainage ditches to
discharge pollutants and storm water, creating a point source under
the CWA. The Lumber Companies filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
EPIC's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted.
The first issue was whether discharging storm water via culverts and
The CWA
ditches constituted a point source under the CWA.
prohibits discharging pollutants from a point source into the navigable
waters of the United States without an NPDES permit. The CWA
defines a point source as a discernable conveyance from various
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sources, including ditches. Hence, accepting EPIC's allegatio-as as
true, the district court held the Lumber Companies discharged
pollutants from a point source.
Next at issue was whether the CWA exempted the Lumber
Companies' discharges as a storm water discharge. Although the CWA
requires permits for discharges from point sources, section 402 of the
CWA exempts discharges comprised entirely of storm water. The
district court applied a two-part inquiry in determining whether the
storm water exception applied. First, the court addressed whether the
Lumber Companies' discharges were comprised entirely of storm
water. In its complaint, EPIC asserted that the Lumber Companies
used culverts and drainage ditches to discharge storm water and
pollutants. Hence, accepting as true all allegations in the complaint,
the court concluded the Lumber Companies were not exempt from
NPDES permit requirements because the discharges were not
comprised entirely of storm water.
Secondly, the court addressed whether the Lumber Companies'
In 1987, EPA passed
discharges were currently unregulated.
regulations authorizing states and the EPA to continue to regulate
exempt storm water discharges on a case-by-case basis. Additionally,
the CWA expressly regulates point source discharges. Hence, the
Lumber Companies discharges were not exempt from the NPDES
permitting requirement because the CWA regulates point source
discharges.
Accordingly, the court denied the Lumber Companies' motion to
dismiss because the Lumber Companies discharged storm water and
pollution from a point source, the discharges were not exempt as
storm water because they were not comprised entirely of storm water,
and the CWA regulates point source discharges.
HeatherK Chamberlain

North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass'n v. Holly Ridge Assocs., No.
7:01-CV-36-BO(3), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13676 (E.D.N.C. July 25,
2003) (granting representational standing for organizations to pursue
Clean Water Act citizen suit claims in federal court; holding that
disputed ditches, wetlands and other waters were subject to Clean
Water Act jurisdiction; that stormwater and sediment discharged into
jurisdictional waters from point sources were pollutants, and therefore
subject to permitting under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System; and reserving judgment on whether fecal coliform
bacteria constituted a pollutant under the Clean Water Act).
The North Carolina Coastal Federation ("NCCF") and North
Carolina Shellfish Growers Association ("NCSGA") filed a Clean Water
Act ("CWA") citizen suit for violations of sections 402 and 404 of the
CWA caused by ditching and excavation activities on a 1,262-acre tract
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of land located in Onslow County, North Carolina. Holly Ridge
Associates and John A. Elmore (collectively "HRA") owned the tract,
which bordered Stump Sound and the Atlantic Intracoastal
Waterway-navigable waters used for commercial shellfishing and
recreational activities. Between January and November 1998, HRA
constructed and expanded ditches through 34.2 acres of wetlands and
uplands adjacent to wetlands causing a discharge of sediment and
other pollutants, including fecal coliform bacteria, into the
surrounding waters. HRA did not obtain CWA permits for any
discharges of pollutants from point sources, including stormwater and
fill material.
First, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina examined whether NCCF and NCSGA satisfied the
three legal elements for representational standing. An organization
can establish representational standing when (1) at least one of its
members has individual standing, (2) the organization seeks to protect
interests germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief sought requires the participation of individual members.
In this case, both parties agreed that NCCF and NCSGA already
satisfied the second and third elements for representational standing.
Therefore, the court focused solely on whether NCCF's and NCSGA's
members fulfilled the requirements for individual standing.
Individual standing requires proof of a concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the
challenged action and likely to be redressable by a favorable decision.
In the environmental litigation context, the injury in fact element is
satisfied when one or more members of an organization can prove
they live, work, and recreate in the affected area and the challenged
activity would diminish their use and enjoyment of that area.
Threatened injury can be adequate for standing. In this case, the
declarations of individual members clearly established that the impact
on water quality due to the ditching activities impacted their ability
and enjoyment to boat, fish, shellfish, wade, and view wildlife in the
area at issue. Further, diminished water quality threatened the
economic and property interests of those members who retained
shellfishing leases in the Stump Sound area.
The court next analyzed whether the alleged injuries were
traceable to HRA's actions. NCCF and NCSGA only needed to prove
the types of pollutants discharged from the tract were likely to
contribute to the kinds of injuries alleged, but not that HRA's actual
conduct caused the injuries. HRA asserted that NCCF's and NCSGA's
claims of closed shellfishing waters due to increased fecal coliform
bacteria discharged from the tract were completely speculative because
sediment and other pollutants from the tract could not reach the
waters of Stump Sound. Despite HRA's contentions, the court found
the requisite nexus between HRA's actions and the increased
pollutants in the waters.
For relief, NCCF and NCSGA asked the court to impose civil
penalties, to compel HRA to remove poorly maintained fill material on
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the land, and to require HRA to obtain the necessary CWA permits for
discharging stormwater and fill material. The court found that since
there was proof of traceability between the injuries and the ditching
activities, a favorable outcome would redress NCCF's and NCSGA's
requests for relief. Therefore, both organizations satisfied the final
component to individual standing.
The court granted the
organizations representational standing to pursue their claims.
The court next addressed whether HRA's offer of judgment
impeded Congress' intentions. Under the CWA, any citizen can
commence an action for alleged violations of the CWA. Offers of
judgment require a plaintiff to accept the offer within ten days or risk
paying litigation costs incurred by defendants if the outcome is less
favorable than the offer. Since plaintiffs in CWA citizen suits are not
eligible for personal redress, forcing a citizen suit plaintiff to choose
between accepting an "unacceptable" offer and continuing the
litigation with the hope of a more favorable judgment would violate
the substantive and procedural rights of CWA citizen suits.
Finally, the court addressed issues of liability and concluded that
(1) the various waters on and adjacent to the tract are by definition
"waters of the United States" and subject to the jurisdiction of the
CWA; (2) HRA discharged pollutants, including stormwater and
sediment, into jurisdictional waters; and (3) the discharges derived
from point sources and were subject to a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. The court denied ruling on
whether fecal coliform bacteria constituted a pollutant under the CWA
due to conflicting testimonies from different experts.
On NCCF's and NCSGA's first argument related to liability, the
court found that all waters at issue were subject to jurisdiction under
the CWA. Stump Sound and Batts Mill Creek fell under the United
States Army Corps of Engineers' definition of navigable waters, and
the tributaries, man-made ditches, and man-made lake in question
were all "hydrologically connected" to jurisdictional waters under the
CWA.
HRA disputed whether Cypress Branch was a tributary of Batts Mill
Creek, arguing that the creek ended in a wide wetland flat which
would abate any channelized surface flow coming from the stream.
However, the court held that since intermittent surface flow from
episodic storm events was sufficient to carry pollutants to connected
jurisdictional tributaries and navigable waters, the hydrological
connection existed.
Next, the court looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Carps of
Engineers ("SWANCC") in examining wetlands on the tract of land not
immediately adjacent to navigable waters. In previous decisions, courts
applied two different interpretations of SWANCC. Some courts found
the ruling limited CWA jurisdiction to only those waters that were
navigable or adjacent to open bodies of navigable water. The other
interpretation, used by this court, contended that SWANCC applied
only to isolated waters lacking any hydrologic connection to navigable
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waters or tributaries of navigable waters.
Using this interpretation, the court found that wetlands on the
tract were not isolated, but formed a "continuous, hydrologically
connected network" with Cypress Branch and any ditches adjacent to
the wetlands. Any pollutants discharged from the wetlands continued
to pose a threat to the quality of all jurisdictional waters downstream of
that system. Thus, the court found that all wetlands on the tract, even
those not directly adjacent to Stump Sound, were subject to CWA
jurisdiction.
The court then considered whether certain HRA discharges were
"pollutants" under the CWA, which would be prohibited without an
NPDES permit. The CWA defines sediment, composed primarily of
sand and silt, as a pollutant. Evidence and testimony offered by NCCF
and NCSGA confirmed discharges of sediment from the ditches on the
tract into waters of the United States. Moreover, undisputed evidence
demonstrated that improper construction and maintenance of ditches
and spoil piles caused massive erosion of silt, sand and sediment into
wetlands, tributaries and streams both on and adjacent to the tract.
The CWA also defines biological material, including fecal coliform
bacteria, as a pollutant. NCCF and NCSGA contended that the ditches
on the tract altered the landscape to the extent that fecal coliform
bacteria from animal droppings, normally absorbed into the ground,
was instead taken up with stormwater and carried out into waters of
the United States. However, the court reserved judgment on whether
fecal coliform bacteria was a pollutant in this matter because
conflicting factual disputes warranted further discussion.
The CWA requires a permit for stormwater discharges derived
from industrial activities, including clearing, grading, and excavation
which disturbs five or more acres of land. Despite HRA's claims that
the tract was managed for forestry purposes and was therefore exempt
from the permit requirements, the court found that because HRA's
activities disturbed over 34.2 acres, the ditching qualified as industrial
activity. Therefore, stormwater conveyed from these ditches qualified
as a pollutant under the CWA.
NCCF and NCSGA then argued that the ditches, sediment traps,
gullies and rills, and the tract itself were in fact point sources under
the CWA. The court agreed with the organizations, finding that
ditches fell under the CWA's definition of point sources; sediment
traps failed to confine further sediment deposits, and therefore
contributed to the sediment problem; and that gullies and rills
accelerated the movement of sediment through the ditches.
Moreover, the court held the site itself constituted a point source
because the entire tract required an NPDES permit for the ditching
activities involving more than five acres.
Furthermore, section 404 of the CWA governs the discharge of fill
material that alters the bottom elevation of any jurisdictional water.
Here, NCCF and NCSGA alleged that the rock check dams
constructed in several of the ditches constituted "fill material" and
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affected the bottom elevation of those ditches. HRA maintained that
the check dams fell under the silvicultural exemption of section 404,
which allowed the discharge of fill material from "plowing, seeding,
The
cultivating, [and] minor drainage" without regulation.
exemption however, included a recapture provision requiring a permit
for discharges of fill material designed to alter or bring the area to new
use. NCCF and NCSGA claimed the network of ditches were beyond
the definition of "minor drainage," and specifically created for
converting wetland to non-wetland. The court refused to determine
whether the silvicultural exemption applied under section 404 due to
However, because undisputed
the conflicting factual disputes.
evidence proved discharges of fill material into waters of the United
States, NCCF and NCSGA could obtain a determination of liability for
HRA's underlying violation of CWA section 404.
DaraLur

North Dakota v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. Al-03-50,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12072 (D.N.D. July 14, 2003) (finding that a
high probability of failure on the merits and lack of greater public
interest precluded the court from issuing a preliminary injunction for
water level control in reservoirs regardless of possible irreparable
harm).
The State of South Dakota moved for a preliminary injunction to
prevent the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") from
lowering the water level of the reservoirs in South Dakota. The
procedural events preceding South Dakota's motion began with North
Dakota filing a complaint in North Dakota state district court on April
29, 2003. The State of North Dakota alleged that the Corps violated
North Dakota's water quality standards through its operation of
Garrison Dam. The parties removed the case to the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota, Southwestern Division,
and the States of Nebraska and South Dakota intervened. South
Dakota then filed a separate complaint. South Dakota alleged that
judicial estoppel prohibited the Corps from reducing water levels on
mainstream reservoirs to support navigation, that lowering the water
level was contrary to the Flood Control Act of 1944, and that the
Corps' actions were in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
A hearing on June 4, 2003, determined both North Dakota's and
South Dakota's Motions for Preliminary Injunctions.
In evaluating the Motions for Preliminary Injunction, the court
evaluated four factors: (1) the movant's probability of success, (2) the
threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent injunction, (3) the
balance between the harm to the movant and the injury on other
interested parties, and (4) public interest. The burden of proving
these factors is on the moving party.
The court held that South Dakota was not likely to succeed on the
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merits of this case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals previously
held in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde that South Dakota was not likely to
succeed on these exact same arguments. That decision from the
Eighth Circuit limited this court's ability to grant a preliminary
injunction based on these arguments. The court therefore concluded
that South Dakota was not entitled to a preliminary injunction based
on future probability of success.
On the second factor of irreparable harm, the court held that the
Corps would irreparably harm South Dakota if it managed the water
levels. The death of rainbow smelt eggs, which would result from the
lowered water levels, would harm South Dakota's fisheries. These facts
alone persuaded the court to find for South Dakota on the factor of
irreparable harm.
The court combined the last two factors, reasoning that since all
parties involved were governmental entities, the balancing of harm
between the parties and the effects on the public interest were
essentially the same. Because there were compelling arguments on
both sides, the court held that the interests did not weigh in favor of
either party.
In conclusion, the court held that although South Dakota had
shown a threat of irreparable harm, the State did not show it was likely
to win on the merits nor did it put forth a convincing argument of
greater public interest for their cause. The court further noted that
the previous decision of Eighth Circuit was controlling and it would be
improper for the court to issue a preliminary injunction in this case.
Ryan D. Phillips

S.E. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d 26
(D.D.C. 2004) (approving water supply Settlement Agreement
negotiated by municipal electricity providers and state, provided that
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama first
vacated a previously-entered temporary injunction).
The plaintiff in this dispute ("D.C. litigation") in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, Southeastern Federal
Power Customers ("SeFPC"), was a non-profit corporate consortium of
rural and municipal electricity suppliers servicing the southeastern
United States. These suppliers receive a portion of their electricity
from the hydroelectric power generated by the Buford Dam. The
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") built the Buford
Dam on the Chattahoochee River in the 1940s, creating Lake Lanier.
Congress initially authorized Lake Lanier and Buford Dam
expressly for hydropower generation, flood control, and navigation
purposes. The Corps contended that future local water supply usage
was always within Congressional intent, but intervening parties in this
action disagreed. Beginning in the 1970s, the Corps reserved some of
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the water in Lake Lanier for local water supply, which reduced the
overall water quantity available for power generation. The Corps
wished to convert these local storage withdrawal contracts from
interim contracts to permanent contracts, which would cause a
permanent increase in the water stored for local use and a permanent
reduction in the amount of water available for power generation. In
October 1989, the Corps drafted a water storage reallocation report
representing the permanent storage contracts for submission to
Congress. This report alarmed the downstream states, Florida and
Alabama, because it allocated such a large quantity of water to storage
for local water usage. The State of Alabama then sued the Corps in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
("Alabama court"), and the State of Florida moved to intervene on the
side of Alabama, while the State of Georgia moved to intervene on the
side of the Corps.
In 1990, the Alabama court granted a stay on the condition that
the Corps not execute any permanent water supply contracts without
prior approval from Alabama and Florida while the stay was pending.
This stay order functioned during the 1990s, and the parties
periodically updated the Alabama court about their progress in the
underlying dispute. Settlement negotiations during the 1990s resulted
in an interstate compact ("ACF Compact"), which was intended to
provide an orderly process by which the states could agree on an
allocation formula. The ACF Compact maintained the situation as
when the lawsuit was filed in Alabama in 1990, and expired in August
2003. Under the ACF Compact, the Corps continued to allow
municipal water withdrawal for community use in successively larger
amounts each year.
In December 2000, SeFPC filed its complaint in the D.C. litigation,
contending that the cumulative municipal water withdrawals resulted
in diminished aggregate water to produce the hydroelectric power that
SeFPC sold. This production decrease forced SeFPC's members to
purchase more costly energy elsewhere, and continue to pay for
Buford Dam hydropower at prices disproportionate to the quantity of
water devoted to hydropower generation. Meanwhile, the Corps
charged the municipal water suppliers proportionately less for the
water stored for municipal use under the interim contracts.
Georgia and the municipal water suppliers moved to intervene in
the D.C. litigation, and after two years of negotiations, the participants
in the litigation entered a settlement agreement ("Settlement
Agreement"). Two weeks after the parties presented the Settlement
Agreement to the court for approval, Alabama and Florida intervened
in the D.C. litigation. Alabama and Florida also revived the moribund
litigation in the Alabama court by an application for a preliminary
injunction asking that court to declare the Settlement Agreement null
and void in violation of the 1990 stay.
The Alabama court granted Alabama and Florida's application and
enjoined the Corps and Georgia from executing the Settlement
Agreement without the approval of the Alabama court. Alabama and
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Florida then intervened in the D.C. litigation, opposing the approval
of the Settlement Agreement. The court also addressed the validity of
the Settlement Agreement because more parties were before the court
in the D.C. litigation than in the Alabama action.
The court stated that a settlement agreement should be approved
if it is fair, adequate, and reasonable, so long as it is not illegal or
contrary to public policy. Alabama and Florida argued that the Corps
lacked the necessary statutory authority to carry out the obligations of
They also claimed the Settlement
the Settlement Agreement.
Agreement violated several federal environmental statutes. The court
held that while the objections might present grounds upon which to
prevent execution of portions of the Settlement Agreement, they
lacked sufficient definiteness and imminence to justify invalidation of
the entire Settlement Agreement.
In response to Alabama and Florida's first claim, the court
examined the Corps' authority to manage water storage in Lake Lanier
under the Water Supply Act of 1958 ("WSA"). The WSA limits the
extent to which the Corps can change a project without first getting
The court stated that the test for WSA
congressional approval.
compliance was whether the Settlement Agreement's adjustments and
allocations to water storage would seriously affect the other authorized
purposes of Lake Lanier. Here hydropower production was the only
authorized purpose of Lake Lanier seriously affected by the Settlement
Agreement. Because SeFPC was the only party involved in hydropower
production and supported the Settlement Agreement, the court held
that the Corps and the Settlement Agreement complied with the WSA.
With respect to Alabama and Florida's National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") claim, section 3.1 of the Settlement Agreement
explicitly conditioned implementation of its terms on completion of
the NEPA process, and gave discretion on the timing of the process to
the Corps. The court stated that either Alabama or Florida could voice
their concerns during the public comment phase of the NEPA review
process and to Congress, if necessary, after they raised additional
NEPA claims about water supply usage and appropriate water
baselines. The court also ruled that the Corps would satisfy their
burden under the other federal statutory issues Alabama and Florida
had raised by implementing the NEPA process under the Settlement
Agreement.
The court also held that the preliminary injunction issued by the
Alabama court was valid and remained in force. Therefore, while the
court decided the Settlement Agreement was fair and reasonable, and
not illegal or contrary to public policy, it also included a proviso in its
ruling that the parties could not execute the Settlement Agreement
until the Alabama court dissolved its injunction.
David W Hall
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STATE COURTS
ALASKA
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Alaska, 80 P.3d 231 (Alaska 2003)
(affirming state agency's consistency review approving an airport
expansion proposal that included filling 240 acres of coastal wetlands).
The Alaska Center for the Environment ("ACE") challenged the
Coordination's ("Division")
Alaska Division of Governmental
consistency review approving the expansion of the Ted Stevens
ACE challenged the
Anchorage International Airport ("AIA").
Division's determination, contending that the AIA's proposal lacked
the specificity required for a thorough consistency review under
standards imposed by state and municipal coastal management
programs. The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial
District upheld the Division's determination, and ACE appealed to the
Alaska Supreme Court. On appeal, ACE again contested the Division's
review and proposal's lack of specificity, asserting that both failed to
comply with the Alaska Coastal Management Program's ("Alaska
CMP") consistency review requirements.
AIA's expansion proposal entailed several types of construction
projects that would require filling 240 acres of wetlands in Turnagain
Bog and Postmark Bog over a period of ten years. ACE claimed that
the Division failed to evaluate all the probable and cumulative effects
that might occur in developing the bogs because it evaluated effects
based on a model of probable uses rather than actual and specific
projects. Additionally, ACE argued the proposal failed to focus or
identify types of construction permits other than the long-term
wetlands fill permit for specific facilities located within the coastal
bogs.
Applying the substitution of judgment standard of review for the
agency's decision, the court did not review the trial court's decision,
but evaluated the Division's consistency review directly and affirmed
the trial court's finding of consistency with state and municipal
standards.
The court held that proposals including broad and
conceptual plans are acceptable when the submitting party provides
lists of all permitted uses and activities. Even though the AIA's
proposal lacked detailed plans, the provided descriptions of projects,
locations, facilities, and prohibited uses and the maps of typical project
layouts were sufficient for the Division to conduct an adequate review.
The court also held AIA's project did not need to be phased, which
would allow several consistency reviews of smaller portions of the
project throughout stages of construction. ACE claimed that phasing
was important to fully evaluate the impact on sensitive coastal areas as
the project plans developed. The court, however, affirmed the
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Division's position that segmenting a project potentially impaired a
comprehensive evaluation of environment risks, and imposing the
degree of specificity claimed by ACE was a false presumption within
the requirements of the Alaska CMP.
Determining that AIA's proposal was sufficient for a
comprehensive consistency review, the court upheld the prior ruling
that the Division correctly applied the standards of the Alaska CMP
and the Anchorage Coastal Management Plan ("Anchorage CMP")
when it approved the expansion project as consistent with state and
municipal standards. ACE's claims specifically contested the Division's
evaluation of state standards for a major energy facility, coastal
development and habitats, and geophysical hazards. Additionally,
ACE claimed that the Division's approval failed to comply with
Anchorage's local geophysical hazards standard, hazardous lands
policy, and transportation and utilities standard.
Under the state definition, a major energy facility includes a
development of more than local concern carried out in close
proximity to the coastal area and is subject to siting and other criteria
under the Alaska CMP. ACE asserted that fuel storage, transportation,
and dispensing on or near the runway for in-state energy use
constituted a major energy facility.
The Division disagreed,
contending that there was a distinction in the standard between
energy-related facilities and the use of fuel by businesses for daily
operations. The court affirmed the Division's interpretation that the
proposed uses in the expansion project constituted the latter. The
court deferred to the Division's assessment that the "major energy
facility" regulation instead applied to energy-related activities that
affected shipping routes, potential spills, and airborne emissions.
Thus, the various siting controls for a major energy facility were
inapplicable to the airport expansion project.
Next, ACE challenged the Division's interpretation of the coastal
development and habitats standards. Under the Alaska CMP, the
habitats standard requires stricter protection of coastal areas, but both
establish criteria that must be satisfied to justify development of coastal
habitats for purposes other than water-dependent and water-related
uses. The court held that the Division did not act arbitrarily or
unreasonably when establishing a public need for the loss of coastal
habitat to the airport expansion. ACE argued that the Division needed
to assess the public need with greater specificity for the different types
of proposed projects, rather than the expansion as a whole. ACE also
argued the Division did not define the potential revenue generated by
the proposed expansion, nor offer proof that it appropriately
evaluated the more strict habitats standard. The court concluded that
the Division had met the significant public need factor under the
habitats standard to justify development because the expansion of the
AIA was essential to the commercial viability of the entire state.
Further, the coastal development and habitats standards also
required the Division to assess feasible alternatives for the project and
approve the proposed development if no other alternatives are
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available or cost-effective. In its review, the Division discussed several
other alternate sites for airport expansion, but found them also in the
coastal zone and even more costly to develop. It also found no other
feasible alternatives for providing float or ski-based plane facilities.
ACE argued that the Division's treatment of all uses and activities as
functionally equivalent allowed the Division to determine that the
wetlands were the only feasible location for every single use listed.
Instead, ACE contended, the Division should have assessed feasible
alternatives for the different uses and activities. Again, the court ruled
against specificity, allowing the Division to consider "the likely mix of
future uses" rather than possible alternatives for individual uses.
Under the habitats standard of maximum conformance,
development of wetlands must not interfere with natural drainage
patterns, destroy critical habitat, or discharge toxic substances. ACE
asserted that AIA's hydrologic analysis, storm/runoff water collection
and treatment system design plan, which included offsite wetland
mitigation, failed to satisfy the maximum conformance standard.
Despite ACE's concerns, the Division found, and the court affirmed,
that AIA's proposal maximized conformance with the habitats
standard. In fact, the court cited as evidence the FAA's guidance that
offsite wetland mitigation is valuable in airport development to
discourage wildlife hazards.
Third, ACE argued that the Division lacked sufficient information
to evaluate siting, design, and construction measures in areas of high
geophysical hazards because AIA did not conduct appropriately
detailed studies.
The Division contended that studies were
unnecessary since the uses authorized in the permit were low-density
human uses and utilized construction standards in compliance with
the Uniform Building Code. Thus, the proposal effectively minimized
property damage and loss of life and conformed to both state and local
requirements. Because geophysical hazards on and around the airport
were general knowledge, the Division allowed the AIA to defer
detailed studies to later stages of the development process.
ACE further challenged the finding of consistency with the
Anchorage CMP policy of discouraging development in high hazard
areas while encouraging use of the lands for open space, recreation,
parks, greenbelts, and aesthetic purposes. ACE contended that the
location of the project in high hazard areas was inconsistent with the
purpose of the local policy. The court held that the Division's
consistency determination need only conform with local policy, not
with stated values or purposes. Regardless, the consistency review
included several value assessments of the land. For example, AIA's
proposal to build a 300-foot buffer along a portion of the airport's
boundary was evaluated by the Division against competing local
interests to maintain the natural aesthetic of the open space.
Finally, ACE contended that transportation routes and utilities
failed to comply with the local municipality's standard for review of
transportation and utility routes because the local coastal management
program requires avoidance or minimization of adverse impacts to
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coastal or freshwater marshes and wetlands due to public works
activities. Here, the court found that ACE was correct regarding the
standard of review, but the Division satisfied the requirement through
its discussion of other standards. Nonetheless, the court held that the
Division took a hard look at the local coastal management program
policies, even though it failed to mention them explicitly.
Therefore, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that AIA's
proposal contained sufficient information for the Division to conduct
a satisfactory consistency review. Further, the court affirmed the
Division's determination that AIA's proposed airport expansion
project satisfied all requirements for development of coastal areas
under the state and local coastal management programs.
DaraLur

ARKANSAS
Ark. River Rights v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, No. CA03-389, 2003
Ark. App. LEXIS 786 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) (holding summary
judgment improper when questions of material fact remained
regarding public prescriptive easement and navigability of the waters
over Echubby Area).
Echubby Lake Hunting Club ("Club") purchased the Echubby
Areas (the Echubby chute, Echubby Lake, a ditch connecting the
chute to the Echubby Lake, and a small lake in the Coal Pile area)
from the Chicago Mill and Lumber Company in 2001 as part of a 2400acre land acquisition. Although the Echubby Area is currently covered
by water, until the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
constructed the Lock and Dam No. 2 ("Dam") on the Arkansas River
in the 1960s, the Echubby Area was not accessible from the Arkansas
River. Shortly after its acquisition, the Club applied to the Corps for
permission to construct a crossing over part of the Echubby Area.
Because the proposed crossing would block public access to parts of
water within the Echubby Area, Arkansas River Rights Committee
("Group") adamantly opposed the crossing and claimed the public
had acquired a prescriptive right to use the water. As a result of the
Group's opposition, the Club filed a complaint in Lincoln County
Circuit Court ("trial court"), seeking a declaration indicating its
ownership of Echubby Areas was free and clear without any right of
access by the Group. The Group claimed that because the Echubby
Area waters were navigable and the public had been exercising open
and notorious control over the waters for the past seven years, the
Group had acquired a public prescriptive easement over the water.
Arguing that hunting and fishing rights cannot be acquired by
prescription and that navigability of the waters should be determined
by their natural state (thus before the dam), the Club filed a motion
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for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found summary
judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact
remained as to both whether the public had acquired a prescriptive
right and as to the navigability of the Echubby Area waters. The court
came to this decision by relying on a previous holding by the Arkansas
Supreme Court, which stated that once water from a navigable body
artificially covers a riparian owner's land without the owner's consent
for a sufficient length of time, the public acquires the right to use the
newly covered land. Thus, because the dam caused water from the
Arkansas River, which was navigable, to cover the Club's land without
its consent, questions as to the public's prescriptive right to the water
over the covered land remained.
Next, the court quickly rejected the Club's contentions that
conditions on the date of statehood determine navigability of a water
body and that the court should determine navigability by the condition
of the area before any improvements. Regarding the Club's first
contention, the court relied on a prior United States Supreme Court
precedent indicating that while navigability to fix ownership of a river
bed or riparian rights is determined as of the date of statehood,
navigability for other purposes, as was the case here, may arise later.
Regarding the Club's second contention, the court concluded the
current conditions of the Echubby Area were not due to any
improvements to the Echubby Area itself, but rather were secondary
effects from improvements to a different body of water, the Arkansas
River. Further, no precedent existed which requires closing water to
the public simply because it was rendered navigable through
improvements made to another body of water. Finding the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment when questions of material fact
remained regarding the public's prescriptive easement and the
navigability of the water, the court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
Aimee H. Wagstaff

CALIFORNIA
San Francisco Baykeeper v. California State Water Res. Control Bd.,
No. A08908, 2003 WL 21235472 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2003) (holding
that in the period between a determination that a water body is an
impaired body under section 303 (d) of the Clean Water Act and the
development of a Total Maximum Daily Load for that particular
pollutant, an interim permit that allows an increase in the discharge of
a pollutant does not necessarily constitute a degradation of the level of
water quality needed to protect existing uses nor a degradation of the
existing beneficial uses violative of the antidegradation policy for a
Tier 1 water).
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San Francisco Baykeeper ("Baykeeper") filed a petition for a writ of
mandate in the California Superior Court seeking to vacate the
California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Francisco Bay
Region's ("Regionial Board") issuance of two National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits to two sewage
treatment plants. Baykeeper specifically alleged that mass effluent
limits for mercury used in both permits failed to comply with
California's antidegradation policy. The superior court concluded
that: (1) California's antidegradation policy for Tier 1 waters does not
completely prohibit increasing the discharge of mercury, (2) the
Regional Board made an authorized policy choice in its decision to
include trigger levels approximating the actual mass discharged into
the water and enacting mass limitations rewarding reclamation, and
(3) the administrative record supported the Regional Board's
determinations as to the interim permit. The superior court upheld
the permits. Baykeeper appealed to the California Court of Appeal,
First District, Division 2. The appellate court examined whether the
superior court prejudicially abused its discretion and concluded the
interim mass limits did not violate the antidegradation policy.
The City of Petaluma ("Petaluma") owns a secondary treatment
plant that discharges some of its treated wastewater into the Petaluma
River, which eventually leads to the San Pablo Bay. The Fairfield
Suisun Sewer District ("FSSD") owns a tertiary level treatment plant
that discharges treated wastewater to Boynton Slough, part of Suisun
Marsh and a tributary to Suisun Bay and Suisun Slough. In 1998, the
Regional Board issued its 1998 Section 303(d) List of Impaired Water
Bodies and Priorities for Development of Total Maximum Daily Loads
("TMDL") for the San Francisco Bay Region. The Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") approved this list. The list identifies both
San Pablo Bay and Suisun Bay as water bodies impaired by mercury. In
1998, the Regional Board reissued permits for the Petaluma and FSSD
plants. The permit expressed effluent limitations in terms of mass and
concentration and listed final and interim concentration limits. The
Regional Board created the final limit for mercury based on its best
professional judgment of the limit needed to comply with the
objectives outlined in the 1995 basin plan for the San Francisco Bay
Region. The final and interim concentration limits contained more
stringent concentration limits for mercury than the previous 1990
permits for these two plants.
Baykeeper argued that the Regional Board prejudicially abused its
discretion by determining that the mass effluent limitations for
mercury complied with California's antidegradation policy. The
federal government created the antidegradation policy in 1983; it
required that states adopt their own antidegradation policy. California
adopted an antidegradation policy that protects three categories of
waters. California classified the waters concerned in the present case
as Tier 1 waters. California's antidegradation policy protects the
"existing instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to
protect" those uses for Tier 1 waters. The antidegradation policy for
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Tier 1 waters applies when a future action results in "significantly
lowered" water quality or when a future action causes "significant" or
"substantial" augmentation of pollutant loadings.
The appellate court started the analysis with four important
considerations: (1) the court should accord substantial weight to the
Regional Board's interpretation, (2) the Regional Board has more
experience than the court with the scientific and technical
considerations of the issues considered in this case, (3) the permits
expired in July 2003, and (4) the Regional Board set a date to
implement the TMDL for mercury after the permits expired. The
appellate court further concluded that for Tier 1 waters, an increase in
mercury discharge does not necessarily equate to either a degradation
of existing uses that are beneficial or degradation of the water quality
level needed to protect the existing uses. The appellate court held
that an action triggers the federal and state antidegradation policies
when it causes a lowering of the water quality and not necessarily when
there is an increase in the discharge of a pollutant. It also affirmed the
superior court's determination that allowing higher mass limits for
plants with significant reclamation programs does not violate the
antidegradation policy.
The superior court deferred to the Regional Board's
determination that an increase in the amount of mercury allowable
under the permit would not cause undue degradation to these water
bodies and upheld the superior court's affirmation of the permits. In
turn, the appellate court held that the superior court did not
prejudicially abuse its discretion. According to the appellate court,
Baykeeper urged the court to make a policy choice, which the court
had no authority to make. Concluding, the appellate court stated that
the legislature vested the regional and state water boards-not the
courts-with the authority to make the policy choices on this type of
issue.
Adriano Martinez

Huls v. Thorpe, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11333 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 2003) (holding that no triable issue of fact existed where upper
landowner did not engage in affirmative conduct causing property
damage resulting from surface water flow onto lower landowner's
property).
Ralph and Edna Huls owned property directly behind and below
property owned by Richard and Diane Thorpe. From December 1997
through March 1998, seasonal heavy rains caused flooding from the
Thorpe property onto the Huls property. Although the Hulses
installed a drain on their property, water from the Thorpe property
continued to flood their land. The water flow allegedly caused mold,
mildew, and fungus to grow in the Hulses' home, adversely affecting
The Hulses filed a lawsuit in the
their health and property.
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Sacramento Superior Court alleging trespass, nuisance, and
negligence and seeking damages resulting from the flooding. The
trial court granted the Thorpes' motion for summary judgment, and
the Hulses appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Third
Appellate District.
The court reviewed the Hulses' appeal de novo to determine
whether the trial court appropriately granted the Thorpes summary
judgment. The court found that historically three doctrines emerged
for the treatment of surface water: the common enemy rule, the civil
rule, and the reasonable use rule. The common enemy rule states that
landowners have an unqualified right to fend off surface waters that
come onto their properties. The civil rule states that lower owners
must accept surface waters that drain onto their lands from upper
owners, but that upper owners cannot alter natural drainage systems
on their properties to increase the burden. The reasonable use rule
seeks to determine the surface water rights of all parties involved using
all relevant factors.
Specifically, the Hulses argued that the trial court erred because it
failed to apply the reasonable use rule. The court, however, found the
civil rule applied in California, as California accepted the civil rule as
the basis for peaceful relations between neighboring landowners.
Pursuant to the civil rule, a landowner is liable for damages caused by
surface water flooding where that landowner affirmatively alters his or
her property to cause water flow onto an adjacent property by
unnatural means. The court noted that courts could not apply the
civil rule without also considering the reasonable use rule. As such,
the landowner threatened with injury to his or her property by flow of
surface waters must take reasonable action to avoid or reduce any
actual or potential harm. Here, the court found that the Thorpes had
not affirmatively altered their property. Accordingly, no unnatural
surface water flow from the Thorpe property onto the Huls property
existed. The court thereby found that no triable issue of material fact
existed and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Kyle K. Chang

COLORADO
City of Golden v. Simpson, 83 P.3d 87 (Colo. 2004) (holding that the
plain terms of a change decree required city to stop diverting water
from creek, and that water court did not err in dismissing city's
complaint seeking injunctive relief after it denied city's temporary
restraining order).
The City of Golden ("Golden") originally diverted water from
Clear Creek at the Oulette Ditch, located several miles downstream
from Golden. Golden diverted water at the rate of 6.69 cubic feet per
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second ("cfs") for irrigation purposes. This senior water right Qated
back to May 1860. However, issues arose in 1966 that caused Golden
to seek new water rights. Golden needed water for municipal purposes
and needed to divert the water farther upstream and closer to its
municipal intake. As a result, the District Court, Water Division 1
entered a change decree imposing new conditions on Golden.
The 1966 decree reduced Golden's water rights from 6.69 cfs to
3.42 cfs "to reflect historical beneficial use," moved the diversion point
upstream to the Church Ditch, and changed the use to municipal.
Because of the move, Golden's point of diversion moved farther
upstream than many other water right holders. In an.attempt to guard
their rights, the other water right holders included certain protective
provisions in the change decree.
One of the included provisions protected the rights of Farmers
High Line Canal and Reservoir Company ("FHL'). The provision
recreated the pre-change relationship between FHL and Golden. FHL
diverted water at the FHL Canal, which was located between the
Oulette Ditch and the Church Ditch. According to the provision,
when water flowing at the Oulette Ditch was sufficient to satisfy
Golden's new volume (3.5 cfs) at its prior point of diversion, and when
Clear Creek did not have enough water to satisfy the rights of both
Golden and FHL, the change decree required Golden to stop
diverting water at the Church Ditch. In effect, Golden's new rights
were subordinate to FHL's water rights.
A severe drought triggered this provision in mid-July 2002, due to
insufficient water to satisfy FHL's rights. Because the water flow at the
Oulette Ditch was 5-10 cfs at that point, FHL placed a call on Clear
Creek, which required Golden to stop diverting at the Church Ditch.
Despite the request, Golden continued diverting. FHL reported
Golden's violation to the Division Engineer, who subsequently issued a
cease-and-desist order that demanded Golden stop diverting.
Golden continued to divert water and filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order ("TRO"), a motion for preliminary
injunction, and a complaint for injunctive relief to prevent
enforcement of the cease-and desist order. Soon thereafter, the
District Court, Water Division 1, ("water court") held a hearing on
Golden's motion for a TRO. Based on the testimony at the hearing
and the language of the 1966 decree, the water court held Golden did
not have any legally enforceable right to continue diversions. As a
result, the water court ordered Golden to comply with the cease-anddesist order. The water court subsequently denied Golden's motion
for a TRO and dismissed the complaint for injunctive relief. Golden
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Golden made two primary arguments on appeal. First, Golden
argued the water court erred in its interpretation of the language in
the 1966 change decree. In doing so, Golden suggested the change
decree did not preclude Golden from exercising its right to divert
water in this circumstance. Second, Golden argued the water court
erred in dismissing Golden's complaint for injunctive relief without a
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separate hearing.
The court affirmed the water court's interpretation of the 1966
change decree. The court noted that a main goal in crafting change
decrees is the prevention of injury to other water users. Hence, in
change decrees parties include provisions such as the one at issue in
this case. Further, courts interpret change decrees in the same
manner they interpret contracts; the court's primary goal is to
implement the intent of the parties. Finally, the court noted the
reasons the parties entered the change decree-Golden was the one
that wanted to move its point of diversion and change the use from
seasonal irrigation to year-round municipal.
The court held that the change decree was clear on its face and the
intent of the parties was apparent: Golden did not have a right to
divert water from Clear Creek when the two conditions in the
provision were satisfied. In this case, the court noted, both were
clearly satisfied. FHL did not have enough water to satisfy its rights, yet
the rate at the Oulette Ditch was sufficient to meet Golden's new
volume. As for Golden's numerous interpretations of the change
decree, the court suggested that the attempts were futile because the
language of the decree and the intent of the parties were both clear.
Further, because the decree was clear on its face, the court held that
extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to alter its plain meaning. The
court affirmed the water court's interpretation.
The court also rejected Golden's argument that the water court
erred in dismissing Golden's complaint for injunctive relief without a
separate hearing. The court held that the water court followed proper
procedure.
The court pointed out at the onset that the court
interpreted Golden's motions as attempts to temporarily or
permanently prevent enforcement of the state's cease-and-desist order.
It also noted that like a TRO, the purpose of an injunction is to
prevent irreparable harm prior to a decision on the merits of a case.
In doing so, the court realized the importance of the expeditious
nature of water court proceedings such as the one in this case. The
court determined the water court heard all the necessary, relevant
evidence offered by the parties on the matter in dispute in the single,
full-day hearing. Because the water court ordered Golden to comply
with the state's cease-and desist order, it was impossible to grant
Golden's complaint for injunctive relief. Therefore, the water court
properly and necessarily dismissed Golden's complaint against the
State after it granted the State's injunction against Golden.
In conclusion, the court rejected both of Golden's arguments on
appeal, and affirmed the holding of the water court.
Benjamin M. Petre
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Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. Groundwater
Appropriators of the S. Platte River Basin, Inc., 85 P.3d 536 (Colo.
2004) (holding a prevailing party in a water court proceeding that has
reached trial is entitled to an award of costs).
On June 30, 1998, Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte
River Basin, Inc. ("GASP") filed an application in the District Court in
Water Division No. 1 ("water court") for a conditional water storage
right for the proposed Ovid Reservoir in Sedgwick County, Colorado.
GASP's application sought the right to store 7500 acre-feet of water,
which GASP later amended prior to trial to 5772 acre-feet of water,
with a right to fill and refill. Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
("Fort Morgan") filed a statement of opposition with the water court
claiming that GASP's application could adversely affect its vested water
rights located in the South Platte River Basin. The Division Engineer
filed a Summary of Consultation identifying concerns that GASP
needed to address before the Engineer could approve the application.
GASP then certified its intent to protest an adverse ruling of the water
referee and moved to resubmit the matter to the water judge. The
water court conducted a trial, during which GASP presented evidence
in support of its application. Fort Morgan presented evidence in
opposition to the application, arguing that GASP failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that GASP can and will put the water
to beneficial use within a reasonable time. The water court entered an
order granting GASP a conditional water storage right in Ovid
Reservoir and granted GASP's Motion for Award of Cost, which Fort
Morgan appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Fort Morgan appealed the water court's ruling on the following
points: (1) whether an applicant for water rights who obtains a decree
granting conditional water rights should be considered a "prevailing
party" pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure for the purpose of granting costs against an opposer in an
application; and (2) whether the water court's decision to award costs
to GASP against Fort Morgan pursuant to Rule 54(d) in this case was
unreasonable, unfair, and arbitrary, or constituted an abuse of
discretion.
Fort Morgan asserted that water right adjudication
proceedings are not litigation under Rule 54(d), except in
extraordinary circumstances, because they are not proceedings
brought against another party, and therefore should not result in
imposition of costs against an opposer, which would impede the right
to protect senior water rights. GASP argued that when an opposer
forces an applicant to a contested trial, the opposer is doing more than
protecting its own water right, and therefore, an award of costs under
Rule 54(d) is appropriate.
The court held that since no statute or rule prohibited the award
of costs and since water right proceedings do not preclude the
applicability of Rule 54(d), the award of costs rests with the discretion
of the water court. The court acknowledged that water court
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proceedings were unique due to the bifurcated proceedings before,
first, a referee and second, after re-referral, to a discovery and trial
before the water court. However, the court concluded that in the
absence of a statute that states otherwise, trial courts have discretion in
awarding costs to the prevailing party. The concept of prevailing party
is consistent with Rule 54(d), because by the time a water case reaches
the second phase in a trial before the water court, it becomes litigation
where the prevailing party is entitled to costs. The court ruled that
they would not generally overturn an award of costs on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Here, the court found no abuse of discretion,
as the water court's decision was supported by the record. Thus, the
court affirmed the water court's order awarding costs to GASP.
Stacy Hochman

Moyer v. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n, 78 P.3d 313 (Colo. 2003)
(holding that water court did not violate its discretion in rejecting
Moyers' Bill of Costs filed more than twenty months late).
In the fall of 1996, Appellee Empire Lodge Homeowners'
Association ("Empire Lodge") filed a complaint in the District Court
for Water Division No. 2. Empire Lodge alleged enlargement of the
Moyers' use of a decreed irrigation right. Moyer counterclaimed that
Empire Lodge diverted water out-of-priority. In March 2003, the
water court dismissed Empire Lodge's suit and issued an injunction in
favor of Moyer's counterclaim. Additionally, the water court ordered
costs in favor of Moyer and instructed Moyer to file a Bill of Costs. On
April 6, 2000, Moyer filed a motion requesting an extension of time,
specifically until April 28, to submit the Bill of Costs. The water court
granted the motion.
On April 25, Moyer again moved for an
extension of time until June 15, 2000, or three weeks after the court
had ruled on pending motions for reconsideration filed by Empire
Lodge and a motion to intervene from a state engineer, whichever was
later. On May 2, 2000, the water court denied those motions. On
February 25, 2002, Moyer submitted her Bill of Costs, and Empire
Lodge objected. The water court denied the Bill of Costs. Moyer
appealed the water court's denial of the Bill of Costs and the
subsequent motiofi for reconsideration directly to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
The court addressed whether the water court had abused its
discretion in rejecting Moyer's Bill of Costs. The court stated that the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure ("CRCP") applied to water court
proceedings, except where the rules expressly state otherwise. CRCP
121 requires a party to submit a Bill of Costs either 15 days after a
judgment, or at a later time that the court permits. In the first motion,
Moyer requested a later date, which the water court granted. The
water court, however, never ruled on the second motion. Although
the water court could have granted another extension, it did not.
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Moyer argued that the water court should have granted this motion
because of Empire Lodge's failure to submit a timely objection. The
court held that Empire Lodge's failure to object did not deprive the
water court of its power to deny the motion for extension. Moyer also
contended that the filing of the motion tolled the expiration deadline
of the previous motion. The court disagreed, stating that the failure to
address the motion did not extend the expired deadline. With respect
to the subsequent motion to reconsider, Moyer argued that because
the water court did not rule on her second motion to extend, her
missed deadline was due to excusable neglect. The court disagreed
and held that her actions were not based on an erroneous court order
and that her circumstances were different than circumstances of
excusable neglect. The court stated that failing to meet a deadline
because she decided to wait to hear the ruling of a request to extend
the deadline was not the same as relying on an erroneous court order.
Thus, the court affirmed the water court's decision.
Robert E. Wells

CONNECTICUT
Prestige Builders, LLC v. Inland Wetlands Comn'n of Ansonia, 831
A.2d 290 (Conn. App. 2003) (holding that an inland wetlands
commission must enact a formal regulation granting it authority over
upland review areas before it can regulate those areas.)
In 2000, in the Superior Court of Connecticut at Ansonia, Prestige
Builders sought review of the inland wetlands commission's denial of
its application to construct a nine lot residential subdivision. The
complaint addressed two issues: (1) whether current statutes provided
the Inland Wetlands Commission of the City of Ansonia
("Commission") authority to regulate activities in upland review areas
without first enacting a regulation governing activities in such areas,
and (2) whether common law provided the Commission with such
authority. The superior court dismissed the complaint and Prestige
Builders appealed to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. On appeal,
the court found in favor of Prestige Builders and remanded the case,
directing the commission to grant the construction application.
Prestige Builders owned property within the City of Ansonia.
Several areas of wetlands and watercourses totaling one acre existed on
the property.
In 2000, Prestige Builders proposed a nine lot
residential subdivision on approximately 7.5 acres of the property.
The Commission determined that because the property contained
wetlands and watercourses, any activity in and around those areas
constituted regulated activity, as defined by the Commission's
regulations. Therefore, the Commission indicated it had authority to
analyze the environmental impacts of the proposed construction.
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Subsequently, the Commission denied the application, stating that the
proposed construction could lead to flooding, erosion, and icing, thus
creating a negative effect on wells. Prestige Builders denied that there
was any regulated activity on the property since there would be no
activity on the wetland portion of the property. Prestige Builders
further argued that the Commission had not enacted a regulation
granting it authority over upland review areas.
First, the court addressed whether the Commission had statutory
authority to regulate the upland review area without first enacting a
formal regulation. The court applied the standard articulated in State
v. Courchesne, which states, "in interpreting statutes, we look at all the
available evidence, such as statutory language, the legislative history,
the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the purpose and policy
of the statute, and its relationship to existing legislation and common
law principles." Accordingly, the court held that a commission must
first enact a formal regulation to exercise authority over upland review
areas. The court further held that the Commission improperly
exercised its authority in denying the application since it had not
enacted any regulation giving it authority over upland review areas.
Second, the court discussed whether the common law provided the
Commission authority to deny the application. The court cited a
string of relevant cases recognizing the authority of an inland wetlands
commission to regulate activities in areas adjacent to wetlands or
watercourses that would have negative impacts on such wetlands or
watercourses.
However, in each case, the local commission had
enacted formal regulations over upland review areas.
Although the Commission adopted a regulation governing upland
review areas after denying the application, the court found that such
an amendment could not be retroactively applied to Prestige Builders.
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Prestige Builders and ordered the
Commission to grant the application for the nine-lot residential
neighborhood.
Tonn K Petersen

FLORIDA
Slusher v. Martin County, 859 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding the issuance of a well permit was improper because the
district court misinterpreted their own rule by misconstruing the
definition of an existing legal use).
James W. Slusher bought property in 1994 with a pond created for
the purpose of raising fish. Soon thereafter, Martin County began
operating a well adjacent to Slusher's property, which caused Slusher's
pond to drain. The South Florida Water Management District
("District") had issued Martin County a permit to operate the well
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adjacent to the pond; Slusher petitioned for an administrative hearing
challenging the permit. The District denied Slusher's petition, and
Slusher appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals contending the
District should not have issued the permit due to the adverse effects
the well had on his pond.
Rule 40E-2.301 (1) (f) of the Florida Administrative Code ("Code")
requires a well applicant to give reasonable assurances that a proposed
water use will not interfere with presently existing legal uses. Section
1.8 of the Basis of Water Review for Water Use Applications within the
South Florida Water Management District ("Basis") defines "existing
legal use" of water as a water use that is authorized under a District
water use permit or is existing and exempt from permit requirements.
The District interpreted the last part of this definition to mean expressly
exempt from permit requirements. However, because the definition
of "existing legal use" was clear and unambiguous, the court
determined the District misconstrued its own rule by adding the
expressly requirement, and therefore did not give deference to the
District's interpretation.
Thus, because the District previously
conceded that no permit was necessary for the pond, Slusher's use of
the pond qualified as an existing legal use. Furthermore, no record
existed that Martin County gave any reasonable assurances that their
well would not interfere with Slusher's existing legal use.
The District further concluded that Section 3.6 of Basis-stating
that a well permit should be denied only if significant reduction in
water levels in an adjacent water body would occur to the extent that
the designed function is impaired-should also preclude Slusher from
relief. However, the original owner of the land provided undisputed
testimony that the pond's designed function was to raise fish.
Therefore, because the loss of the pond water impaired the designed
purpose of the pond, the court found that the District's argument that
the permit was properly issued was without merit. Thus, the court
reversed the District's decision to issue Martin County a permit to
operate a well because the District misinterpreted its own rules.
Aimee Wagstaff

GEORGIA
Gwinnett County v. Lake Lanier Ass'n, Nos. A03A2340, A03A2341,
A03A2342, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 63 (Ga. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2004)
(holding (1) the Environmental Protection Division need not give
public notice after changes are made to a permit draft to release
highly treated wastewater into a lake, (2) the party challenging a
permit must affirmatively prove a violation of anti-degradation
regulations, and (3) the permit at issue was not invalid for failure to
require limits on mercury and properly limited effluent fecal coliform
and phosphorous).
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Gwinnett County ("Gwinnett")
applied
to the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division ("EPD") for a National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit to discharge highly
treated wastewater into Lake Lanier. The EPD gave public notice of
the permit application and allowed public comment on the permit
draft, which described the discharge location as near Buford Dam in
Lake Lanier. The EPD issued the permit to Gwinnett after revising the
discharge point to the North Advanced Water Reclamation Facility
("North Plant"). The North Plant discharged effluent near Buford
Dam into Lake Lanier. The EPD allowed no further public comment
on the revised permit before issuing the final permit.
An
administrative law judge ("ALJ") affirmed the EPD's issuance of the
permit after an evidentiary hearing. Lake Lanier Association, Terence
D. Hughey, Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc., and the
Sierra Club (collectively "Association") sought review of the ALJ's
decision in the Superior Court of Hall County. The court reversed the
ALJ's decision that the EPD must give additional public notice for the
revisions made to the original draft permit, and decided Gwinnett
must carry the burden of proving the absence of violations of antidegradation regulations. However, the trial court affirmed the ALJ's
rulings that the permit required no specific limits for mercury in the
effluent, and that the permit set proper limits on fecal coliform and
phosphorus.
Gwinnett appealed the reversals of the ALJ's decisions by the trial
court to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The court of appeals agreed
with the ALJ's decision that the EPD did not need to give new notice,
regarding the changes made to the permit draft before issuing the
NPDES permit. State regulations require the EPD to provide public
notice of the NPDES permit application with a period of public
comment before issuing the permit. The permit draft, issued in the
public notice, need only contain a general description of the discharge
point and the body of water absorbing the discharge. Here, the EPD
gave proper notice and accepted public comment. The court also
noted that state regulations allow the EPD to appropriately change or
revise the discharge point after the comment period without giving
additional notice. Therefore, the court of appeals found the EPD gave
sufficient public notice and reversed the trial court's decision
requiring additional notice.
The court of appeals also decided that the ALJ correctly found the
Association failed to prove violations of anti-degradation regulations.
State anti-degradation regulations require applicants for an NPDES
permit to demonstrate justification of water quality changes to the EPD
before the EPD issues the permit. Once the EPD issues the final
permit, any party challenging the permit must prove by a
preponderance of evidence that the permit holder failed to
demonstrate justification of water quality changes. The court held that
the trial court erred when it shifted the burden of proving whether a
violation of the regulations occurred from the Association to Gwinnett.
The court also held that the trial court erroneously substituted its
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judgment of the facts for the ALJ's judgment regarding whether a
violation of the anti-degradation regulations occurred. The ALJ's
decision must be upheld unless clearly erroneous, and the court held
that the ALJ made sufficient factual findings to support its ruling.
Therefore, the court reinstated the ALJ's finding that no violations of
the anti-degradation regulations occurred.
Next, the Association claimed the permit should include limits on
mercury. The court affirmed the trial court's decision not to require
limits for mercury in the permit, stating NPDES permits only limit
Specifically Gwinnett
pollutants that may possibly cause harm.
presented expert testimony at the ALJ hearing showing (1) no
mercury present in the influent coming into the treatment plant, (2)
the plant could reduce any mercury that may appear in the influent to
safe levels, and (3) if testing ever detected mercury in the effluent then
the EPD would impose mercury limits.
The Association also claimed that the limits for phosphorus and
fecal coliform would not protect Lake Lanier's designated uses of
swimming and fishing. The court held that the limits for phosphorus
and fecal coliform stipulated in the permit complied with all water
quality regulations, and the Association's claim lacked support by any
evidence in the record. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court rulings concerning public notice and anti-degradation
regulations, and affirmed the trial court's findings relating to effluent
limits of mercury, phosphorus, and fecal coliform.
David B. Oakley

HAWAII
In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004) (holding
although private commercial real estate developer's proposed
economic development plan constituted a "reasonable-beneficial"
water use, Commission on Water Resource Management properly
denied developer a water use permit pursuant to common law and
statutory authority).
The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"), the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs, ("OHA"), and other individuals appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, challenging a Commission on Water
Resource Management ("Commission") decision granting Wai'ola 0
Moloka'i ("Wai'ola") and its parent company Moloka'i Ranch, Ltd.
("MR") (collectively "MR-Wai'ola") a water use permit and authorizing
the Commission chairperson to issue well construction and pump
installation permits. DHHL, OHA, and the others argued (1) the
Commission erred in finding that MR-Wai'ola satisfied the requisite
conditions for obtaining a water permit for a "new use"; (2) the
Commission's decision violated the State's duty to protect DHHL's
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water rights pursuant to the Hawai'i Homes Commission Act
("HHCA"), the Hawai'i State Constitution, and the State Water Code
("Code"); (3) the Commission erred in interpreting the four-year "use
it or lose it" provision in section 174C-58(4) of the Hawai'i Statutes as
an enforcement tool instead of a planning tool, and abused its
discretion by finding the facts of matter warranted allocating water for
use beyond a four-year period; (4) the Commission erred in granting
an "interim" permit for a "new" use vis-A-vis an "existing" use; and (5)
the Commission erred in finding MR had correlative rights to
transport groundwater outside the watershed of origin.
MR-Wai'ola owned approximately one-third of the land on the
island of Moloka'i. Wai'ola was a domestic water purveyor that
operated as a public utility, as approved by the Hawai'i Public Utilities
Commission. As of 1998, Wai'ola supplied water to the western part of
Moloka'i, roughly one-sixth of the island's population. Although
Wai'ola owned and operated transmission and distribution systems
across Moloka'i, it did not control any source of potable groundwater
on the island. To serve its customer base, Wai'ola purchased potable
water from DHHL, Maui County ("County") and Kukui, Inc.
("Kukui"), all of which operated wells located in the Kualapu'u aquifer
system.
MR developed a thirty-year revitalization plan to stimulate
Moloka'i's economy premised upon (1) maintaining and capitalizing
on Moloka'i's rural character and vast open space; (2) increasing and
diversifying economic activities for Moloka'i residents in the areas of
agriculture, tourism, and light industry; and (3) protecting and
promoting the physical and cultural environment unique to the island
of Moloka'i. To effectuate its plan, MR applied for a water use permit
on behalf of Wai'ola. MR requested 1.25 million gallons per day
("mgd") of groundwater from the Kamiloloa aquifer system to
accommodate its current and future domestic, commercial, industrial,
and municipal needs. Specifically, MR sought approximately 220,000
gallons per day ("gpd") to serve its current needs on western Moloka'i
in the event DHHL and Kukui discontinued purchase agreements with
Wai'ola, and 0.1 mgd for the ongoing development of MR's land over
the next fifteen to twenty years.
On May 21, 1996, the Commission approved the water use permit
for MR's Kamiloloa well, subject to reductions in water amounts
previously allocated to other parties. The Commission mandated that
(1) DHHL reduce its water use by 14,000 gpd; (2) Maui Department of
Water Supply reduce its water use by 85,910 gpd; and (3) Kukui
reduce its water use by 19,952 gpd. DHHL filed a timely petition for a
contested case hearing on MR's approved permits on October 3, 1996,
alleging that MR-Wai'ola's proposed well would adversely affect
DHHL's interests. The Commission determined that DHHL had
standing to contest the permits. Additionally, through a separate
hearing, the Commission granted standing to OHA, the County,
individuals who either resided on land within the Kamiloloa aquifer
system or had property interests in Kamiloloa, and native Hawaiians
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who claimed traditional and customary gathering rights pursuant to
pre-1778 Hawaiian law.
At the contested case hearing, the Commission limited DHHL,
OHA, the County, and the others to discussing the effect of the
proposed Kamiloloa well on the two adjacent aquifers (Kualapu'u and
Waikolu) and the effect of the proposed well on the nearshore
environment. The first issue addressed whether (1) MR-Wai'ola's
proposed water use constituted a "reasonable use" and was permissible
under state common law; (2) the proposed use was consistent with the
public interest and the quantified effect of groundwater pumping on
stream flow and nearshore waters; and (3) any party had appurtenant
or riparian rights, or any other right to a quantifiable amount of water
equal to or having priority over the proposed use. Regarding the
second issue, the Commission addressed the conditions that it would
impose upon MR-Wai'ola's water use in the event it granted the water
use permit.
The Commission issued its proposed findings of fact ("FOF"),
conclusions of law ("COL"), and decision on August 19, 1998. After
reviewing written exceptions submitted by DHHL, OHA, the County,
and the others, the Commission issued its final decision on December
28, 1998. The Commission concluded, inter alia, that MR-Wai'ola's
proposed water use constituted a reasonable-beneficial use sufficient to
warrant an "interim water use permit" for MR-Wai'ola's proposed
Kamiloloa well. Following this decision, DHHL, OHA,the County,
and the others collectively appealed the Commission's decision to the
Supreme Court of Hawai'i.
On appeal, the supreme court first addressed the extent to which
reservations of water preclude applicants for "new" water use permits
from satisfying the requisite conditions to obtain such permits.
Specifically, the court reviewed the Commission's finding that a
"reservation" of water did not constitute an "existing legal use" for
purposes of the Code and the Commission's decision that DHHL's
reservations were aquifer-specific and thus, as a matter of law, MRWai'ola's application for a water use permit in the Kamiloloa aquifer
system did not interfere with DHHL's reservation in the Kualapu'u
aquifer system.
Pursuant to section 174C-5, the Commission administers the Code
and can adopt and enforce rules as necessary to facilitate Code
administration. The court stated it would defer to the Commission's
interpretation of its own rules unless that interpretation is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the underlying legislative purpose. The
Commission also formulates a "Hawai'i water plan" to protect, manage,
and conserve the state's water. Here, the court found that the
Commission had authority to limit reservations of water to specific
aquifers, as the Commission administers the Code and determines the
contents of the Hawaii water plan and the Commission's interpretation
of its rule was not erroneous or inconsistent with the legislative
purpose.
However, the court stated that pursuant to sections 174C-49(a) (7)
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and 174C-49(e), MR-Wai'ola's proposed water use could not interfere
with DHHL's water rights, as any permit issued by the Commission was
subject to DHHL's rights. As such, MR-Wai'ola had the burden of
establishing that its proposed water use in the Kamiloloa aquifer
system would not interfere with DHHL's water reservation in the
Kualapu'u aquifer system, and that the Commission had a duty to hold
MR-Wai'ola to this burden.
The court continued its analysis of this first issue by holding that a
water reservation does not constitute an existing legal use. The court
found statutory language and language from the Hawai'i
Administrative Rules specifically distinguishing a water "reservation"
from an "existing legal use." However, the court also noted that
separate statutory authority protected DHHL's reservation rights.
Lastly, in balancing competing interests for water use permit
applications, the court considered whether water reservations
constituted a public trust purpose requiring Commission protection.
The court has long recognized the heightened duty owed to native
Hawaiians, including their water rights. Consistent with this duty, the
court held that a water reservation constituted a public trust purpose
and that the Commission bore a duty to protect the interests of native
Hawaiians in balancing competing interests for water use permits.
Because water reservations effectuated the State's public trust duty to
"ensure the continued availability and existence of its water resources
for present and future generations," such reservations were entitled to
the constitutional protections given to public trust purposes.
In holding that water reservations constituted a public trust
purpose, the court next addressed whether the Commission
discharged its public trust duty to protect DHHL's water reservations
in the Kualapu'u aquifer.
Although the court acknowledged a
presumption of validity for agency decisions affecting public trust
resources, reasonably clear FOFs and COLs premise this presumption.
In this case, the court found no FOFs regarding whether MR-Wai'ola
established that its proposed use would not interfere with DHHL's
reservation in the Kualapu'u aquifer, as required by the Code. The
court thus held that the Commission incorrectly concluded that MRWai'ola did not need to meet its burden of proving its use would not
interfere with DHHL's reservation because DHHL had a reservation in
Kualapu'u aquifer and MR-Wai'ola sought use of Kamiloloa water.
The Commission thereby violated the public trust doctrine, the Code,
and the Hawai'i Constitution by failing to render proper FOFs and
COLs determining whether MR-Wai'ola satisfied its burden of proof.
As such, the court held the Commission did not adequately discharge
its duty to protect DHHL's reservation in the Kualapu'u aquifer.
Although the court held that the Commission did not discharge its
duty with respect to DHHL's water reservation, it found that the
Commission did satisfy its public trust obligation to protect DHHL's
existing legal uses of the Kualapu'u aquifer.
Specifically, the
Commission adequately protected DHHL's existing wells against the
competing uses proposed by MR-Wai'ola. The court stated that the
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Commission had a duty to "consider the cumulative impact of existing
and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement
reasonable measures to mitigate this impact." Here, the Commission
addressed the potential impact of MR-Wai'ola's proposed Kamiloloa
well on DHHL by (1) considering two hydrological studies in
rendering its FOFs and COLs, (2) granting MR-Wai'ola a water use
permit for approximately one-half of the requested water amount, and
(3) proposing a municipal reservation in the Kamiloloa aquifer system
that would be set up for municipal uses as defined in the Code. The
court therefore concluded that the Commission sufficiently protected
DHHL's interest in its existing wells.
The court secondly addressed whether the Commission erred in
finding that MR-Wai'ola satisfied the requisite conditions to obtain a
water use permit. In Hawai'i, the Code's permitting provisions control
issuance of use permits with respect to water management areas
("WMA"). Because the Commission designated the entire island of
Moloka'i as a WMA, the Code governs all applications for water use on
the island. Pursuant to statute, a "new," as opposed to "existing," use
of water is required to obtain a water permit. Furthermore, under the
Code and the public trust doctrine, permit applicants have the burden
ofjustifying their proposed uses in light of protected public rights. To
determine whether the Commission erred in concluding MR-Wai'ola
had met its burden of proof, the court considered each relevant
element of the prevailing statute separately.
Within this analysis, the court first addressed whether MR-Wai'ola
established in its permit application that the water source, here a
groundwater body, could accommodate MR-Wai'ola's proposed water
use. The Commission concluded that the Kamiloloa aquifer system
could accommodate MR-Wai'ola's proposed use because there was
unallocated water in the aquifer and DHHL had no reservations in
Kamiloloa water. The court stated that because water reservations are
aquifer-specific, the sustainable yield of a particular aquifer is also
Having noted this, the court held that the
aquifer-specific.
Commission did not clearly err in finding that the Kamiloloa aquifer
could accommodate MR-Wai'ola's requested allocation.
The court next considered whether the Commission erred in
finding that MR-Wai'ola's proposed water use would minimally affect
Specifically, the court reviewed the
DHHL's Kualapu'u wells.
Commission's refusal to consider the effect on DHHL's interest
because DHHL's wells were in the Kualapu'u system and MR-Wai'ola
proposed to construct wells only in the Kamiloloa system. Upon
reviewing the entire record, the court concluded that the Commission
did not clearly err in finding that MR-Wai'ola established its proposed
water use in Kamiloloa would not interfere with DHHL's existing wells
in Kualapu'u.
Third, the court addressed whether MR-Wai'ola's application
established that its proposed use was a reasonable-beneficial use
consistent with state and county land use plans and designations, and
was consistent with county land use plans and policies. Pursuant to
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statute, a "reasonable-beneficial use" is "the use of water in such a
quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, for a
purpose, an in a manner [that] is both reasonable and consistent with
the state and county land use plans and the public interest." To
establish a reasonable-beneficial use, water permit applicants must, at a
minimum, prove their water needs and demonstrate the absence of
plausible mitigating measures. The court reviewed the record and
found evidence sufficient for the Commission to conclude that MRWai'ola's proposed use constituted a reasonable-beneficial use of
water. The court thus held that the Commission did not clearly err in
finding that MR-Wai'ola met its burden of establishing a reasonablebeneficial use of water.
Lastly, the court reviewed whether the Commission erred in
finding MR-Wai'ola met its burden of establishing that its proposed
use of water would not interfere with DHHL's rights. Upon reviewing
the record, the court found the FOFs failed to address whether MRWai'ola offered sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden. Moreover, the
court found COLs that suggested the burden was on DHHL to
establish that MR-Waiola's proposed use would not interfere with
DHHL's reservation rights. This was directly contrary to the court's
well-settled interpretation of an applicant's burden under the Code,
for purposes of a "new" use. Because the Commission made no FOFs
or COLs establishing whether MR-Wai'ola met its burden of proving its
proposed use would not interfere with DHHL's rights, the court
remanded the matter back to the Commission to make FOFs and
COLs regarding this issue.
The third issue the court addressed was whether the Commission
misinterpreted section 174C-58(4) as an enforcement tool instead of a
planning tool. OHA argued the Commission erred in granting MRWai'ola a water permit for water it would not use within four years of
the permit's issuance.
OHA further argued that, even if the
Commission had statutory authority to issue MR-Wai'ola a water permit
for nonuse beyond a four-year period, it erred in finding good and
sufficient reasons for doing so.
The court construed section 174C-58(4) to permit, rather than
mandate, suspension or revocation of water use permits based on
partial or total nonuse. Furthermore, the language of section 174C58(4) explicitly allowed the Commission to enter into written
agreements where any period of nonuse may apply toward the fouryear revocation period. As such, the court stated that section 174C58(4) was an enforcement tool by which the Commission could revoke
or suspend a water use permit upon knowledge that the permitted
allocation of water, which the Commission expected the permit
applicant to use within four years, was unused. Moreover, the court
found a Commission COL in the record that supported the court's
interpretation of section 174C-58(4). The court therefore held that
the Commission did not abuse its discretion in allocating water for
future uses beyond a four-year period to MR-Wai'ola because the Code
and the Hawai'i water plan saw a long-range comprehensive syllabus
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for Hawaii's water resources and the record supported the
Commission's conclusion that the fifteen-to-twenty years necessary to
implement MR-Wai'ola's development plan warranted a water
allocation in excess of four years.
The court next addressed whether MR-Wai'ola could transport
water outside the water's aquifer of origin. The Commission found
that MR-Wai'ola, by virtue of owning land in the Kamiloloa aquifer
system, had correlative rights to transport water from Kamiloloa to
various service areas outside of Kamiloloa. However, court precedent
established that relevant Code provisions, and not the common law
doctrine of correlative rights, applied to WMAs. Because the entire
island of Moloka'i was a WMA, the correlative rights doctrine was
inapplicable. As such, the court held the Commission erred in
concluding that MR-Wai'ola had correlative rights to Kamiloloa water.
The court noted that even if MR-Wai'ola had correlative rights, such
rights did not extend to transporting groundwater outside the
Kamiloloa aquifer system. The court remanded this issue back to the
Commission, stating that MR-Wai'ola had a right to transfer water
outside the watershed of origin pursuant to a validly issued water
permit and statutory authority. The Commission could allow MRWai'ola to transport water outside the Kamiloloa aquifer if the
Commission found, as it did in this case, that such use was consistent
with the public interest and the general land use plans and policies of
the state and counties.
Lastly, the court considered whether the Commission erred in
granting MR-Wai'ola an "interim" water use permit for its proposed
future uses. Pursuant to statute, the court found that the Commission
could issue interim permits only for "existing legal uses," and not for
"new uses." The court found in both the Commission's FOFs and MRWai'ola's answering brief that MR-Wai'ola's application sought a "new"
use of water. Moreover, the court was unable to find in the record any
justification for the Commission's issuance of the interim permit.
Although MR-Wai'ola proposed both "existing" and "future" uses of
aquifer water, its water use nonetheless sought to establish a new
groundwater source from which to make such uses. As such, the court
held the Commission incorrectly granted MR-Wai'ola an interim water
use permit.
Ultimately, while the court upheld some of the Commission's
Thus, the court vacated the
decisions, it reversed others.
Commission's decision and remanded the case back to the
Commission for further proceedings.
Kyle K. Chang
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IDAHO
Lovitt v. Robideaux, 78 P.3d 389 (Idaho 2003) (holding district court
could not adjudicate rights of the parties because the parties failed to
establish their littoral rights by failing to exhaust their administrative
remedies, and that use of locked gate unreasonably limited the nature
and scope of prescriptive easement).
In 1997, Robert and Judy Lovitt ("Lovitts") filed suit against Robert
and Karen Robideaux ("Robideauxs") in Kootenai County District
Court. The Lovitts sought a declaratory judgment to establish each
party's littoral rights, injunctions requiring the removal of shoreline
pilings and preventing future littoral right infringement, and to quiet
title of a separate driveway through a prescriptive easement. The
Robideauxs counterclaimed and sought to quiet title to the location of
their pilings and dock, relocation of the Lovitts' dock, and the right to
use a locked gate across a driveway easement. The district court
found: (1) the parties failed to show sufficient evidence to establish
their littoral rights, (2) it lacked authority to adjudicate the parties'
rights because the parties failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before the Departments of Land ("Department"), and (3) the Lovitts'
use of the driveway to access Lot 111 established an easement by
prescription.
The parties were neighbors in the Hayden Lake Cottage Tracts on
Hayden Lake, Kootenai County, Idaho. The Robideauxs owned Lots
112, 113 and 114. The Lovitts owned Lot 111, which was adjacent to
Lot 112. All lots were located on Lee's Bay. The bay had a "V" shape,
which opened to the north. A sand bar of variable depth extended
across the bay's 400-foot wide mouth. Lot 111 was situated on the
northwest shore of Lee's Bay with part of its shoreline along the bay
and part along the open lake. The Robideauxs' Lots 112, 113, 114
were situated southeast of Lot 111 along the western shore of the "V"
shaped bay. All of Robideauxs' shoreline was along Lee's Bay.
Since the 1940s, the Lovitts and their predecessors in interest
maintained a dock on the shoreline of Lot 111. Sometime after 1997,
the Robideauxs relocated their dock to a position north of the Lovitts'
dock on Lot 111 ("point dock") with the Lovitts' permission. The
relocation placed the Robideauxs' dock near the mouth of Lee's Bay
floating above the sandbar. Around the time of the relocation, the
Robideauxs built a second dock off the shoreline of Lot 112. Both
families used point dock for a period of years. In 1993, the families
had a falling out after the Robideauxs placed pilings into the lakebed
off the point of the Lovitts' property. Consequently, the Lovitts
revoked the Robideauxs' permission to maintain the point dock. The
revocation prompted the Robideauxs to obtain a permit for a dock
and shore ramp on Lot 112; the Robideauxs planned to build the
shore ramp directly over the Lovitts' dock.

Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

In addition, the dock issue provoked a separate dispute concerning
a recorded easement. The recorded easement provided roadway
access across Lots 112 and 113 to all lots west including Lot 111. Since
the 1940s, however, the Lovitts and their predecessors in interest used
a separate driveway to access Lot 111. The separate driveway crossed
Lots 112 and 113 but was not part of the recorded easement.
On review, the Idaho Supreme Court cited the Lake Protection Act
("Act") as legislation that authorized the Department to issue and deny
permits for navigational encroachments such as docks. The court
explained littoral rights refer to the rights of owners of land adjacent
to navigable waters to maintain their adjacency by building navigable
encroachments such as docks and pilings. The court stated the Act
authorized owners of property next to a navigable lake to apply for a
permit to construct a dock to reach the navigable waters. The Act bars
a permit holder from locating a dock to infringe upon an adjacent
landowner's littoral right without written consent or proper notice.
The court further explained the Act empowered the Department to
determine whether a permit infringed upon the littoral rights of an
The court emphasized the
adjoining riparian landowner.
Department's expertise and experience in such matters was most
In
appropriate to determine the proper placement of docks.
particular, the court noted the Act clearly contemplated the
Department's ability to determine littoral rights when infringement
issues arose because of the planned placement of a dock. For these
reasons, the court held the parties failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before the Department.
As to the easement dispute, the court noted that Idaho law
required that use of a gate, or any other method of regulating an
easement, by the owner of the servient estate must be reasonable. The
court determined the Robideauxs' use of a gate across the easement
was unreasonable because gate use began in an effort to spite the
Lovitts. The court noted that neither the Robideauxs nor their
predecessors in interest saw any need to gate the driveway until the
dock dispute arose. As such, the court concluded the locked gate was
unreasonable.
In sum, the court affirmed the district court's rulings and held that
the parties failed to establish their littoral rights since they did not
The court also held sufficient
exhaust administrative remedies.
evidence existed to enjoin the Robideauxs from use of locked gate
because the gate limited both the nature and scope of the Lovitts'
prescriptive easement.
J Reid Bumgarner
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MASSACHUSETTS
Trio Algarvio, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 795 N.E.2d
1148 (Mass. 2003) (upholding assessment of tidewater displacement
fee, and denying assessment of tidelands occupation fee as conditions
of granting license to fill tidelands).
In 1995, Trio Algarvio, Inc. ("Trio"), the present owner of land
adjoining the Acushnet River in New Bedford, applied to the
Protection
Environmental
of
Department
Massachusetts
("Department") for a license to use one-half acre of tidelands
previously filled by Trio's predecessor without authorization. The
Department granted the license, but also assessed Trio a tidewater
displacement fee and a tidelands occupation fee. Trio challenged the
assessments, and an administrative law judge affirmed the assessments
at an adjudicatory hearing. Trio filed for judicial review in superior
court, arguing that the relevant wharfing statute exempted it from
both fees. The superior court rejected this argument and affirmed the
assessments. The appellate court found Trio's argument persuasive
and reversed the superior court's judgment. The Department then
appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
On appeal, the court first discussed the history of the relevant
wharfing statutes. The statutes granted private ownership in certain
tidelands below low water mark to encourage the development of
facilities to enhance navigable waters for commercial purposes.
in the later nineteenth century however, the
Beginning
Commonwealth's legislature enacted legislation to protect the
waterways-unregulated development was beginning to displace the
tidewater and thus ruin the resource. The laws required either
excavation elsewhere in the same harbor or payment of a fee as
compensation for the displacement of tidewater from the development
of wharves and piers. In addition, the legislature established tidelands
occupation fees as a means of compensating for the right to develop
tidelands belonging to the Commonwealth.
Trio specifically argued that requiring landowners to pay a
displacement fee for work authorized by a wharfing statute was in
derogation of the grant made by the statute. Trio relied on three cases
that held individuals developing tidelands under similar wharfing
statutes need not pay displacement fees. In all three cases, the courts
determined that to assess the landowners displacement fees would be
in derogation of the original land grants since the landowners had
already compensated for the tidewater displacement under the specific
terms of the wharfing statutes. However, the court found that the
wharfing statute at issue in this case contained no means or conditions
to compensate for tidewater displacement. In contrast, the wharfing
statute applicable in this case reserved the right in the Commonwealth
to impose later conditions or requirements as necessary to protect the
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waterways. The court further explained that even if the statute did not
expressly grant this right to the Commonwealth, the public trust
doctrine would permit the Department to assess Trio the displacement
fee.
Nonetheless, the court determined that the Department's
assessment of tidelands occupation fees may have been in derogation
of the wharfing statute grant to Trio. The court analyzed the history of
the Commonwealth's practice of granting title to tidelands. Prior to
1866, Massachusetts granted title to tidelands in fee simple subject to a
condition subsequent, as was done under the wharfing statutes.
However, in 1866, the Commonwealth established a licensing scheme
whereby the legislature issued revocable licenses for the use of
tidelands and charged fees-tidelands occupation fees-for the
privilege of occupying the lands. The legislature took care to state that
its new licensing scheme would have no affect whatsoever on previous
grants. Thus, the court determined that if a landowner seeking a
license to fill or occupy tidelands held title to the land, the occupation
fees did not apply; but if a landowner did not hold title to the land, the
fees did apply. Thus, the status of Trio's land was determinative of
whether or not it was subject to the tidelands occupation fee. Since
the superior court never defined Trio's title, the court remanded the
issue for further proceedings.
Kate 0. Lively

MICHIGAN
City of Romulus v. Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 260 Mich. App. 54
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding it was not improper for the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality to issue a permit for a
hazardous waste underground deep injection well facility in a legally
filled wetland, and that need for such a facility is not a factor
considered when issuing such permits).
Environmental Disposal Systems Inc. ("EDS") undertook a project
to obtain a permit to construct a hazardous waste underground deep
injection well facility on an undeveloped site in the City of Romulus.
EDS obtained many of the necessary permits and was in the process of
applying to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
("MDEQ") for a Part 111 permit, required under the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA"), when they
learned of wetlands located on the proposed site. According to
applicable regulations, a facility of this nature could not be located in
a wetland. Upon learning of the wetland, EDS obtained an NREPA
Part 303 permit from MDEQ authorizing them to fill the wetland and
destroy it. EDS then proceeded to fill the wetland and continued with
the application process for the Part 111 permit to construct the facility.
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The City of Romulus, the City of Taylor, and Wayne County
challenged the decision by MDEQ to issue a Part 111 permit allowing
EDS to construct and operate the facility on the site. The Wayne
Circuit Court held the MDEQ did not violate any regulations by
issuing the Part 111 permit.
The Cities of Romulus and Taylor and Wayne County appealed,
and the Court of Appeals of Michigan considered two significant
issues. First, whether MDEQ erred in issuing the Part 111 permit since
Rule 603 of the Michigan Administrative Code prohibits location of a
deep injection well facility in a wetland. Second, whether MDEQ erred
by not considering the necessity of a facility of this type, in this area,
before issuing the permit.
On the first issue, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the
lower court noting that it was proper for MDEQ to issue the permit
although the site had once contained a wetland. The Cities of
Romulus and Taylor and Wayne County did not challenge the validity
of the Part 303 permit that gave EDS the authority to fill the wetlands
on the site. The court noted that upon filling, a wetland ceases to be a
wetland, so MDEQ was correct in issuing the Part 111 because the
wetland would no longer exist when the facility was constructed.
The appellate court then held that because Part 111 and Part 303
both fell under the NREPA, the drafters of the statutes must have
anticipated that a builder could fill a wetland upon obtaining a Part
303 permit prior to obtaining a Part 111 permit. Since the NREPA did
not forbid this sequence of events, MDEQ was justified in issuing the
Part 111 permit to EDS. The court concluded by noting that Rule 603,
which prevents construction of a hazardous waste disposal facility in a
wetland, did not preclude MDEQ from issuing a Part 111 permit in an
area where wetlands no longer exist because of legal filling under a
Part 303 permit.
On the second issue, the appellate court again affirmed the trial
court finding that MDEQ was correct in not considering the need for a
facility prior to issuing a Part 111 permit. MDEQ applies a marketdriven approach to facility permitting, which allows the prospective
builder of such facilities to evaluate the need on an economic basis.
The City of Romulus, the City of Taylor, and Wayne County cited
several sections of Part 111 and other NREPA statutes in support of the
argument that MDEQ must evaluate the need for such a facility prior
to issuing a Part 111 permit. The" court evaluated the sections
individually and ultimately held that nothing in the regulations or
statutes required MDEQ to evaluate the need for a facility. Therefore,
MDEQ was correct in not evaluating the need, and allowing EDS to
assume the economic risk involved with the possibility that the market
would not support the proposed facility. In addition, the court held
that nothing required MDEQ to promulgate a rule dictating their
market-driven approach to facility permitting. The court reasoned
that the market-driven approach was not actually a rule or procedure,
but rather MDEQ's abstention from evaluating a market's need for a
specific facility.
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The court noted that MDEQ based its decision on competent,
material and substantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in
their review of the decision. The City of Romulus, the City of Taylor,
and Wayne County argued that the trial court erred in its review of
MDEQ's actions, but they did not allege any specific error in the trial
court's review. On appeal, this court held that, without a more specific
allegation of error, the trial court was correct in reasoning that
MDEQ's decision was valid.
The court thus affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the
trial court did not err in its evaluation of the MDEQ's decision to issue
the Part 111 permit allowing EDS to construct their hazardous waste
underground deep injection well facility.
Ryan D. Phillips

Dyball v. Lennox, No. 241296, 2004 WL 345278 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb.
24, 2004) (holding trial court may not consider circumstances
surrounding a grant when interpreting an unambiguous easement for
ingress and egress to a body of water, and right of way in easement did
not give rise to riparian rights).
George and Linda Dyball were riparian owners of property on
Lake Fenton. The Dyball property was subject to an easement that
Edith Crane granted Bob Crane in 1955. William Lennox owned a lot
in Cranewood No. 1 that enjoyed a dominant estate regarding the
easement. Crane's deed provided, "The Easterly 16 feet of the above
described premises being reserved for the use of those parties, their
heirs, assigns, and successors, owning lots in Cranewood No. I
Subdivision... for the purposes of ingress and egress to and from the
premises in which they may have an interest to the water's edge of
Lake Fenton." The Dyballs filed a complaint seeking declaratory
judgment limiting Lennox's easement use for ingress and egress only
and a permanent injunction restraining improper use. The Dyballs
alleged Lennox abused the easement by installing and maintaining a
dock, using the premises to temporarily store boating equipment,
using the premises for recreation, and attempting to exercise general
dominion over the premises.
Lennox argued that factual
circumstances demonstrated the original grantor's intent to include
use and placement of a dock within the easement's scope. Lennox
asked the court for a judgment (1) declaring the easement included
riparian rights for the dominant tenement holders, and (2) reflecting
Lennox's rights to store the dock on the easement and continue
historic dock placement at the end of the easement. The trial court
denied the Dyballs' motion for summary disposition, finding that the
easement was for ingress, egress, and riparian rights, and was not
limited to the right to maintain a dock on the lake end of the
easement.
On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Dyballs argued
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the trial court erred by considering the circumstances surrounding
Crane's deed because the easement's language was unambiguous. The
court had to determine whether, if the easement's language was
the trial court could consider surrounding
unambiguous,
circumstances. In Little v. Kin the Michigan Supreme Court held that
when the language of a legal instrument is plain and unambiguous,
the court must enforce it as written and inquire no further. Lennox
argued that the easement language "to the water's edge" created
ambiguity because it was traditional language for creating riparian
rights. Lennox failed to support his claim of ambiguity, and the court
of appeals found the easement was unambiguous; hence, the trial
court could not inquire into circumstances surrounding the easement
grant or the time of grant.
The court then had to determine whether the deed's
unambiguous language gave rise to riparian rights. According to the
court's interpretation of Thies v. Howland, the terms "ingress" and
''egress to the water's edge" did not demonstrate intent to grant
riparian rights. Prior Michigan case law established that permanently
mooring a boat and erecting and maintaining a dock near the water's
edge are riparian rights. Since the easement's plain and unambiguous
language did not permit Lennox to erect and maintain a dock or
permanently moor a boat, and since Lennox could not expand the
easement, the court held the trial court erred by granting Lennox
summary disposition and denying the Dyballs's motion to declare the
easement for access, and ingress and egress only.
Elizabeth Frost

NEBRASKA
Dep't of Natural Res. v. Bose, 267 Neb. 430 (Neb. 2004) (holding the
cancellation of a water appropriation right was proper where the
appropriators received sufficient notice, had not used the
appropriation for more than three consecutive years, and did not
demonstrate sufficient cause for nonuse).
The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") notified
Lee and Craig Bose, holders of a water appropriation right on the
Republican River, of a hearing to determine whether DNR would
cancel all or part of their water appropriation because of nonuse for
more than three consecutive years. The Boses attended the hearing at
which Lee Bose testified. Following the hearing, DNR's director
canceled the Boses' appropriation, concluding the testimony
established that the Boses' had not irrigated the land subject to the
appropriation from the River for more than three consecutive years.
The Boses appealed the DNR ruling to the Nebraska Supreme Court
contending (1) DNR did not provide adequate notice of the hearing;
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(2) DNR did not support its finding by competent and relevant
evidence and its finding was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable;
and (3) DNR erred by failing to find sufficient cause for the Boses'
nonuse. The court ultimately rejected each of the Boses' arguments
and affirmed DNR's cancellation of the appropriation.
The supreme court, based on its own precedents, concluded the
hearing notice issued by DNR provided adequate notice of the
relevant issues and met statutory requirements. Additionally, the court
addressed whether DNR supported its factual determination of nonuse
by competent and relevant evidence. At the hearing, DNR presented a
field investigator's report, which advised canceling the appropriation
because of nonuse for three consecutive years. The court concluded
this field report constituted prima facie evidence of the Boses'
forfeiture of the appropriation and shifted the burden to the Boses to
demonstrate beneficial use. The court agreed with DNR's director
that the Boses' testimony failed to establish beneficial use within the
past three consecutive years. Therefore, the court concluded DNR's
director supported his determination of nonuse by competent and
relevant evidence and his determination was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.
Once DNR establishes that a water appropriation has not been
used for more than three consecutive years, the Nebraska
abandonment statute places the burden on the holders of the water
appropriation right to present evidence of sufficient cause for nonuse.
Specifically, the statute provides that sufficient cause for nonuse exists
when the water source is inadequate to support beneficial use or in
circumstances where a prudent person would not have been expected
to use the water. As holders of the water appropriation right, the
Boses had the burden of demonstrating sufficient cause for nonuse.
Specifically, Lee Bose testified that his nonuse was a matter of
The court
convenience, rather than supply or practicability.
concluded, as did the DNR director, that this testimony did not
establish a sufficient cause for nonuse as defined by the relevant
statute. Therefore, the court held the director did not err in failing to
find sufficient cause for nonuse. Because the evidence demonstrated
nonuse during the past three consecutive years and because the Boses'
failed to allege a sufficient cause for the nonuse, the court affirmed
DNR's order canceling the Boses' water appropriation right.
Cheryl Miller
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Dep't of Natural Res. v. Silverstone & Drakes Canal Inc., 674 N.W.2d
266 (Neb. 2004) (holding that the notice of hearing to cancel water
appropriations for nonuse was adequate, and that the evidence was
sufficient to support the findings of the Department of Natural
Resources).
The Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") entered an order
on May 20, 2003, partially canceling the water rights on land owned by
Silverstone and Dakes Canal Inc., Vance Dake, and Marcia Uehling
("Silverstone"). Silverstone appealed DNR's order to the Supreme
Court of Nebraska, which affirmed DNR's order.
Water appropriation number A-5000 ("appropriation") was a water
right to divert 0.57 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water from the
Sappa Creek at certain points for irrigation of 62.6 acres of land in
Harlan County, Nebraska. Silverstone was the owner of the land
covered by the appropriation, which had a priority date of July 30,
1952. On January 31, 2003, the DNR sent a notice to Silverstone
stating that a hearing would take place to determine whether to cancel
all or part of appropriation as a result of nonuse for more than three
consecutive years.
DNR held the hearing on March 18, 2003. At the hearing, DNR
presented a verified field investigation report regarding the irrigation
of the land covered by the appropriation. Based on the report and the
testimony of witnesses, DNR concluded that part of the land
designated under the appropriation was not subject to irrigation for
more than three consecutive years, thus cancellation of that part of the
DNR issued an order of
appropriation was therefore proper.
cancellation in part on May 20, 2003.
Silverstone appealed DNR's order partially canceling the water
rights of Silverstone and other landowners. In doing so, Silverstone
made a few key arguments. The court first addressed Silverstone's
arguments regarding the adequacy of the notice. Silverstone argued
that the notice did not properly state the issues involved and that the
notice failed to indicate properly the important phone numbers. The
court held that the notice adequately informed Silverstone of the
issues because it clearly stated the purpose of the hearing and the fact
that interested persons should appear. The court also noted that the
notice contained copies of relevant statutes. The court also rejected
Silverstone's argument regarding the notice's statement of phone
numbers, finding that the provision of the phone number was
sufficient under the state statute.
The court then proceeded to Silverstone's arguments regarding
DNR's findings. On this issue, Silverstone asserted that DNR erred in
finding that irrigation did not occur on the canceled portion of the
land for more than three consecutive years and, in the alternative,
argued that DNR erred in not finding sufficient cause for nonuse. At
the onset of its discussion of these issues, the court noted the limits on
court's ability to review the director's factual determinations.
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Specifically, the court stated it could only decide whether competent
and relevant evidence supported such determinations, and whether
the determinations were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In this
case, the court held that both determinations were supported by
or
sufficient evidence and were not arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable. Consequently, the court rejected both arguments.
In conclusion, the court rejected all of Silverstone's arguments and
affirmed DNR's order.
Benjamin M. Petre

NEW JERSEY
In re Adopted Amendments to N.J. Admin. Code tit. 7, § 7A-2.4, 365
N.J. Super. 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's adoption of the
Landscape Project method to classify wetlands was neither inconsistent
with governing statue, unsupported by the record, nor arbitrary or
capricious).
New Jersey Builders Association ("Builders") challenged as ultra
vires the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's
("DEP") adoption of the Landscape Project method ("LPM") to
classify wetlands. In 2002, DEP adopted the LPM to classify wetlands
supporting the habitats of threatened or endangered species as
wetlands of exceptional resource value. Prior to the adoption of LPM,
DEP made wetlands determinations entirely on specific sightings of
Based on the
individual threatened or endangered species.
assumption that species are located in the middle of their home range,
DEP mapped a habitat for that species regardless of whether the entire
mapped area contained features that the species actually used or
required. LPM broadened the field of inquiry beyond "sightingspecific" areas. Using satellite imagery, LPM focuses on habitat areas
required to support local populations of threatened or endangered
wildlife species. By adopting LPM, DEP sought to establish a more
population driven parameter of habitat protection that would best
ensure the continued, long-term existence of a particular documented
species or population in an identified wetland. Builders appealed
DEP's decision to adopt the LPM in Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division claiming LPM exceeded DEP's statutory mandate.
The court stated that judicial review of state agency regulations is
restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action violated
the enabling act's express or implied legislative policies, (2) whether
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings on
which the agency based their action, and (3) whether in applying the
legislative policies to the facts the agency clearly erred by reaching a
conclusion that could not reasonably have been made upon a showing
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of the relevant factors. Thus the court found a regulation can only be
set aside if it is proved to be arbitrary or capricious, plainly transgresses
the statue it purports to effectuate, or alters the terms of the statute
and frustrates the policy embodied in it.
The court found DEP's adoption of LPM to delineate wetlands did
not flout the enabling statue or undermine the legislative intent.
Since DEP classifies wetlands supporting the habitats of threatened or
endangered species, the court noted that LPM broadens the inquiry to
include habitats of actual sightings or physical evidence of these
species, and contiguous wetlands that contain the natural
characteristics that make the wetlands suitable for species to populate.
The court held that because endangered or threatened species are not
stationary many rare species require continuous blocks of habitat.
Furthermore, rapid suburbanization of landscape could lead to the
loss and degradation of critically important wild life habitats. The
court concluded the adoption of a more protective approach through
LPM was neither inconsistent with governing statue, unsupported by
the record, nor arbitrary or capricious. Thus, the court concluded
that the adoption of LPM did not exceed DEP's statutory mandate.
D.M. Shohet

Manzo v. Mayor of Marlboro, 838 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003) (holding township may enact ordinances using residential
cluster development to reduce pollution in nearby streams and
waters).
Rose Manzo and Morgan Estates ("Manzo") filed suit against
Marlboro Township ("Marlboro") challenging Marlboro's Zoning
Ordinance in the Monmouth County Superior Court. Manzo alleged
that (1) the Zoning Ordinance was inconsistent with the Township's
Master Plan, (2) the ordinance represented fiscal zoning, (3)
Marlboro improperly sought to reduce residential development
density, (4) the ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act by
discriminating against families with children, and (5) the means
Marlboro used to achieve its stated goal were unreasonable. The court
dismissed each of Manzo's claims.
The estate of Rose Manzo owned 167 acres of undeveloped land in
Marlboro. Manzo and Morgan Estates, L.L.C. ("Morgan Estates")
entered in an option agreement for Morgan Estates to purchase the
property by 1999. The property was divided into quadrants by streams,
ultimately running into Big Brook, which runs along the northern
boundary of the property. Until August 1999, the property was zoned
for lots of 30,000 square feet, similar to other properties in the area.
In the same month, Manzo and Morgan Estates executed the prior
agreement, and soon thereafter, Marlboro created a new zoning
district named the Stream Corridor Preservation Residential District-Il
("SCPRD-II"). The SPRCD-II required a minimum lot size of 80,000
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square feet and allowed some optional clustering provisions. This
amendment to the ordinance was the subject of Manzo's suit.
In order to assess the challenge to SCPRD-II, the court first
recognized the presumption of validity accorded municipal
The court then quickly dismissed four of Manzo's
ordinances.
contentions as irrelevant to the factual situation. Next, the court
evaluated whether Marlboro's purpose in adopting the ordinance
creating the SCPRD-I was reasonable and therefore valid.
Manzo first asserted that the purpose of the ordinance was to allow
Marlboro to limit the number of households, although Marlboro's
expressed purpose was to protect streams, particularly nearby Big
Brook. The court concluded that evidence such as the Township
Master Plan, the Township Planner, and Township Council minutes
supported Marlboro's stream-protecting purpose. The court further
identified New Jersey's legislation and a Municipal Land Law that
noted the correlation between residential and commercial
development and reduced water quality.
Manzo further requested the court to examine the means utilized
The court determined that
by Marlboro to support this goal.
Marlboro's ordinance exhibited a legitimate relationship to its
purpose because experts agreed that cluster developments allow less
land disturbance and less opportunity for pollution to reach waterways.
Concluding that the SCPRD-II cluster provisions supported Marlboro's
objective for less-polluted streams, the court dismissed Manzo's
complaint.
Becky Bye

OHIO
Witfoth v. Kiefer, No. L-02-1325, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6766 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003) (holding (1) no reasonable person could consider a
low yielding well a material defect or problem, (2) sellers need not
disclose low well yield on disclosure form, and (3) nondisclosure did
not amount to fraudulent concealment).
In 1998, Frank and Mary Witfoth filed suit in Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas against James and Kim Kiefer alleging fraudulent
representation and concealment arising out of the sale of the Kiefer's
home. The Kiefers disclosed a well supplied water to the home on the
sales disclosure form but made no indications about the condition or
yield of the well. Prior to purchase, the Wiffoth's professional home
inspector advised them to hire a specialist to measure the well's yield.
The Witfoths declined, trusting that the sales disclosure would have
indicated low well yield. After move in, the Wiffoths discovered the
water flow was insufficient for consecutive showers or loads of laundry.
A pump test later determined the well yield was 1.5 gallons per minute
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("gpm") while the average well yield in a two-mile radius was 2.5 gpm
and 5 to 7 gpm in Lucas County. The county previously approved the
well and maintained a public record of its yield. Expenses to correct
the yield exceeded $18,000. After hearing the evidence, the trial court
directed a verdict in favor of the Kiefers. The Witfoths appealed to the
Ohio Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court of appeals first considered whether the water
system's low yield constituted a material problem or defect requiring
disclosure. The court noted that the well functioned properly, was
approved by the county, and was not substantially lower yielding than
nearby wells. As such, no reasonable person could consider the water
system a material problem or defect. Furthermore, although the low
yield was inconvenient, the court noted judicious use of the well
enabled the family to shower, wash clothes and wash dishes. Thus, the
court held the Kiefers needed not disclose the low yield.
Next, the court of appeals considered whether the doctrine of
caveat emptor precluded recovery for fraud. Under Ohio law, a buyer
cannot recover damages where (1) the condition is discoverable upon
reasonable inspection, (2) the purchaser had an opportunity to
examine the premises, and (3) there is no fraud on the part of the
seller. As to the first and second part of the test, the court noted the
Wiffoths had full opportunity to inspect the property, a test existed to
measure well yield, the Witfoths did not order such a test and the yield
was public record. Accordingly, the court concluded no reasonable
person could dispute the well yield was open and obvious and not
misrepresented. As to the third part of the test, absence of fraud, the
court considered whether nondisclosure amounted to fraudulent
concealment. Again, the court noted the Kiefers did not actively
misrepresent the well. Therefore, under the doctrine of caveat emptor
precluded the Witfoths from recovering for fraud.
In sum, the court held no reasonable person could consider a
water supply with low yield a material defect or problem. The court
then held the Keifers had no obligation to disclose the low well yield
and the nondisclosure did not constitute fraudulent concealment.
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's rulings.
J Reid Bumgarner

SOUTH CAROLINA
Williamsburg Rural Water & Sewer Co., Inc. v. Williamsburg County
Water & Sewer Auth., 593 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that a county's constructive approval of a water and sewer service
proposal submitted by a non-profit corporation grants only nonexclusive water and sewer service rights and that a county is immune
from tort liability for non-intentional conduct which incidentally acts
to depreciate the commercial value of the non-profit's non-exclusive
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water and sewer rights).
Williamsburg Water, a non-profit organization, filed an action
against Williamsburg County, South Carolina, and its Water and Sewer
Authority, along with the Town of Kingstree (collectively, the
"County") in the Circuit Court of Williamsburg County. The catalyst
for the suit occurred after Williamsburg Water submitted a proposal to
provide water and sewer services to specific unincorporated areas of
the County. After Williamsburg Water submitted the proposal, there
were three public readings of a proposed franchise ordinance that
would permit the county to expand its existing water and sewer
services into the same areas that Williamsburg Water had previously
proposed to serve. Approximately three months after the first public
reading, the ordinance passed into law. The County subsequently
applied for federal funding and solicited bids to construct a water
system in the specific areas designated in the Williamsburg Water
proposal.
Williamsburg Water filed suit seeking a determination that it
possessed an exclusive right to provide water and sewer services to
specified areas of the County. Additionally, Williamsburg Water
claimed the County constructively approved its proposal to provide
services because the County failed to properly deny its proposal as
required by local law. Williamsburg Water further claimed that the
County hampered its ability to secure federal funding for the proposal
when the County expanded its own water and sewer services into the
same areas that Williamsburg Water had already obtained the right to
serve. Next, Williamsburg Water sought damages in tort alleging gross
negligence occurred when the County took measures to provide water
and sewer services to the areas previously designated in Williamsburg
Water's approved plan. Finally, Williamsburg Water claimed that it
was exempt from the County's franchise ordinance as a bona fide
water/sewer system defined by the ordinance.
Williamsburg Water and the County each moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the County
and found that Williamsburg Water had only a non-exclusive right to
provide water and sewer service to the specified areas. Also ruling for
the County, the trial court held that the County was immune from
Williamsburg Water's tort claim under the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act. However, the trial court found that there was a "general issue of
material fact as to whether Williamsburg Water was exempt from the
County's franchise ordinance." Williamsburg Water appealed the trial
court's summary judgment rulings to the Court of Appeals of South
Carolina.
The first issue identified by the court was whether Williamsburg
Water's right to provide water and sewer services in the County was an
exclusive right that would have blocked the County from granting
future franchises within the specified areas. The court affirmed the
decision of the trial court and concluded that though Williamsburg
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Water did have a constructive right to provide water and sewer services
by virtue of the County's failure to comply with codified procedure for
denying the proposal, the right was not exclusive.
The court
elaborated that Williamsburg Water's service rights were not "superior
to the County's own right to decide who will provide water and sewer
services to its citizens" and admitted the unfortunate result of the
ruling was to deflate the commercial value of the rights possessed by
Williamsburg Water.
Next, the court held that it could not review the issue of whether
the trial court erred in failing to find that Williamsburg Water was
exempt from the County's franchise ordinance because an order
denying summary judgment could not be reviewed according to state
case law precedent. The court of appeals remanded this issue to the
trial court for further proceeding to determine applicability of the
franchise ordinance to Williamsburg Water.
Finally, on the issue of whether the County's conduct rose to the
level of gross negligence, the court concluded there was no evidence
in the record that the County intentionally sought to hamper
Williamsburg Water's ability to provide the proposed services. The
court instead indicated that it was evident the County proceeded to
extend its water and sewer services to the specified area based on the
misguided notion that it satisfied the notice provisions of local law
when it held public readings of the proposed ordinance. Because the
court held that this conduct was not an "intentional, conscious failure"
to perform a duty, it concluded that these circumstances immunized
the County from liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
and affirmed the trial court.
Thus, the court's ruling was to affirm the decision of the trial court
and remanded the issue regarding the application of the franchise
ordinance. Two of the court judges concurred in the result, each
differing with the reasoning and analysis of the majority.
Brian M Forbush

TEXAS
Chocolate Bayou Water Co. v. Texas Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n, 124 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a party
petitioning forjudicial review of a water right application must exhaust
all available administrative remedies before the court system acquires
jurisdiction).
Chocolate Bayou Water Company ("Chocolate Bayou") and Sand
Supply, both divisions of Campbell Concrete and Materials, L.P.,
appealed the decision of the District Court of Travis County granting a
plea to jurisdiction, and in the alternative summary judgment,
dismissing their suit contesting the validity of a reissued water right
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permit. In 1999, the Texas legislature required the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ"), formerly the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission, to reissue the previously issued
but expressly abandoned Aliens Creek water right permit to the Texas
Water Development Board ("TWDB"). After the TWDB amended the
permit to change the type of use, the TCEQ issued the permit on
January 16, 2002. At the trial court, Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply
claimed that defective notice provided by the amendment process
deprived any affected parties of an opportunity to timely request a
contested-case hearing with the TCEQ. The Court of Appeals of
Texas, Third District, Austin held the notice of the amended permit
provided to Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply adequate and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
The reissued Aliens Creek permit initially contained all of the
provisions of the original permit, including the intended use as a
cooling reservoir for a power plant, and required amendment to
change the purpose of the permit to supplying municipal water to the
The Texas legislature intended the permit
City of Houston.
amendment process to meet the notice and hearing requirements of
the Texas Water Code for issuing a diversion permit. TWBD filed an
application to amend the Aliens Creek permit in June 2003; the TQEC
mailed notice of the amended application to all potentially affected
senior water right holders.
Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply both held water rights senior to
the reissued Allens Creek permit that the amended permit could have
adversely affected. However, neither requested a hearing with the
TCEQ to contest the amended Aliens Creek permit within the ;llotted
time frame. Both Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply relied on
language in the notice to protect their rights even though a draft of
the amended application sent with the notice indicated potential harm
to those rights. The Texas Water Code only requires that notice of a
water right permit provide enough information to timely inform
senior water users of potential adverse effects on their interests.
Interested parties can obtain further details by viewing the final
application and any supporting materials available for inspection at
the TQEC. The final amended permit application allowed the TWDB
to divert waters at stream levels below stream flow restrictions placed
on both Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's permits. The TQEC
denied Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's motions for contestedcase hearings as untimely and issued the amended Aliens Creek
application as a water right permit early in 2002.
The court stated that the court system only had jurisdiction to
review actions of an administrative agency such as the TQEC only after
the petitioning party exercises all administrative remedies. The court
held that Chocolate Bayou's and Sand Supply's failures to timely file
contested-case hearing motions acted as a waiver of their rights to seek
administrative review, and affirmed the trial court's finding of lack of
jurisdiction to review the decision of the TQEC to issue the amended
Allens Creek permit.
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Chocolate Bayou and Sand Supply also challenged the legislation
requiring the TQEC to reissue the original Aliens Greek permit as an
unconstitutional "local law." The court held this challenge untimely
because such a challenge must occur prior to a final agency action.
Sean R. Biddle

City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain, 124 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. Ct. App.
Oct. 16, 2003) (holding statutory notice and hearing requirements did
not apply to municipality's request to amend its water permit to allow
an interbasin transfer, but that the same requirements did apply to the
municipality's request to amend its purpose of use; holding the
executive director of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
could not issue the permit as amended).
The City of Uncertain, along with other concerned organizations
and individuals ("Uncertain"), appealed a Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality ("TCEQ") order that had amended the City of
Marshall's ("Marshall") water right permit. The District Court of
Travis County, 5 3'd Judicial District reversed TCEQ's order and
remanded the issue to TCEQ. TCEQ and Marshall appealed the
district court's decision. The Court of Appeals of Texas, Third
District, Austin heard the case on appeal.
In 1947, Marshall obtained a water permit to divert water from
Cypress Creek. In 1986, Marshall sought and received authorization
from the Texas Water Commission to divert 16,000 acre-feet ("af") of
water from Cypress Creek for municipal purposes. Marshall used its
water to provide water service to customers in the Cypress Creek Basin.
In 2001, Marshall applied to TCEQ for recognition of its historical
practice of providing water to customers in the Sabine River Basin in
addition to customers in the Cypress Creek Basin.
Marshall's
application also requested a change in authorized use, from municipal
use only to both municipal and industrial uses.
TCEQ determined that Marshall's amendment did not fall under
statutory notice and hearing requirements. Under the Texas Water
Code, inter-basin transfer applications where the proposed transfer is
from one basin to a municipality within that basin for use in the
municipality's service area outside the basin are not subject to the
statutory provisions concerning public notice and hearings. TCEQ
also determined that amending Marshall's authorized use from
municipal to both municipal and industrial would not create greater
adverse impacts than the existing permit on either the environment or
other water right holders. Following its two determinations, TCEQ
granted Marshall's request for an amended permit.
Uncertain filed a motion for TCEQ to overturn its decision and a
motion for a public hearing. When TCEQ denied the motions,
Uncertain filed suit in the district court. The district court granted
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Uncertain's motion for summary judgment, concluding that ICEQ
erred in granting the amended permit without notice or opportunity
for a contested-case hearing. The district court further found that
under the statute, TCEQ's executive director did not have authority to
issue the amended permit. TCEQ and Marshall appealed to the
appellate court.
The appellate court distinguished between Marshall's inter-basin
transfer request and its request to change the authorized use.
Regarding the inter-basin transfer request, the court agreed with
TCEQ that the statutory notice and hearing provisions did not apply to
that part of Marshall's application. Thus, the court reversed the
district court's decision on the point of whether the statute required
TCEQ to provide notice and a contested-case hearing for Marshall's
request for an inter-basin transfer. However, the court affirmed the
district court's decision on Marshall's additional request to change the
authorized use from municipal only to municipal and industrial,
holding the statute did apply to that request for a change in use.
Thus, since the notice and hearing requirements applied to part of
Marshall's application, TCEQ should have complied with the statutory
provisions with respect to the application in its entirety.
Uncertain also argued that TCEQ's executive director did not have
statutory authority to grant Marshall's request for an amended permit.
TCEQ had determined that since it was uncontested and did not
require a hearing, the executive director could approve the
application. However, because the court held the application was
subject to the notice and hearing requirements, the application did
require a hearing, and thus TCEQ's executive director did not have
the authority to grant Marshall's request.
Thus, the appellate court reversed the district court on the point
that Marshall's request for an amended permit to authorize an interbasin transfer was not subject to statutory notice and hearing
requirements. The appellate court affirmed the remainder of the
district court's ruling.
KatharineJ.Ellison

City of San Marcos v. Texas Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-020072-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 96 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004)
(holding that when a city discharges treated sewage effluent into a
natural flowing stream system, the discharged water-after
commingling with natural waters-may lose all characteristics
distinguishing the effluent as property of the city).
The appellee, Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
("Commission"), has primary responsibility for protecting the
environment and implementing any law and regulations concerning
the environment in the state. On July 2, 1998, the Commission
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granted the City of San Marcos a permit to convey treated sewage
effluent discharged by the City into the San Marcos River to a
diversion point three miles downstream. The Commission placed
several limiting conditions-designed to protect downstream water
users and environmental uses of the river-on the final version of the
permit. The City sought judicial review contesting the imposition of
the limiting provisions on the final permit. In the same action, the
San Marcos River Foundation and Dr. Jack Fairchild (collectively "the
Foundation") challenged the Commission's authority to grant the
permit without requiring the City to first obtain an appropriation
right. The District Court of Travis County affirmed the Commission's
final order granting the permit in its entirety. In a substituted
opinion, the Texas Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Foundation,
reversed the district court, and remanded with directions to vacate the
City's permit.
The City receives the majority of its municipal water supply from
groundwater from the Edwards Aquifer. For many decades, the City
has discharged the ground water into the San Marcos River once the
water passed through the City's sewage treatment plant. In order to
decrease dependence on groundwater, the City petitioned the
Commission in 1995 for a permit to use the San Marcos River to
convey and divert treated sewage effluent at a point three miles
downstream from the discharge point. The City planned to augment
its potable water supply by piping the water diverted from the San
Marcos River along with water imported from the Guadalupe River to
a drinking water treatment facility currently under construction.
During the application process, both the City and the Commission
relied on the common law rule of capture as applied to groundwater
to support the City's continued ownership of the effluent after
discharge into the San Marcos up to the point where the City intended
to divert the water. The rule of capture as applied to groundwater
provides that no ownership rights exist until the water is pumped from
the ground and placed under the control of the pump owner.
Maintaining ownership rights in captured groundwater requires
exercising continued control over the water. Texas is the only state
that still recognizes the rule of capture as applied to groundwater.
Further, the Commission and the City cited Texas case law that allows
the owner of groundwater to convey the water down a natural
watercourse and divert the water, less any losses due to transportation,
while retaining ownership of the water. Water conveyed in such a
manner is still considered under control of the owner because Texas
law recognizes water as a fungible resource. The exact same water
molecules discharged into the watercourse do not have to be diverted
Applying the above law, the
at the chosen point downstream.
Commission determined that the City maintained control over the
discharged effluent and granted a permit to convey and divert the
treated sewage effluent without requiring the City to apply for an
appropriation permit with the added restrictions of priority of usage.
The appellate court agreed with the Foundation's contention that
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the City's treated effluent was not fungible with the natural waters of
the San Marcos. When the effluent entered the San Marcos and
commingled with the natural flowing waters, which are property of the
State of Texas, the discharged effluent lost all characteristics that
distinguished it as separate property of the City. Therefore, at the
point of discharge, the City lost control and ownership of the formerly
captured groundwater. The City provided further support to the
appellate court's findings by failing to rebut contentions that the City
intended the transportation of the effluent as a preliminary form of
treatment because the commingling would dilute the concentrations
of effluent with the clean natural waters of the San Marcos before the
City treated the water for municipal use. The court continued by
narrowly interpreting cases allowing for water to be treated as a
fungible resource as involving waters of only the purest quality
exceeding that required of sewage effluent.
Since the appellate court ruled to invalidate the City's permit to
convey and divert its sewage effluent, the appellate court did not
address the City's concerns with limiting provisions initially imposed
on the now invalid permit. In recognizing the importance of the
state's scarce water resources, the appellate court stated that similar
plans to reuse effluent would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. In fact, the Texas Legislature passed a statute giving the
Commission the authority to approve permits exactly like the subject
of this litigation, but the appellate court found the law inapplicable to
the present case because the City's permit was pending prior to the
effective date of the law.
Sean tK Biddle

Maverick County Water & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Reyes, No. 0403-00421-CV, 2003 WL 22900914 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)
(holding trial court erred in suit for damages caused by flooding
resulting from a broken canal by refusing water district's plea to the
jurisdiction where, as a governmental unit, water district was immune
from suit for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, inverse
condemnation, and nuisance claims).
In April 2000, the manager of the Maverick County Water and
Improvement District No. 1 ("District"), in order to make more water
available for electricity and irrigation, increased the capacity of one of
its canals. On April 8, 2000, the canal broke and released water,
flooding Anita Reyes's property. The District invited Reyes to its April
12 board meeting, where the board president allegedly admitted
liability and promised to pay all damages. After the District informed
Reyes that it had denied her claim, she sued the District for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel, inverse condemnation, and nuisance in
the District Court for Maverick County. The District filed a plea to the
jurisdiction alleging sovereign immunity, which the trial court denied.
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The District brought an interlocutory appeal arguing that the trial
court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.
Reviewing the trial court's ruling de novo, the Texas Court of
Appeals, San Antonio explained that sovereign immunity defeats a
court's subject matter jurisdiction, and a Texas governmental unit is
immune from suit absent state consent. According to Texas case law,
to sue a governmental unit a party must demonstrate the court's
jurisdiction by alleging a valid immunity waiver. The court did not
analyze Reyes's argument that the board's promise formed an oral
contract because Reyes did not allege a statute providing waiving
sovereign immunity. The court further explained that the District
could only sue for contract damages if the District's board approved a
written contract. Reyes did not allege a written contract existed, so the
District remained immune.
The District argued that as a governmental unit it was not subject
to promissory estoppel. Under Texas case law, promissory estoppel
generally does not apply against governmental units exercising their
public or governmental functions. The court held that Reyes's claim
did not fall under the general rule's exception (for instances where no
governmental function is impaired and estoppel is necessary to
prevent injustice) because the District's governmental function
included water and floodwater distribution. Since the suit involved a
dispute over the District's water distribution for electricity and
irrigation purposes, applying promissory estoppel would impair the
District's governmental function.
Reyes also argued that the flooding constituted a physical taking.
To prevail on an inverse condemnation claim, the Texas Constitution
requires that "the governmental entity intentionally performed certain
acts that resulted in a taking of the property for a public use."
According to case law, negligence that contributes to damage does not
constitute a taking, but if the damage is "necessarily incident to or a
consequential result of an authorized intentional act," the state may be
liable. Here the court held that the flood damage was not a necessary
or substantially certain result of releasing more water into the canal,
and the inverse condemnation claim was not valid.
The court began its analysis of Reyes's claim that flooding
constituted a compensable nuisance by stating that a single temporary
event cannot support a nuisance claim. To maintain the claim, Reyes
must show the nuisance was "inherent in the condition or thing itself,
beyond that arising from alleged improper or negligent use." Since
Reyes failed to allege anything inherent in the canal rendering it a
nuisance, the court held the facts as pled did not constitute a valid
nuisance claim.
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Because the court held the District was immune from suit on all
four counts, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the plea
to the jurisdiction and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.
Elizabeth Frost

UTAH
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003) (holding a
contract between two diverters governing shared use of diversion
facilities may not expand one party's diversions to more than its
decreed amount, nor could it restrict the other party's diversions to
less than his decreed water right so long as the first party's rights were
fully satisfied).
Green River Canal Company ("GRCC") and Lee Thayn owned
water rights on the Green River near Green River, Utah. GRCC owned
the diversion facilities by which both GRCC and Thayn diverted their
water. In 1952, GRCC and Wilson Produce Company ("Wilson"),
Thayn's predecessor-in-interest, executed a contract clarifying their
shared use of GRCC's diversion facilities. The parties amended the
contract later that year. In 1981, Thayn purchased Wilson's land. In
1995, GRCC sued Thayn, claiming Thayn breached the contract and
amendment (collectively "Agreements") by diverting more water than
permitted under the Agreements. GRCC alleged the Agreements
limited the quantity of water Thayn could divert through GRCC's
facilities, despite Thayn having acquired water rights in excess of the
amounts specified in the agreements. In entering summary judgment
for GRCC on its breach of contract claim, the Seventh District Court
found Thayn could not divert water in excess of the amounts specified
in the Agreements. Thayn appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment,
ruling the Agreements were descriptive, not determinative, of the
parties' water rights at the time they executed the Agreements.
Both GRCC and Thayn used a 2500-foot long shared canal (the
"Raceway") to divert water from the Green River to their irrigation
canals. GRCC constructed its irrigation canal in 1880, and Wilson
constructed its irrigation canal in 1933. Because Wilson's canal lay
forty-two feet higher in elevation than GRCC's canal, Wilson pumped
water to its canal by remodeling a hydroelectric facility. Both GRCC's
canal inlet and Wilson's hydroelectric facility lay at the foot of the
Raceway. All water not diverted by GRCC flowed into Wilson's
After Thayn purchased Wilson's land, he
hydroelectric facility.
renovated the hydroelectric facility to generate electricity for sale.
GRCC and Wilson executed the contract in 1952 to govern their
shared use of the diversion facilities. The contract clarified GRCC's
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ownership of the diversion facilities, and required Wilson divert all of
its water through GRCC's facilities and pay half of all maintenance
expenses. The contract also specified each parties' priorities to the
water; before Wilson could divert any water, GRCC was entitled to
"enough and sufficient water to supply [its] stockholders," with GRCC
having the exclusive right to determine quantity.
Later in 1952, the parties executed the amendment, which
clarified the quantities of water contemplated in the original contract.
The amendment granted GRCC twenty cubic feet per second ("cfs")
year-round for stock watering and sixty cfs during the irrigation
season. The amendment granted Wilson thirty-five cfs for irrigation
and 400 cfs to drive his hydroelectric facility and pumps.
Both parties' water rights changed after 1952. Although the
parties based GRCC's eighty cfs contract right on an 1881 diligence
claim, in 1974 the State Engineer determined GRCC needed only sixty
cfs during the irrigation season, including its twenty cfs stock-watering
right. Thus, GRCC's total water right was reduced to sixty cfs. In 1975,
Wilson obtained the right to pump 600 cfs for power generation
during the irrigation season. In 1981, the State Engineer granted
Wilson's change application to pump the 600 cfs year-round, leaving
unchanged Wilson's thirty-five cfs irrigation right. GRCC did not
object to Wilson's change application.
GRCC sued Thayn in 1995, claiming Thayn's breached the
Agreements by diverting more than the 400 cfs specified in the
amendment. Thayn raised laches, estoppel and waiver as affirmative
defenses. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in 1996.
The trial court granted GRCC's motion, holding the Agreements
limited Thayn to 400 cfs through GRCC's diversion facilities despite
his 600 cfs right. After a trial on Thayn's affirmative defenses, the trial
court found Thayn had failed to carry his burden. Thayn appealed the
trial court's summary judgment and trial rulings.
The court reversed the trial court. Although the trial court
accepted GRCC's argument that the amendment clarified each party's
water rights and limited Thayn to 435 cfs, the court held that the
amendment only clarified an omission in the original contract.
Specifically, because the contract allowed GRCC enough water to
satisfy its stockholders, without specifying a quantity, before Wilson
received any water, GRCC could have asserted its stockholders needed
all of the water, leaving Wilson with nothing. Such an interpretation
"would have rendered the [contract] ...of no value to [Thayn] ."
Further, the trial court's interpretation resulted in GRCC being
allowed more water than its water right permitted. Although GRCC
had argued the amendment allowed it to divert eighty cfs before
Thayn could divert any water, "private parties cannot create rights to
water simply by contracting to do so." Because the State Engineer had
limited GRCC to a total of sixty cfs during the irrigation season, GRCC
could not expand that right to eighty cfs through its Agreement with
Thayn, nor could it prevent Thayn from diverting more than 400 cfs
until after GRCC had diverted its eighty cfs contract amount. "So long
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as GRCC's prior right to divert the water it needs is satisfied,.. GRCC
has not legal right to make any additional diversions .... "
The court then reviewed Utah's beneficial use doctrine to limit
GRCC's right to sixty cfs and leave Thayn's right at 635 cfs. The State
Engineer determined GRCC's right to be sixty cfs and Thayn's right to
be 635 cfs. Although "the State Engineer's decisions are generally not
binding on the courts," the court noted GRCC had failed to object to
Thayn's change application in 1981.
"[T]he State Engineer's
decisions.., are binding upon the parties unless and until a party files
a timely objection to the proposed determination." Because GRCC
failed to object to Thayn's change application, it could not now
collaterally attack that determination in its present lawsuit. Thus, the
court held that the Agreements could neither expand GRCC's water
right beyond its sixty cfs decree nor could it restrict Thayn's right to
less than his 635 cfs decree so long as GRCC received its sixty cfs. The
court therefore reversed the trial court's entry of GRCC's summary
judgment and granted Thayn's motion for summary judgment.
Brian L. Martin

Prisbrey v. Bloomington Water Co., 82 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2003)
(holding that with except for statutory requirements, the State
Engineer has discretion as to the form of the published notices of
water use changes; that where the State Engineer published well
location descriptions in legal detail, a term commonly used on
government maps and providing readers a quick reference to find
which water notices to read is proper; and that a water rights owner,
not the lessee, is entitled to use of the right and thus was proper party
to apply for a diversion point).
In 1999, Bloomington Water Company ("Bloomington"), at the
request of its lessee, Leucadia Financial Corporation ("Leucadia"),
filed an application for a permanent diversion point and place of use
change with the State Engineer ("Engineer") for water rights
Bloomington held in Washington County, Utah. Using conventional
terminology, the Engineer published notice of the application,
alerting objectors to file any protests with the Engineer on or before
May 26, 1999, as required by law. Having filed no protest, Ladell
Prisbrey ("Prisbrey") was not present at the hearing where the
Engineer approved Bloomington's proposed changes. On November
12, 1999, Prisbrey filed a petition for judicial review of the Engineer's
decision.
Bloomington moved for summary judgment arguing
Prisbrey lacked standing, as he did not file a protest. The Washington
County District Court granted the summary judgment motion and
Prisbrey appealed.
Prisbrey raised three claims on appeal: (1) the descriptions of the
diversion points in the application were 'virtually undecipherable,' (2)
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the phrase 'southeast of Little Valley' was a misleading description of
the diversion points, and (3) the notice should have listed Leucadia as
the applicant, instead of Bloomington. The Utah Supreme Court
addressed these claims in turn.
Examining Prisbrey's first claim, the court found that the Engineer
followed Utah law in describing the proposed diversion points. The
court noted that the law required published applications to include
the applicant's name; a description of the water right; the quantity of
water used; the stream or source; the current and proposed points of
diversion; the places, purposes, and extent of present and proposed
use; and any other information the engineer needs. The court held
the Engineer had satisfied all requirements and that Prisbrey's claim
focused merely on the nomenclature used to describe the diversion
points. According to the court, the Engineer used customary language
that complied with elementary rules of punctuation. Thus, "as long as
the published notices fully and accurately disclose the statutorily
required information," the publication's form is within the Engineer's
discretion. The court also stated that there is a presumption that
members of the "water-right holding community" understand the
Engineer's nomenclature.
The court held Prisbrey's second claim failed because the
Engineer did not intend "Little Valley" to be a specific description
because he had already given specific locations of the diversions in
legal detail. The court concluded that the phrase simply enabled
interested readers to quickly find the water notices they needed to
read. Further, the court stated that Prisbrey had again challenged the
form of the term and had failed to provide statutory support for his
claim.
Regarding Prisbrey's last claim, the court held that based on prior
rulings, only a water right owner was entitled to change a water right.
Thus, as the water right owner, Bloomington was the proper party to
apply for a diversion point change. Leucadia, as lessee, held only a
terminable possessory interest in rights and a future right to purchase
the water right; it would be illogical to allow Leucadia to make
permanent changes in the diversion point.
Because Prisbrey failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by
filing a timely protest and because the Engineer's published notice
complied with all statutory requirements, the court upheld the trial
court's grant of summaryjudgment in Bloomington's favor.
Jeff Giliio

United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 79 P.3d
945 (Utah 2003) (holding trial court should abstain from hearing
private suits for relief inconsistent with an uncontested proposed
determination by the state engineer).
In

1932,

several
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Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company ("HCIC"), a mutual water
company. As a result, HCIC acquired the Cleveland Canal, which runs
from the mouth Huntington Creek to the town of Cleveland, Utah,
crossing Cedar Creek, a tributary of Huntington Creek. Due to Cedar
Creek's heavy spring run-off flows that would wash out the canals,
HCIC built a cement "flood bridge" across the Cleveland Canal to
allow up to ten cubic feet per second ("cfs") of water to flow into the
canal. As part of the State Engineer's general adjudication of the San
Rafael River, HCIC claimed a right to 10 cfs from Cedar Creek in 1970.
Though United States Fuel Company ("U.S. Fuel") diverted water
from Cedar Creek as well, it did not protest HCIC's claim. On
December 1, 1982, the State Engineer issued a proposed
determination recognizing HCIC's senior irrigation right on Cedar
Creek.
On December 2, a U.S. Fuel agent received the State
Engineer's determination, but did not file an objection until ninetyone days later. In 1989, HCIC demanded U.S. Fuel release the first ten
cfs in Cedar Creek for HCIC's use. In 1992, U.S. Fuel, ANR Co., Inc.,
and intervenor Intermountain Power Agency and their predecessor-ininterest (collectively "USF") brought this action before the Emery
County District Court to quiet title to its water rights and prevent
HCIC from interfering with its use. In a counterclaim, HCIC asserted
it possessed a senior water right and requested the trial court find USF
abandoned its rights.
On September 10, 2001, the trial court
disregarded the State Engineer's previous determination and held
USF had a priority water right to the Cedar Creek. HCIC appealed
directly to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing (1) the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this dispute; (2) neither waiver, estoppel nor laches
barred USF's claim to a senior priority right; (3) estoppel barred HCIC
from submitting evidence of Cedar Creek's tributaries; and (4) USF
had not forfeited its water rights.
On appeal, HCIC argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
this matter because permitting USF to challenge the determination
through an independent action outside of the pending general
adjudication violated Utah Code section 73-4-11. Section 73-4-11
requires a claimant to object to the State Engineer's proposed
determination of water rights by filing an objection within ninety days
of the date of service. If the claimant fails to do so, section 73-4-12
requires the court to render a judgment in accordance with the
proposed determination. USF argued the requirements in section 734-11 were only permissive, not mandatory.
After noting the State Engineer's special qualifications for
understanding water disputes, the court conceded the State Engineer
was an executive officer that could not serve a judicial function;
therefore, generally, the proposed determinations were persuasive
only and could not bar private claims over water rights. However, the
court found the plain language of section 73-4-12 created an exception
to the general rule by mandating courts to render judgments
consistent with uncontested determinations. Furthermore, the court
reiterated, "the adoption of uncontested state engineer's proposed
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determinations by operation of law did not unconstitutionally confer
adjudicative power on the state engineer." Acknowledging USF's
ability to seek leave of court to excuse its untimely objection, the court
concluded that until USF explored that remedy, HCIC was entitled to
the ten cfs water right reflected in the State Engineer's proposed
award.
Thus, because USF did not object to the proposed determination
within ninety days, the trial court lacked authority to hear an action
that could result in a judgment inconsistent with an uncontested
determination.
Therefore, the court held the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this claim and vacated the judgment.
Jessica L. Grether

Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125
(Utah 2003) (holding that Utah Water Conservancy Act did not create
standing for a water conservancy district to bring cause of action for
forfeiture; and party protesting a change application does not gain
standing, by virtue of the protest, to petition the court for a
declaration of forfeiture).
The Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints ("CPB") submitted a change application to
the State Engineer for certain water rights located in Washington
County, Utah. The Washington County Water Conservancy District
("Conservancy District") submitted a challenge to the change
application, asserting that CPB forfeited some of its water rights. The
State Engineer granted CPB's request, noting that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine whether CPB forfeited its water rights. The
Conservancy District then petitioned the Washington County District
Court challenging the State Engineer's determination of the change
application, and charged that CPB had forfeited the water rights at
issue. The trial court ruled that the Conservancy District lacked
standing to bring its cause of action and the Conservancy District
appealed directly to the Utah Supreme Court.
On appeal, the court considered three issues: (1) whether the
Utah Water Conservancy Act ("Act") granted standing to the
Conservancy District, (2) whether the Conservancy District's
participation in the change application proceedings gave standing to
challenge the state engineer's determination, and (3) whether the
Conservancy District qualified for standing under traditional standing
requirements.
First, in addressing standing under the Act, the court concluded
that the Act did not grant the Conservancy District standing. The
court reached this conclusion by noting that the Act contained broad
statements outlining the purposes of conservancy districts. Subsequent
to these broad statements were specific powers that the legislature
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delegated to conservancy districts. The court noted that none of the
delegated specific powers granted standing to challenge water rights or
to appeal the State Engineer's determinations with respect to change
applications. Finally, the court rejected the Conservancy District's
argument that members of a class protected by a statute have standing
to enforce the statute. The court reasoned that many statutes protect
large classes generally, but this fact did not grant standing to those
general members to press for enforcement of those statutes.
Next, the court addressed whether participation in the change
application proceedings gave the Conservancy District standing. Utah
law permits "interested" persons to file protests with the State
Engineer. It also permits persons who are "aggrieved" because of
actions taken by the State Engineer to obtain judicial review of those
actions. The Conservancy District argued that because it was an
"interested" person who was "aggrieved" by the State Engineer's
determination, it therefore obtained standing to challenge the State
Engineer's determination in court. The court concluded that not
every "interested" person is necessarily "aggrieved." The court held
that to be "aggrieved," a person must show a particularized injury.
Further, the court cautioned that if the court allowed every
"interested" person to become "aggrieved" whenever the State
Engineer ignores a protest, water rights that would not otherwise be
subject to challenge would be easier to contest.
Finally, as to traditional standing principles, the Conservancy
District argued that the trial court incorrectly applied the traditional
standing test. The trial court stated that a party seeking standing must
demonstrate that that they would suffer a distinct and palpable injury
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome. Here the trial court
required the Conservancy District to show a particularized harm, to
show some connection between the Conservancy District's use and
CPB's use. The court held this was not a new test as the Conservancy
District had argued, but the traditional test, and concluded that the
trial court did not incorrectly apply the traditional standing test. Next,
the court reviewed the Conservancy District's evidence that allegedly
supported a connection between CPB's use and the Conservancy
District's use. The relevant inquiry was whether CPB's underground
supply was part of the Ash Creek hydrological system. The court
concluded that the trial court had ample evidence to reach its
conclusion and therefore upheld the trial court's decision. According
to the court, three exceptions exist to the standing requirement: (1)
no one has a greater interest in the outcome, (2) the issues will not
ever be raised unless the plaintiff is granted standing to raise them,
and (3) the legal issues are sufficiently crystallized for immediate
judicial resolution. If none of the requirements apply, then a plaintiff
may qualify for standing if the issues are "so unique and of such great
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public
interest." The court concluded that none of the exceptions applied in
this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Robert E. Wells
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WASHINGTON
Kettle Range Conservation Group v. Washington Dep't of Natural
Res., No. 29077-4-, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 3053 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 2003) (holding that evidence of erroneous data and
calculations regarding road plans and sedimentation prescriptions
contained in a watershed analysis is insufficient for watershed analysis
approval for a logging operation and may cause more sediment to
reach watershed waterways than the amount allowable under the
Washington Forest Practices Act).
The Kettle Range Conservation Group and the Lands Council
(collectively, "Kettle Range") initiated a regulatory compliance action
before the Washington Forest Practices Appeals Board ("Board")
against Stinison Lumber Company ("Stimson"). Seeking summary
judgment, Kettle Range argued that the Washington Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR") acted contrary to the requirements of the
State Environmental Protection Act ("SEPA") when it issued a
modified determination of nonsignificance ("MDNS") to Stimson
based in part on a faulty watershed analysis. Kettle Range claimed that
the watershed analysis did not comply with Washington Forest
Practices Rules because it did not adequately address the adverse
environmental impacts of Stimson's proposed logging project.
Specifically, Kettle Range alleged that Stimson should not have
received forest practice permits, which allowed the company to harvest
timber in the watershed, because Stimson did not first submit a full
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") for the project. Kettle Range
argued for recission of Stimson's forest practice permits and moved for
an emergency stay, followed by a motion for a preliminary stay.
Stimson and the DNR moved for partial summary judgment,
asserting that the Stimson watershed analysis was sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Forest Practices Act. The Board granted
Stimson's and the DNR's motions for summary judgment, denied all
Kettle Range motions, and ruled for Stimson and the DNR on multiple
remaining issues.
Subsequently, Kettle Range sought judicial review under the
Washington State Administrative Procedure Act. The Superior Court
of Thurston County, Washington granted review and affirmed the
Board's decision in favor of the DNR and Stimson. Kettle Range then
appealed to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division Two. The
court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and held there was
"substantial evidence to support the Board's determination that the
DNR adequately considered Stimson's future forest practices."
However, the court agreed with Kettle Range that because parts of the
watershed analysis were "based on significant erroneous data and
calculations," the court could not conclude that the watershed analysis
would "cure adverse impacts of Stimson's proposal on the
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environment or comply with Forest Practice Rules."
On appeal, Kettle Range argued that the Board erroneously found
that it lacked authority to adjudicate a claim that the DNR acted
contrary to federal and state clean water legislation. However, the
court of appeals interpreted this argument as directly challenging the
water quality standards developed by the Forest Practices Board and
Ecology, and agreed that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim. Affirming the Board, the court of appeals explained that Kettle
Range failed to file a petition for declaratory judgment in the superior
court, as required to challenge administrate rules.
Next, Kettle Range argued that the Board erred in finding that the
DNR adequately evaluated the effects of Stimson's future forest
practices in issuing the MDNS. Specifically, Kettle Range claimed that
the DNR decision failed to address protection of the native grizzly bear
and its habitat and, therefore, the DNR should have required a
project-specific EIS. However, the court of appeals again disagreed,
finding that the DNR was entitled to rely on both an EIS previously
prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act and
a Conservation Agreement ("CA") entered into by Stimson. The court
held the EIS and CA appropriately addressed problematic issues as
required, including land specific plans to mitigate negative effects on
the grizzly bear, even if the logging activities in question were not part
of the particular logging project described in the prior EIS and CA.
Additionally, Kettle Range argued that the watershed analysis
completed by Stimson and approved by the DNR contained
inadequate and incorrect soil erosion prescriptions, contrary to
Washington law.
The DNR responded that the prescriptions
contained in the watershed analysis were an improvement over
previous methods, regardless of the practices proposed at the time.
The court of appeals, however, agreed with Kettle Range on this point
and held that though Stimson provided a higher level of
environmental protection than exercised in the past, the "legal
requirement that the prescriptions must meet minimum protective
standards" was not met. In support of this conclusion, the court of
appeals pointed to evidence that Stimson based soil erosion
prescriptions on omitted roads in the road plan and false sedimentdelivery-level calculations, which would likely cause unwarranted
damage to the watershed. Ironically, the court of appeals pointed out,
the purpose of the erosion prescriptions was to prevent such watershed
damage.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected Kettle Range's request for
attorney's fees because of its ruling that the DNR was "substantially
justified in approving the watershed analysis." The court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded to the DNR.
Furthermore, the court of appeals required Stimson to correct the
sedimentation calculations, watershed analysis prescriptions, and road
plan be corrected. After Stimson made the corrections, the court of
appeals ordered the DNR to determine if the revised watershed
analysis and road plan complied with the Washington Forest Practices
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Rules for watershed analysis approval.
Bnan M. Forbush
O'Hagan v. State, No. 28897-4-, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2928 (Wash.
Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2003) (holding (1) agency properly determined
property was wedand, (2) restrictions in conditional water permit were
valid, and (3) landowner failed to show that wetland restrictions
deprived property of all economic value).
Patrick O'Hagan sued the Washington State Department of
Ecology ("DOE"), challenging its decision to impose six conditions on
a permit the DOE issued to O'Hagan in accordance with section 401
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). O'Hagan sought to log and convert
three acres of his property, known as Bog 33, into a cranberry bog.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers classified Bog 33 as
forested wetland. Based on the wetland classification, section 401 of
the CWA required O'Hagan to obtain a permit prior to dredging or
filling his wetlands. The DOE granted O'Hagan a conditional permit,
imposing six conditions on the permit intended to mitigate wetland
loss. O'Hagan appealed all six conditions. The Superior Court of
Pacific County affirmed the DOE conditions, and O'Hagan appealed
the trial court's decision to the Washington Court of Appeals.
On appeal, O'Hagan challenged the DOE finding that Bog 33
constituted "wetlands," and further challenged the DOE's authority to
impose conditions on wetlands. O'Hagan argued that the Pollution
Control Hearings Board ("PCBH") finding that conversion of Bog 33
could adversely affect wildlife was arbitrary, and thus, the DOE had no
authority to impose conditions. Alternatively, O'Hagan argued the
DOE action constituted a regulatory taking without compensation, and
that the DOE waived the permitting requirement by failing to issue the
permit within one year of O'Hagan's application.
The court dismissed all of O'Hagan's claims. First, the court noted
that the Washington legislature authorized the DOE to take all
necessary action to comply with the CWA, and held the DOE's grant of
a conditional permit was not an abuse of agency authority. Second,
the court rejected O'Hagan's claim that the DOE action constituted a
taking. The court also held that a regulatory taking may occur where
the regulation does not support a legitimate state interest and denies
the property owner "all economically viable use of the property."
Applying this standard, the court held that O'Hagan's potential lost
profits from cranberry production did not constitute deprivation of all
economic uses of his land. The court then dismissed as moot
O'Hagan's claim that the PCHB's upholding of the DOE conditions
was arbitrary and capricious and violated O'Hagan's due process rights
because the permit and its conditions expired in 2000. Therefore,
because the court could provide no relief for O'Hagan's claims, the
court dismissed them as moot.
Holly Shook
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WYOMING
Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 77 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2003)
(holding that a permanent injunction barring a landowner from
interfering with irrigation company's easement did not violate
procedural and due process rights).
Lucerne Canal and Power Company ("Lucerne") filed suit against
landowner Thomas Wilson in 1988 to prevent Wilson from interfering
with Lucerne's water and irrigation easement. Lucerne claimed
Wilson had taken actions to prevent water from reaching Lucerne's
diversion structure, thereby negatively affecting its shareholders. The
District Court, Goshen County issued a consent decree and judgment
in 1990 ordering Wilson to not interfere with Lucerne's easements and
rights-of-way. Based on Wilson's serial non-compliance with the
consent decree, Lucerne obtained a temporary restraining order and a
subsequent permanent injunction in 2002 barring Wilson from
interfering with Lucerne's easement. Wilson appealed the issuance of
the permanent injunction to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. Finding
no fatal procedural defects in the trial court's ruling, the court
affirmed the trial court's order.
The court reviewed Wilson's appeal of the injunction for abuse of
discretion by the trial court. The court noted that the 2002 injunction
merely restated the holding of the 1990 consent decree. However,
Wilson claimed the issuance of a permanent injunction violated his
procedural and due process rights. The court, in its analysis of these
procedural claims stated that, "injunctive relief is appropriate to
prohibit the servient estate owner from interfering with the dominant
estate owner's use of his easement." Wilson's continued violations of
the consent decree exposed Lucerne's shareholders to irreparable
harm from water lost downstream. Therefore, the court declined to
apply procedural rules claimed by Wilson solely to avoid his violations
of the established water rights and easements previously resolved
under the principle of res judicata in the 1990 consent decree. The
court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its issuance of
the permanent injunction.
Chris Wittenbrink

CONFERENCE REPORTS
ARE STATES STILL IN CHARGE?
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES
22ND ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE
San Diego, California

February 19-20, 2004

DAY ONE
THURSDAY
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE EVOLUTION
OF STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONS IN
WESTERN WATER LAW.

Roderick E. Walston, Acting Solicitor of the United States
Department of the Interior, delivered the keynote address. Mr.
Walston brought with him a unique perspective through which he
provided an overview of this year's topic, as he has held a number of
prominent positions on both sides of the state-federal fence. Before
joining the Interior Department, Mr. Walston served as Deputy
Attorney General and later Chief Assistant Attorney General for the
State of California. While serving the State, Mr. Walston handled
many important natural resource and water law cases, including seven
cases in the United States Supreme Court. After leaving in 1999, he
served as General Counsel of the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California. In 2002, he was appointed Deputy Solicitor of
Interior.
Mr. Walston's address, entitled "Evolution of State-Federal
Relations in Western Water Law," provided a historic backdrop for the
conference.
Developing its theme from Justice Holmes' famous
statement, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience," the speech focused on how the history and national
experience of the United States shaped the nation's water laws. Not
limited to a strict history, the keynote address also set the stage for
upcoming speakers by illustrating the role our national history and
experience plays in current state-federal controversies, such as South
Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe and Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow v. Keyes, as well as in the recent state-federal partnership
regarding the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park federal
reserved water right.
In describing the history of the state-federal relationship, Mr.
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Walston defined three eras-those of unchallenged state primacy,
federal expansion and development, and of federal environmental
laws. During the era of unchallenged state primacy the federal land
policy was geared towards acquiring and disposing of natural
resources. In this era western territories and states abandoned the
common law riparian doctrine of the eastern states in favor of the
prior-appropriation doctrine. Further, under the federal land policy
of the time, water rights were severed from public lands, along with
federal control of the resource.
The second era, that of federal expansion, was marked by the
Reclamation Act, by federal land reservations, and by the reserved
rights doctrine. Increased federal activity raised questions over the
federal government's responsibility to comply with state law. Mr.
Walston discussed how the Supreme Court, through Californiav. United
States, United States v. New Mexico, and Congress, by way of the
McCarran Amendment, answered this question and defined the statefederal relationship. He then spoke over the current Black Canyon of
the Gunnison National Park reserved right agreement, where, in
exchange for a lesser federal reserved right, the State of Colorado has
agreed to assert a state instream flow right through the Park, and of his
belief that this agreement is consistent with New Mexico and the
McCarran Amendment.
He then described the current era of federal environmental laws
and the legal conflicts arising from the relationship between water
quantity and water quality. Mr. Walston discussed the then pending
Miccosukee Tribe case, and its implications for large federal water
projects. He also spoke of recent Supreme Court cases which suggest
two constitutional limits on federal environmental regulation: that
certain federal environmental regulations may exceed Congress's
commerce clause power, and such regulation can give rise to an
unconstitutional taking.
In conclusion, Mr. Walston stated his belief that our national goals
reflect the interest of our citizenry. With regards to western water law,
he described the federal-state relationship as a unique system
developed from a unique experience. As illustrated in the Black
Canyon of the Gunnison settlement, it is a system that leaves room to
accommodate federal, state, and local interests.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONARE FEDERAL AGENCIES INTRUDING
OR FILLING THE VOID?

Dr. Robert Lohn, Regional Administrator for the Northwest
Region of the National Marine Fisheries Service in Seattle Washington
gave this presentation. Dr. Lohn argued that Federal Agencies help
states rebalance water rights and water uses. He also argued that the
way that various parties to a water dispute approach a problem
determines the effectiveness of the solution.
Dr. Lohn argued that the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
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provides stimulus for settling water disputes because its application
forces the government to apply water to inequitable and unfair uses.
By taking away water from irrigation districts to ensure the survival of a
species, the government can cause farms to lose their loans, decrease
land values, and allow third parties to intervene in local affairs. On the
other hand, when localities act to control water use by creating plans,
they can avoid government application of the ESA and intervention by
third parties.
Dr. Lohn believes that the best solution for water disputes is
subbasin and watershed planning. This sort of planning identifies the
biological requirements of the watershed or sub basin, and develops
methods of limiting use and balancing interests that are locally
acceptable.
Finally, Dr. Lohn argued that the way parties approach water
problems determines the success of solutions they reach. When the
Federal Government takes aggressive, litigation oriented approaches, it
This approach destroys the
meets with resistance from locals.
possibility for cooperative solutions. In other cases, where groups
undertake collaborative efforts from the start they made cooperative
solutions possible.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONSTATE ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION CONTRACTS FOR
IRRIGATION: HASTA LA VISTA, BABY!
RIo GRANDE SILVERY MINNOW V. KEYS
Many claim the Tenth Circuit's January 2004 Rio Grande Silvery
The
Minnow v. Keys decision left more confusion than clarity.
interplay between conflicting areas of environmental and water law
gives rise to the confusion. The legal confrontation among the state
administration of water rights, federal reclamation contracts, and
environmental regulations marks one of many ways water law
continues to morph; it also produced one of the most spirited
discussions of the 2004 Water Law Conference.
The crowd erupted in laughter as John Stomp, the Water
Resources Manager for the Public Works Department of Albuquerque,
New Mexico began his speech: "We support the Silvery Minnow, we
As might be
just don't support the minnow taking our water."
expected, the conflict between protecting species and providing water
Albuquerque is confronting the same
permeated his discussion.
resource problems most large western cities now face: increased
demand from booming populations, drought, and environmental
protection make the management of water increasingly more difficult.
Albuquerque has responded with a heavy focus on conservation. Since
1995, the city has reduced its use by 28%.
Heavy groundwater
Nonetheless, problems still abound.
depletions have caused land subsidence; further subsidence is
expected. In-stream flows necessary to protect the Silvery Minnow
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have also reduced available supply. In response, Albuquerque has had
to adapt and adapt quickly. Through a captive breeding program,
habitat projects, collaborative programs, and the removal of non-native
species, the city has been able to address the Silvery Minnow issue
while still providing for its residents. No doubt, the challenges will
continue to morph, but Albuquerque's experience will pave the way
for many other western cities confronting the interplay among state
administration, federal reclamation contracts, and environmental
regulations.
Laird Lucas, Executive Director for Advocates of the West, a nonprofit environmental organization based in Boise, Idaho responded
with the most theatrical presentation of the conference. Rather than
stand behind the podium, he walked among the participants freely
challenging both the Bureau of Reclamation and the City of
Albuquerque whom he stated are merely presiding over the extinction
of the Silvery Minnow. Nonetheless, he offered praise for New
Mexico's Governor and master-negotiator Bill Richardson, who
spearheaded negotiations among the major users in the Middle Rio
Grande basin in late 2003. He was also quick to point out that federal
agencies declined to participate in the discussions. Both actions
prompted his call for the future: (1) federal government involvement
in the settlement discussions; (2) increased efficiency in agricultural
irrigation; (3) programs to provide incentives for farmers to conserve
or market water; (4) habitat restoration; and (5) storage and release of
water to ensure flows necessary for habitat protection. In essence, the
complications the City of Albuquerque faces can only be met with
multiple solutions, perhaps as complex as the problem.
Jennifer Gimbel concluded for the Bureau of Reclamation, taking
the place of Bureau of Reclamation Commissioner John Keys who was
unable to attend the conference.
Ms. Gimbel also focused her
discussion on the difficulties managing and supplying water amidst
drought and intense litigation. She pointed out that the Rio Grande
Compact intensifies the difficulties; the compact provides little
discretion for the reallocation of water for endangered species
purposes. Further, even if sufficient quantities are available to protect
species, the quality and temperature of water delivered may not be
adequate for protection.
As with the prior speakers, despite their different points of view,
the session offered one clear point. The difficulty of managing water
resources in the West is increasing at a furious pace. Whether
attempting to provide water sources, protect endangered species, or
negotiate the conflict between the two, the experiences of those
working through the issues related to the management of the Rio
Grande are a harbinger.
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BREAK OuT SESSIONNEW RULES TO AN OLD GAME:
CHALLENGES AND CHANGES IN
ADMINISTRATION ON

BIG RIVER SYSTEMS

In this session, the panelists compared the management of the
Missouri and Colorado Rivers and focused on the successes in
managing the Colorado River to analyze the shortcomings of the
Missouri's management. Janice Schneider offered six examples of why
the Missouri River is "broken":
(1) There is a major rift between upper and lower basin interests;
(2) Unaddressed environmental issues are beginning to drive
system-wide operational decisions;
(3) Tribal issues have not been framed, much less addressed
(4) No effective "law of the river"-changing needs/interests of
states, tribes and feds are difficult to accommodate
(5) Big time disputes in the "federal family" (between the Army
Corps of Engineers and the US Fish & Wildlife Service)
(6) Every year is an adventure; political power plays are routine;
stakeholder-based decision-making is a distant dream.
In each of these areas, Ms. Schneider contrasted the Colorado and
Missouri Rivers to highlight the need for a "Law of the River" for the
Missouri. She emphasized the need for more unified management
because the Army Corps of Engineers, operating under a stale Master
Manual, remains the "king of the river," but remains in conflict both
with states on the river and the US Fish & Wildlife Service. In contrast,
she pointed out, there is a level of collaboration in the management of
the Colorado that exists between the states and the federal
government that is totally absent from the Missouri, a collaboration
that won't exist without a major overhaul.
David Cookson, who works for the Nebraska Office of the Attorney
General, continued with specific examples of the problems faced on
the Missouri. To provide one example of the conflict surrounding the
management of the Missouri, he focused on issues related to
protecting endangered species like the pallid sturgeon, piping plover,
and least tern through modification of flow rates. Mimicing the
When, for
natural hydrograph has proved incredibly difficult.
example, the Corps of Engineers developed a Biological Assessment
that included flow changes, the state of Missouri was outraged with the
proposed solution. In response, the Corps developed a mechanism for
protecting species without flow modification, a mechanism that that

1. David J. Hayes & Janice M. Schneider, Latham & Watkins, Big River Systems:
Challenges and Changes at 6-7 (2003) (on file with the University of Denver Water
Law Review).
2. Id.atl4.
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the upstream states found unsatisfactory. In attempting to meet each
state's needs and protect the species, any management plan also has to
ensure protection of water quality and prevent temperature spikes.
Again, as Ms. Schneider pointed out, the complications of managing
the Missouri are multiple; collaboration is the key to their resolution.
Mike Pearce, who works for Fennemore Craig in Phoenix, Arizona,
finished the panel discussion providing an overview of the
management of the Colorado River. He focused his discussion on
Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton's recent efforts to enforce
compact requirements.
BREAK OUT SESSIONONCE QUANTIFIED, WHO ADMINISTERS

WATER RIGHTS ON NATIVE AMERICAN
RESERVATIONS AND PUEBLOS?

The first speaker was Harry "Skip" Johnsen, an attorney whose
practice focuses on federal Indian law. He has represented the
Colville Confederated Tribes and currently represents the Lummi
Nation as a partner at Raas, Johnsen & Steun, P.S. of Bellingham,
Washington.
In Mr. Johnsen's opinion, the answer to the
administration question depends upon the source of those rights. He
began by noting that absent congressional intent to the contrary, state
law generally does not apply to tribes, tribal members, and property
located within the boundaries of Indian reservations. However, the
administration question becomes difficult when it concerns nonIndian water rights within reservation boundaries. Mr. Johnsen
discussed the impact of three major federal statutes-the Allotment
Act, Public Law No. 280, and the McCarran Amendment-have on
administration of these non-Indian rights. According to Mr. Johnsen,
these statutes neither changed jurisdiction over allotted lands, nor did
they indicate that administration of allotted lands would be transferred
to the states, and thus do not support state administration of federally
derived rights. Mr. Johnsen suggested that although states may not
administer tribal rights on reservations, they may or may not
administer non-Indian rights within reservations. The appropriate
entity for administering these rights should be determined by
examining the tribal ability to administer rights on the reservation (for
instance, whether a tribe has enacted a comprehensive system of water
management), the degree of impact non-tribal administration would
have on tribal rights, and on the degree of off-reservation impact
associated with those rights.
The next panelist, Paul G. Taggert of King & Taggert, Ltd., Carson
City, Nevada; provided the state perspective. Prior to entering private
practice, Mr. Taggert was a District Attorney for the State of Nevada.
In Mr. Taggert's view, the administration question should be
considered in light of Congress's express preference, by way of the
McCarran Amendment, that the United States participate in state
court proceedings regarding the administration of state-decreed water
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rights. Mr. Taggert's presentation focused on his participation in a
recent Ninth Circuit case, State Engineer v. South Fork Band of the TeMoak Tribe. This case arose over a conflict between the State of Nevada
and the Tribe over which entity had authority to administer triballyheld, state-decreed water rights on the Te-Moak reservation. The
Ninth Circuit held that the state court that decreed the Tribe's water
rights had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings related to the
administration of those rights and that the McCarran Amendment
applies retroactively to water rights decreed before its enactment. Mr.
Taggert stressed the importance of the Ninth Circuit's McCarran
Amendment holding. Without a waiver of the United States and
Tribe's sovereign immunity, the state court's exclusive jurisdiction over
the decree would mean little. Mr Taggert spoke of legislative history
behind the McCarran Amendment and Senator Pat McCarran's prior
experience as a Nevada state judge, which included reviewing the
propriety of the decree at issue in the Te-Moak case. According to Mr.
Taggert, Senator McCarran's legislation was designed to address
precisely the type of state/federal conflict over water rights
administration that arose in the Te-Moak case. As on the Te-Moak
Reservation, where the federal government purchases state-decreed
water rights for a federal purpose, the United States and those
claiming rights through it are bound by, and must submit to state
administration of, that decree.
The last speaker, Pamela Williams, Director of the Secretary of the
Interior's Indian Water Rights Office, discussed the federal
government's policy of negotiating, rather than litigating, Indian water
rights claims. Ms. Williams described four generalized categories of
settlement approaches taken by the United States and Tribes that
address administration of tribal rights: (1) the minimalist approach,
which puts off administration issues until another day; (2) the multiprong approach employed in Arizona, which may address marketing
of settlement water or rely upon federal reclamation law or contracts
as a gap fillers; (3) the compact commission approach in Montana,
which often expressly address administration issues; and (4) the
unique approach of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, where
all rights on the reservation, including non-Indian rights, are
administered by the Tribe. Ms. Williams emphasized that these
categories are not strictly defined; every Indian water rights settlement
is a unique response to local conditions, the needs of the Tribe, and
the needs of neighboring water users. In her experience, the issue of
administration does not present much of a problem when negotiating
settlements. Moreover, the negotiated approach has proved quite
successful in reducing administration conflicts.
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BREAK OUT SESSIONWATER, WATER EVERYWHERE,
BUT NOT A DROP TO DRINK:
CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING

NON-TRADITIONAL SUPPLIES

Population increases and global warming both are having
tremendous impacts upon water use and supplies. As a result, multiple
non-traditional methods of supplying water have developed-many in
California because its water supply is neither consistent nor sufficient
to meet the needs of its huge population. These non-traditional
methods include desalination, groundwater storage, reclaimed water,
and decentralized wastewater management.
Peter M. MacLaggan, Vice President of Poseidon Resources
Corporation, began the presentation with a discussion about his
company's proposal to build a desalination plant at the Encina Power
Plant in Carlsbad that would supply 50 million gallons of drinking
water per day. He highlighted many of the positive attributes of
desalination plants: (1) less dependence upon imported water
supplies; (2) less dependence upon the vagaries of precipitation; (3)
improved quality; and (4) fewer environmental impacts than other
methods of supply.
Paul N. Singarella, an attorney with Latham & Watkins in Costa
Mesa, CA, continued the session with a discussion about two ways of
increasing supplies: groundwater storage and the reclamation and
reuse of wastewater. Groundwater storage allows the state to protect
against unpredictable climate and supply changes. Reclamation and
reuse of wastewater remains a new area of water development. It has
been difficult to create markets for reclaimed water and as a result, it
will be one method of supplying water that will continue to be
pursued, especially in times of severe drought.
Finally, George Tchobanoglous, a professor in the Department of
Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of California,
Davis, concluded with a discussion of the reuse of treated wastewater
from decentralized systems. Rather then reclaiming water on a
regional level, decentralized wastewater management involves
individual homes, clusters of homes, and isolated communities. Once
this water is reclaimed, it is typically reused for agriculture and
landscape irrigation, although many other uses will surely develop in
the future, especially as treatment methods continue to develop.
BREAK OUT SESSIONENVIRONMENTAL WATER SETTLEMENTS:
CAN WE MAKE A DEAL?

Peter W. Sly, an attorney from Brooklin, Maine, chaired this panel
comprised of: Alf W. Brandt, the Assistant Regional Solicitor for the
United States Department of Interior in Sacramento, California, J.
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Michael Harty, the Director of West Coast Programs, CDR, Davis,
California, Richard Roos-Collins a Senior Attorney with the National
Heritage Institute, California Hydropower Reform Coalition, Berkley,
California, and Jeanne S. Whiteing an Attorney with Whiteing &
Smith, Boulder, Colorado.
Alf Brandt argued that parties should consider whether they want
the Federal Government involved in water settlement negotiations
because with federal participation come several limitations. These
limitations include: possible lack of authority for the negotiating party;
the Anti-Deficiency Act; existing legal obligations like the Endangered
Species Act; deference to states; and navigational servitude which gives
the Federal Government power over navigation and interstate
commerce. While Federal and State cooperation may be essential to
solving problems in basins, the two sides often refuse to work together
until a crisis occurs. Mr. Brandt argued that effective solutions require
anticipation of problems, and building constructive relationships using
techniques like mediation.
Jeanne Whiting argued that the states are not in charge of water
rights on Indian Reservations because Indian reserved rights are
distinct from other forms of water rights. Indian Tribes have made
better progress in reaching water settlements with state governments
than they have reaching settlements with the federal government.
Federal policy has also encouraged tribes to try to settle water disputes.
In these settlements the Federal Government has emphasized avoiding
liability, and avoiding mention of the Federal Government's trust
obligations. Tribes are required to waive water rights claims against
the federal government.
Richard Roos-Collins discussed settlement as a part of the FERC
licensing process. He argued that FERC prefers to issue licenses based
on the settlement process. This process requires the two parties to
negotiate the terms of the agreement, which in turn provides the basis
of the Federal license. The agency has a right to re-open the
settlement.
Typically these settlements include management
provisions to deal with disputes.
Michael Harty argued that in water disputes, the legal framework
may not directly cause conflict, but that legal solutions did not really
resolve the individual problems at the root of water disputes. Mr.
Harty argued that the positions of parties to a water dispute generally
have values imbedded within them, and these values contribute to
conflict. Collaboration seeks to satisfy all parties to the best degree
possible. These solutions focus on interests of the parties rather than
power or rights. As a result, collaborative problem solving offers the
possibility of solving for the individual human problems that the legal
framework cannot address.

Issue 2

CONFERENCE REPORT

DAY TWO
FRIDAY
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONETHICS ROUNDTABLE: ETHICALLY REPRESENTING
YOUR CLIENT IN CONCURRENT LITIGATION
AND SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONOVERVIEW OF GLOBAL WATER
SUPPLY AND DEMAND

After an ethics roundtable focusing on the complexities involved
with representing a client in both litigation and settlement
negotiations in the same matter, Kenneth J. Warren, of Schorr and
Solis-Cohen LLP, introduced Marcia Macomber, Director of Program
Development, Universities Partnership for Transboundary Waters,
Oregon State University, Dept. of Geosciences, in Corvallis, Oregon.
Ms. Macomber discussed past and potential international conflict over
water resources.
To highlight the potential for conflict, Ms. Macomber pointed to
the 263 international water basins-basins that occupy two or more
countries-throughout the world. As an example, the Danube crosses
17 countries. Ms. Macomber reviewed the initial findings of a study
using technology to determine the potential for international conflict
over water resources. Included in the study were databases containing
reported water-related conflicts and water treaties. These findings
suggest that conflict occurs much less frequently than cooperation,
and where conflict does occur, it is typically mild; violent conflict is
rare.
Those parameters thought to suggest a high likelihood of conflict
turned out to be false. For instance, cooperation was typically greatest
among countries in arid regions. Factors that did indicate a higher
likelihood of conflict included sudden physical change, uncoordinated
development, and general animosity unrelated to water. As a result of
the study, Oregon State founded the Universities Partnership for
Transboundary Waters to encourage participation and organization in
developing a common framework to address potential conflict and
help avoid it in the future.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATIONHOT TOPICS FOR THE WATER PRACTITIONER:
DEALING WITH FEDERAL STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS ON
STATE WATER RIGHTS

This panel was moderated by Kevin M. O'Brien of Downey Brand
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LLP, Sacramento California.
The panelists included Michelle
Diffenderfer of Lewis, Longman & Walker, P.A., West Palm Beach,
Florida, James M. Speer Jr. an Attorney from El Paso, Texas, and
Michael Van Zandt of McQuaid, Bedford & Van Zandt LLP, San
Francisco, California.
Michelle Diffenderfer discussed the South Florida Water Management
District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians case. This case addressed whether
pollutants within water that is a part of an interbasin transfer added to
water in another basin can constitute an "addition" under the Clean
Water Act. The Water District argued that addition meant discharge,
meaning that a pollution transfer would not constitute an addition
under the act, only pollutants added by the transfer station itself. The
Solicitor argued that the transfer constitutes an "addition" if the
station increases the pollutants in the water. This case has the
possibility to dramatically effect many water districts and interbasin
transfers, and cause many lawsuits. A decision by the Supreme Court is
expected soon.
James M. Speer was replaced, and his replacement discussed El
Paso v. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1. In this case El Paso
is attempting to avoid paying for water by claiming a municipal statute
provides El Paso with a share of water from the Rio Grande. New
Mexico claimed that Federal law applied. Mr. Speer's replacement
argued that in this dispute between Texas and New Mexico, a Federal
role was essential because state law alone could not resolve the issues
involved, and because the Federal role protected the environment and
helped facilitate peace between the various users.
Michael Van Zandt argued that conflicts over water existed
throughout the West primarily because of the history of Federal
expansion and development. Van Zandt discussed the history of the
Federal role in the West, and how early statutes including the Taylor
Grazing Act and Bureau of Reclamation contracts provided users with
rights to use water.
These prior rights conflicted with the
environmental regulations passed by Congress in the 1970s and 1980s.
Arguably, newer federal laws like the Endangered Species Act that
interfere with vested rights affect a taking. To this point, lawsuits
challenging agency authority to interfere with vested rights have not
succeeded. There are a multitude of questions to be answered by
future litigation including the scope of the property right, what rights
must be compensated under the Fifth Amendment, whether this is a
physical or regulatory taking, and whether it is temporary or
permanent.
Plenary Session PresentationWorking Together: Examples of Cooperation
between State and Federal Agencies
The session opened with comments by moderator Elizabeth A.
Rieke of the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Ms. Rieke spoke of
her experience working on the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, the
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intricate, collaborative federal-state program that manages California's
San Francisco Bay and Sacremento-SanJoaquin Delta. She stressed
that gaining the local (and influential) business community's support
for the program was critical to its success.
The first two panelists, David Nawi and Stephen P. Saxton, both
private attorneys from Sacremento, California, discussed their
experiences with CALFED. Mr. Nawi provided a broad overview of the
CALFED project and the legal hurdles that obstructed its
implementation. He spoke of the over twenty state and federal
agencies with conflicting jurisdiction, the two massive water supply
projects (one state and one federal) with separate users and policies,
the differing state and federal regulatory structures, the fact that no
structure for state-federal cooperation existed, and he spoke of the
environmental groups and the Endangered Species Act deadline
which forced the state and the federal governments to the bargaining
table. Mr. Saxon's presentation focused on the difficulties associated
He also attributed the
with obtaining funding for CALFED.
Endangered Species Act with creating the impetus to get the state, the
federal government, and other stakeholders to negotiate a program to
address degradation of the Bay-Delta. According to Mr. Saxon,
another key to implementing CALFED was the leadership provided by
high-level, policy-making officials within the state and federal
government which created the necessary bridge between the state and
federal participants and shepherded the collaborative process.
Next, Charles B. Rich of the United States Department of the
Interior Solicitor's Office outlined a recent example of state-federal
cooperation in Colorado-the settlement over the federal reserved
right for the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park. Mr. Rich
described how in its initial application the federal government sought
a base flow through the park, as well as shoulder flows that would
encompass the natural hydrograph of the Gunnison River. However,
this initial strategy of asserting a large right presented real litigation
risks, given the federal government's past poor success rate in
obtaining large reserved rights in the state, and because it would
conflict with the operation of the Bureau of Reclamation's Aspinall
Unit, just upstream of the park. He then summarized the current
agreement whereby the federal government will only seek a base-flow
through the park, and the state would seek shoulder flows under a
state instream flow right. Although currently stalled pending a court
challenge by environmental groups, Mr. Rich heralded the settlement
as a triumph of federalism, in which a state has taken a role in
protecting a natural treasure within its boundaries.
The session, and the conference, concluded with a presentation by
Charles A. DeMonaco. Mr. DeMonaco has represented a number of
local, state and federal agencies over his career, and currently
represents the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, as
well as officials of the United States Department of Jusitice. His
presentation concerned his experiences with litigation over the Exxon
Mr.
Valdez oil spill and the restoration of Florida's Everglades.
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DeMonaco provided a broad overview of his role in, and the
importance of state-federal cooperation in, the negotiations that led to
a settlement over the Exxon Valdez spill. He then discussed the
Everglades, similarly stressing the need for state-federal cooperation,
and in addressing a question raised by the CALFED speakers, opined
that the "one voice" speaking for the federal government should be
the Justice Department. Mr. DeMonaco also devoted much of his time
to showing slides of the Everglades and its rich ecology. In so doing,
he illustrated that something else has a stake in the federal-state
relationship, and not only water users, bureaucrats, and attorneys
benefit when states and the federal government collaborate in finding
solutions to water quantity and water quality problems.

